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Part I 
Concepts, History, Policy

Introduction
Nils Muižnieks
Most researchers and policy-makers focus on Russians when discussing 
the integration of Latvian society. The size of the Russian minority in Latvia 
and its presumed potential for causing mischief have contributed to this narrow 
focus, which has been reinforced by the attention of the Russian Federation 
and various European and international organizations to the status of Russians 
or “Russian-speakers” (those with Russian as a native language). This book 
examines the position of Russians and other minorities and their relations with 
Latvians, but also attempts to measure the integration of Latvian society as a 
whole. As will be argued below, integration implicates not just minorities, im-
migrants and refugees, but the majority population as well. 
The slightly presumptuous subtitle of this volume – An Audit – was in-
spired by an earlier effort by colleagues to measure the quality of democracy in 
Latvia.1 The term “audit” suggests a rigorous, systematic evaluation based on 
accepted standards. The reader will have to determine the extent to which the 
authors of this volume have fulfilled this promise. According to the Compact 
Oxford English dictionary, the traditional meaning of an audit is “an official 
inspection of an organization’s accounts.”2 Usually, if an organization’s ac-
counts, procedures or processes are found wanting, the auditor provides rec-
ommendations on how to improve performance. While the “auditors” in this 
volume occasionally enter the realm of the prescriptive, they generally let the 
analysis speak for itself. 
This reluctance to offer a host of policy recommendations derives from a 
number of considerations. To propose such recommendations, one must make 
a number of assumptions: that policy-makers want effective policy, that there 
is a consensus as to what constitutes effective policy, that policy-makers are 
willing and able to change policy if it is found in some way wanting, and that 
there are resources available for implementing policy. All of these assump-
tions are problematic in contemporary Latvia. As will be suggested below in 
the chapter by Juris Rozenvalds, Latvia’s political elite has been very divided 
 1 Juris Rozenvalds, ed. (2005), How Democratic Is Latvia: An Audit of Democracy. Riga: 
University of Latvia Press. 
 2 See http://www.askoxford.com/concise_oed/audit?view=uk.
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regarding integration policy, which has resulted in a lukewarm commitment (at 
best) to implementing even those policy documents that have been adopted. 
Since a number of key pieces of legislation affecting integration (e.g., the Law 
on Citizenship, the State Language Law) were adopted or last amended under 
severe international pressure, the political elite has proven very reluctant to 
revisit these laws, even when there was a compelling reason for amending 
them to reflect new circumstances. While government resources for promoting 
integration have never been plentiful, in the context of a severe economic crisis 
after 2008, social integration has fallen near the bottom of the government’s 
list of funding priorities and will probably remain there for some time. Despite 
the absence of an attentive target audience among policy-makers, the authors 
of the chapters covering integration in various life realms (Part II) do point to 
the most urgent tasks that need to be addressed. 
A strictly policy-oriented approach would also miss much, as the level of 
integration in a society is undoubtedly affected by a whole range of factors 
besides government integration policy. Clearly, the inherited experience of 
inter-ethnic relations shapes current social processes, as does the economic and 
political situation in general. The analysis below captures only incompletely 
the impact of the current economic crisis on social integration, as the situation 
at the time of writing (February 2010) was still very dynamic and some of the 
available data predate the onset of the crisis in late 2008 or capture only its 
initial effects. Social integration is also affected by the international situation – 
this was clearly evident immediately after Latvia’s accession to the European 
Union, when naturalization rates briefly jumped and many of Latvia’s inhabit-
ants (Latvians and minorities alike) took advantage of their right to free move-
ment within the European Union and migrated, mostly to Ireland and Great 
Britain. The quality of social integration is also affected by the ups and downs 
of Latvia’s relations with Russia - the “kin-state” of Latvia’s largest minority.3 
Integration policy, which has been contradictory and inconsistent, has been 
but one, and not always the most important, factor in shaping the integration 
of Latvian society.
There have been a number of previous efforts to develop integration indica-
tors and to measure integration in Latvia. From 2002 through 2004, first, the 
Social Integration Department of the Ministry of Justice, then the secretariat 
of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Affairs (hereafter, 
simply “integration secretariat”) organized a series of inconclusive inter-
ministerial discussions with the aim of developing progress indicators for the 
National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia. From 2003 to 
2005, the integration secretariat compiled a sizeable data base of integration 
projects, an effort that was subsequently abandoned. During its existence from 
 3 See Nils Muižnieks, ed. (2006), Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International 
Dimensions. Riga: University of Latvia Press. 
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2002 to the end of 2008, the integration secretariat commissioned a number of 
sociological surveys and other studies on various aspects of integration.4 In ad-
dition, the Society Integration Foundation has funded a number of studies deal-
ing with various aspects of integration or the situation of specific minorities.5 
International non-governmental organizations and foreign research institutes 
have also conducted a number of useful studies.6 This volume builds on many 
of these previous efforts, but tries to go further. 
Previous efforts were often plagued by a host of problems. Most of the 
aforementioned efforts were either surveys focusing on attitudes or thematic 
studies with a focus on one aspect of integration or one minority. No official 
consensus was ever reached on indicators, so those who commissioned research 
or carried it out proceeded using various methodologies and approaches. The 
involvement of stakeholders in society and ministries other than that directly 
responsible for integration was patchy. It should also be noted that the major 
funders of the research (the integration secretariat and the Society Integration 
Foundation) had a certain vested interest in the results. Many of the studies 
also ignored the academic and policy-oriented work on measuring integration 
conducted elsewhere. 
 4 For commissioned studies on the media, see Sergejs Kruks and Ilze Šulmane (2002), 
Pilsoniskās sabiedrības attīstība un sabiedrības integrācija. Riga: Komunikācijas studiju 
nodaļa; Ilze Šulmane and Sergejs Kruks (2006), Neiecietības izpausmes un iecietības 
veicināšana Latvijā. Riga: ĪUMSILS. On minorities, see Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte (2004), 
Latvijas mazākumtautību sabiedrisko organizāciju dibināšanas mērķi. Riga: RSU; LU FSI 
and ĪUMSILS (2007), Mazākumtautības Latvijā. Vēsture un tagadne. Riga: LU FSI; Nils 
Muižnieks, red. (2007), Nacionālo minoritāšu konvencija – diskriminācijas novēršana un 
identitātes saglabāšana Latvijā. Riga: LU SPPI. On the role of local governments, see 
Baltijas Sociālo zinātņu institūts (2004), Pašvaldību loma sabiedrības integrācijas procesā. 
Riga: BSZI. On civic values at school, see Rīgas Stradiņa universitāte, Pilsoniskās vērtības 
latviešu un mazākumtautību izglītības programmās: salīdzinājums. Riga: RSU. For the most 
recent commissioned surveys, see, e.g., SKDS (2006), Sabiedrības integrācijas aktuālākie 
aspekti. Riga: SKDS (2007), Sabiedrības integrācijas aktuālākie aspekti. Riga; SIA „AC 
Konsultācijas” (2008), Kvantitatīvs un kvalitatīvs pētījums par sabiedrības integrācijas un 
pilsonības aktuālajiem aspektiem. On opposition to integration, see Latvijas Universitātes 
Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, ĪUMSILS (2007), Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: 
cēloņi un sekas. Riga: LU FSI and ĪUMSILS. 
 5 See Latvian Centre for Human Rights and Ethnic Studies (2003), The Situation of Roma 
in Latvia. Riga: LCHRES; Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2006), Integration practice 
and perspectives. Riga: BISS; Baltijas sociālo zinātņu institūts (2008), Mēs. Svētki. Valsts. 
Valsts svētku svinēšanas socioloģiska izpēte. Riga: BSZI. 
 6 See, e.g., the New Baltic Barometer Surveys, available online at www.balticvoices.org; 
Open Society Institute EU Accession Monitoring Program (2002), Monitoring the EU 
Accession Process: Minority Protection, Vol. 1, An Assessment of Selected Policies in 
Candidate States. Budapest: OSI/EU Accession Monitoring Program; and the various 
seminar reports and studies on Latvia and the other Baltic states available on the web site 
of the European Centre for Minority Issues in Flensburg, Germany, at www.ecmi.de. 
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The effort to measure democracy mentioned above had the luxury of using 
a ready-made methodology that had already been used elsewhere. The authors 
of this volume were not so fortunate, as European countries feature a wide 
range of approaches to integration, none of which can be transferred wholesale 
to the Latvian context. Most often, discussions about integration elsewhere in 
the European Union are about immigrants or refugees, called “third country 
nationals” in EU parlance.7 Particularly in many of the new EU member states, 
integration policy and discourse have focused not on new arrivals, but on the 
indigenous Roma population.8 Latvia does have a small population of recent 
immigrants whose integration needs should be addressed.9 Moreover, Latvia 
also has a Roma community numbering between 8,000 and 15,000 persons 
whose situation prompted the Latvian authorities to adopt a Roma integration 
programme. However, as subsequent chapters demonstrate, Latvia’s societal 
divisions have more to do with other cleavages based on ethnicity and language, 
with the prime divide being between ethnic Latvians and Russian-speakers, 
most of whom were either born in Latvia or have lived here for many years. 
The initial task of the authors was to come to grips with what we were 
seeking to measure. As noted in the chapter by Juris Rozenvalds, the official 
Latvian definition of integration is unsatisfactory for a number of reasons, 
which prompted the research team to search elsewhere for a more nuanced un-
derstanding of social integration that would be firmly based in social science. 
Thus, the chapter by Nils Muižnieks below seeks to provide a brief intellectual 
history of the concept of social integration, examining usages over time in the 
academic and international policy communities and identifying points of con-
sensus. The understanding of social integration resulting from this exercise, in 
turn, informed the effort to develop a framework for measuring integration in 
line with best European practices. 
This volume represents the outcome of a three-year project generously 
funded by the Open Society Institute’s Think Tank Fund with co-funding from 
the University of Latvia. At the outset of the project, the project team (Nils 
Muižnieks, Juris Rozenvalds, Ilona Kunda) conducted an inventory of existing 
integration research in Latvia, including sociological research, localized stud-
ies, analyses of the inter-section of gender and ethnicity, discourse analyses on 
 7 See the relevant section of the European Commission’s web site on immigrant integration at 
http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/immigration/integration/fsj_immigration_integration_
en.htm.
 8 See, e.g., OSI EU Accession Monitoring Program (2002), Monitoring the EU Accession 
Process: Minority Protection Vol. I, An Assessment of Selected Policies in Candidate 
States. Budapest: OSI EU Accession Monitoring Program. 
 9 See, e.g., Centre for Public Policy Providus (2008), Learning to Welcome: The Integration 
of Immigrants in Latvia and Poland. Riga: Providus; and Advanced Social and Political 
Research Institute (2009), Immigrant Integration in Latvia. Working Paper No. 1, Riga: 
ASPRI, available at http://www.szf.lu.lv/files/petnieciba/publikacijas/working_paper/
immig%20integ%20final%20draft.pdf
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topics related to social integration, and more. Many of the chapters below draw 
on this rich store of data and analysis. Subsequently, the project team organ-
ized a series of seminars, conferences and consultations to discuss the emerg-
ing research framework with other researchers, outside stakeholders (NGOs, 
minority groups, gender equality experts, etc.), and the ever dwindling number 
of civil servants responsible for integration policy. Finally, draft chapters were 
presented at an international conference on 16-17 November 2009 organized 
by the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute and the Public Policy 
Centre Providus in Riga, Latvia, entitled “Inclusion Unaffordable: the Uncertain 
Fate of Integration and Anti-Discrimination Policies in Central and Eastern 
Europe.” 
Before developing concrete indicators, the project team commissioned focus 
group research to identify perceived barriers to integration. Then the project 
team developed a set of draft indicators based on the results of the focus group 
study, our identified points of consensus on the social science understanding of 
integration, and liberal borrowing from other Europe-wide efforts to measure 
social cohesion in diverse societies and benchmark integration policies.10 
To set the context of the current situation, the chapter by Juris Rozenvalds 
traces the historical legacy of the Soviet and early post-independence years 
for integration policy, outlining the “everyday habits of mind” acquired by 
policy-makers and the public at large that continue to impinge on the integra-
tion process and integration policy. Rozenvalds also examines the political 
compromises and disagreements leading up to the adoption of an integration 
policy framework and the various institutional mechanisms set up to implement 
this policy. Next, Ilona Kunda takes on the ambitious task of evaluating the 
policy impact of the Society Integration Foundation – the best-funded, longest-
lasting institution charged with implementing integration policy by supporting 
“bottom-up projects”.
Subsequent chapters investigate integration in various realms of life. Ilze 
Brands Kehris examines political and civic integration, focusing on citizenship 
issues, participation and representation. Mihails Hazans provides an in-depth 
analysis of integration in and through the labour market, focusing on language 
and ethnicity. Feliciana Rajevska analyses integration and social policy, fo-
cusing on housing, health care and the prison system. Brigita Zepa focuses on 
integration in the education system, stressing not only ethnic, linguistic and 
inter-cultural issues, but also the education of various vulnerable social groups. 
Ilze Šulmane looks at the role of the media and the information environment 
in integration. Finally, Aivars Tabuns examines language, culture and identity. 
10 Particularly useful were the Council of Europe (2005), Concerted development of social 
sohesion indicators: Methodological guide. Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, 
and Migration Policy Group (2005), Setting up a system of benchmarking to measure 
the success of integration policies in Europe. Brussels: European Parliament, Directorate 
General Internal Policies of the Union. 
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While this volume aims at an all-encompassing approach, a number of im-
portant issue areas and target groups are mentioned only in passing, primarily 
due to the paucity of available disaggregated data. For example, the study does 
not examine in depth the role of the criminal justice system or the military in 
social integration. In other contexts, police and border guards are often the first 
and primary representatives of the state encountered by immigrants and some 
minority groups. Moreover, as evidenced by numerous recent instances of unrest 
throughout Europe, misconduct by police or the (perception thereof) can spark 
social tensions and inter-communal strife. This realization has led to a jump in 
the amount of attention being paid at international and national level to policing 
diverse societies.11 At the same time, international experience (e.g., the United 
States) suggests that militaries can be useful promoters of social integration. In 
Latvia, the changing social role of the military after the transition to a profes-
sional army in 2006 has not been analysed by any researcher. Unfortunately, 
disaggregated data on the criminal justice system (including both personnel and 
“clients”) and the military are fragmented and dated.12
Another lacuna is data and analysis on the situation of the Roma. Apart 
from a 2003 study, there is little recent information and analysis on this, 
Latvia’s most vulnerable minority. After accession to the European Union, a 
significant number of Latvian Roma migrated elsewhere, primarily to Ireland 
and Great Britain, though their number is unknown. What is more, the economic 
crisis has invariably struck the Roma very hard, leading to their further social 
exclusion. There is clearly a need for an updated study examining all aspects 
of the situation of Latvia’s Roma, including public attitudes towards them and 
the impact of the Roma integration programme. 
The foregoing points to the urgent need for statistics disaggregated by eth-
nicity, language, religion, citizenship and country of origin. In their enthusiasm 
to implement EU directives on data protection, some Latvian authorities have 
gone so far as to declare all ethnic data “sensitive data”, thereby depriving 
researchers and policy-makers of a crucial tool. If the appropriate safeguards 
are in place and the data are anonymous, voluntary and based on self-identifi-
cation, they can facilitate combating discrimination and aid those developing 
policy initiatives to address the needs of vulnerable groups and promote social 
11 See OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (2006), Recommendations on 
Policing in Multi-Ethnic Societies. The Hague: OSCE, available at http://www.osce.
org/documents/hcnm/2006/02/17982_en.pdf. See also European Commission against 
Racism and Intolerance (2007), General Policy Recommendation No. 11, Combating 
Racism and Racial Discrimination in Policing. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. Available 
at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/GPR/EN/Recommendation_N11/
Recommendation_2_en.asp#TopOfPage. 
12 For suggestive data and analysis, see Anhelita Kamenska and Ģirts Valdis Kristovskis 
(2005), ‘Civilian Control of the Military and Police,’ in Rozenvalds, ed., How Democratic 
is Latvia, pp. 111–124.
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integration. The forthcoming census in Latvia in 2011 should provide a good 
opportunity for researchers, integration policy makers and stake-holders in 
civil society to engage in a dialogue about the data most needed in the realm 
of social integration. 
Several brief notes on terminology are in order. In Latvian, the operative 
phrase can be translated as the “integration of society” or “society’s integra-
tion” (sabiedrības integrācija). In this volume, we have chosen to render this 
as “social integration,” reflecting a broad understanding of the word “social” 
to mean everything pertaining to society (as in the social sciences). This 
might seem odd to a Latvian reader, as the literal Latvian equivalent (sociālā 
integrācija) refers primarily to social policy, such as the integration of disa-
bled persons, etc. “Social integration” won out over the cumbersome “societal 
integration” or the odd Latvian-English construction “society integration” for 
reasons of convenience, as well as its longer academic pedigree.
Another terminological and conceptual issue involves the categories used 
to describe various groups and identities in society. In the chapters below, the 
authors most often use the terms “Latvian” and “minority,” or “Latvian,” “Rus-
sian” and “other,” or “Latvian” and “Russian-speaking” (usually used to refer to 
persons whose native language is Russian). These categories do not reflect the 
many new amalgam identities in Latvian society deriving from ethnically mixed 
marriages, Europeanization, and the growing importance of other identities. The 
categories used by the authors below generally reflect those used in the census, 
the Population Register, sociological surveys and public discourse. The census, 
which has been based on self-identification, offers respondents only traditional 
monist categories (e.g., Latvian, Russian, Roma). The Population Register, in 
turn, uses the voluntary ethnicity entry in passports, which also uses traditional 
ethnic categories and restricts people’s choice of an ethnicity in various ways 
(e.g., to switch to “Latvian” one must demonstrate a certain level of Latvian 
language proficiency). Surveys often split respondents into either three big 
ethnic groups – Latvian, Russian and “other” or by native language – Latvian 
or Russian-speaker. One barrier to integration is the lingering Soviet essential-
ist understanding of ethnicity as an immutable, exclusive (one can have only 
one ethnicity), inherited characteristic. Another barrier is linguistic: there is no 
single word in Latvian describing a person belonging to Latvia (the Constitu-
tion refers to Latvijas tauta – the “people of Latvia”). Calls to use “Latvian” to 
describe all residents or citizens of Latvia regardless of ethnicity have sparked 
accusations of assimilationism. 
Finally, a few notes of gratitude are in order. First, I would like to take this 
opportunity to thank the Open Society Institute Think Tank Fund for its support, 
patience and painless bureaucracy. Second, I would like to thank my colleagues 
and co-authors for their cooperation, particularly Juris Rozenvalds, now dean 
of the Faculty of Social Sciences at the University of Latvia, and Ilona Kunda, 
colleague at the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute. Were it not 
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for Ilona’s administrative and other talents, this project would never have gotten 
off the ground, let alone found its way to the reader in the form of a book. Of 
course, any remaining errors of commission and omission are all mine. 
Social Integration: A Brief History of an Idea 
Nils Muižnieks
Introduction
Researchers and practitioners in Latvia and elsewhere have long debated 
over the meaning of the concept of “social integration”. Participants in these 
debates have used the term in many, often contradictory, ways. Before attempt-
ing to analyse integration policy or measure integration in Latvia, it is useful to 
sort through this confusion by stepping back and briefly examining the history 
of the idea itself and the varied meanings it has acquired in the academic and 
policy literature over time. Having traced the genealogy of the idea, we will 
be in a better position to present our own understanding of the term, which 
builds on previous work. 
Social Integration in Durkheim and Parsons
The French sociologist Emile Durkheim (1858–1917) is considered a pio-
neer in the study of social integration. Durkheim saw social change as a process 
of increasing differentiation of the social structure. As the division of labour 
developed, the need for maintaining coherence and unity within the social 
system grew. Such coherence and unity, which Durkheim termed “integration”, 
could take place in two different ways. In a system characterized by “mechani-
cal solidarity”, “integration” relied on common values and beliefs. In a system 
characterized by “organic solidarity”, “integration” relied on interdependence of 
the parts. Durkheim’s “organic solidarity” can be seen as functional integration, 
stressing reciprocity and social linkages, while “mechanical solidarity” can be 
seen as normative integration. Durkheim saw “organic solidarity” as increas-
ingly displacing “mechanical solidarity,” though feared that the development of 
norms appropriate to the division of labour could lag behind the rate of social 
change, creating endemic social strain.1 
 1 Emile Durkheim (1933), The Division of Labor in Society, trans. George Simpson. Glencoe: 
The Free Press, pp. 70–132. For an informed discussion of Durkheim’s thought that places 
it in a broader intellectual context, see Andrew C. Janos (1986), Politics and Paradigms: 
Changing Theories of Change in Social Science. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 
pp. 23–4. 
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Talcott Parsons (1902–1979) was the pre-eminent American sociologist of 
the 20th century and an avid disciple of the 19th century “classics”, especially 
Durkheim and Max Weber. Like Durkheim, Parsons also saw social change 
as differentiation, which necessitates “integration” not only through political 
and institutional change, but also through shared social values and norms, as 
well as common expectations. Parsons conceived of integration as a process of 
institutionalizing common values in the social system at various levels. 
Parsons described value change in terms of evolution or choice between 
five different “pattern variables”: 
1) affectivity versus affective neutrality; 
2) self-orientation versus collectivity orientation; 
3) universalism versus particularism; 
4) ascription versus achievement and 
5) specificity versus diffuseness.2 
Except for the second variable, with which Parsons injected a utopian ele-
ment into his scheme, the other variables describe a process of rationalization, 
individuation, and growing impersonalism accompanying the transition from 
traditional to market societies. This description became influential among those 
studying “modernization”, when interest in various aspects of integration blos-
somed.
Social Integration in the Modernization and 
Nationalism Literature
The concept of “political integration” gained wide currency in the social 
sciences in the 1960s and 1970s among those examining “modernization” – the 
social, economic and political changes accompanying industrialization. In 1965, 
Myron Weiner identified five different usages of the term “integration” among 
scholars at the time: 
1) imposing central control over subordinate political units or regions, 
2) linking government to the governed, 
3) promoting the capacity of people in a society to organize for a common 
purpose, 
4) developing a value consensus, and 
 2 Talcott Parsons (1966), Societies: Evolutionary and Comparative Perspectives. Englewood 
Cliffs, pp. 22–3; Talcott Parsons and Edward A. Shils, eds. (1962), Toward a General 
Theory of Action, 2nd ed. New York, pp. 76–81. For analysis of Parsons work, see Victor 
Lidz (2000), ‘Talcott Parsons.’ In George Ritzer, ed., The Blackwell Companion to Major 
Social Theorists. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, pp. 388–431. 
Nils Muižnieks. Social Integration: A Brief History of an Idea 17
5) bringing together different groups into a single territorial unit and estab-
lishing a national identity.3 
While several of these usages draw on Durkheim’s and Parson’s legacy, 
others strike out in new analytical directions.
The first usage focuses on central government control over fragmented 
territories – a common subject of inquiry among analysts examining the new 
states of Africa and Asia rent by centrifugal tendencies in the early post-colonial 
years. While still topical in many parts of the world, this usage is less salient in 
Latvia. The second usage shifts attention from preventing horizontal territorial 
fragmentation to generating “vertical” ties between the government and the 
governed – an imperative that has remained topical in Europe and Latvia to 
this day. The third and fifth usages include the interaction, exchange and inter-
dependence which are the essence of functional integration, while the fourth 
usage corresponds with normative integration as outlined above. As Weiner 
himself noted, “Since there are many ways in which systems may fall apart, 
there are as many ways of defining “integration”.4 
The fifth usage of integration identified by Weiner, that of bringing together 
groups in one territory and forming a common national identity, became very 
widespread among students of nationalism, “nation-building” and “national 
integration”. The most influential figure in this literature has been Karl Deutsch, 
who pioneered the study of what could be termed “communicative integra-
tion”. Deutsch defined a “community” in terms of “complementary habits and 
facilities of communication”.5 Two core concepts in Deutsch’s approach were 
“social mobilization” and “assimilation”. “Social mobilization” referred to 
the uprooting of people from their traditional settings (through urbanization, 
industrialization, government and media penetration of local communities, the 
development of transport networks) and their availability for mass communica-
tion. Deutsch understood “assimilation” in both linguistic and cultural terms. 
In Deutsch’s approach, the two processes were linked:
 If assimilation stays ahead of mobilization or keeps abreast of it, the 
government is likely to remain stable, and eventually everybody will 
be integrated into one people… On the other hand, where mobilization 
is fast and assimilation is slow, the opposite happens.6
For Deutsch, “integration” often meant assimilation through exposure to 
intense processes of communication. 
 3 Myron Weiner (1965), ‘Political Integration and Political Development.’ In The Annals of 
the American Academy of Political and Social Science 358, March 1965, pg. 53.
 4 Ibid., pg. 54.
 5 Karl W. Deutsch (1953), Nationalism and Social Communication. Cambridge: MIT Press, 
pg. 70. 
 6 Karl W. Deutsch (1969), Nationalism and Its Alternatives. New York: Knopf, pg. 27.
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Treating “integration” as tantamount to “assimilation” is very common in 
the social science literature on nationalism and “national integration.” This trend 
reflects a number of factors: the assimilationist thrust of state policy in many 
“nationalizing”7 polities, a belief in the transitory nature of ethnic identities, 
and a widespread perception of sub-national identities as being incompatible 
with the consolidation of an overarching national identity. As Arend Lijphart 
noted in 1971, “in almost all theories of integration a high degree of cultural 
homogeneity, and especially a homogenous political culture, is considered a 
prerequisite for political integration”.8 Much of the literature of the 1960s and 
1970s is also quite optimistic about the ability of national projects to assimi-
late indigenous, minority, regional or “low” cultures into a homogenous high 
culture through standardized education policy, universal conscription, language 
policy and other instruments available to the modern state. The impetus behind 
attempts at cultural and linguistic homogenization merits additional attention, 
as it has been quite persistent. 
Common Rationales for Integration qua Assimilation
Over time, several different rationales for promoting assimilation have 
been offered by observers and policy-makers. One important rationale that 
was quite common in the 19th and early 20th centuries was the belief that as-
similation was good for minorities. Paternalistic ethnocentrism as a rationale 
for assimilation can be illustrated through the statements of several prominent 
19th century British liberals. 
In 1839, Lord Durham sought to justify the Anglicization of Canada in the 
following terms:
 The language, the laws, the character of the North American continent 
are English; and every race but the English appears there in a condition 
of inferiority… It is to elevate them from that inferiority that I desire 
to give to the Canadians our English character. I desire it for the sake 
of the educated classes, whom the distinction of language and manners 
keeps apart from the great Empire to which they belong.9 
In 1861 John Stuart Mill made a similar argument in more general terms:
 Experience proves that it is possible for one nationality to merge and 
be absorbed in another; and when it was originally an inferior and 
 7 This term was popularized by Rogers Brubaker (1996), Nationalism Reframed: nationhood 
and the national question in the New Europe. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
 8 Arend Lijphart (1971), ‘Cultural Diversity and Theories of Political Integration.’ In Canadian 
Journal of Political Science/Revue canadienne de science politique, Vol. 4, No. 1 (March 
1971), pg. 4. 
 9 Cited in Anthony H. Birch (1989), Nationalism and National Integration. London: Routledge, 
pg. 38.
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more backward portion of the human race the absorption is greatly to 
its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not more beneficial to a 
Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current 
of the ideas and feelings of a highly civilized and cultivated people – to 
be a member of the French nationality, admitted on equal terms to all 
the privileges of French citizenship, sharing the advantages of French 
protection, and the dignity of French power – than to sulk on his own 
rocks, the half-savage relic of past times, revolving in his own little 
mental orbit, without participation or interest in the general movement 
of the world, the same remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish 
Highlander as members of the British nation.10 
In the 21st century, such paternalistic ethnocentrism, at least public expres-
sion thereof, is rare. Economic and/or political rationales for promoting or 
accepting assimilation are far more common. 
A common argument is that modern economic development necessitates 
cultural and linguistic homogeneity. As Ernest Gellner, one of the foremost 
recent theorists of nationalism, has argued, “a modern industrial state can 
only function with a mobile, literate, culturally standardized, interchangeable 
population”11, “its economy depends on mobility and communication between 
individuals, at a level which can only be achieved if those individuals have 
been socialized into a high culture, and indeed into the same high culture”.12 
The core mechanism for socialization (and assimilation) in the modern state is 
mass public education. Will Kymlicka has provided a cogent summary of the 
argument of those he has labelled “liberal nationalists”: “standardized public 
education in a common language has often been seen as essential if all citizens 
are to have equal opportunity to work in the modern economy.”13
Cultural and linguistic homogeneity are also commonly thought to be an 
essential prerequisite for attaining a number of political goals as well. Those 
studying “modernization” in Africa often made an argument about the link 
between cultural diversity and non-democratic forms of government. As Leo 
Kuper argued in 1969, “Cultural diversity or pluralism automatically imposes 
the strictest necessity for domination by one of the cultural sections. It excludes 
the possibility of consensus … and necessitates non-democratic regulation of 
10 Cited in ibid., pg. 39.
11 Ernest Gellner (1983), Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
pg. 46. 
12 Ibid., pg. 140. 
13 Will Kymlicka (2001), ‘Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe.’ 
In Will Kymlicka and Magda Opalski, eds., Can Liberal Pluralism be Exported? Western 
Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
pg. 20. 
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group relations.”14 In 1970, Dankwart Rostow, the founding father of the disci-
pline of “transitology,” made a more general claim, arguing that the crucial pre-
requisite for the transition to democracy was national unity: “the vast majority 
of the citizens in a democracy-to-be must have no doubt or mental reservations 
as to which political community they belong to.”15 
Certain contemporary liberals espouse what could be termed “civic assimi-
lationism” – a view that accepts cultural and linguistic diversity in the private 
sphere, but argues that a shared, homogenous public or societal culture is essen-
tial for dialogue and effective communication, conflict resolution and the pursuit 
of common goals.16 While some have argued in favour of homogeneity from the 
liberal camp, others have done so from a more social democratic perspective. 
Some have argued that there is a trade-off between cultural heterogeneity and 
the maintenance of welfare states, as people are often less willing to demon-
strate social solidarity with those who are culturally different.17 
While cultural homogeneity may facilitate social solidarity, render democ-
ratization easier, and make democracies more stable, cultural diversity is now 
an inalienable part of all European societies. Moreover, even if policy-makers 
were tempted to resurrect the kinds of assimilationist policies common in the 
18th and 19th centuries, the effort would be in vain, as insuperable barriers to 
mass assimilation have emerged in democratic European systems. It is important 
to understand the nature of these barriers, as they also point to the necessity of 
pursuing an integration policy that does not set the unrealistic goal of creating 
culturally and linguistically homogenous societies. Moreover, those barriers 
constrain the kinds of integration policy that are possible. 
Barriers to Assimilation in Contemporary Europe
Regardless of the frequency and persistence of the arguments of those 
justifying assimilation as a desirable policy goal, large-scale assimilation of 
minorities, immigrants and indigenous people in 21st century Europe is highly 
unlikely for a number of reasons. First of all, both liberal and Marxist18 assump-
tions about the transient nature of ethnic affiliations have proven to be faulty. As 
14 Introduction to Leo Kuper and M. G. Smith, eds., (1969), Pluralism in Africa. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, pg. 14. 
15 Dankwart A. Rostow (1970), ‘Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model,’ 
Comparative Politics, Vol. 2, No. 3 (1970), pg. 350.
16 Bhiku Parekh calls Rawls and Habermas the most prominent exponents of “civic 
assimilationism.” See Bhiku Parekh (2006), Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity 
and Political Theory, 2nd ed. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, pg. 200. 
17 See Frank Salter (2004), Welfare, Ethnicity and Altruism: New Data and Evolutionary 
Theory.London: Routledge. 
18 For a detailed overview of Marxist approaches to ethnicity, see Walker Connor (1984), 
The National Question in Marxist-Leninist Theory and Strategy. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.
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Walker Connor, a prominent critic of the assimilationist assumptions of writers 
on “nation-building” noted, “advances in communications and transportation 
tend also to increase the cultural awareness of the minorities by making their 
members more aware of the distinctions between themselves and others”.19 In 
the 1970s and 1980s, the re-emergence of Catalan, Corsican, Scottish, Welsh 
and other West European minority nationalisms shook the positions of those 
arguing that minority identities had lost their salience in Western Europe. 
A decade or two later, the disintegration of multinational communist states 
such as Yugoslavia, the Soviet Union and Czechoslovakia demonstrated that 
authoritarian systems fare little better than democratic ones in neutralizing or 
depoliticising sub-national identities. 
While minority identities have proven adaptable and resilient in various 
economic and political systems, they are increasingly protected by the consoli-
dation of a minority rights regime in Europe.20 While it remains quite weak, this 
regime does constrain the room for manoeuvre of states by explicitly forbidding 
forcible assimilation of national or ethnic, linguistic, and religious minorities 
and indigenous people.21 As Will Kymlicka has noted with regard to assimilat-
ing minorities, “France was only successful in the nineteenth century because 
it employed a level of coercion against the Basques and Bretons that would be 
inconceivable now”.22 
Not only have “traditional” minorities carved out some political space for 
preserving and maintaining their identities, Europe has increasingly become 
host to “new” minorities through the absorption of migrants, asylum-seekers 
and refugees. The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD) estimated that the documented migrant population in the European 
Economic Area was more than 20 million foreigners or 5.3% of the population 
at the end of the twentieth century. The International Organization for Migration 
(IOM) placed the figure even higher, at around 56 million or 7.7% of the entire 
19 Walker Connor (1972), ‘Nation-Building or Nation-Destroying?’ World Politics, Vol. XXIV, 
No. 3 (April 1972), pg. 329. 
20 There is a large and growing literature on this regime. Among others, see Gabriel N. Toggenberg, 
ed., (2004), Minority Protection and the Enlarged European Union: the Way Forward. 
Budapest: OSI/LGI; Marc Weller, ed., (2005), The Rights of Minorities: A Commentary 
on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
21 See, e.g., Art. 32, Document of the Copenhagen Meeting of the Human Dimension of the 
CSCE (1990); Art. 5, Para. 2, Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities (1995); Art. 8, UN Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples (2007). 
22 Kymlicka, ‘Western Political Theory and Ethnic Relations in Eastern Europe,’ pg. 26.
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population.23 In the medium to long-term, a continued influx is highly likely 
not only due to traditional “push” factors in Africa and elsewhere, but due to 
“pull” factors caused in particular by ageing populations. Some demographers 
predict that Europe will need as many as 50 million immigrants by 2050 to 
maintain current living standards.24 
While continued immigration is likely, Europeanization is also beginning 
to limit the room for manoeuvre of European governments in their treatment 
of immigrants. Empirical studies suggest that great differences persist as to the 
extent of Europeanization of domestic immigration policies in various European 
countries.25 However, since the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, migration is a policy 
area that has witnessed steady “communitarization.” As Christian Joppke has 
argued, there is now a competition for skilled labour migrants, and EC direc-
tives now regulate not only family migration and asylum, but also many issues 
concerning immigrant integration, in particular anti-discrimination and the 
residence and free movement rights of non-EU immigrants.26 Here, the direc-
tion of policy is not uniform, as the trend towards stabilizing the legal status of 
immigrants and expanding their rights has often been accompanied by policy 
measures aimed at teaching them, sometimes under compulsion, the national 
language and local values, a point to which we will return later. 
Integration, Multiculturalism and Intercultural 
Competence
Attempting to assimilate minorities and immigrants has been a common 
response of many states in Europe and elsewhere to diversity. However, over 
the last several decades, several countries have officially foresworn assimila-
tion, acknowledged the persistent nature, legitimacy and equal worth of minor-
ity and immigrant cultures and sought to make accommodation for minority 
cultural needs. While “multiculturalism” in some circles has come to mean 
purely the separate coexistence of different groups, in other contexts it has 
23 Figures cited in Rita Sussmuth and Werner Weidenfeld (2005), ‘The Integration Challenge: 
Living Together in a Europe of Diversity.’ In Rita Sussmuth and Werner Weidenfeld, eds., 
Managing Integration: The European Union’s Responsibilities Towards Immigrants. Berlin: 
Bertelsmann Stifftung, pg. xi. 
24 Wolfgang Lutz and Sergei Scherbov (2006), ‘Future Demographic Change in Europe: The 
Contribution of Migration.’ In Demetrios G. Papandreiou, ed., Europe and Its Immigrants in 
the 21st Century. Washington, D.C./Lisbon: Migration Policy Institute and Luso-American 
Foundation, pp. 207–222.
25 See, e.g., Thomas Faist and Andreas Ette, eds. (2007), The Europeanization of National 
Policies and Politics of Immigration: Between Autonomy and the European Union. 
Hampshire: Palgrave. 
26 Christian Joppke (2007), ‘Transformation of Immigrant Integration: Civic Integration and 
Antidiscrimination in the Netherlands, France, and Germany,’ World Politics 59 (January 
2007), pg. 247.
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been conceived as a situation in which cultural maintenance is accompanied 
by intergroup contacts. 
The first state to elevate “multiculturalism” to the level of policy was 
Canada, which in 1971 altered its long-established bicultural policy based on 
the British and French Charter groups, largely as a result of concern expressed 
by non-Charter immigrant groups about the preservation of their identities. 
Sweden declared “multiculturalism” official policy in 1975, while Australia 
did so in 1978. While diverse in their origins, the policies of all three states, at 
least at the outset, have shared a number of common features: 
1) accepting the maintenance of minority and immigrant cultures, 
2) ensuring that children have opportunities to learn both the national 
language and their mother tongue, 
3) overcoming inequities in access to employment, housing and other 
realms, and 
4) combating racism and discrimination.27 
“Integration” in the context of multicultural policies has often been seen 
in opposition to assimilation. 
One of the most influential analysts of “integration” in the context of multi-
culturalism is the Canadian social scientist John Berry, who has written widely 
about “acculturation attitudes” – “the ways people prefer to live in intercultural 
contact situations” and “acculturation expectations” – “views about how im-
migrants and other non-dominant ethnocultural groups should acculturate”.28 
According to Berry, two issues are critical: to what extent do individuals from 
non-dominant groups wish to maintain their cultural attributes and to what 
extent do they wish to have contacts with other groups. As can be seen in the 
diagram below, these two issues can be used to portray the stances of individu-
als belonging to minority groups, as well as those of the broader society. In this 
formulation, “integration” at the individual level is the maintenance of one’s 
identity accompanied by a willingness to engage in contact with members of 
other cultural groups. At the societal level, a willingness to permit or even 
promote the maintenance of minority identities combined with a willingness to 
engage in or even promote intercultural contacts means “multiculturalism”.
27 For a cogent overview of the origins, development and major policy directions of these 
three countries, see Christine Ingles (1996), Multiculturalism: New Policy Responses to 
Diversity, MOST Policy Papers 4. Paris: UNESCO, pp. 41–6. 
28 This is from a recent formulation of Berry’s extensive work in Jean Phoney, John W. Berry, 
Paul Vader, and Carmella Lie Kind (2006), ‘The Acculturation Experience: Attitudes, 
Identities and Behaviours of Immigrant Youth.’ In John W. Berry, Jean Phinney, David 
L. Sam and Paul Vedder, eds., Immigrant Youth in Cultural Transition: Acculturation, 
Identity and Adaptation Across National Contexts. Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., 
pg. 73. 
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The emphasis on and positive valuation of intercultural contact has its roots 
in the social psychology of prejudice, a field pioneered by Gordon Allport in 
the 1950s. Allport hypothesized that intergroup contact would lead to reduced 
intergroup prejudice if four conditions obtained: 
1) the contact participants were of equal status, 
2) they shared common goals, 
3) there was no competition between the groups, 
4) there was authority sanction for the contact.29 
A recent overview of over 200 studies testing the “Allport contact hypoth-
esis” found strong confirmation that intergoup contact does relate negatively 
to prejudice, that the largest effects were achieved in work and other organiza-
tional contexts, and that majority participants revealed much larger mean effects 
than minority participants.30 
Even if all of Allport’s conditions obtain, intergroup contact can still result 
in misunderstanding and even conflict if the contact parties lack what is increas-
ingly called “intercultural competence.” “Intercultural competence” has been 
defined in various ways. Green has argued that it involves “learning how to 
perceive others through their own cultural lens, knowledge of certain cultural 
beliefs, personal comfort with differences, willingness to change one’s ideas, 
29 Gordon W. Allport (1954), The Nature of Prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
30 Thomas F. Pettigrew and Linda R. Tropp (2000), ‘Does Intergroup Contact Reduce 
Prejudice? Recent Metanalytical Findings. In Stuart Oskamp, ed., Reducing Prejudice 
and Discrimination. Mahwah: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc., pp. 93–114. 
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the ability to be flexible”.31 Manco has argued that it entails “psychosocial 
capacities that enable individuals and groups to [...] confront the complex situa-
tions arising out of contact between cultures in an inegalitarian socio-economic 
and political context”.32 Increasingly, it is held that “intercultural competence” 
can be acquired through education. 
In a recent important contribution, the Council of Europe’s White Paper on 
Intercultural Dialogue stressed three core intercultural competence areas: 
1) “democratic citizenship” facilitated by education enabling an individual 
to act as an active and responsible citizen respectful of others; 
2) “language”, including knowledge of the national language and protection 
of minority languages, and 
3) “history” – a critical, evidence-based approach stressing dialogue and 
the elimination of stereotypes.33 
The new emphasis on “interculturalism” is a useful supplement to the 
stress on cultural maintenance and minority identities in the “multicultural-
ist” approach. However, a certain tension remains between minority rights as 
conceived within the discourse on “multiculturalism” and non-discrimination. 
To avoid the stress on difference of the former and the frequent injustice 
of “cultural blindness” towards minority groups inherent in the latter, Timo 
Makonnen has argued for “multicultural integration” in which legislation and 
policy avoid creating or reifying differences, but reflect them, while seeking to 
combat prejudice and equalize socioeconomic inequities.34 
“Integration” as a component of minority rights and/or anti-discrimination 
strategies is a topic of frequent discussion in the work of regional and interna-
tional organizations. Thus, it is useful to investigate how “integration” has been 
conceived in human rights discourse, as this provides a useful supplement to work 
in the social sciences. Moreover, international and regional organizations have 
increasingly framed both the policy and academic debates through their standard-
setting, country monitoring, and funding of research and programmes. 
31 J. Green (1998), Cultural Awareness in the Human services: A Multi-Ethnic Approach, 3rd 
ed. Boston: Allyn & Bacon, pg. 75.
32 Altay Manco (2006), ‘Young people of immigrant origin in Europe: how can we make the 
school an instrument for social mobility and acquisition of intercultural competences?’ In 
Achieving social cohesion in a multicultural Europe: Concepts, situation and developments, 
Trends in social cohesion, No. 18. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pg. 161.
33 Council of Europe (2008), White Paper on Intercultural Dialogue: „Living Together as 
Equals in Dignity.” Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pp. 28–9.
34 Timo Makkonen (2004), ‘Is Multiculturalism bad for the fight against discrimination?’ In 
Martin Scheinin and Reetta Toivanen, eds., Rethinking non-discrimination and minority 
rights. Turku: Abo Akademi University, pp. 175–6. 
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Integration, Human Rights and International 
Organizations
Various international and regional organizations, such as the United Nations 
(UN), the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) and 
the Council of Europe (CoE) have put the issue of social integration on their 
agendas, primarily in the context of human rights. These organizations often 
insert the word “integration” into various international standards and reports 
governing the treatment of indigenous people, migrants, refugees, and national 
or ethnic minorities. Though the meaning assigned to the term often differs 
depending on the mandate of the organization in question and the specific 
population of concern, certain common usages can be identified.
The term “social integration” gained wide currency in the human rights 
community at the 1995 UN World Summit for Social Development in Copen-
hagen. The report of the summit, which uses the term 40 times, notes that: 
 Social integration, or the capacity of people to live together with full 
respect for the dignity of each individual, the common good, pluralism 
and diversity, non-violence and solidarity, as well as their ability to 
participate in social, cultural, economic and political life, encompasses 
all aspects of social development and all policies.35
A subsequent UN report that continues the work of the Social Summit 
argues that inclusion, participation and justice are the three main “building 
blocks of social integration”.36 The report goes on to claim that “participatory 
dialogue” is the core instrument to “promote the values and principles of social 
integration”.37 In a review of the work of several European human rights or-
ganizations on issues of integration, Merja Pentikainen has identified the “par-
ticipatory dimension of integration – i.e., linking the question of participation 
and integration” as a frequent common element.38 
The Council of Europe has focused less on “social integration” but on the 
similar concept of “social cohesion”. Like the UN, it also has focused on par-
ticipation and achieving “cohesion through human rights.”39 A recent influential 
publication on Concerted Development of Social Cohesion Indicators defines 
35 United Nations (1995), ‘Report of the World Summit for Social Development.’, A/
CONF. 166/9, 19 April 1995, 29, available at http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N95/116/51/PDF/N9511651.pdf?OpenElement.
36 United Nations (2007), Participatory Dialogue: Towards a Stable, Safe and Just Society 
for All. New York: United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, pg. 11.
37 Ibid., pg. 61.
38 Merja Pentikainen (2008), ‘Creating an Integrated Society, Managing Diversity and Human 
Rights in Europe.’ European Yearbook of Minority Issues, Vol. 6, 2006/7. Leiden: Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers, pg. 349. 
39 Council of Europe (2005), Concerted Development of Social Cohesion Indicators: 
Methodological Guide. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pg. 15. 
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“social cohesion” as “society’s ability to secure the long-term well-being of 
all its members, including equitable access to available resources, respect for 
human dignity with due regard to diversity, personal and collective autonomy 
and responsible participation.”40 
The focus on “equitable access” and non-discrimination as a core founda-
tion of social integration is particularly evident in the work of bodies concerned 
with anti-racism. In the International Convention on the Elimination of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD) adopted in 1965, Article 2 (1)(e) calls on State Parties 
to “encourage, where appropriate, integrationist multiracial organizations and 
movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races”.41 Here, 
“integration” carries the connotation of removing segregationist barriers of 
discrimination, while “integrationist” implies “composed of various cultural 
backgrounds,” as opposed to homogeneous. 
The Council of Europe’s European Commission against Racism and Intoler-
ance (ECRI) has increasingly touched on issues of integration in its work. ECRI 
has drawn attention to the links between integration and combating racism and 
racial discrimination, by pointing out that public debate on integration may 
stigmatise communities42 and that certain integration measures may be in breach 
of non-discrimination principles.43 This can be the case when an “obligation to 
integrate” is imposed on certain groups or penalties are inflicted for failing to 
integrate, but also with regard to language policy.44 
Pentikainen has noted that not only ECRI, but also the Advisory Commit-
tee of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(ACFC) and the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities (HCNM) 
“have put a lot of emphasis on the importance of the knowledge of the official 
(state) language for integration in the case of minority groups.”45 Despite the 
stress on the official language, integration is commonly defined in contrast to as-
similation. This is the context in which integration is mentioned in the Council 
of Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities 
(FCNM), one of the few international legal instruments to mention “integration” 
specifically. Article 5, paragraph 2 of the FCNM reads thus: “Without prejudice 
to measures taken in pursuit of their general integration policy, the Parties shall 
refrain from policies or practices aimed at assimilation of persons belonging to 
national minorities against their will and shall protect these persons from any 
action aimed at such assimilation.” Paragraph 46 of the Explanatory Report 
of the FCNM notes that “Paragraph 2 does not preclude Parties from taking 
measures in pursuance of their general integration policy.”
40 Ibid., pg. 23.
41 http://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1969/03/19690312%2008–49%20AM/Ch_IV_2pg.pdf.
42 See, e.g., ECRI’s third report on the Netherlands (§128), available at www.coe.int/ecri. 
43 See, e.g., ibid. (§49–50) and ECRI’s third report on Denmark (§68).
44 See, e.g., ECRI’s third report on Latvia (§120–1). 
45 Pentikainen, ‘Creating an Integrated Society,’ pg. 348. 
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Despite the useful work of international human rights bodies on various 
aspects of integration, the concept is not a legal one, and the complex inter-
relationships it is meant to describe are difficult to capture in treaties and 
monitoring reports. After reviewing in detail the work of various international 
organizations, Pentikainen concludes that “there is still an urgent need to clarify 
and further develop the concept”.46 Interestingly, a newcomer to the field of 
human rights and integration, the European Union, has recently rapidly pushed 
forward work on integration, specifically with reference to immigrants. 
The European Union and Immigrant Integration
Since the 1999 European Council meeting in Tampere, the EU has become 
increasingly active and influential on issues relating to immigrant integra-
tion. Until Tampere, the EU had been primarily concerned with integrating 
immigrants into the labour markets of EU member states. At Tampere and 
soon thereafter, the EU began to take a broader approach by stressing the 
integration of immigrants into society, primarily through participation and 
non-discrimination. 
At Tampere EU leaders agreed that the aim of immigrant integration policy 
should be to equalize the rights and obligations of third-country nationals with 
those of the citizens of the EU. The package of anti-discrimination directives 
adopted in 2000 consolidated this focus on equality and non-discrimination as 
a core element of immigrant integration, supplemented by the concept of “civic 
citizenship” put forward by the Commission in November 2000.47 
In 2004, the Justice and Home Affairs Council adopted the “Common Basic 
Principles for Immigrant Integration Policy in the European Union.”48 The first 
principle moves the focus of integration beyond immigrants alone, stressing 
that “integration is a dynamic two way process of mutual accommodation by all 
immigrants and residents of Member States.” While reiterating the importance 
of participation in various realms (Principles 3, 5 and 9) and non-discrimination 
(Principle 6), the Principles also contain some additional important elements. 
Principle 8 notes that “the practice of diverse cultures and religions is 
guaranteed under the Charter of Fundamental Rights and must be safeguarded” 
and thereby acknowledges the important of cultural maintenance. At the same 
46 Ibid., 368. 
47 For a brief overview of the development of EU immigrant integration policy, see the relevant 
part of the European Commission’s home page at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/fsj/
immigration/integration/fsj_immigration_integration_en.htm and the links to the respective 
documents. 
48 Ibid. See also Jan Niessen and Mary Ann Kate (2007), From Principles to Practice: 
The Common Basic Principles on Integration and the Handbook Conclusions. Brussels: 
MPG, available at http://www.migpolgroupg.com/multiattachments/3769/DocumentName/
Principles_to_Practice_CBP_Handbook3.pdf.
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time, Principle 7 echoes those who stress the importance of intercultural contact, 
underlining that “frequent interaction between immigrants and Member State 
citizens is a fundamental mechanism for integration”. While recognizing diver-
sity, there is also indication of a common core: “respect for the basic values of 
the European Union” (Principle 2) and the assertion that “basic knowledge of 
the host society’s language, history and institutions is indispensable to integra-
tion” (Principle 4).
If, as noted earlier, the degree of Europeanization of immigration policy 
is variable, the same must be said for immigrant integration policy. Despite 
the adoption of the “Common Basic Principles,” sharing of best practices, and 
increased EU funding, states have retained a large degree of sovereignty in this 
sphere. Nonetheless, Christian Joppke has argued that a convergence of national 
models of dealing with immigrants is taking place, largely based on the replica-
tion of practice in the Netherlands. Joppke has argued that the “emergent gestalt 
of contemporary European immigrant integration is a peculiar coexistence of 
civic integration and antidiscrimination policies.”49 The former are obligatory 
civics courses for immigrants, while the latter refer to policy measures taken 
following the adoption of the Race directive in 2000. 
Points of Consensus and Our Approach
After reviewing the evolution of conceptions of “social integration” and 
the varied uses of the term in the academic, human rights and policy literature, 
a number of points of consensus can be identified. Contemporary discourse 
portrays integration in contrast to assimilation. In certain contexts, integration 
may lead to voluntary assimilation, but the European human rights regime 
prohibits forcible assimilation. Moreover, as was argued earlier, large-scale 
assimilation, even on a voluntary basis, is highly unlikely given the resilience 
of sub-national identities, the consolidation of a minority rights regime protect-
ing those identities and the increasingly diverse nature of European societies, 
which are all becoming societies of immigration. 
While acknowledging the reality of cultural diversity, integration does 
not entail the parallel, separate coexistence of ethnocultural groups, but rather 
their interaction. While sociologists as far back as Durkheim noted that social 
linkages, exchange and reciprocity can generate coherence and unity, in a 
context of cultural diversity, individual and group contacts can also reinforce 
the maintenance of particularistic identities. While contact between persons 
belonging to different ethnocultural groups can lead to conflict, Allport and his 
disciples have demonstrated that, under specified conditions, it can also reduce 
prejudice. Recent work suggests that “intercultural competence” can also be 
taught and learned, thereby decreasing the likelihood of conflict and tension. In 
49 Joppke, ‘Transformation of Immigrant Integration,’ pg. 247.
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the context of integration, a core competence area is knowledge of the official 
or state language, though knowledge of minority languages by members of the 
majority is also desirable. Knowledge of the national language can not only 
facilitate contact, communication and cooperation, it can also further participa-
tion and equal access to various social goods. 
The post-World War II emergence of a global human rights discourse, par-
ticularly in the realm of anti-racism and minority rights, focused attention on 
the rights of ethnic, religious and linguistic minorities, immigrants and indig-
enous people. Until recently, integration was considered to concern primarily 
these groups. However, more recent work, particularly at the United Nations, 
Council of Europe, and European Union, suggests that integration implicates 
all of society, that it is a “two-way street” of mutual accommodation. There is 
a broad consensus that integration is closely intertwined with both participation 
and the promotion of non-discrimination and equality. 
Participation is conceived not only as the foundation of democratic poli-
ties, but increasingly, as a critical minority right.50 While a vibrant democracy 
requires the participation of all members of society, effective participation 
by persons belonging to minorities is essential so that majority-dominated 
democratic institutions take minority needs into consideration. While effective 
minority participation can lay the groundwork for the protection of minority 
identities, participation need not lead to particularism. Indeed, it is only through 
participation that minorities, immigrants and other members of society develop 
a sense of belonging to a broader national community.51 This sense of belonging 
has traditionally been seen as a core aim of integration. 
 Participation in and of itself is not a guarantor of social cohesion, as all 
may participate, but asymmetries in power and access to resources can lead to 
distorted outcomes in which all participate but only some gain representation. 
Thus, not participation alone, but participation and representation are needed, 
as it is only when all members of society, regardless of their sub-national 
identities, see members belonging to their groups represented in positions of 
social, economic, cultural and political influence that participation will yield 
an integrative effect. 
In order to minimize the impact of power and resource asymmetries, there 
is a growing consensus on the importance of non-discrimination in integration. 
50 See Advisory Committee on the Framework Convention for the Protection of National 
Minorities (2008), Commentary on the Effective Participation of Persons Belonging 
to National Minorities in Cultural, Social and Economic Life and in Public Affairs. 
Strasbourg: Council of Europe, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/
minorities/3_FCNMdocs/PDF_CommentaryParticipation_en.pdf.
51 On this point, see the remarks by Rita Sussmuth, former speaker of the German parliament 
and expert on immigrant integration in Council of Europe (2006), Achieving social cohesion 
in a multicultural Europe: Concepts, situation and developments, Trends in social cohesion, 
No. 18. Strasbourg: Council of Europe, pg. 31.
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Non-discrimination can not only help level the playing field for democratic 
participation, but it can also eliminate the artificial barriers to beneficial contact 
and cooperation that are erected when individuals, groups or institutions engage 
in unjustified differential treatment of persons on grounds such as presumed 
race, skin colour, national or ethnic origin, language, religious affiliation and 
other grounds. Here, the focus cannot be solely on equality of opportunity, 
as glaring differences in social outcomes that are not the result of differential 
treatment can also undermine social cohesion and the maintenance of a sense 
of belonging by all members of society.
Thus, in our conception, social integration is a process of unifying society 
by strengthening participation, intercultural contact, and non-discrimination. 
However, each of these pillars has an important sub-component. In the case 
of participation, it is representation; for intercultural contact, it is intercultural 
competence; for non-discrimination, it is the promotion of equality. The three 
pillars are linked and all are essential for successful integration. Participation 
and non-discrimination alone can be implemented without substantial interaction 
between the majority and various minorities, thereby resulting in separation. 
At the same time, intercultural contact can also take place in non-democratic 
systems whose members may have acquired intercultural competence. Unless 
such contact is accompanied by participation and non-discrimination, it can 
lead to domination or forcible assimilation.
Measuring Social Integration in Latvia 
In measuring integration in Latvia, the aforementioned tripartite scheme has 
been used as a framework by the authors of this study. The editors provided 
authors with a suggested list of indicators (see Appendix) to guide them in ana-
lysing the various realms in which integration takes place – in civic and political 
life, the labour market, the social sphere, the education system, the media and 
information sectors, and in cultural life. Some of the indicators were adopted 
wholesale from studies by the Council of Europe,52 the European Parliament53 
and others, but some reflect Latvia’s distinct situation. 
Indicators reflect not only the situation in society, but public perceptions of 
that situation. The inclusion of data on perceptions is important, as perception 
can become reality if it serves to guide the behaviour of individuals or groups 
in society or policy-makers. Moreover, subjective evaluations of various dis-
parities are important in understanding their social and political significance. 
Discrimination is widely believed to be a source of social strife and alienation. 
52 See, e.g., Concerted development of social cohesion indicators.
53 See European Parliament, Directorate General Internal Policies of the Union (2007), Setting 
Up a System of Benchmarking to Measure the Success of Integration Policies in Europe. 
Brussels: European Parliament. 
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However, as E. K. Francis has shown, “under certain conditions, the differential 
treatment of ethnics may not only be functional but also legitimate.”54 Thus, 
data on perceptions should assist in demonstrating whether a disparity is creat-
ing tensions that undermine integration or not.
The editor urged the authors to provide their overall assessment of the 
situation of integration in their respective realm of inquiry and to point to any 
significant current trends. At the same time, similar to the methodology used in 
one effort to measure democracy in Latvia,55 authors were urged to identify the 
greatest achievement, the most serious problem and the most urgent task. While 
social integration is an ongoing process, limitations of space, available data 
over time and the desire to speak to current debates in Latvia dictated placing 
a time frame on the analysis. In most cases, authors were asked to focus on the 
situation since 2001, when Latvia adopted its first integration policy framework. 
However, occasionally developments are traced over a longer time frame, as 
some change (e.g., language acquisition) has been gradual and significant over 
a long period.
This is not the first effort to measure integration or analyse integration 
policy in Latvia, though it might be the most comprehensive. In order to lay the 
groundwork for the detailed analysis of integration trends in various realms of 
social life, a critical analysis of the development of integration policy in Latvia 
is essential. It is to such an analysis that we now turn. 
54 E. K. Francis (1976), Interethnic Relations. New York: Elsevier, pg. 270. 
55 Juris Rozenvalds, ed. (2005), How Democratic Is Latvia: Audit of Democracy. Riga: 
University of Latvia Press.
The Soviet Heritage and Integration Policy 
Development Since the Restoration of 
Independence
Juris Rozenvalds 
The Soviet Heritage Regarding Integration
Latvia developed historically as an ethnically diverse society, and repre-
sentatives of around 150 different ethnic groups live in the country. However, 
according to the 2009 data of the Central Statistical Bureau, the vast majority 
of inhabitants (93.2%) belong to the four largest groups – Latvians (59.3%), 
Russians (27.8%), Belarusians (3.6%), and Ukrainians (2.5%). Since persons 
belonging to the latter three groups generally use the Russian language in daily 
life, from the standpoint of integration policy one of the most important cleav-
ages is between those whose native language is Latvian (in the 2000 census – 
58.2% of the population) and those whose native language is Russian or 
Russian-speakers (37.5% of the population). 
The ethnic structure of Latvia evolved over centuries and initially was 
quite homogenous, as the share of Latvians approached 90% in the 16th and 
17th centuries. Until World War I members of other ethnic groups, primarily 
members of the ruling elite (e.g., Germans, Russians, and Poles), gradually 
entered the territory of Latvia. Peasants of a different ethnic origin were not 
channelled into Latvia en masse, and thus, no areas of ethnic minority compact 
settlement developed 
The involvement of inhabitants of Latvia in the events of World War I, 
as well as the related mass flight of Latvia’s inhabitants to inner Russia had a 
significant impact on Latvia’s demography in the early 20th century. Population 
losses during the war meant that Latvia’s total number of inhabitants reached 
the level of 1897 only in 1935. Moreover, the number and share of Baltic Ger-
mans in Latvia declined by half over the same period. 
However, the most far-reaching changes in Latvia’s ethnic structure took 
place during and after World War II. During this period, Latvia lost almost all 
members of two historical minorities, the Germans and the Jews. About 60,000 
Germans were repatriated to Hitler’s Reich in 1939–1940, while the Jewish mi-
nority was almost completely annihilated in the tragic events of the Holocaust. 
The merciless repressions of the 1940s, flight and emigration to a number of 
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Western countries by refugees, as well as post-war deportations dramatically 
reduced the number of Latvians in Latvia. In 1959 there were almost 180,000 
fewer Latvians in Latvia than in 1935.
Though the number of Latvians in Latvia declined significantly, the total 
number of inhabitants in Latvia grew on account of migration from other re-
publics in the USSR. In 1959 the total number of inhabitants exceeded the 1935 
total by 230,000. The majority of the increase was accounted for by Eastern 
Slavic settlers, whose share in the population grew rapidly. The share of Rus-
sians grew from 10.6% in 1935 to 26.6% in 1959, 29.8% in 1970, and 34% in 
1989. A similar, but less dramatic increase took place in the Belarusian share 
(1.4% in 1935, 2.9% in 1959, 4% in 1970, and 4.5% in 1979 and 1989) and 
Ukrainian share (0.09 % in 1935, 1.4% in 1959, 2.3% in 1970, 2.7% in 1979 
and 3.5% in 1989) in the total population of Latvia. 
Total population and ethnic breakdown of Latvia’s population, 1935–2009 
(1000s and %)
1935 1959 1970 1979 1989 2000 2009
Total 1950,4 2093,5 2364,1 2502,8 2666,6 2375,3 2261,3
incl.
Latvians 75.4 62.0 56.8 53.7 52.0 57.7 59.3
Russians 10.6 26.6 29.8 32.8 34.0 29.6 27.8
Belarussians 1.4 2.9 4.0 4.5 4.5 4.1 3.6
Ukrainians 0.09 1.4 2.3 2.7 3.5 2.7 2.5
Poles 2.5 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.5 2.4
Lithuanians 1.2 1.5 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.4 1.3
Jews 4.8 1.7 1.6 1.1 0.9 0.4 0.4
Germans 3.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1 0.2
Sources: Central Statistical Bureau of Latvia: http://data.csb.gov.lv /DATABASEEN/Iedzsoc/
Annual%20statistical%20data/04.%20Population/04.%20Population.asp and Central Statisti-
cal Bureau of Latvia, Results of the 2000 Population and Housing Census in Latvia: Col-
lection of Statistical Data. Riga: 2002, pg. 121.
In the final decades of Soviet rule, a situation developed in which two nu-
merically similar groups had formed – a Latvian language group and Russian-
speakers – which differed in their sources of information, their attitudes towards 
the situation in Latvia and in their value orientations. In later years, with the 
transformation of Latvian society and the restoration of independence, when the 
issue of societal consolidation came to the forefront, these differences became 
very important in the context of creating an integration policy. 
Violent incorporation into the Soviet empire, merciless repressions, the 
abasement of ethnic sentiments, as well as Soviet unification and levelling in 
the post-war period created a whole range of stable orientations in the con-
sciousness of the Latvian part of society, and this had a major impact on social 
processes. In the first place, one must mention the idealization of the pre-war in-
dependence era, including the six years of authoritarian rule by Kārlis Ulmanis. 
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The Soviet regime’s categorical denial of this period created a black-and-white 
perception of history based on binary opposites. 
Among Latvians there was also a widespread view that the leadership of 
the Latvian Soviet Socialist Republic (LSSR) defended the republic’s interests 
less vigorously than analogues in Estonia and Lithuania and was more eager 
to follow Moscow’s dictates. Thus, many Latvians acquired a black-and-white 
historical memory of the “real socialist” past, while Latvia’s neighbours ap-
peared to have a more nuanced picture which took into account Estonia’s de-
velopment in the 1960s and 1970s or Lithuania’s undeniable socio-economic 
growth in the immediate post-war years. One of the most typical manifestations 
of these day-to-day habits of the mind in the 1990s was the lingering hope 
that problems could be resolved through a surge of activity based on simply 
denying the Soviet legacy and restoring the pre-war social order and its ethnic 
composition. This hope often displaced debate about the suitability of various 
solutions based on the past to the situation of 1990s Latvia and contemporary 
understandings of social and economic policy. In this regard, it is notable that 
Latvia is the only post-Soviet or post-communist country to have maintained 
its pre-war constitution and electoral system, with small changes thereto (e.g., 
a bill of rights and a 5% threshold)
The truly complex and tragic history of Latvia and the Latvians in the 
20th century created the conviction in everyday consciousness of the unique 
character of Latvia’s situation. This, in turn, was linked with the perception 
that Latvians were a “chosen people”, but in a negative way – that they had 
suffered more than all other nations in the 20th century. This was thought to 
impose some special obligations on Western countries towards Latvians and 
Latvia, while Latvians, for their part, had the right, in the name of overcoming 
the injustices of the past, to act in ways that were not always in accordance with 
the accepted standards for civilized political behaviour of the Western world. 
The lengthy debasement of Latvian national feelings in the Soviet empire, 
as well as progress in the process of Latvia’s Russification which generated 
serious threats to the existence of the Latvian language created a kind of “ca-
tastrophe rationale”, which was rather widespread in Latvia’s political discourse 
in the 1990s. The essence of this rationale involved asserting that if a certain 
issue was not addressed in a certain way, Latvians as a nation would cease to 
exist. This fear is still alive, notwithstanding its clear inconsistency with the fact 
that since the days of the “singing revolution” Latvians have clearly dominated 
in independent Latvia’s political life. 
Finally, Soviet rule produced a disposition in everyday consciousness which 
could be termed “a minority complex”. In Soviet times, Latvians comprised an 
insignificant minority in the composition of the enormous empire (about 0.5% 
of the Soviet population). In Latvia itself, the local authorities controlled policy 
areas touching upon Latvian culture, education, as well as local industry and 
agriculture (where Latvians predominated). By contrast, Moscow controlled 
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the flow of culture, education and information for new arrivals, as well as the 
generally Russian management of so-called all-Union enterprises. As a result, 
the aforementioned circumstances created a peculiar Soviet era Latvian “privi-
lege” – concentrating only on one’s own problems. Issues of language, culture 
and ethnicity, in the awareness of broad parts of Latvian society, were linked 
only to Latvians. The popular motto of the Third Awakening – “We want to be 
masters in our native land” – was linked in everyday consciousness with the 
readiness to stress Latvian rights, without recognizing the rights and needs of 
others in society. As noted by Elmārs Vēbers, this also became one of the rea-
sons that in the mid-1990s Latvians were unprepared for the idea of a political 
or civic nation “and perceived it negatively and in an intensely overwrought 
fashion”.1 In later years, Latvian public opinion reacted in a similar way, with 
misunderstanding and suspicion, towards the ratification of the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities. The aforementioned dis-
positions played an important role in the process of mass mobilization during 
the “singing revolution,” but after independence sometimes became a hindrance 
to attaining social stability. 
In contrast to Latvian identity, the identity of Latvia’s Russian-speakers in 
the Soviet period was characterized by all the features of a “normal” identity 
in which socio-economic affiliations override the importance of ethnic origin, 
language or cultural background. At the basis of this was the primacy of a 
historically determined identification with the state over ethnicity, as well as 
the advantages enjoyed in the Soviet Union by Russian-speakers, which often 
acquired the status of self-understood axioms in everyday consciousness. 
Vladislavs Volkovs, who has written widely on the identity of Latvia’s Russians, 
calls this characteristic “ethnic nihilism”.2 Insofar as socio-economic priorities 
dominated over specifically ethnic ones in the consciousness of Russians during 
the period of the “singing revolution” and the initial years of independence, 
these priorities did not conflict with the efforts of Latvians to achieve the resto-
ration of independence as a decisively important precondition for ensuring the 
defence of their culture and language. This prevented the emergence of ethnic 
conflict in the early 1990s and created a peculiar “inertia of normality” which 
largely ensured the peaceful evolution of events in the revolutionary period of 
1988–1991 and the first years after independence.
This distinguishes the situation in Latvia from that in former Yugoslavia, 
where all the major ethnic groups, including the Serbs, saw their existence as 
threatened, though often on openly mythological and irrational foundations. 
Thus, a clash of “minorities” was created, which had tragic consequences for 
 1 Elmārs Vēbers (2007), ‘Vai teiksim ardievas sabiedrības integrācijai?’ in Leo Dribins, ed., 
Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: cēloņi un sekas. Riga: LU Filozofijas un socioloģijas 
institūts, pg. 119. 
 2 Vladislavs Volkovs (1996), Krievi Latvijā. Riga: LZA Filozofijas un socioloģijas institūts, 
pg. 67. 
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the history of the peoples of Yugoslavia. Over the course of the 1990s, as a 
consequence of the transformation in Latvia, the identity of Latvia’s Russians 
slowly evolved into that of a minority which has to actively stand up for its 
language and cultural rights. The potential for ethnic mobilization on the part 
of Latvia’s Russians was illustrated most clearly in the broad protests against 
education reform in 2003–2004.
With regard to the preconditions for integration policy, one must also men-
tion demographic and socio-economic factors, which, in certain aspects, created 
a more benevolent environment for the implementation of integration policy in 
comparison with the other Baltic states. In demographic terms, the peculiari-
ties of settlement patterns of Latvia’s inhabitants and the related differences 
in cultural and economic processes in comparison with Estonia and Lithuania 
should be mentioned. In contrast to North-eastern Estonia, for example, Latvia 
historically has not witnessed the emergence of whole regions (certain parishes 
in the eastern province of Latgale are the exception) in which minorities live 
compactly and in isolation from Latvians. Minorities in Latvia are rather evenly 
spread throughout the whole of Latvia’s territory, particularly in the cities. 
Latvia traditionally has had a rather high rate of ethnic inter-marriage: of all 
Latvian males entering marriage in 2008, for example, 20.0% married outside 
their ethnic group, while the same holds true for 19.8% of Latvian women.3 
In Estonia, by contrast, only 9–10% of Estonians enter exogamous marriages. 
In contrast to Estonia, Latvia has not witnessed the emergence of significant 
socio-economic differences between ethnic communities, particularly with 
regard to income levels. Ethnic origin is not strongly correlated with poverty, 
which affects Latvians and minorities equally (see Mihails Hazans’ and Feli-
ciana Rajevska’s chapters below).
The ability of political forces to ensure the implementation of policy ac-
ceptable to the most significant groups in society would have a crucial impact 
on subsequent integration policy. For the first time since the tragic events of 
the summer of 1940, the opportunities for relatively free competition between 
political forces emerged in Latvia with the epic process of transformation in 
the Soviet Union accompanying Gorbachev’s perestroika and the “singing 
revolution” that followed. 
The Heritage of the Years of the “Singing Revolution” 
Regarding Integration 
During the years of the “singing revolution” two paths towards independ-
ence were actively debated in Latvia’s public sphere. The first can be called 
the “socially realistic” path, which was represented by the Popular Front of 
 3 For these data and those from other years, see the home page of the Central Statistical 
Bureau of Latvia at www.csb.gov.lv. 
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Latvia (PFL), the largest and most influential national democratic organization 
in Latvia founded on 8 October 1988. In its first programme of 1988, it stressed: 
“the PFL promotes and consolidates the efforts of all of Latvia’s inhabitants, 
regardless of their social status, language, party, religious or national affiliation, 
to democratize society and further its moral renewal”.4 The first generation of 
leaders of the PFL were well aware of the complicated nature of ethnic rela-
tions in Latvia and implemented a moderate and realistic policy which took 
into consideration post-war demographic changes and stressed the consolida-
tion of all inhabitants of Latvia on the road to sovereignty within a renewed 
Soviet Union, then, after the appeal of the PFL board on 31 May 1989, towards 
complete independence from the Soviet Union. The congresses of the PFL in 
1988 and 1989 offered a national programme oriented towards unifying all of 
Latvia’s inhabitants, based on the realization that the renewal of independence 
would be possible only with the active support of members of all of Latvia’s 
ethnic groups. In this regard, the PFL assigned great importance to informing 
minorities about Latvia’s history and current social and political events. To 
meet this end, the Russian edition of the PFL newspaper “Atmoda” (“Awaken-
ing”) was published and a team of lecturers was created to conduct outreach 
work. The PFL adopted a stand on citizenship issues that respected post-war 
reality – it advocated granting citizenship to all permanent residents who had 
lived in Latvia at least ten years. 
The other, “legalistic” path for attaining independence was represented by 
the Citizens Committees of the Republic of Latvia and the Citizen’s Congress. 
Following the example of the Citizen’s Congress of the Republic of Estonia, 
the citizen’s movement emerged in spring 1989 and elections to the Citizens’ 
Congress took place in April 1990. A detailed analysis of the activities of the 
Citizen’s Congress from 1990 through its closure in 1993 falls beyond the 
purview of this chapter. The most important point here is that the Citizens’ 
Committee and Congress emphasized legal continuity and the illegal nature of 
the Soviet occupation, and thus, viewed all persons who settled in Latvia after 
17 June 1940 as illegal immigrants who either had to leave Latvia or receive 
resident permits from authorized representatives of the Latvian state. In Octo-
ber 1990 the newspaper of the Citizens’ Committee Pilsonis (Citizen) praised 
the efforts of Estonian militants in trying to achieve a forced resettlement of 
post-war settlers: “While the minds of many respected Latvians here and in 
exile are busy with the issue of how to include the colonists by granting them 
citizen’s rights, our cool-headed and more farsighted northern neighbours are 
thinking more about how, in as civilized and polite a manner as possible, to get 
rid of these uninvited guests.”5 Clearly, in the context of this approach, the very 
 4 Latvijas Tautas fronte (1989), Latvijas Tautas fronte. Gads pirmais. Riga: LTF, pg. 208. 
 5 ‘Imigrantu piespiedu izsūtīšana – optimālais risinājums,’ Pilsonis, No. 7, 16 October 1990, 
pg. 1.
Juris Rozenvalds. The Soviet Heritage and Integration Policy Development Since .. 39
idea of integrating post-war “colonists” was unacceptable in principle. From 
the perspective of the Citizen’s Committee, first the rights of the citizens of 
the Republic of Latvia and their descendents needed to be restored. Then the 
activists in the citizen’s movement hoped for the mass emigration of minorities 
that would bring Latvia back to pre-war demographic proportions. 
However, during the years of the “singing revolution,” the realistic platform 
of the PFL predominated. Pressure from the central structures of the USSR and 
imperialistic forces within Latvia played an important role. At the beginning of 
January 1989, as a counterforce to the PFL, the International Workers’ Front 
of Latvia was created, and it subsequently participated in the creation of the 
USSR United Workers’ Front in summer 1989. At the same time, the Com-
munist Party of Latvia (CPL) was initially oriented towards cooperation with 
the PFL, as evidenced, for example, by the presentation of CPL First Secretary 
Jānis Vagris at the demonstration “For a Law-Based State” on 7 October 1988, 
as well by the fact that about 1/3 of the delegates to the first PFL congress were 
CPL members. However, gradually, as the stance of the PFL radicalized and the 
influence of conservative forces in the CPL grew, in particular after the split of 
the CPL, relations became confrontational. 
At the time, the Russian-speaking part of society in Latvia was not politi-
cally united, though, as Nils Muižnieks has noted, even progressive Russian-
speakers had serious misgivings about the policy of the PFL (not to mention 
more radical nationalist organizations), which had at its core liberal nationalism 
and an emphasis on the priority of the Latvian nation.6 However, according to 
the assessment of Juris Dreifelds, only 20–30% of Russian-speakers supported 
the efforts of the conservative forces to renew the Soviet era status quo.7 So-
ciological surveys demonstrated that in 1990 39% of all minority respondents 
supported Latvian independence.8 On 3 March 1991 a referendum on Latvian 
independence took place as a means to outmanoeuvre the USSR central authori-
ties, who planned to organize a referendum on saving the Union on 17 March. 
The all-Union referendum was meant to be a negative answer to the issue of 
“freeing” the Baltic states. 
In the Latvian poll all permanent residents over the age of 18 in Latvia 
could participate and answer the question “Are you for a democratic and in-
dependent Republic of Latvia?” The voting list consisted of 1,902,802 inhab-
itants of Latvia, 1,666,128 participated (87.56%), and 1,227,562 or 73.68% 
 6 Nils Muižnieks (1993), ‘Latvia: Origins, Evolution and Triumph,’ in Ian Bremmer and Ray 
Taras (eds.), Nations and Politics in the Soviet Successor States. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pg. 196. 
 7 Juris Dreifelds (1996), Latvia in Transition. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
pg. 69. 
 8 Brigita Zepa (1992), ‘Sabiedriskā doma pārējas periodā Latvijā: latviešu un cittautiešu 
uzskatu dinamika (1989–1992),’ Latvijas Zinātņu akadēmijas vēstis. A daļa, Nr. 10 (543), 
pg. 22.
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voted in favour while 411,374 or 24.69% voted against. The Latvian poll has 
been interpreted in diverse ways. Some authors have seen it as an example of 
ethnic voting which testified that “among minority voters there was a trend of 
voting against Latvia’s independence or not participating in the ballot.”9 It is 
hard to agree completely with this interpretation. Undoubtedly, the majority of 
persons belonging to minorities saw in the events of the “singing revolution” 
the strong interest of Latvians and generally adopted a neutral stance towards 
them (which, given the previous experience of Russification, was an achieve-
ment on the part of Latvia’s democratic forces). However, the share of voting 
age persons in the entire population who voted for independence (64.51%) was 
significantly (around 12%) greater than the share of Latvians in the total popu-
lation (52.05% in the 1989 census), which suggests that a significant segment 
of the minority population – at least one fourth – voted for Latvian independ-
ence on 3 March 1991. On this indicator, Latvia outdid Lithuania, where the 
share of those voting for independence was about the same as the Lithuanian 
share in the total population, and Estonia, where the share of those voting for 
independence was only a few percentage points higher than the Estonian share 
in the population. 
In line with the spirit of the ideas of the PFL, on 19 March 1991 the Su-
preme Council adopted a law “On the free development of Latvia’s national and 
ethnic groups and their rights to cultural autonomy”. Adoption of the law was 
significant, as it promoted the activities of minorities and the creation of cultural 
societies. Later the law would be criticized for lacking an institutional mecha-
nism and for containing certain norms that were impossible to implement.10 As 
Ilga Apine has noted, “the law was later criticized for being declaratory, but it 
moved things forward at the time.”11 
In 1990 and the first eight months of 1991 a situation emerged spontane-
ously that was quite favourable towards deepening processes of integration and 
institutionalizing them. One can agree with Elmārs Vēbers that, “the idea of the 
unity of society has its own pre-history here in Latvia and one does not need to 
search for an external confirmation for it, as stressed by those politicians who 
believe that the idea of social unity was imposed on us by foreign countries and 
international organizations”.12 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that 
the beginnings of integration created during the “singing revolution” were not 
 9 Gatis Puriņš and Uģis Šulcs (2001), ‘Vai 2001. gada Rīgas Domes vēlēšanu rezultāti bija 
pārsteigums (etniskie balsojumi, atskatoties uz 1991. gada 3. marta aptaujas pieredzi)’, 
available at http://home.lanet.lv/~politics/raksti/3.MARTS/3.MARTS.htm.
10 Vēbers, ‘Vai teiksim ardievas sabiedrības integrācijai?’, pg. 117. 
11 Ilga Apine (2008), ‘Latvijas etnopolitiskā attīstība neatkarības gados’ in Leo Dribins, 
ed., Sabiedrības integrācijas tendences un prettendences. Latvijas un Igaunijas pieredze. 
Etnisko attiecību aspekts. Riga: LU akadēmiskais apgāds, pg. 10. 
12 Vēbers, ‘Vai teiksim ardievas sabiedrības integrācijai?’, pg. 117. 
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developed further. On the contrary, much of what had been attained was lost 
in the first years after the restoration of independence. 
The First Years of Integration (Non-)Policy in 
Renewed Latvia, 1991–1997
In the first years of independence, Latvia did not have a coherent integra-
tion policy. It is possible to speak of separate, indirectly connected policies that 
significantly, but for the most part negatively, influenced spontaneous proc-
esses of integration in society. The first that should be mentioned is changes 
in citizenship policy, which took place not long after the restoration of true 
independence on 21 August 1991. Though the events of the previous years 
laid the groundwork for independence, such rapid success came suddenly due 
to a coincidence of various circumstances that were extremely favourable to 
the Baltic republics. One can agree with the assessment of Dainis Īvāns, the 
first chairman of the Popular Front, of the events of August 1991: “Of course, 
everything was decided in Moscow, and thank God for that”.13 The weakness of 
our eastern neighbour and the defeat of the pro-imperialistic forces in Latvia, 
which was most clearly demonstrated by the decisions of the parliament on 
suspending the activities of the Communist Party and the Interfront on 24 
August 1991 and the subsequent ban on 10 September, rapidly decreased the 
external and internal pressure. This, in turn, became one of the most important 
factors that furthered the political elite’s rapid resort to solutions deriving from 
the “legalistic” path for attaining independence. 
On 15 October 1991 the parliament, in contradiction to the programme of 
the PFL then in force, adopted a decision to restore citizenship to those inhabit-
ants of Latvia who had it before 17 June 1940 and their descendants. Though 
the decision renewed citizenship regardless of ethnicity, it created the basis for 
the division of Latvia’s inhabitants into “us” and “them”, in which the latter 
were almost solely post-war non-Latvian settlers. Thus, as Ilga Apine has noted, 
ethnonationalism became the basis for ethnopolitics.14 The 15 October 1991 
decision pushed aside those non-Latvians who voted for the PFL in the March 
1990 elections to the LSSR Supreme Soviet and for Latvian independence in 
the referendum of 3 March 1991. Given the generous pre-referendum promises, 
such a step had a destructive impact – the action of Latvian politicians in the 
fall of 1991 provided a basis for the conviction that is still widespread among 
many non-Latvians that they had simply been deceived.
13 Jānis Škapars, ed. (1998), ‘Augusta pučs Latvijā. Diskusija: I. Godmanis, D. Īvāns, 
J. Dinēvičs, J. Škapars’, in Latvijas tautas fronte. 1988–1991. Riga: Apgāds Jāņa sēta, 
pg. 263. 
14 Apine, ‘Latvijas etnopolitiskā attīstība neatkarības gados,’ pg. 11. 
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If the restoration of citizenship was logical, a problem at the legislative 
level was the lack of a citizenship law until 1994, which meant that naturaliza-
tion during this period was not possible. Those inhabitants of Latvia who lost 
their civic rights with the 15 October decision had to wait for the clarification 
of their status until 1995, when the law “On the status of those former USSR 
citizens who are not citizens of Latvia or any other state” was adopted. The 
distribution of non-citizen passports began only in 1997. 
The beginnings of integration policy developed very slowly for a variety of 
reasons. In the beginning of the 1990s, many members of the Latvian political 
elite nurtured the conviction that the solution to inter-ethnic relations lay in the 
return migration of many non-Latvians to their places of origin, first of all, to 
Russia. Soon after independence, the issue of the withdrawal of Russian troops 
and the closure of the strategically important Skrunda early warning radar 
station was high on the Latvian-Russian bilateral agenda, as well as Latvia’s 
domestic policy agenda. The forerunner of the Russian army – the Red army – 
was linked in Latvian eyes to the violent incorporation of Latvia into the Soviet 
Union. Moreover, the 50,000–80,000 Soviet military pensioners in Latvia (in-
cluding 22,000 retired officers) had in previous years enjoyed unjustified (in the 
eyes of the majority) privileges. This created a favourable atmosphere for the 
emergence of hopes in the mass departure of non-Latvians. Radical nationalist 
political rhetoric and the activities of certain state institutions kindled these 
hopes. For example, the Citizenship and Immigration Department refused to 
include more than 100,000 inhabitants into the population register based on 
their (often imagined) links to the Soviet army and consistently ignored court 
rulings on the violation of their rights. The results of this policy were not long 
in coming – in the early to mid-1990s, close to 200,000 people departed from 
Latvia, with 52,000 leaving in 1992 alone. As Ilze Brands Kehris has noted, 
“contradictory political signals (including the discourse of deoccupation and 
the promotion of repatriation as mandated by law)” played a certain role in 
creating the public frame of mind in both the 1990s and now.15 The Law on 
Repatriation adopted in 1995, alongside the goals of promoting the return to 
Latvia of people of Latvian and Liv origin, also set the goal of “promoting the 
voluntary return of non-Latvians to their ethnic homeland”.16
There was no room for the creation of a long-term integration policy in 
such an atmosphere, even more so as citizenship, language and education 
policy in the early and mid-1990s were all created in line with this spirit. As 
indicated by Estonian researcher Priit Jarve, one of the additional goals of strict 
language and citizenship policy in both Estonia and Latvia was to promote the 
15 Ilze Brands-Kehre and Ilvija Pūce (2005), ‘Politiskā nācija un pilsonība’ in Juris Rozenvalds, 
ed., Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija? Demokrātijas audits. Riga: LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, 
pg. 25. 
16 See http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=37187.
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departure of Russian-speakers.17 Thus, policy towards minorities in the early 
and mid-1990s embodied the coexistence of overcoming the injustices and 
inter-ethnic disproportions created by Soviet rule with the abandonment of the 
preconditions for social consolidation that were created during the years of the 
“singing revolution.” 
In the early 1990s, the main topic of political discussion was the citizenship 
law. Based on the assumption that the Supreme Council which was elected on 
the basis of another principle had no right to draft restored Latvia’s legislation 
on citizenship issues, real work on preparing a citizenship law began only when 
the newly elected parliament convened in July 1993. In September 1993 five 
different draft citizenship laws were submitted in parliament. At first, the draft 
law was based on the idea of quotas, which envisaged determining the number 
of new citizens depending on the natural rate of increase among citizens. On 
21 June 1994, 66 out of 100 parliamentary deputies voted to adopt a citizenship 
law with quotas. President Guntis Ulmanis did not promulgate the law and sent 
it back to parliament for review. 
On 22 July 1994, 58 members of parliament supported a citizenship law 
without quotas, but with a timetable that would allow naturalization to begin 
first with the youngest applicants for citizenship, denying this right to the most 
motivated group of middle-aged persons. Subsequent events demonstrated that 
the 1994 law was not capable of effectively fulfilling its functions – there was 
a glaring contradiction between the objective necessity of creating the oppor-
tunity for post-war settlers to integrate into political life and the legislators’ 
desire to slow the naturalization process to a minimum. After the acquisition 
of citizenship through naturalization began in 1995, it turned out that the pace 
was incredibly slow – only 7% of those who had the right to submit applica-
tions from 1995 through 1997 used that right.18 
Similar trends set the tone in language and education policy at this time. 
They were marked by efforts to strengthen pressure on the Russian language and 
ensure the functioning of Latvian as the state language. Latvian was enshrined 
as the state language as early as 6 October 1988, when the Supreme Soviet of 
the LSSR adopted amendments to the republic’s constitution. On 5 May 1989 
the Law on Languages of the LSSR was adopted granting Russian the status of 
the language of inter-ethnic communication. The Latvian parliament rescinded 
this norm on 31 March 1992. 
17 Priit Jarve (2003), ‘Language Battles in the Baltic States: from 1989–2002,” in Farimah 
Daftary and Francois Grin (eds.), Nation-Building, Ethnicity and Language Politics in 
Transition Countries. Budapest: LGI, pg. 82. 
18 Jekaterina Dorodnova (2003), Challenging Ethnic Democracy. Implementation of the 
Recommendations of the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities to Latvia, 
1993–2001. Hamburg: Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of 
Hamburg. Working paper 10, pg. 43, available at http://www.core-hamburg.de/documents/
CORE_Working_Paper_10.pdf.
44 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
In the mid-1990s, a new law on the State Language was drafted which 
was adopted in 1999. This law placed minority languages on the same level as 
foreign languages and did not in any way regulate the use of these languages 
in Latvia. This evoked criticism from both local experts and international or-
ganizations, who pointed out that this was in contradiction to the Framework 
Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which Latvia signed in 
1995 but ratified only 10 years later. This contradiction is still not resolved. 
Thus, there is a certain basis to the impression of relations between the Latvian 
language and other languages as a zero-sum game in which the gains of the 
Latvian language have come at the expense of other languages.
In the realm of education policy, events developed according to a similar 
scenario. As noted by Ilze Brands Kehris, the Soviet Union bequeathed to 
Latvia a segregated school system in which schools with Latvian and Rus-
sian languages of instruction coexisted. The largest challenge in the realm of 
minority education, therefore, was not the introduction of minority language 
training, but acquisition of the state language while permitting minorities to 
maintain their language, culture and identity.19 At the end of the 1980s and the 
beginning of the 1990s, Polish, Jewish, Ukrainian, Belarusian, Lithuanian and 
Estonian schools were created, though they attracted less than one percent of 
all students. In the first half of the 1990s the co-existence of parallel Latvian 
and Russian language schools continued, though state pressure on Russian lan-
guage education institutions gradually grew. While guaranteeing the acquisition 
of education in Latvian, the 1991 Education law envisaged the possibility of 
education in minority languages as well. Amendments to the Law on Education 
drafted in 1995 held that “in general education minority schools in which the 
language of instruction is not Latvian, instruction in at least two subjects in 
the humanities or the sciences must take place in grades 1 through 9 and three 
subjects in grades 10 through 12.”20 Beginning in 2006, all teachers were re-
quired to have a Latvian proficiency at the highest level, and teachers in Russian 
language schools became special magnets for the attention of the State Lan-
guage centre and its inspectorate. However, education issues were not a topic 
at the top of the public agenda, especially while there were still widespread 
hopes that non-Latvians would leave Latvia en masse. When it became clear 
that the vast majority of non-Latvians would remain in Latvia, when Western 
pressure destroyed the hope that the naturalization of post-war settlers could 
be delayed indefinitely, the issue of the Latvian state’s relationship with a large 
part of its inhabitants entered centre stage. Given the important of language 
19  Ilze Brands-Kehre and Ilvija Pūce (2005), ‘Nationhood and Identity’. In Juris Rozenvalds, 
ed., How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy. Riga: University of Latvia Press, 
pg. 27. 
20 See http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=36364&from=off.
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in Latvian identity, the issue of the language of instruction in schools rapidly 
gained importance. 
In the mid 1990s Latvia’s northern neighbour Estonia rushed ahead of 
Latvia in elaborating a social integration programme. As a result of cooperation 
between the Estonian government and the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (UNDP), in 1997 the first drafts of a programme were prepared. That 
same year the first Minister for Population and Ethnic Affairs was appointed. 
On 2 March 1999 the Estonian government adopted an integration programme 
entitled “The Integration of non-Estonians into Estonian society.” Developments 
in Estonia had a big impact on debates in Latvia in 1998 and 1999.21 
The political processes of 1991 to 1997 created several stable dispositions 
among the Latvian political elite with regard to integration issues that continue 
to have contemporary significance. For one, the Latvian part of the political elite 
showed very little interest in integration issues and did not trust minorities. As 
suggested by elite research in 2003, only 5% of Latvian elite representatives 
thought that minority rights issues were important, while the figure for members 
of the Russian-speaking elite was 60%. While 90% of the Russian-speaking 
elite were convinced of the loyalty of Latvia’s Russians towards Latvia, the 
figure among members of the Latvian political elite was only 20%.22
In the first years after independence a chronic problem in Latvian politics 
became the inability and lack of desire of the power holders to create and 
maintain dialogue with the opposition. This pertains to both relations between 
different Latvian political groupings, as well as to relations between the political 
elite and the rest of society, but was most fully reflected in relations with mi-
norities. Given the fact that the majority of Latvia’s minorities are comprised of 
post-war settlers, the search for compromise was often perceived by the political 
elite and a significant segment of Latvian society as the betrayal of national 
interests. Thus, since the beginning of the 1990s, the notion that only Latvian 
politicians know what Russians should want has dominated the thinking of the 
Latvian political elite. From this flows the conviction that Russian-speakers 
should accept unconditionally the rules of the game being offered to them.23 
Since the early 1990s, the Latvian political elite has not been united regarding 
integration issues either. Researchers from the University of Latvia’s Institute 
of Philosophy and Sociology concluded in 2001 that the leading party politi-
cians “express very divergent views on social integration.”24 Five years later, 
21 n.a. (1998), Nacionālās attiecības un nacionālā politika Latvijā: Domas un vērtējumi 
Latvijas inteliģences apvienības XIX konferencē 1998. gada 4. aprīlī. Riga: LIA, pg. 11. 
22 Anton Steen and Brigita Zepa (2003), ‘Latvijas elite pārmaiņu laikā’, available on the 
home page of the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences at http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/
resources/elitesPetij/Elite.pdf.
23 Juris Rozenvalds (2002), ‘Monologu kultūras krīze’ published on politika.lv on 3 January 
2002, available at http://www.politika.lv/temas/sabiedribas_integracija/3852/. 
24 Elmārs Vēbers et al., Etnopolitika Latvijā. Riga: ELPA, pg. 47. 
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the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences came to a similar conclusion in research 
entitled Integration Practice and Perspectives.25
Since the beginning of the 1990s, a characteristic trait of the Latvian politi-
cal elite has been its weakness, which is manifested in the inability to adopt 
balanced strategic decisions in which the interests of state are placed higher 
than short-term considerations of political gain. As a consequence, many sig-
nificant political decisions since the restoration of independence, in particular 
those affecting relations between Latvia’s largest communities, attained their 
final form not as a result of the conscious decisions of Latvian politicians, but 
rather as the result of external pressure. 
All the foregoing hindered the elaboration of a far-sighted and consistent 
policy. Given the disagreements within the elite and the majority’s lack of in-
terest about integration issues, the impetus for formulating integration policy 
came to Latvia from foreign partners: international organizations and foreign 
foundations. 
Western Influences on Integration Policy
The main international players in Latvia in the early 1990s were the OSCE 
Mission to Latvia, the OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities, the 
Council of Europe, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) 
office in Latvia, and the Soros Foundation – Latvia. When Latvia approached 
accession to the European Union and NATO, the stance of these organizations 
became very significant in raising awareness about integration issues and un-
derlining the necessity of elaborating integration policy. 
UNDP, which began its operations in Latvia in 1992, had an essential role 
in assisting in the development of a Latvian language training programme as 
well as in setting the groundwork for integration policy. The Law on Language 
was significantly amended in 1992, envisaging language requirements for many 
posts in the public and private sectors. This threatened to create tension in so-
ciety, as many Russian-speakers did not know the language and could be laid 
off from work. When the Citizenship Law was adopted, insufficient language 
proficiency prevented many from naturalizing in the early years. In 1994 the 
Latvian government turned to UNDP and requested the formation of an expert 
mission to help elaborate a draft Latvian language training programme. This 
programme was adopted by the government on 1 November 1995. In the first 
four years, the National Programme for Latvian Language Training worked 
under the auspices of UNDP, using its wide experience, professional skills, and 
traditions of administering large programmes. Implementation was so success-
ful that in the second stage after 1998 the programme attracted funding from 
25 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas. Riga: BISS, available at 
http://www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/integracijas_prakse/brosura_LV.pdf.
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the European Union, Sweden, Finland, Norway, Denmark, the Netherlands, 
and Canada.26 In 2001 administrative oversight and responsibility for attaining 
programmatic goals was taken over by the Latvian Ministry of Education and 
Science. 
Another important UNDP contribution to promoting integration issues and 
addressing them is linked to the publication of Human Development Reports in 
Latvia. The first report in 1995 had a chapter on the “Creation of a Multiethnic 
Society in Latvia,” which touched upon integration. The 1997 report, in turn, 
devoted a special chapter with a detailed analysis of inter-ethnic relations and 
recommended elaborating a long-term integration programme.27 
The Soros Foundation – Latvia, for its part, funded most of the research 
on ethnic relations in the early and mid-1990s, including many projects by the 
researchers of the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology (Elmārs Vēbers, Leo 
Dribins, Ilga Apine, Vladislavs Volkovs) and the large research project “On the 
Way to a Civil Society.” It sought to support NGOs working in spheres related 
to integration, including the creation of the Latvian Centre for Human Rights 
and Ethnic Studies in 1993, the creation of the Public Policy Centre Providus 
in 2002, as well as many projects implemented by the Naturalization Board 
and schools.28 
However, European organizations had the greatest impact on the beginnings 
of integration policy, especially the Organization (until 1995, Conference) on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Given the wide membership of 
the organization and its unique experience in promoting inter-state cooperation, 
the OSCE became a very significant player in Latvia’s domestic policy. The im-
portance of the OSCE grew in the context of the desire of Latvia and the other 
Baltic States to be free of the Russian military presence as soon as possible. 
At the OSCE Helsinki summit in 1992, Russia agreed to OSCE supervision of 
the troop withdrawal, demanding in return a more active OSCE engagement 
in addressing the status of the Russian-speaking population, in particular in 
Latvia and Estonia. 
For this kind of supervision to be implemented, at the end of 1992 the 
OSCE agreed to create the post of High Commissioner on National Minorities 
(HCNM) and appointed as first HCNM Max van der Stoel, a diplomat from 
the Netherlands. Supervision was carried out through regular country visits, 
correspondence, as well as through the OSCE field mission, which worked in 
Latvia from the fall of 1993 to the end of 2001. Its mandate stressed addressing 
citizenship issues and preparing monthly reports to OSCE member states on the 
situation in Latvia. The HCNM’s primary goal was early prevention of conflict 
26 Patrice C. MacMahon (2007), Taming Ethnic Hatred: Ethnic Cooperation and Transnational 
Networks in Eastern Europe. Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, pg. 174.
27 Nils Muižnieks, ed., (1997), Latvia Human Development Report 1997. Riga: UNDP, 
pg. 65. 
28 See MacMahon, Taming Ethnic Hatred, pp. 140–177. 
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and timely action to address tensions. In the first half year of his mandate, van 
der Stoel visited Riga twice and in April 1993 sent Latvian foreign minister 
Georgs Andrejevs a letter with recommendations to accelerate the adoption of 
a citizenship law which envisaged moderate demands of applicants for citizen-
ship. Five different parliamentary factions submitted their own draft Laws on 
Citizenship, ranging from the de facto denial of any naturalization whatsoever 
to the “zero option” of granting citizenship to everyone. In this context, the 
proposals put forth by Latvia’s Way and the People’s Harmony factions con-
taining annual naturalization quotas appeared moderate. In this situation, the 
HCNM had a broad playing field in which he worked alone as well as in close 
cooperation with the leadership and experts of the Council of Europe. 
Latvia had already in September 1991 submitted an application to join the 
Council of Europe, which had made adopting an acceptable citizenship law one 
of the main preconditions for Latvia’s membership. The Latvian side actively 
involved Council of Europe experts in discussions about the draft Law on Citi-
zenship in the preparatory phases. Partially as a result of this involvement, as 
well as due to the demarches of both the Council of Europe and the European 
Union, president Guntis Ulmanis returned the initial law to parliament for 
review. As a consequence, Latvian deputies adopted a more restrictive form of 
a compromise proposal put forth by the HCNM which envisaged naturalization 
“windows” setting a timetable for applicants based on their age. 
Thus, the Latvian political elite avoided the risk of leading the country 
into international isolation and Latvia was accepted into the Council of Europe 
on 10 February 1995. However, the desire of the HCNM and representatives 
of other international organizations to see in the Law on Citizenship a piece 
of legislation demonstrating that Latvia fully took into account the interests 
of minorities remained unfulfilled. Immediately after its creation in 1994, the 
Naturalization Board came under the watchful eyes of the OSCE Mission and 
the HCNM, which both urged Latvia over the coming years to take various steps 
to promote naturalization by liberalizing requirements, organizing language 
courses, informing non-citizens and adopting an integration policy.29 
As noted earlier, the pace of naturalization in 1995–1997 was very slow 
and the idea of the naturalization “windows” turned out to be an unnecessary 
hindrance, as the stance of Latvia’s non-citizens towards the naturalization 
process, and with it, the political integration process as a whole, turned out to 
be reserved, at best. This is why the work of the HCNM from 1996 through 
1998 was geared towards urging the Latvian authorities to rescind the “win-
dows” system. In 1996 and 1997 clear support for this stand was expressed 
by the European Union, the Council of Europe, NATO and other international 
29 The work of the OSCE Mission to Latvia has not been well documented. The work of the 
OSCE HNM is analysed in detail in Dorodnova, Challenging Ethnic Democracy.
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organizations. In 1997 the European Union clearly linked admittance to the 
European Union with decreasing the number of non-citizens. 
The main problem in relations with the OSCE and other international 
organizations was the stance of the Latvian political elite, which, on the one 
hand, believed that only cooperation with western countries and rapid integra-
tion in western structures could ensure Latvia’s long-term independence. On 
the other hand, there was a gulf between the nationalist convictions of most 
of the Latvian political elite and western recommendations in the realm of 
ethnopolitics. This led to a situation in which adhering to western standards 
was seen as a forced measure, a heavy price Latvia had to pay for the political 
support of western states. When Fatherland and Freedom representative Guntars 
Krasts became prime minister in July 1997, it was difficult to hope that the 
idea of rescinding the naturalization “windows” and the necessity of creating a 
systematic integration policy would garner political support. This process could 
only be accelerated through the intensification of external pressure that would 
make Latvian politicians more responsive to the recommendations of Western 
partners. This happened in 1997 and 1998. 
The 1997–1998 Crisis: The Beginnings of an 
Integration Policy
In 1997 and 1998 crisis situations emerged in several of Latvia’s external 
and internal policy realms. In 1997 in Luxembourg European Union leaders 
adopted a decision to extend invitations for membership negotiations with six 
candidate countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Cyprus, Poland, Slovenia and 
Hungary. Latvia was not in their number. Though a number of Latvian politi-
cians denied the link between the European Commission’s decision and Latvia’s 
social integration problems, the publication on 15 July 1997 of the European 
Commission’s report Agenda 2000 testified to the contrary. The report clearly 
indicated that “Latvia needs to take measures to accelerate naturalisation pro-
cedures to enable Russian-speaking non-citizens to become better integrated 
into Latvian society’.30 In 1997 and 1998 international organizations and influ-
ential western countries engaged in an unprecedented, coordinated campaign 
to pressure the Latvian authorities to rescind the naturalization “windows” 
system. This pressure from the West was suddenly compounded by problems 
with Latvia’s eastern neighbour. 
An escalation of tension was caused by extremist activities. On 6 June 
1997 an explosion rocked Victory Park in Riga. Two members of the extrem-
ist Aizsargi organization were killed in the explosion with which they tried to 
30 Agenda 2000 – Commission Opinion on Latvia’s Application for Membership of the 
European Union, pg.19, available at http://www.mfa.gov.lv/data/file/e/kom-kart-zin-1997.
pdf. 
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destroy the monument to the “Liberators of Soviet Latvia and Riga.” Russian 
media commented widely on this incident, and the Russian Duma adopted a 
special announcement. 
At the beginning of 1998, the crisis in relations with Russia deepened. On 
3 March 1998 several hundred pensioners, mostly Russian-speakers, organized 
an unauthorized demonstration in front of the Riga City Council. When the 
police used excessive force to clear the demonstrators from a street they were 
blocking, Russia reacted sharply, and inter-state tensions grew. Russian foreign 
Minister Evgeny Primakov and Russian presidential press secretary Sergei 
Yastrezhembsky accused Latvia of serious human rights violations and urged 
the international community to intervene to regulate the situation in Latvia, 
particularly with regard to the situation of Russian-speakers. This time it was 
not merely the usual rhetoric of Russian officials, as western allies were also 
deeply concerned about the situation. The atmosphere was further exacerbated 
by the marking of the 55th anniversary of the Latvian Legion, in which state 
officials and parliamentary deputies participated, as well as by explosions by 
unknown perpetrators near the Riga synagogue and the Russian embassy. 
In this context Latvia’s western partners – both influential countries and 
international organizations – sought to soften the consequences of Russia’s reac-
tion, but also to intensify the pressure on the Latvian political elite by urging 
it to express a clearer position on these events and to finally take real steps 
towards the consolidation of society. In this situation, the Latvian political elite 
understood that absent a change in policy, Latvia could lose the political support 
of western countries. On 31 March 1998 Prime Minister Guntars Krasts created 
a working group composed of four ministers (Foreign Affairs, Education and 
Science, Justice, and Culture) under the leadership of deputy prime minister 
Juris Kaksītis to draft a national programme for the integration of society 
In mid-April 1998, at the invitation of Prime Minister Krasts, OSCE HCNM 
Max van der Stoel visited Riga one more time (his 11th visit). During his visit 
the Latvian government adopted a decision supporting in principle the elimina-
tion of the naturalization “windows”. In mid and late 1998 a number of other 
significant steps linked to integration issues were taken at the legislative level. 
On 22 June 1998 the parliament adopted amendments to the Law on Citizenship 
easing naturalization, eliminating the “windows” and permitting non-citizen 
children born after 1991 to be registered as Latvian citizens. 
However, the struggle was not yet over. After the adoption of the amend-
ments to the Law on Citizenship, opponents of the changes halted their prom-
ulgation and began to gather signatures for a referendum, which was supported 
by more than 1/10 of the number of citizens who had been eligible to vote in 
the previous parliamentary elections. On 3 October 1998 a referendum on the 
amendments to the Law on Citizenship took place together with the parliamen-
tary elections. The public demonstrated massive interest, as the referendum 
had the highest participation of any such ballot in Latvian history – 97.14% of 
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those who had participated in the previous parliamentary election voted in the 
referendum.31 Though supporters and opponents of the amendments to the Law 
on Citizenship were divided roughly equally (44.98% voted for rescinding the 
changes, while 52.54% voted against rescinding the changes), the amendments 
stood and entered into force. 
The response of nationalist political forces to this development became the 
adoption of a new Education Law on the last day of the parliamentary session 
on 29 October 1998. Article 9 of the law stated that “in state and local govern-
ment education establishments education is acquired in the state language,”32 
pushing the implementation date for this controversial provision to the seem-
ingly distant date of 1 September 2004. As is known, the implementation of this 
provision close to six years after its adoption evoked unprecedented protests on 
the part of Latvia’s Russian-speaking population. These protests were directed 
not so much against the general goal of the education reform – the strengthen-
ing of the situation of the Latvian language in society – as against the methods 
envisioned for achieving this goals and the distinctly paternalistic nature of 
education policy. On the whole, the education reform led to another result that 
was unexpected for the nationalists – the strengthening of civic bonds among 
members of the Russian-speaking population and their transformation from 
a rather amorphous and politically divided group into a well-organized and 
increasingly influential political force. 
The State Language Agency found that among minority graduates of 
schools in 2007 and 2008, “Latvian language proficiency is sufficient for study 
and active participation in social and economic life”33 and interpreted this as 
a positive result of the transition to instruction primarily in the state language 
in state and local government secondary education institutions. However, the 
influence of the education reform on social integration, particularly on mutual 
trust between ethnic communities, is ambiguous. 
The work of researchers in Latvia also promoted the evolution in public 
and elite attitudes in the late 1990s and the beginning of work on preparing a 
social integration programme. An important turning point and the end of the 
illusion that the task of integration would be obviated by the mass emigration 
of minorities from Latvia was the research programme “On the Way to a Civil 
Society” organized by the Naturalization Board with the support of the Soros 
31 The tally is available at the home page of the Central Election Commission at http://web.
cvk.lv/pub/public/27532.html.
32 See http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=50759.
33 See State Language Agency (n.d.), ‘Latviešu valodas prasmes un lietojums augstākās 
izglītības iestādēs. Izglītības reformas rezultāti’, pg. 1. Available at http://www.valoda.
lv/lv/petijumi/veiktiepetijumi. 
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Foundation – Latvia and the National Human Rights Office.34 Two very impor-
tant insights flowed from the research results. First, very few minorities and 
non-citizens planned to leave Latvia. According to the results of the sociological 
survey, 90% of non-citizens and 94% of all citizens planned on remaining in 
Latvia. Second, the research revealed significant differences in the attitudes and 
values of Latvians and minorities, citizens and non-citizens, which threatened to 
make Latvia into a “binational society.” The research prompted the search for 
ways to overcome the values cleavage. As Elmārs Vēbers notes, “the thesis that 
citizenship, education and language policy could be implemented ignoring the 
presence of non-citizens and minorities lost its socio-political relevance.”35 
Preparation of the National Programme for the 
Integration of Society
In the second half of the 1990s, the Ministry of Education and Science and 
other ministries (Welfare, Justice, Interior, Culture) elaborated policy in certain 
realms linked to social integration. However, work on the basic guidelines for 
integration policy began only in 1998. An expert group under the leadership 
of Elmārs Vēbers, a researcher at the Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, 
prepared a draft framework document on the integration of society in Latvia. 
On 10 March 1999 the framework document for the national programme was 
presented to the public for debate. As noted in the webpage of the Naturalization 
Board, about 25,000 people throughout Latvia participated in about 80 differ-
ent events related to discussing the document. In the course of the discussion, 
about 306 articles in the press were devoted to the framework document and 
the issues surrounding it.36 In September 1999 the government accepted the 
framework document as the basis for drafting a national programme.37 In 1999 
and 2000 wide debates continued in society about integration in which two 
different stances collided. The research Integration Practice and Perspectives 
called these the “national political discourse” and the “oppositional discourse”.38 
The “national political discourse” was opposed to the official state integration 
discourse and to the basic declared approach on minority issues, and in its most 
radical form, expressed an openly intolerant, even hateful attitude towards Rus-
sians in Latvia. The “oppositional discourse,” at the same time, criticized both 
the integration programme and its implementation.39 This discourse stressed the 
34 Baltic Data House (1998), Pētījumu un rīcības programma “Ceļā uz pilsonisku sabiedrību”. 
Atskaite. 1. un 2. posma rezultāti. Riga: Baltic Data House, available at http://www.biss.
soc.lv/downloads/resources/pilsoniskaSabiedriba/pilsoniskaSabiedriba1997.pdf.
35 Vēbers, ‘Vai teiksim ardievas sabiedrības integrācijai?’, pg. 120. 
36 See http://www.np.gov.lv/?id=511.
37 See http://www.np.gov.lv/lv/faili_lv/SI_koncepcija.pdf.
38 Zepa, Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 4. 
39 Ibid.
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necessity of changing public understanding of the essence of integration and 
freeing Latvians of the misconception that integration pertains only to minori-
ties.40 Minority representatives were also dissatisfied that integration in Latvia 
was based on existing legislation in the realm of citizenship, but particularly in 
language and education, which in their opinion invariably changed the officially 
proclaimed goal of integration into an attempt at assimilation.
Regardless of the very divergent attitudes in society and the attempts of 
Fatherland and Freedom/LNNK to torpedo the adoption of the integration pro-
gramme, preparations continued. On 18 July 2000 the government adopted the 
short version of the programme and assigned the coordination of implementa-
tion to the Ministry of Justice, which created a social integration department 
in November 2000. Finally, the government approved the National programme 
on “The Integration of Society in Latvia” on 6 February 2001. 
Achievements and Weaknesses of the Integration 
Programme
An undeniable achievement of the integration programme was the enshrine-
ment of integration as state policy. The programme defines integration as 
 Mutual understanding between individuals and groups in the context of 
a common state. The basis for social integration is loyalty to the Latvian 
state, the awareness that each individual’s future and personal welfare is 
closely tied to the future of the Latvian state, its stability and security. 
At the basis is a readiness to willingly accept the Latvian language as 
the state language, respect for the Latvian language and culture, and that 
of minorities living in Latvia.41 
The programme envisaged promoting naturalization and civic participation 
and, for the first time, funding from the state budget for promoting integration. 
However, even during the preparation phase, a number of the programme’s 
“genetic defects” of both a procedural and substantive nature were evident.
Let us start with the procedural problems. Several other analyses have 
pointed to the fact that very few members of minorities were involved in the 
programme’s working group.42 This is characteristic not only of integration 
policy development – minority participation in the development, implementa-
tion and monitoring of other policy is also low and ineffective. The government 
has been largely incapable and unwilling to ensure the effective participation 
40 Ibid., pg. 247. 
41 ‘Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā. Koncepcija.’ Riga, 2001, pg. 4. 
42 Open Society Institute EU Accession Monitoring Program (2002), ‘Minority Protection in 
Latvia: An Assessment of the National Programme “The Integration of Society in Latvia,’ 
Monitoring the EU Accession Process: Minority Protection, Vol. 1, An Assessment of 
Selected Policies in Candidate States. Budapest: OSI, pp. 297–364.
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of persons belonging to minorities in policy development and participation is 
insufficiently institutionalized.43 This is true also of the rather unproductive 
dialogue between persons belonging to minorities and the president and vari-
ous ministries.
In 1996, during the presidency of Guntis Ulmanis, a minority advisory 
council was created as a response to an open letter by minority organizations 
that there is a lack of government-minority dialogue. The task of the council 
was to gather information about issues affecting minorities, further dialogue 
on these issues between minorities and the government, and draft recommen-
dations for addressing problems. Various minority representatives, as well as 
experts on ethnopolitics were invited. However, the work of the council fell 
short of initial hopes – there was concern about the risks of politicization (sev-
eral council members were elected to parliament), as well as a lack of clarity 
about its functions. During the presidency of Vaira Vīķe-Freiberga, the minority 
advisory council was never convened, though formally it was never disbanded. 
On 18 February 2009 President Valdis Zatlers renewed the work of the council 
under the leadership of former Popular Front chairman and representative of 
the Latvian Lithuanian community Romualds Ražuks. It is too early to assess 
the effectiveness of the renewed council. 
The conceptual basis of the integration programme also contains certain 
contradictions and inconsistencies which were determined by the diverging 
interests of various political forces and their influence on the preparation of the 
programme. As a result, the document is a political compromise. For the docu-
ment to be more acceptable, the most controversial issues related to inter-ethnic 
relations were united in one document with issues pertaining to social inclusion 
and regional integration, though these were already addressed in other policy 
documents. A tribute of sorts to the efforts of radical nationalists to prevent 
the adoption of the programme altogether was mention of the repatriation of 
minorities in the text of the programme.44 
The programme’s diagnosis regarding Latvia’s various cleavages is precise 
(differences in values and interpretations of history, threat perceptions, mistrust, 
an unwillingness to link one’s future to the state of Latvia), but the programme 
does not indicate how to address these controversial issues. The basic ideas of 
the programme are based in the normative tradition, which sees social cohesion 
as being based on common norms, ideals and values and stresses the impor-
tance of institutions of socialization, such as the education system, the army, 
cultural institutions, etc. Implementation would reflect the tendency to impose 
a preconceived set of values (primarily understood as ethnic Latvian values), 
43 Nils Muižnieks, ed., (2007), Nacionālo minoritāšu konvencija – diskriminācijas novēršana 
un identitātes saglabāšana Latvijā. Riga: LU SPPI. 
44 Valsts Programma ‘Sabiedrības integrācija Latvijā’. Riga, 2001, pg. 31. See http:// www.
politika.lv/temas/sabiedrības_integracija/4106/.
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neglecting the process of negotiation between proponents of divergent values. 
The programme stresses the priority of the Latvian language and culture, but 
recognizes the rights of persons belonging to minorities to nurture their own 
cultures. The fact that integration is a two-way process is mentioned, though 
subsequently the emphasis is on the tasks of minorities – the need to accept 
Latvian culture, learn the Latvian language, understand history, be loyal, believe 
they are needed, etc. In certain cases, the programme sets forth unattainable 
goals, such as the creation of a unified information space.45
Unfortunately, the programme’s initial version did not envisage any 
progress indicators. Subsequent efforts to develop a set of indicators did not 
result in their introduction into the policy planning process. The programme 
foresaw a very vaguely defined system of implementation, which created the 
opportunity to perceive (and portray) as integration policy a very wide range 
of actions, thereby often masking the government’s unwillingness or inability 
to adopt responsible decisions on politically sensitive issues. 
Problems with Integration Policy Implementation and 
Development
One of the most visible results of the adoption of the integration programme 
in 2001 was the creation of state institutions whose main tasks were implemen-
tation of integration policy, policy coordination and attracting and administering 
EU funds. On 5 July 2001 the Parliament adopted the Law on the Society Inte-
gration Foundation (SIF). The Foundation was created to further the attainment 
of the goals set out in the National Programme on “The Integration of Society 
in Latvia” by ensuring financial support. In 2003, the foundation acquired the 
right to administer Phare grant programmes, and in 2004, the right to administer 
EU structural fund grant programmes.46 
During the parliamentary electoral campaign in 2002, issues pertaining to 
the institutional set-up for dealing with integration became an important part 
of the party debate. Latvia’s First Party advocated creating a ministry for mi-
norities, while New Era proposed the creation of an integration ministry. After 
the elections, Latvia’s First Party assumed responsibility for the integration 
portfolio and created a Special Assignments Minister for the Social Integration 
Affairs endowed with a support structure called a secretariat, not a full-fledged 
ministry. Over time, its authority came to include “the development and imple-
mentation of state policy in the realm of social integration – promotion of the 
development of civil society, prevention of racial and ethnic discrimination, 
inter-sectoral issues of preventing discrimination and promoting tolerance in 
45 Ibid., pg. 87. 
46 On the work of the Society Integration Foundation, see the chapter by Ilona Kunda 
below. 
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society, minority rights, the preservation of Liv culture and traditions, support 
for the Latvian diaspora, as well as immigrant integration.”47 The government 
invited as first minister the then director of the Latvian Centre for Human 
Rights and Ethnic Studies, political scientist Nils Muižnieks.
A very broad portrayal of integration issues in the integration programme 
led to a situation in which different ministers (from 2002–2008, five different 
persons held the job) stressed very different priorities depending on their in-
dividual predilections and the political situation at the time. At first, the work 
of the secretariat focused on minority NGOs and the NGO sector in general, 
anti-discrimination and the promotion of tolerance. Among the significant 
initiatives of the secretariat was promoting the ratification of the Council of 
Europe’s Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in 
2005, though the ratification act contained significant reservations and came a 
full ten years after signature. Two other notable initiatives were promoting the 
registration of non-citizen children as citizens through a direct mail campaign 
targeting 15,000 parents and the elaboration of a Roma integration programme 
and its adoption by the government in October 2006. In subsequent years, the 
secretariat paid more attention to politically less sensitive issues, such as sup-
port for rural NGOs and strengthening ties with the Latvian diaspora, especially 
those who had left as labour migrants to Ireland and Great Britain.48
In the six years of its existence, the secretariat regularly became the focus 
of controversy. In the early years, this was because its policy often came into 
conflict with the convictions of the nationalistically inclined segment of the po-
litical elite. Another reason derived from the unclear division of labour between 
the secretariat and the Society Integration Foundation. Tensions in relations 
between the two bodies surfaced periodically, followed by sharp exchanges of 
views about the duplication of functions with regard to supporting the NGO 
sector, the rights of the minister to exercise oversight over the Foundation, and 
the extent to which the work of the SIF reflected the tasks set for it.49 One of 
the reasons mentioned by the media for these disagreements was a behind-the-
scenes struggle over control of the flow of funding to support integration. If 
the minister’s initial budget was around 300,000 lats per year (~€428,000), the 
Society Integration Foundation had a budget of 1.5 million lats (~€2.14 million) 
in 2003 and 10 million (~€14.28 million) in 2008.50 
47 Cabinet of Ministers regulations No. 764 of 13 November 2007. See http://www.likumi.
lv/doc.php?id=166986.
48 David Galbreath and Nils Muižnieks (2009), ‘Latvia: managing post-imperial minorities’ 
in Bernd Rechel, ed., Minority Rights in Central and Eastern Europe. London: Routledge, 
pp. 146–7.
49 Society Integration Foundation governing board meeting minutes No. 57 of 11 December 
2007.
50 Dita Arāja (2007), ‘Kam tiks SIF naudas lāde?’ published on politika.lv, 26 June 2007, 
available at http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=14296.
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Quo vadis Integration Policy?
Official sources portray integration policy in Latvia as a topical realm 
for society in which Latvia can share its positive experience. For example, 
the home page of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs offers a generally positive 
evaluation of accomplishments in the realm of integration: “there are many 
examples that attest to the successful integration of society in Latvia. Most of 
these examples are difficult to perceive or quantify, but they can be found in all 
of society’s structure.”51 At the same time, the views of researchers are much 
more critical. In a 2007 article “The Tough Nut of Integration in Latvia and 
Europe,” Nils Muižnieks evaluated accomplishments thus: 
 It should be acknowledged that in the six years since the adoption of 
the integration programme in 2001, Latvia has not marked significant 
progress in the direction of attaining the initial basic goals that were 
set – the rapprochement of the values of inhabitants and the promotion 
of a sense of belonging to Latvia. A number of recent studies suggest 
that there are still enormous differences in values and attitudes between 
Latvians on the one hand, and Russians and most other persons belong-
ing to minorities on the other. With regard to understandings of history 
and stances towards Latvia’s ethnic policy and foreign policy goals, 
this divide is very deep and is not growing narrower with the change of 
generations. Survey data over a period of more than ten years suggest 
that Russian-speakers’ sense of belonging to Latvia was and remains 
very weak.52 
Over time, the objective necessity for new, more contemporary basic 
guidelines that reflected changes in the relations among Latvia’s ethnic groups 
became ever more apparent. In 2007 the Integration Secretariat prepared new 
Social Integration Policy Guidelines 2008–2018. The understanding of integra-
tion in this document was cardinally different from that in the 2001 document 
and largely reflected the Council of Europe’s approach to social cohesion.53 The 
new draft document stressed the importance of a democratic, inclusive civil 
society in social integration, as well as the significance of the ideas of multi-
culturalism in inter-ethnic relations. The draft document included 17 indicators 
to evaluate progress in 2012, 2015 and 2018. However, the new guidelines fell 
victim to changes in the domestic political situation. People’s Party Minister 
of Culture Helēna Demakova categorically objected to the inclusion of ideas 
51 See http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/integracijas-politikacopy/.
52 Nils Muižnieks (2007), ‘Integrācijas “cietais rieksts” Latvijā un Eiropā,’ Diena, 
25 October 2007, available at http://www.diena.lv/lat/arhivs/kulturas-diena/sabiedribas-
integracijas-cietais-rieksts-latvija-un-eiropa.
53 Council of Europe (2004), A New Strategy for Social Cohesion. Strasbourg: Council of 
Europe, pg. 3, available at http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/socialpolicies/socialcohesiondev/
source/RevisedStrategy_en.pdf.
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of multiculturalism into the draft document, as she considered the “ideology 
of multiculturalism” to be “in direct contradiction to the idea of a national 
state.”54 The sharp attacks were effective and further discussion of the draft 
was halted.
The elaboration of a new policy document was hindered by the doubts that 
were frequently expressed in the public sphere about the need for a special 
state structure devoted to integration issues. Such doubts were raised not only 
by politicians sceptical of the idea of integration in general, but also by the 
government’s social partners, especially after the onset of the global economic 
crisis. Finally, in 2008, the government adopted a decision to eliminate the 
secretariat of the Special Assignments Minister for Social Integration Affairs, 
ostensibly to economize on resources. On 1 January 2009 the Ministry for Chil-
dren and Families took over integration functions and was renamed the Ministry 
for Children, Families and Social Integration Affairs. Less than four months 
later, on 28 April 2009, the government adopted a decision to reorganize this 
ministry and divide its functions among several other ministries. Most of the 
integration-related functions fell to the Ministry of Justice, though some, such 
as anti-discrimination policy, went to the Ministry of Welfare and supporting 
minority NGOs went to the Ministry of Culture. As a result of the reorganiza-
tion, most of the former staff of the integration secretariat were fired and state 
budget funding for fulfilling the various functions was seriously cut, thereby 
seriously threatening integration policy implementation overall. 
Regardless, work on new draft social integration policy guidelines 
2010–2016 continued in the summer and autumn of 2009, and in October 2009, 
the Ministry of Justice was compiling the comments and objections of various 
ministries to the draft document. If and when the new policy guidelines are 
adopted by the government, they will replace the 2001 national programme. 
The introductory conceptual part of the new guidelines marks a significant 
step forward in comparison with the 2001 programme. They are in line with 
both the main policy directions of the European Union and with the insights 
of contemporary social science about the preconditions for integration. The 
draft document defines integration as a “mutual process of understanding and 
cooperation between the majority and the minority, in which the minority is 
an inalienable part of society.55 Target groups for social integration policy in-
clude ethnic minorities, including Roma, non-citizens, persons subjected to an 
intolerant attitude and discrimination on the basis of race, skin colour, ethnic 
affiliation, religious conviction, sexual orientation, as well as immigrants and 
54 ‘Demakova: multikulturālisms Latvijā noliedz okupāciju,’ Diena, 26 February 2008, 
available at http://www.diena.lv/lat/politics/hot/demakova_multikulturaalisms_latvijaa_
noliedz_okupaaciju/a7cdb867f7cac782036c9e68d5d20775?comm_page=1.
55 Ministry of Justice (2009), ‘Sabiedrības integrācijas politikas pamatnostādnes 2010. – 2016. 
gadam,’ (draft document), Riga: Ministry of Justice, pg. 5. 
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society as a whole.56 The draft document clearly delineates ethnic integration as 
the precondition for ensuring ethnic harmony from social, regional and diaspora 
integration. The inclusion of the task of immigrant integration can also be 
judged as a forward looking, topical approach. Other positive features include 
the efforts of the authors of the draft to precisely define the responsibilities 
of the Ministry of Justice in integration policy, as well as to create progress 
indicators related to integration for concrete policy realms. Unfortunately, 
given budget austerity, there are no additional resources foreseen for attaining 
the goals set in the document, which risks turning the new integration policy 
guidelines into a list of the state’s good intentions. A no less important issue 
is the ability of the Latvian political elite and society as a whole to overcome 
its long-term divisions over the need for integration policy, its goals and tasks. 
This will determine whether the provisions of the policy guidelines will remain 
at the level of declaratory policy, or whether they will serve as the basis for 
harmonizing relations between the major population groups in society. Given 
the inevitable inflow of immigrants, asylum-seekers and refugees in the future, 
integration of new arrivals will also become one of the most important precon-
ditions for sustainable development in Latvia. 
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The Society Integration Foundation and 
‘Ethnic Integration’ 
Ilona Kunda1
Introduction
This is the first attempt to characterize the projects supported by the Soci-
ety Integration Foundation (SIF) in the realm of ethnic integration. The core 
question to be addressed is: have the initiatives supported by SIF had a positive 
impact on overcoming ethnic divisions in society? These divisions are identi-
fied and described in the National Programme on “The Integration of Society 
in Latvia” (hereafter, Integration Programme) adopted in 2001. 
The SIF is not the only player in integration policy, but it is significant as 
an example of a specially created institution with a mandate to implement the 
Integration Programme. From 2001 through 2006, the SIF administered almost 
13 millions lats (~€18.5 million) in funds. Thus, it is important to understand 
how effective this model of policy implementation has been: what kinds of re-
sults were possible based on the Integration Programme and on implementation 
envisaging support for initiatives “from below” in the form of project proposals 
in various subfields of integration.
Nobody has ever sought to measure the impact of the SIF’s activities and 
there is very little academic research about various aspects of its work.2 Discus-
sions in 2008 about the division of labour between the SIF and the Integration 
Secretariat or in 2009 about which institution the SIF should be subordinated 
to have not been based on any analysis of integration policy outcomes that 
provide some insight into accomplishments in this realm. This research seeks 
to analyse the contribution of the SIF to addressing the particularly ethnic as-
pects of social integration, and not, for example, issues of social inclusion or 
regional integration. This choice was dictated by the broader research agenda 
of the Advanced Social and Political Research Institute (ASPRI), as well as by 
the declared interests of representatives of the SIF themselves. 
 1 The author would like to thank Aiga Balode, Maksims Kovaļenko, Zane Silabriede and 
Kristina Morzsevska for research assistance. 
 2 Exceptions are OSI/EU Accession Monitoring Program (2002), Monitoring the EU Accession 
Process: Minority Protection Volume 1. Budapest: OSI, pp. 296–364; and Leo Dribins, 
ed. (2007), Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: cēloņi un sekas. Riga: FSI.
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The SIF was created to promote implementation of the Integration Pro-
gramme. In asking what the SIF has accomplished in the realm of ethnic integra-
tion, one must ask what the Integration Programme proposed to accomplish and 
whether that was possible. Did the Integration Programme identify and stress 
the most important cleavages and the preconditions for lessening them, or does 
it merely offer the implementing agency a catalogue of ideas? In the subsequent 
implementation process, could decisions and procedures compensate for any defi-
ciencies? In the case of the SIF, an important focus of analysis becomes the policy 
implementation model itself – support for the initiatives of society, which stresses 
the capacity of society to spontaneously generate answers and solutions to its 
problems. The issue here is to ascertain how successfully this model has worked 
in the context of the limitations of both sides – the SIF and implementers. 
Preliminary analysis suggested that the Integration Programme can only 
serve incompletely as a point of reference in assessing the policy impact (see 
Juris Rozenvalds’ chapter above). Thus, it was necessary to generate a theoreti-
cal basis permitting conclusions about the possible impact of SIF-supported 
projects on lessening cleavages in society. Here, the basis for analysis chosen 
was contact theory – the hypothesis that certain kinds of inter-group contact can 
lead to changes in attitudes (see Nils Muižnieks’ chapter above). Though this is 
only one possible approach, it does point to a necessary precondition for change 
and is suited to Latvia’s situation, as it corresponds to ideas contained in the 
Integration Programme. Taking contact theory as a basis, the author analysed 
those aspects of the implementation of the Integration Programme that related 
to promoting the submission of certain kinds of projects and evaluating them 
(the substantive part of grants competitions and the selection criteria), as well 
the projects supported. 
The time frame for analysis was projects supported from 2002 through 
2006, as 2006 was the last year for which project implementation reports were 
available when the research began in late 2007. Analysis was rendered more 
difficult because, except for 2002 and 2003, the SIF did not separately identify 
ethnic integration projects. Thus, the author had to agree with SIF officials on 
a case-by-case basis on whether a project could be considered an “ethnic inte-
gration” project – one that addressed ethnic or linguistic cleavages in society. 
Overall conclusions about possible policy impact are provisional and sugges-
tive, rather than definitive, as the source of information chosen (implementation 
reports) has certain weaknesses. The most important limitations were 
1) the implementation reports do not include direct questions about contact 
between the groups involved, so data had to be derived from answers to 
other questions; 
2) implementation reports focus attention only on a limited number of 
issues and do not usually entail a self-critical assessment of what one 
has accomplished. However, data were sufficient to identify the most 
important general trends. 
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Further, I sketch in greater detail the theoretical basis for the analysis, 
characterize the Integration Programme’s strong and weak points from the 
perspective of an implementing agency, and examine how the model of a self-
organizing society was implemented in the case of the SIF. In the second part 
of this chapter, I characterize the projects supported by the SIF in the realm 
of ethnic integration and offer some general explanations for the peculiarities 
discovered. In the conclusion, I raise certain issues about further support for 
ethnic integration in Latvia. 
The Integration Programme: A “Road Map” Towards 
Desired Changes? 
The Integration Programme constitutes the substantive point of reference 
for all subsequent initiatives and interpretations in this realm of policy – it 
defines the goals to be attained and the directions for activity. This document 
has three separate levels and within each of those levels the content is further 
developed and specified. In the language of policy evaluation, the Integration 
Programme is a theory of change: it offers an explanation of what needs to be 
changed and the process through which that is possible.
In analysing the Integration Programme as a document, it is possible to 
ascertain how much room for setting priorities and interpretation is left to the 
implementer. It is also important to identify themes that are made sufficiently 
concrete and those that are left without operationalization. If the policy docu-
ment includes well-founded ideas, but avoids clearly identifying priorities or 
mechanisms for achieving the changes desired, there is a great risk that imple-
mentation will focus on less important or effective aspects of change. Moreover, 
avoiding open discussion of certain problems can exacerbate public alienation 
and cynicism towards the state. My goal was to assess the extent to which the 
Integration Programme could serve as a map to policy implementation by offer-
ing a structured and well-founded model of change with regard to overcoming 
ethnic divisions and the extent to which it left without concrete elaboration 
important concepts, topics and activities. 
“Road Map” or Catalogue?
The Integration Programme has three different levels: from 
1) abstract concepts and general goals, through 
2) directions of activity to 
3) a catalogue of examples of concrete projects to be supported. 
At the first level, the text of the Integration Programme suggests that the 
main problem is the ethnic divide, partially also mistrust towards the govern-
ment, and includes the idea of the creation of common values based on Latvian 
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culture and a common citizenship. The idea of integration as a two-way process 
is stressed many times, as is the idea of cooperation and the necessity for both 
sides to overcome mutual mistrust and a felling of being threatened. 
At the second level there is simultaneously an elaboration of certain topics, 
but a de-emphasis of the most controversial topics. The topic of ethnic divi-
sions is simply reduced to language, minority culture and education, leaving 
aside issues of mistrust,3 mutual threat perceptions, as well as history and other 
problematic issues pertaining to belonging and identity.
Overall, it should be noted that the introductory part of the Integration Pro-
gramme names a whole range of important goals – active partnership between 
all groups in building the future, two-way relations overcoming divisions relat-
ing to history and culture. However, a number of these ideas are not developed 
any further (e.g., varying interpretations of history, mutual threat perceptions, 
etc.) and no priorities are identified. Some of the solutions suggested are con-
tradictory as well. For example, agreeing on a national identity is only possible 
on the basis of ethnic Latvian culture, which in essence means a culture conflict 
for many members of society. 
Thus, the Integration Programme leaves identifying many solutions and 
resolving a whole range of contradictions in the hands of the implementing 
agency. On the one hand, a lack of concrete policy stances could open the way 
for progressive ideas and solutions. On the other hand, relying on the spontane-
ous proposals of society carries a great risk of reproducing existing relations, 
strategies and understandings. 
An additional drawback is the lack of any progress indicators in the 2001 
document. Thus, the point of departure for policy implementation is in many 
ways progressive, but internally contradictory. In terms of operationalization, 
the document is a political compromise that creates additional challenges for 
implementation. 
Which Circumstances Can Promote Overcoming 
Society’s Divisions?
In policy implementation, it is important whether the main policy document 
clearly names the mechanism through which divisions are to be overcome and 
whether that mechanism can achieve results. If the main policy document does 
not do this, it is necessary to search for indications that initiatives from society 
can spontaneously offer solutions that could be seen as effective. 
In the introductory sections of the Integration Programme, there is frequent 
reference to cooperation between different groups, trust, and overcoming 
 3 See the Integration Programme in Latvian, which on page 8 states ‘In the psychological 
sense, integration is the ability to trust,’ available at http://www.politika.lv/temas/
sabiedribas_integracija/4106/.
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insecurity. This emphasis also corresponds to theoretical ideas about changes 
in attitudes and overcoming ethnic distance. Though overcoming cleavages 
can be linked to numerous factors, the author chose Gordon Allport’s contact 
hypothesis as a point of departure.4 As shown by research conducted in Latvia, 
a significant and durable trend in Latvian society, particularly among ethnic 
Latvians, is the prevalence of strategies of separation.5 To ascertain the possible 
impact of the SIF on ethnic integration, I sought signs of contact and a charac-
terization thereof in the project implementation reports: was there contact, was 
the status of participants equal, was contact sustained, what was the content 
and who was the initiator of the joint action. 
The contact hypothesis is supplemented by John Berry’s scheme of ac-
culturation strategies, which distinguishes four possible strategies according 
to the interaction of four different factors: the desire to maintain one’s cultural 
traditions and readiness to engage in contact with the other group. Accord-
ing to Berry, integration is a balance between both dimensions, and global 
research shows that the inclusion of new arrivals takes place best according to 
this scheme.6 Berry’s thesis explains why it is important to reinforce security 
about one’s culture, but that that needs to be balanced by contact, as only a 
sufficient sense of security about one’s cultural identity can serve as a basis for 
the willingness and ability to maintain contact with members of other groups. 
Berry’s scheme provides an additional rationale for the necessity of contact, 
particularly in analysing the many projects supported by the SIF in the realm 
of maintaining and demonstrating one’s cultural heritage. 
The quantitative instrument for analysis of project implementation reports 
was based on the aforementioned ideas of Allport and Berry, specifying the 
areas in which contact took place, the target groups, the planned (knowledge, 
skills) and unplanned results. The guidelines for the project competitions and 
other documents used for project selection were analysed with regard to whether 
they focused attention on contact taking place in projects.
Policy Implementation as a Continuation of Policy 
Formulation
Any idea becomes transformed during the policy process and policy crea-
tion continues in the implementation phase. In the case of the projects sup-
ported by the SIF, there are several phases of transformation. The first phase 
is the priorities and areas proposed by the Integration Programme, followed 
 4 Gordon W. Allport (1954/1979), The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge: Perseus Books.
 5 See Inese Šūpule and Brigita Zepa (2006), ‘Etniskā apdraudētība kā dzīves kvalitātes 
aspekts,’ in Dzīves kvalitāte Latvijā. Riga: Zinātne. 
 6 For a recent statement, see John W. Berry et al, eds. (2006), Immigrant Youth in Cultural 
Transition. London: Lawrence Erlbaum Assoc. 
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by the priorities proposed by the SIF, the content emphasized by the guide-
lines in the grant competitions and the aspects highlighted in the guidelines 
for evaluators. Here, we will try to follow the process of transformation and 
the potential to focus on the most important ideas of ethnic integration in all 
phases mentioned.
The mission of the SIF defined in the law – “to promote the implementa-
tion of the Integration Programme” – meant promoting the implementation of 
a range of contradictory ideas that represented a political compromise. Several 
different approaches were possible on the part of the SIF: proactive involve-
ment in interpreting the ideas of the Integration Programme by promoting a 
public or expert discussion about specifying the most contradictory elements; 
reliance on the “self-organization of society”- that is the ability of society to 
proposes solutions “from below”; or some combination of a reactive and pro-
active approach. 
It can be assumed that the choice is largely linked to the fact that any 
institution has to find a balance among various goals: the maintenance of its 
existence and the strengthening of its autonomy7 on the one hand, and the need 
to further the substantive goals it was set up to achieve on the other. The SIF 
is no exception. After characterizing the balance of approaches chosen by the 
SIF, the possibilities and drawbacks of the chosen model in the contract of 
integration policy implementations will be explored. 
Thus, the analysis begins by examining two sets of issues: 
1) the policy implementation model chosen by the SIF (supporting the 
“self-organization of society”), its links with the SIF’s institutional 
autonomy, and some advantages and drawbacks of this model; and 
2) the standard decision-making process in the life cycle of a project com-
petition with a view to identifying phases where it is possible to focus 
integration practices in a certain way. These are the phases in which it 
is possible in theory to compensate the deficiencies of the Integration 
Programme.
The Choice of a Policy Implementation Model and Its 
Functioning
On 6 February 2001 the Cabinet of Ministers adopted the National Pro-
gramme on “The Integration of Society in Latvia” and designated the Ministry 
of Justice responsible for coordinating implementation. On 5 July 2001, one half 
 7 In the context of this research, autonomy is understood as an institution’s possibility 
to influence its own goals and tasks, taking into account the external environment’s 
changing influence on the concrete sphere. Researchers in organization theory and public 
administration indicate that each institution has a propensity to seek autonomy, the more 
so if such an opportunity is enshrined in legislation. 
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year after adoption of the Integration Programme, the parliament adopted the 
law on the Society Integration Foundation (SIF), which entered into force on 1 
September 2001. The SIF would become a special player in integration policy, 
as its mission was defined as “promoting implementation of the goals of the 
National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia.” On 27 December 
2002 a new institution, the secretariat for the Special Assignments Minister for 
Social Integration Affairs (hereafter, simply Integration Secretariat) was created 
that took over coordination functions form the Ministry of Justice. 
Though implementation of the Integration Programme was meant to be a 
collective and all-encompassing process, the true configuration of state, local 
government and NGO actors developed in a more fragmented way, with a spe-
cific distribution of resources and opportunities for acquiring funding. The SIF 
acquired a rather independent status, as it operated on the basis of a separate 
law and that law envisaged a high degree of autonomy. It stated that the SIF 
Council, which is organized on the basis of parity, adopts all the main decisions. 
The SIF is a public foundation and, according to the law, not subordinate to any 
other institution in the state administration. Its budget is separate from the state 
budget, and the law foresees that state budget funds are given directly to the 
SIF, which requests state budget means directly from the Cabinet of Ministers. 
The law does not name a member of the Cabinet of Ministers who is responsible 
for carrying out supervisory functions with regard to the SIF.8
The highest administrative decision-making body is the SIF Council, which 
decides on allocation of resources, as well as the main directions of work. The 
SIF has special committees which prepare the necessary information and draft 
decisions for the work of the Council, and an executive secretariat led by a 
director. The secretariat supports the work of the Council, as well as announces 
all project competitions, informs the public about them, receives project pro-
posals, evaluates them, signs contracts with project implementers, as well as 
supervises and monitors projects. The SIF secretariat was led by Nils Sakss 
from its formation until January 2008, while Aija Bauere was appointed director 
on 9 September 2008. This study pertains to the period from 2002 to 2006.
The tasks of the SIF are linked to the management of resources and their 
distribution for implementing social integration projects, including tasks 
throughout the cycle of attracting resources, managing them and communicat-
ing with the public.9 Legislation governing the operation of the SIF grants it 
a general authority to attract funding to promote social integration in Latvia, 
which allows it to seek funding pro-actively or to respond to offers of funding. 
Decisions on concrete funding are taken by the SIF Council. 
 8 Nils Sakss ‘Politiskā ķīmija skar Sabiedrības integrācijas fonda likumu,’ Latvijas Vēstnesis 
(Government Herald), 4 October 2007, available at http://www.lv.lv/index.php?menu=do
c&sub=komentars&id=164051. 
 9 See the home page of the SIF at http://www.lsif.lv/par-mums.
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When the SIF was created, it had a relatively large freedom for manoeuvre 
and several different scenarios were possible. From the very beginning, the first 
director of the SIF took the tactic of creating a system that would lead towards 
EDIS accreditation, thereby becoming attractive to the European Union and 
other external donors.10 That provided space for a certain autonomy on the part 
of the SIF, while determining the SIF’s neutrality with regard to promoting 
certain types of integration in a pro-active manner. This is acknowledged by 
the former director of the SIF secretariat Nils Sakss: 
 My approach was to create a financial mechanism. If we started with 
200,000 lats and now there are 6 million, I doubt if such progress would 
have been possible if the Foundation had gone into the content. I believe 
that in Eastern Europe we are the only case in which the Integration 
Foundation has received such EDIS accreditation. If the SIF had gone 
a different path, I think that funding would have been much smaller, but 
then the Foundation would work more as a proactive guide dealing with 
the content. Another aspect was that rather soon after the creation of the 
Foundation the Integration Secretariat was created. When the Foundation 
was being created, nobody said a word that such a ministry should be 
created. That appeared quickly, suddenly, as a political decision...11
This configuration of circumstances influenced the role of the SIF Council, 
which narrowed its functions in determining the substance of integration, just 
as the Integration Secretariat began to work. In commenting on the beginning 
of the SIF’s work, Nils Sakss noted that the SIF Council could have played a 
rather active role on the substance of integration if the Integration Secretariat 
had not been created.12 This does not mean that the SIF Council had no sub-
stantive issues on its agenda, but the minutes of Council meetings suggest that 
this took place rather rarely.13
Thus, the SIF embarked on the course of creating a transparent, precisely 
functioning machine. Attracting funding through various mechanisms meant 
choosing which initiative “from below” to support. This model was based on 
supply and was accompanied by standardized working procedures (e.g., criteria 
for evaluating projects in grants competitions14), the long-term priorities set by 
donors (e.g., development of civil society), and also certain restrictions (e.g., 
recipients could not be informal initiative groups).
10 Extended Decentralized Implementation System (EDIS)
11 Author’s interview with Nils Sakss, 22 January 2008.
12 Ibid.
13 One example was the issue of the further development of the SIF at the end of 2007.
14 In accordance with information provided by the SIF, evaluation criteria were adopted from 
the European Commission’s Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EC External Actions 
(6. Grants). These are Standard recommendations for creating any grants competitions. 
They are available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/
practical_guide/index_en.htm.
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As the work of the SIF developed from 2001 to 2008, one concludes that 
significant growth has taken place – from a staff of five persons in 2001 and 
2002 to a staff of 75 in 2008. In terms of staff, the largest departments are 
those for monitoring structural funds and programmes, as the requirements for 
implementing projects with European Union and other sources of funding place 
significant human resource demands on the SIF secretariat. All the departments 
in the SIF secretariat with the exception of those dealing with accounting, 
support and internal audit functions are involved in one or another of the SIF 
project implementing cycles. 
To implement the model chosen, the SIF operated according to detailed 
procedures which are determined by the SIF project management handbooks, 
which are drafted for each of the financial instruments administered by the SIF. 
Supervision of the projects supported by the SIF meant the introduction of the 
principle of double control throughout the period of project administration and 
the fact that two SIF staff members are responsible for each activity (Project 
managers from the supervisory department and financial control workers). The 
capacity of the SIF to implement its functions precisely and transparently is 
attested by the fact that through 2008 the administrative court received only 
one application appealing an evaluation decision in the EU Transition facility 
grant scheme “Promoting the integration of society in Latvia,” and in 2008, the 
court found in favour of the SIF.15 Of course, the lack of complaints can also be 
explained by a desire to avoid lengthy legal proceedings, given the work load 
of the administrative courts, though all indications suggest that effective SIF 
work and communication with applicants is an important factor. 
A Supply-Driven Model of Supporting Initiatives from 
Below 
In interviews conducted during the research in 2008, most respondents 
thought that the funding mechanism for social integration inherent in the SIF 
(and in the Integration Secretariat) was successful because it permitted members 
of the public to take the initiative in the realm of social integration, taking a 
“bottom-up” approach, not imposing an artificial concept. Indeed, those projects 
that were submitted and supported came from non-governmental organizations 
(about 40%), local governments and institutions linked with them, and non-
profit limited liability companies. Alongside the positive aspects of this model 
(the opportunity for society to express itself), one must note also the drawbacks 
of this approach. As Elmārs Vēbers pointed out in 2007, several categories of 
issues fall outside this framework: 
1) those which are broader than one project; and 
15 See the 2008 SIF annual report, available at http://www.lsif.lv/files/Gada-parskats-2008.
pdf. 
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2) those which do not have an appropriate implementing organization 
during a call for project proposals.16 
An analysis of the projects confirms the second point, for example the 
limited response of applicants to certain kinds of calls (dialogue among social 
science teachers, information exchange regarding civic education, etc.) may be 
linked to a low level of organizational development in certain areas. The issue 
of integration topics that transcend the limits of one project is linked with the 
role of the local governments in implementing integration policy. Of course, 
local governments could be applicants in individual projects in all the grants 
competitions administered by the SIF, but it would be important to strengthen 
their strategic role and capacity to create and implement long-term, systemic 
inclusive measures in their communities. The only competition devoted to 
strengthening the role of local governments in 2003 aimed at promoting the 
drafting of local integration programmes, which by itself would not create im-
plementation mechanisms. Moreover, research suggests that local governments 
repeat the mistakes of the national Integration Programme by creating action 
plans as uncoordinated catalogues of opportunities with a large focus on social 
issues.17 Thus, the issue remains open whether spontaneous organization without 
capacity building is a sufficiently effective mechanism. 
Continuing the line of thought suggested by Vēbers, one can suggest that 
a supply-driven model leaves topics which a potential group of implementers 
does not consider possible to offer to the SIF as a state institution considered 
by some to represent the ethnic Latvian majority.18 Is the SIF considered an 
appropriate dialogue partner by all social groups? As former director of the SIF 
Nils Sakss noted in an interview, Russian NGOs “of a certain kind” have not 
offered their projects to the SIF. This leaves unanswered the question – if the 
“bottom-up” approach ensures representation of only one part of the spectrum, 
who will maintain dialogue with the rest of the spectrum and who will make 
these distinctions? This contradiction is illustrated by data about communica-
tion with the public – according to the annual report of the SIF for 2008, only 
5% of the publications about the SIF were in Russian-language newspapers, 
thereby reproducing a lop-sided dialogue.19 
16 Elmārs Vēbers (2007), ‘Vai teiksim ardievas sabiedrības integrācijai?’ In Leo Dribins, ed., 
Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: cēloņi un sekas. Riga: FSI, pg. 125.
17 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2004), Pašvaldību loma sabiedrības integrācijas 
procesā. Riga: BISS.
18 Alienation from government is a well-documented phenomenon in Latvia.
19 See the annual report of the SIF at http://www.lsif.lv/files/Gada-parskats-2008.pdf.
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Implementing a Supply-Driven Model: the 
Contribution of the SIF
In its public communication the SIF seeks to stress the modest nature of 
its role and possibilities. For example, in its 2007 annual report, the SIF notes 
that it is an institution whose work is completely dependent on the desires 
of donors and their willingness to entrust the SIF with financial resources. 
However, this does not exclude the possibility of influencing the creation of 
substantive guidelines. For example, in relation to funds allocated by the state 
budget, the Integration Secretariat submitted to the SIF social integration pri-
orities, thereby formally ensuring policy coordination in the realm of social 
integration. Legislation did not envisage a concrete manner in which the SIF 
had to ensure implementation of these priorities, and until 2008 these priori-
ties suggested by the Integration Secretariat were interpreted as advisory. That 
does not mean that they were not taken into consideration in the guidelines 
and statutes of Project competitions, but officials from both the SIF and the 
Integration Secretariat have noted that there is no legislation in force that states 
that the two bodies had to cooperate. In 2008 both institutions heatedly dis-
cussed duplication of functions with regard to supporting the NGO sector, the 
issue of supervision and autonomy, the SIF’s activities in the public space,20 
and the conformity of the SIF’s activities with the general goals set forth in 
the Integration Programme. The management of the SIF always maintained its 
independent view on such issues. 
It should be stressed that in other aspects as well the former long-time 
director of the SIF Nils Sakss was essential in shaping the work of the SIF. 
It is important to note that his role was in no way purely administrative. For 
example, until January 2008, in most cases, the initiative to attract new projects 
and programmes came from Sakss himself, who prepared the relevant reports 
for the SIF Council.21 
Statutes and Evaluation Criteria as Means of Focusing 
Bottom-Up Initiatives
In investigating how the content of the main policy document was trans-
formed in the implementation process, one must examine the grants competi-
tions organized by the SIF. In this section, we analyse the contribution of the 
statutes and evaluation criteria for grants competitions in implementing ethnic 
integration, stressing how they focus the “supply” of project implementers 
20 See, e.g., the 57th minutes of the SIF’s Council of 11 December 2007, ‘Sabiedrības 
integrācijas fonda padomes sēdes protokols Nr.57,’ Internal document of the SIF.
21 This was noted in interviews with several SIF staff on 12 March 2008.
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and structure the choice of which solutions are most effective.22 While the 
management of the SIF saw themselves as supporters of initiatives from below, 
to receive the SIF’s support, certain conditions must be met which focus the 
content of the supply in certain ways by marking out certain fields of activity, 
desirable types of activities, etc. Such focusing is inevitable, even if the author-
ity of the SIF in administering the concrete financial instrument was limited 
by the funder’s criteria and the participation of the Integration Secretariat in 
assisting to determine priorities.23
The task here is to characterize the result of this focusing, concretely: 
1) To what extent does that which is implemented in the SIF grants com-
petitions reflect the themes in the Integration Programme and cover the 
field? 
2) To what extent do SIF grants competitions react to new needs?
3) To what extent does the SIF compensate for weaknesses in the Integra-
tion Programme?
4) To what extent do the evaluation criteria help to choose the offer with the 
greatest chance of having an impact in the realm of ethnic integration?
Hereafter, conclusions are based on an analysis of the documentation of 
the grants competitions.24 At least nominally, practically all the topics in the 
Integration Programme dealing with ethnic aspects of integration appear in the 
statutes of SIF grants competitions – citizenship and naturalization, creating 
integration programmes at the local government level, school exchanges, sup-
port for minority cultural NGOs, etc.
An Overview of the Competitions
The initial period of 2002 and 2003 should be perceived as cautious at-
tempts to gain understanding about which activities might attract the most 
22 In analysing evaluation criteria, the author chose the statutes of competitions funded by 
the state budget, as well as those funded by the PHARE programme (which were the most 
significant sources of financial support for ethnic integration projects from 2002 through 
2006. To examine the development of the ideas, two competitions from each source of 
funding were chosen from the initial stage of SIF’s work and a later stage. The concrete 
unit of analysis was the sections on evaluation criteria for the competitions ‘Support 
to NGO activities in the realm of ethnic integration in 2002 and 2004’ and the PHARE 
competitions in 2003 and 2006 for the programme ‘Promoting the integration of society 
in Latvia’. 
23 E.g., the PHARE programme has concrete programme guidelines, the fiche was drafted by 
the Integration Secretariat, which also submitted implementation reports to the Ministry 
of Finance. The Integration Secretariat also drafted annual priorities. 
24 Information regarding the content of grants competitions is usually found in the following 
sections: ‘Goals and priorities of the grants competition,’ – the general orientation; ‘Types 
of activities’ or ‘Directions and activities to be supported’ – both with specific thematic 
directions and concrete activity types. 
Ilona Kunda. The Society Integration Foundation and ‘Ethnic Integration’ 73
support from potential project implementers, as the statutes of the competitions 
using state budget funding are very general: “any measures which promote the 
mutual understanding and harmony of ethnic groups living in Latvia.” Specific 
activities to be supported are formulated only in the competition “Mass media 
for the promotion of social integration.” In subsequent years, some new ideas 
were included (e.g., information about the education reform) and the approach 
was made more specific. However, the PHARE Programme “Promoting the 
integration of society in Latvia” (from 2004) is most in line with the spirit 
of the Integration Programme. There one sees measures such as intercultural 
education for various groups, promotion of inter-ethnic dialogue, promotion of 
cooperation on best practices in bilingual education, etc. Overall, the statutes 
of the grants competitions organized by the SIF cover practically all the themes 
in the Integration Programme which are clearly linked to the ethnic aspects of 
integration: citizenship and naturalization, drafting integration programmes by 
local governments, school exchanges, support for minority NGOs, etc. 
To What Extent Do SIF Grants Competitions Meet 
New Needs?
Several SIF initiatives that specify certain topics outlined in the Integra-
tion Programme and react to new challenges should be positively evaluated, 
including: 
“Informing and Promoting Activity among Residents of Local Parishes” • 
(2002);
“Support for measures to inform the public in the realm of minority • 
education” supplementing the PHARE competition (2003);
Social integration activities in areas predominantly inhabited by non-• 
citizens and minorities; employment promotion activities in areas pre-
dominantly inhabited by non-citizens and minorities; Latvian language 
acquisition initiatives in areas predominantly inhabited by non-citizens 
and minorities (2005).
The mechanism for project identification and support created by the SIF is 
completely capable in the framework of competitions to react to new needs of 
the public, to define with sufficient precision types of activities and directions, 
since this was done on many occasions. One shortcoming is that not all ideas 
can evoke interest without certain public awareness raising and NGOs are not 
always the most appropriate implementation agents. On occasion, informal in-
terest groups (which cannot receive support within the context of the PHARE 
programme) might be more appropriate, and smaller grants competitions, which 
require less time to prepare and implement, might be more effective. 
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Compensating for Drawbacks in the Integration 
Programme
Here, we analyse firstly, fields of action in the Integration Programme that 
were not clearly labelled “ethnic” but which could be used to lessen the ethnic 
divide, and secondly, important topics in the Integration Programme (two-way 
communication, active partnership), which were mentioned in the introduc-
tory part of the Integration Programme, but were not stressed afterwards. This 
would require the appropriate instruments in the statutes of the competitions 
and evaluations, as well as encouraging potential applicants to submit certain 
types of ideas. 
First, let us examine the topics where emphasising the ethnic component 
could have had significant added value. This opportunity was most evident with 
regard to civic participation – practical experience in participation and coop-
eration with regard to common problems is incomparably better that rhetoric 
in sending people the message that they have a joint responsibility for their 
lives and future. 
In 2002 a competition entitled “Informing and Promoting Activity among 
Residents of Local Parishes” was announced. Though it did not exclude the 
possibility of submitting projects with joint activities involving Latvians and 
minorities, that aspect was not specifically stressed and the SIF did not classify 
such projects as “ethnic integration.” 
In subsequent years, the topic of “civic participation” was taken up in the 
PHARE grants competitions “Promoting the integration of society in Latvia,”25 
but the formulations in the 2003 and 2005 competitions speak only about 
“non-citizen, non-Latvian-speaking inhabitant and ethnic minority” integra-
tion in various fields, without mentioning any Latvian participation in these 
measures. The statute of the 2006 grants competition stressed various forms 
of dialogue, but in the realm of culture and information exchange, not in civic 
participation. 
With regard to stressing two-way contact with the assistance of Project 
competitions, the SIF did this starting from 2002. The most precise application 
of this idea took place in the school exchange competitions beginning in 2002. 
The justifications for these competitions refer to the necessity of learning in 
practice about what unites people: “getting to know each other and cooperation 
in implementing joint events”. Unfortunately, this very concrete idea of common 
activities was applied mainly to children and youth, though in later years, teachers 
and vocational school students were also mentioned as a target group.
The potential of linking ethnic integration to civic participation was not 
exploited, as there were separate competitions on ethnic integration and civic 
25 In the 2003 Phare grants programme ‘Promoting the integration of society in Latvia,’ activity 
1.2. ‘increasing the public’s participation in discussing issues before decision-making’; 
1.5. ‘promoting social integration initiatives at the local and regional levels,’ etc.
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participation. However, nothing prevented potential applicants from seeing the 
integrative potential of making such links and submitting projects of such a 
nature. A second interesting issue has to do with the “disappearance” of certain 
topics after the introductory part of the Integration Programme (the two-way 
nature of integration, overcoming symbolic divisions, active partnership, and 
cooperation between various social groups). One can understand the avoidance 
of elaborating on the two-way nature of integration, given the political sensitiv-
ity of the issue in 2001. Even today, the idea that overcoming divisions requires 
steps from both sides is not self-evident to many. The Integration Programme 
often indicates differences in values and attitudes. Overcoming such differences 
inevitably implies confronting controversial issues and discussing them. 
At the level of implementation, the SIF could have addressed these issues 
by working them into the statutes of competitions or by creating special com-
petitions to promote contact and cooperation. The issue of promoting dialogue 
about controversial issues is slightly more problematic. The SIF is a state 
institution and adherence to political neutrality can be seen as one of the most 
important preconditions for its work. This complicates addressing extremely 
politicized issues. 
If we examine the extent to which the SIF promoted inter-ethnic contact, 
we see that, in certain cases, the issue was addressed directly. Other instances in 
which the statutes of competitions stressed the two-way nature of contact were:
A 2002 competition for the media set the task of “promoting the aware-• 
ness of Latvia as a multicultural country” (the same in 2003 and 2004) 
and most of the desired activities are oriented towards common elements 
and dialogue;
“Support for NGO projects in the realm of ethnic integration” (2002) – • 
“any measures that promote understanding and harmony among the 
ethnic groups living in Latvia”;
The 2004 competition “Support for NGO projects” includes “multicul-• 
tural education” as a priority;
The PHARE 2003, 2004, 2005 and 2006 competitions each have six to ten • 
priorities/activities, for example, school exchange of experience, intercul-
tural education, media exchange, promotion of ethnic dialogue, etc. 
However, the statutes of competitions highlight clearly “two-way contacts” 
only regarding schools and the media. In other cases the choice is left to the 
project implementers. 
Inter-cultural dialogue is a particular topic of interest. With regard to activi-
ties in the realm of culture, the competitions organized by the SIF offer two 
possibilities. First of all, the goal of the state budget funded grants competition 
“Support for minority cultural societies and associations” was “creation of a 
beneficial environment for the implementation of measures to support minority 
education, culture and languages”. As can be seen, this concerns not dialogue, 
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but strengthening one side. Secondly, the statutes of the PHARE and the Tran-
sitional Facility grants competitions urged “broadening cultural contacts,” 
creating “joint cultural projects,” thereby going beyond the orbit of minority 
societies. Was the public ready to go further than strengthening its own identity 
and to take the next step – communicate with other groups? This we will see 
in the characterization of the projects supported.
It can be concluded that overall, but particularly with the 2003 PHARE 
competition, potential applicants were offered a wide repertoire of possibilities 
to receive support on a wide range of topics. Next, we turn to an analysis of 
how evaluation criteria could assist in filtering out projects with the greatest 
potential of promoting the overcoming of ethnic divisions in society. 
The Contribution of Project Evaluation Criteria
Criteria serve as a filter of supply. On the one hand, criteria structure the 
selection, on the other, they help applicants understand the characteristics of 
a project that is likely to be supported so that applicants can shape their own 
offer. This raises the following questions: what is the current contribution of 
evaluation criteria to integration policy implementation? What is the quality of 
the choices that can be made from the existing criteria and to what extent do 
they facilitate choices about projects which can most further integration? 
In seeking to answer these questions, we examined project application 
evaluation criteria used by the SIF in 2002 through 2006. We set as tasks as-
certaining the evolution of quality criteria and evaluating the existing system’s 
strong and weak aspects in terms of providing possibilities for choosing high 
quality project content.  The role of criteria with regard to possible applicants 
is twofold: on the one hand, criteria send signals about desirable content, on the 
other, very complex or very simple criteria can widen or limit the range of ap-
plicants. The potential project applicant in 2002 received very little information 
about how his ideas would be evaluated. The statute of the 2002 competition 
only indicates which realms will be evaluated, but does not explain in any detail 
the substance of the evaluation. In the 2003 PHARE competition, applicants 
are already told about the assignment of points for each criterion, and where 
the relevant information can be found in the grant application. PHARE 2006 
explains the general thrust of the criteria (what is being sought for in the evalu-
ation process) and the minimal number of points by subsection. 
In compiling the numerical indicators of evaluation criteria from 2002 
through 2006, one can see that the requirements became considerably more 
detailed: from three quality and six administrative suitability parameters in 
2002 to 11 quality and 19 administrative suitability parameters in 2006. At the 
same time, opportunities for dialogue between applicants and the SIF grew, as 
the applicant could supplement insufficiently explained administrative informa-
tion. One can conclude that the applicant had to conform to ever more criteria, 
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which demonstrated the applicant’s desired level of professionalism, but the 
evaluation process did not automatically exclude applicants with less experi-
ence, as in later years one had the opportunity to improve the documentation 
after submission.
The analysis of the best expert can be limited by criteria which are not 
oriented towards the identification and evaluation of elements of a successful 
integration project. The primary difference between a project evaluator and 
other types of programme or policy evaluators is that the former is forced to 
pose questions about the future (“will it promote…?”), while the latter deal 
with the past. In both cases, cause and effect are analysed and, in the case of 
projects, it is whether the activities proposed have a connection with the results 
predicted. If the basis of the activities is a faulty assumption about cause and 
effect, the desired changes cannot take place regardless of ideal organization, 
enthusiasm and perfect financial management. In accordance with modern 
evaluation theories, the quality of an intervention is one of the primary areas 
in which one must seek for answers about the possible attainment of a goal. 
Thus, the share in the evaluation attributed to the logic of change should 
be rather high. For the share to adequately reflect the logic of change, criteria 
for identifying and evaluating it must focus the attention of the evaluator on 
the relevant field’s most important mechanisms of change. In the case of inte-
gration, they have to promote the selection of activities which can reduce the 
divisions in society.
Analysing project evaluation criteria from 2002 through 2006, it is evident 
that the share of “quality” (or “content”) criteria is large and over time even 
grew from 75 to 80 out of 100 points. Thus, an evaluation of the quality of the 
proposed solution technically carried much weight, and this is laudable. 
The second issue is whether these criteria focus attention on the most impor-
tant preconditions for change in the concrete policy area, here, contact between 
different social groups and the quality of that contact. Other significant aspects 
linked to contact are the possibility of potential applicants to address and reach 
the target audience and an understanding of this group’s needs.26 Thus, the ap-
plicant should demonstrate knowledge about the target audience and the ability 
to engage in contact with it in such a way as to resolve the problem. Another 
important theme is the duration of the contact. Sufficient duration of the contact 
does not directly flow from the essence of the change envisaged: to convey in-
formation, episodic contact is sufficient, while changing attitudes or inculcating 
new skills requires longer contact. In the case of integration projects, the time 
dimension has particular importance which cannot be ignored. 
26 “Programs cannot be evaluated in isolation from the problem settings and the people being 
served.” Posavac E., Carey R. (2003) Program Evaluation Methods and Case Studies. 
6th edition, Prentice Hall, pg. 57.
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The Logic of Intervention in SIF Project Evaluation
The criteria linked with the logic of intervention are directly and indirectly 
located in all three quality subsections: “Significance,” “Methodology,” and 
“Sustainability.”27 In analysing the statutes of the competitions, one notes the 
following general characteristics: 
The share of methodology criteria grows (from 15 to 30 points);• 
Over time there is a gradual increase in the level of detail in all sub-• 
sections;
The weight of the so-called “added value”(5 points) remained unchanged, • 
which is an evaluation of the innovative nature of the solution proposed 
or the use of a tried and true solution;
Up to four criteria can be used to define the problem, three to four for • 
the possibility of influencing the problem, which in various ways ask the 
same question, do not stress different aspects that would allow identify-
ing problems and their solutions more precisely, cause and effect, etc.
The formulation of questions is often vague: “to what extent will it • 
influence…” 
A separate issue to be discussed is the target group and its involvement. The 
needs of the target group and contacts with it are the basis for the structure of 
the entire project. If the needs are not defined in a concrete and well-founded 
manner, if it is not indicated which aspect of the problem the project will ad-
dress, or if the project does not work with those most affected by the problem 
identified, the rest of the project’s structure may not be useful. Unfortunately, 
this area is insufficiently elaborated – only one to two criteria pertain to the 
target group’s needs and, in more recent years, involvement. Even in the 
PHARE 2006 competition, precisely defining the needs of the target group is 
worth only five points out of 100! Theoretically, this provides the possibility of 
giving a high evaluation to a project which is not based on the clearly identified 
needs of the target audience. 
It is positive that, with time, one finds in the section “Methodology” the 
criterion “involvement of the target group.” The general trend of criteria de-
velopment over time seems positive (except for the low weight given to good 
practices and innovation), which is evidently linked with the development of 
PHARE competition documentation. The weight of quality criteria and the level 
of detail increase, but in three areas of “quality” they duplicate one another with 
regard to the definition of the problem, the quality of the solution, and the logic 
27 The authors considered indirect criteria to be those which posed apparently general 
questions ‘will the Project make a contribution...’, ‘can an influence be predicted...’, ‘will 
it spur progress towards the goal of the programme?’ Answers here also shape the logic 
of intervention, to wit, the question: how will the applicant address the problem and does 
it look as if s/he will succeed? 
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of implementation. As of 2006, evaluators were given written explanations of 
the criteria, but they do not ask (any) specific questions about the preconditions 
for overcoming the ethnic divide, and thus, it is up to the evaluator to decide 
whether or not to search for them.
In order to evaluate projects more successfully, it is necessary to pose spe-
cific, focused questions which reflect good practice in specific types of projects 
and to identify the most important nodal points (particularly the type of contact, 
its content and duration), which would permit a more in–depth evaluation of 
the applicant’s understanding of the logic of change. It is possible that general 
criteria permit overly frequent use of clichéd approaches and support for just 
about any activity, regardless of the problem, target audience and context. 
Overall, one can conclude that the numerical share of quality criteria is 
high, however, they are quite generic,28 and they do not focus the evaluator on 
the essence of the ethnic divide, mechanisms for overcoming it, and the suitabil-
ity of the contact to the goal set. Thus, experts face a difficult task in evaluating 
the basis of the entire range of project activities – the applicant’s understanding 
of the desired changes and the possibility of implementing them.
Recommendations for Improving the Criteria
1. A greater degree of detail for criteria reflecting the logic of interven-
tion, including identifying the division to be influenced and the basis 
for believing why it is possible; characterize relations with the target 
audience. 
2. Greater attention to these aspects of addressing the problem: is the du-
ration of the target audience’s involvement sufficient for attaining the 
goal? Is the direction of communication in accordance with the goal to 
be achieved?
3. Increased weight to innovative approaches and use of best practices.
Overall, it is necessary to pose directly the question: “Is there reason to 
believe that the activities proposed will lessen significant ETHNIC divisions 
in society?”
In order to draft such supplementary criteria, experts should be commis-
sioned to work with SIF staff to develop a more focused filter for evaluating 
ethnic integration projects that might have broader applicability beyond Latvia. 
If such changes were implemented in the evaluation process, the SIF would 
28 According to information provided by the SIF, the evaluation criteria were taken from the 
European Commission’s Practical Guide to Contract Procedures for EC External Actions 
(6th Grant). These are standard suggestions for any kind of grants competition. They are 
available at http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/work/procedures/implementation/practical_guide/
index_en.htm.
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have the possibility of gathering essential information about the policy field 
and to adjust its activities accordingly over time. 
SIF Supported Ethnic Integration Projects,  
2002–2006
In this section, we characterize the quality of the outcome of the entire 
process analysed above. The analysis is limited by reliance on project imple-
mentation reports which described those aspects of the project requested by the 
SIF. Often, these reports provided the information we sought in only an indi-
rect way. Though we conducted a quantitative analysis, the conclusions point 
only to general trends, as in many cases, information was insufficient to draw 
definitive conclusions. However, the lack of information is also significant, as 
it demonstrated which aspects the SIF was interested in.29 
First, let us characterize the substantive direction of the projects and the 
target audiences, then turn to the issue of contact, which is very important in 
ethnic integration projects. Moreover, we will comment on the share of projects 
with contact in the context of strategies of separation so typical in Latvian so-
ciety. Ethnic integration projects supported by the SIF from 2002 through 2006 
reflect the potential diversity of the field. Measures were implemented in various 
sub-fields of ethnic integration, starting with the promotion of naturalization 
(~10%) and ending with the promotion of employment (~2%). As could be 
expected, a large share of the projects dealt with nurturing the cultural heritage 
(~30%) or promoting language acquisition (~40%). Less popular areas of action 
were public policy in a certain realm (except education reform) – 5%. Less than 
10% of the projects dealt with ethnic integration of socially marginal groups. 
There is diversity in the kinds of knowledge and training provided through 
projects: organization management, labour law, the constitution, local tourism, 
journalism, conflict resolution, civic participation, democratic development. 
The kinds of skills inculcated through projects were varied as well, though 
reference to these was rarer in the project final reports. Skills areas are both 
general, such as fostering a debate, drafting projects, computer skills, but also 
specific – creating costumes, preparing a play, creating a newspaper, flower 
arrangement, leading a tour, etc. This all testifies to the potential breadth and 
diversity of contact and communication. It is another question whether and how 
this potential was used. 
A separate question must be asked about sensitive content – about ques-
tions shaping symbolic integration, which in Latvia’s case are particularly 
29 For example, the implementation reports from 2002 through 2006 did not foresee indicating 
the subfield of integration addressed by the Project, the field in which participants are 
gaining knowledge of skills, the manner of reaching the target audience, the involvement 
of the target group, the duration or manner of the contact, etc.
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important. The Integration Programme states that “an evaluation of historical 
circumstances” is “a precondition for integration,” so that “the young genera-
tion’s historical consciousness in particular does not become a barrier to the 
integration process.” As research consistently demonstrates, the primary cleav-
ages in Latvian society are differences in the sense of belonging among different 
groups, their attitude towards history, culture and identity questions (see Aivars 
Tabuns’ chapter below). Thus, it was important to ascertain to what extent 
projects touched upon the symbolic dimension of values and attitudes towards 
controversial topics, while implementing a dialogue based on respect.
Out of more than 200 projects analysed, in fewer than twenty cases were 
measures oriented towards discussion of politically or psychologically sensitive 
topics (a sense of belonging, interethnic relations). This can be characterized 
as an avoidance of the symbolic dimension, a policy of silence. Unfortunately, 
this avoidance only deepens the divisions for which this policy was created and 
brings us back to the issue of whether the public is capable of spontaneously 
compensating for drawbacks in policy. Another uncomfortable topic is two-way 
contact and the contribution of Latvians to integration. If this topic was touched 
upon, it was not evident in the final reports for projects. 
Kinds of Participants and Activities 
The issue of the target audience is important, as the Integration Programme 
notes, “integration processes should not be promoted as mass measures to 
integrate social communities. They have to be individualized and concrete in 
relation to each person and situation.” The project implementation reports show 
a wide range of target audiences from 17 individuals to half a million. Broad 
awareness raising campaigns were rather common: in about 1⁄3 of all cases, 
all of society was the target audience for information (most often in the form 
of printed materials). About ¼ of all measures involved informing a concrete 
target group. 
Other methods to achieve one’s goals were the following: ¼ for creating 
an environment for the use of language (mainly through language courses), 
1⁄3 through education, 1⁄5 through creating and demonstrating traditional cultural 
values. The most common types of activity are seminars, launches, occasional 
concerts, exhibits, excursions, the technical equipping of an organization. Only 
rarely was a web page created, a film shown or a competition organized.
Returning to the issue raised earlier about project target audiences, it seems 
that it would be beneficial if projects widely involved youth. Indeed, youth were 
a target group in one quarter to one third of all ethnic integration projects sup-
ported by the SIF.30 In later years, reporting forms require indicating the age 
30 In earlier years there was no requirement to clearly indicate the age of the target group, 
so conclusions are tentative.
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of the target audience and it is possible to acquire a more precise figure of the 
share held by youth. It is important that, with changing funding priorities and 
funders, youth remain a priority in the SIF’s work.
The path for reaching the target audience is an issue where we were unable 
to acquire a sufficiently clear picture and thus, can only comment on general 
trends. The reporting forms do not require indicating how a project organizes 
the target audience’s opportunity to come into contact with the project, and this 
shows the importance of this aspect from the funder’s point of view. About 1/5 
of the projects contain indications that the beginning of the project is announced 
in the media. This is true particularly of language courses, in which a public 
announcement is a requirement for receiving a grant. In half the cases it could 
be concluded that the announcement is aimed at an open target group and theo-
retically, anyone can apply. In practice, the question remains whether the target 
group utilizes the channel chosen by the implementer of the project and whether 
the implementer can address his audience in a convincing manner. Providing 
information does not necessarily mean that information is received.
In about 1/5 of the cases, one can conclude that the beginning of a project 
is announced to a concrete target audience (e.g., disadvantaged women who had 
already received advice from a lawyer or a social worker in the organization). 
However, here too, it is not possible to state with certainty that such a manner 
of addressing the target group is effective and that those who can receive the 
greatest benefit from the project are reached.
What Kind of Contact Took Place in the Projects?
Taking into consideration that certain kinds of contact are the main pre-
condition for a change in the perception and attitudes of various groups, the 
contribution of the SIF in the realm of ethnic integration should be sought in the 
existence and character of such contact. Ours was the first attempt to gather in-
formation about inter-group contact and communication from between the lines 
of project final reports in SIF funded projects, and on some issues, our research 
team did not find a consensus.31 Thus, we discuss the existence of contact only 
as a general trend and further work on the methodology of analysing contact 
is necessary. To recall our earlier considerations, we sought two different signs 
of person-to-person contact: its two-way character (equal status among contact 
participants) and a series of contacts or encounters.
Moreover, another important aspect was whether the initiative came from 
the group itself or “from above,” as initiative from the group itself could be seen 
as more closely linked with people’s true interests and motivation for common 
31 All final reports were coded by two researchers (pairs of researchers were created randomly 
out of a total of five researchers) and the consensus level among coders varied. We mention 
only those cases in which there was a high degree of consensus – around 80%. 
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action. In other words, such an initiative might be more sustainable. At the 
same time, if target groups are involved “from above,” such contact may not 
be completely equal and its sustainability might be limited, as the participants 
themselves did not create the agenda.
In analysing project implementation reports, the research team was rather 
united on whether there was face-to-face inter-group contact: this was the case 
in about 30% of all cases. Of these cases, about 2/3 were series of events, not 
episodic contact, so about 20% of the projects had face-to-face contact 
which took place more than once.
Since one of the preconditions for a change in attitudes is the equal status 
of the contact participants, we sought signs of such equality in the activities that 
took place (schoolchildren working together, people from the local community, 
etc.), instead of an event in which a person of higher social status repeatedly 
provides information to those of a lower status (lecturer and auditorium). For 
the analysis, we used the question “What was the nature of inter-ethnic con-
tact: one way (one group dominates), two-way (with the relative dominance of 
one group) or mutual (egalitarian).” An example of mutual, egalitarian contact 
would be a student exchange, in which both sides learn about one another. 
Which cases do we consider to be successful and which are less suited to 
attaining the goals of the Integration Programme?32
Ethnically diverse youth groups with participants from various regional • 
schools are created; in the course of the project, the youth learn to accept 
others, analyse their action, and cooperate with others. 
A similar number of children from Russian and Latvian folklore groups • 
prepare a new folklore programme, get acquainted with minority, Latvian 
and Latgallian culture.
Creative workshops, non-traditional sports and art activities for youth • 
from various ethnic and social groups. 
Bilingual seminars in all the schools of a parish about topics that are of • 
interest to youth.
Events such as these have mostly involved youth. Projects with adults as 
the target audience involve face-to-face contacts more infrequently. One could 
reason that adult contact takes place naturally in the workplace. However, a 
significant number of projects were supported in which the contact potential was 
not utilized, in other words, the impact on integration was less than optimal. 
There were cases in which two-way contact was not essential, as the meas-
ure responded to an acute lack of information (without which further integration 
was not possible) or envisaged the possibility of expressing one’s view to the 
state administration. Successful examples include: a preparatory programme 
32 Project details have been changed, these are composite portraits that unite variations on 
a theme. 
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for naturalization, a hotline about the education reform, a seminar for minority 
families about “Changes in the education system and my child.”33 Moreover, 
it should be acknowledged that it is altogether laudable that some minority 
cultural projects are oriented towards the first step (strengthening oneself), as 
insecurity about one’s own identity hinders contact.34
Taking into consideration these “particular cases,” it is possible to estimate 
that face-to-face contact in projects supported from 2002 through 2006 could 
be justifiably absent in 25% of all cases. However, together with the approxi-
mately 20% of all projects including contact, that raises the question of the 
contribution of the remaining half of all supported projects towards easing the 
ethnic divide. 
At the same time, it is necessary to note that such a result reflects a broad 
trend in Latvian society. Both Latvians and minorities feel threatened and 
compete with each other, which strengthens the desire for separation. As re-
searchers at the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences have noted, such strategies 
of separation are characteristic for 48% of ethnic Latvians and 17% of persons 
belonging to minorities.35 It can be assumed that the project ideas that were sup-
ported partially reproduce the attitudes and communications strategies that are 
prevalent in society, though this issue with regard to those who submit projects 
and their ability to offer social innovations requires further research.
An analysis of the projects casts doubt on the myth of the self-organizing 
society, as in most cases projects reached their target audiences “from above.” 
In the case of school projects, this is not surprising, as only legal entities can 
submit projects. However, “adult” projects were also usually submitted by 
institutions that deal with the target audience as part of their day-to-day duties 
(e.g., a local government) or the character of the measure top-down (a lecturer 
creates a course and offers it to an audience).36 The authors considered active 
involvement of the target audience to have taken place if it was involved in 
creating the content of the measure, implementing it and evaluating it – how-
ever, implementation reports mention this aspect only rarely. It is possible that 
other project documentation indicates ways in which the target audience was 
involved, but this is not considered vital information in the project implementa-
tion reports from 2002 through 2006. 
33 About 15% of projects were devoted to naturalization and the education reform. 
34 Since support for minority cultural organizations has been long-term and systematic, such 
projects could be about 1⁄3 of all cultural-heritage related projects
35 Šūpule and Zepa (2006), ‘Etniskā apdraudētība kā dzīves kvalitātes aspekts,’ Dzīves 
kvalitāte Latvijā. Riga: Zinātne, pg. 362.
36 To make this question more concrete, we tried to ascertain the level of involvement of 
the target audience in each type of measure, but the implementation reports often did not 
have sufficient information to draw definitive conclusions. Evidently, this aspect was not 
considered to be that important. 
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The Special Case of Cultural Contacts
The practice of co-existence of various ethnic cultures in the context of one 
national state requires a separate analysis in SIF supported projects. As noted 
earlier, the Integration Programme leaves this controversial issue in the hands of 
the implementers.37 In accordance with the approach of John Berry, which has 
also been applied to Latvia, cultural contact takes place when the group is suf-
ficiently secure about the possibility of preserving its heritage culture and this 
is a necessary precondition for readiness to communicate with another group. 
At the same time, security derives from one’s ability to live in accordance with 
one’s culture and recognition of it in the public sphere.38
Latvia’s situation is interesting in that both the minority and the majority 
feel threatened.39 Thus, creating security has to take place from all sides at 
once, which is indeed a great challenge. The sense of threat logically leads to 
the priority of self-assertion, not dialogue. For example, research led by Elmārs 
Vēbers entitled Ethnopolitics in Latvia characterizes cultural societies as being 
small organizations with an aging membership (45–60 years) whose events 
reach a small audience (“members of the society, their families and friends”), 
pointing out that “a regular system of cooperation between Latvian and minor-
ity culture has not been created.” Pēteris Laķis once called this the “tradition 
of parallel monologues.”40 This raises the question as to the type of interaction 
that should be promote in Latvia, where the majority feels threatened and the 
minority feels unrecognized. There is no clear answer to this question, but it 
is possible to see what kinds of cultural interaction were proposed by society 
and gained support from the SIF. 
About 1⁄3 of all SIF supported projects were in the realm of the cultural 
heritage and language, including organizing cultural events, preservation of the 
heritage in various ways, public education, etc. The types of activity included 
seminars, presentations, concerts, exhibits, excursions, and in certain cases, 
competitions and the creation of several web pages about the ethnic culture 
of different groups. If such activities were aimed at youth and included inter-
cultural interaction, the contribution of these projects to integration would be 
considerable. However, the basis for optimism is rather weak, as much research 
suggests that minority cultural societies have not been very successful at attract-
ing youth. From the project implementation reports, one concludes that often the 
37 The Integration Programme suggests unifying on the basis of the Latvian language and 
culture, which requires minorities, who have their own ethnic culture, to live in a situation 
of cultural conflict. This has been studied by a number of sociologists in Latvia (e.g., 
Zepa, Koroļova, Rungule), who have pointed to the difficulties of youth in the process of 
identity formation. 
38 John Berry, presentation in Riga at the conference, ‘Intercultural Relations in Culturally 
Diverse Societies: Revisiting the Multiculturalists’ Approach,’ 7 October 2008.
39 See, e.g, Brigita Zepa, ed. (2006), Integration practice and perspectives. Riga: BISS.
40 Elmārs Vēbers, ed. (2000), Integrācija un etnopolitika. Riga: LU FSI, pg. 390.
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activities were self-contained and that demonstrating one’s culture takes place 
with regard to that part of the public which is already involved or informed. In 
many cases, these projects represent self-assertion, not dialogue.  This cultural 
activity is usually limited to traditional culture, especially festivals. Contem-
porary cultural activities might have a greater potential to become forces for 
dialogue and creative transformation.41 Unfortunately, SIF supported projects 
from 2002 through 2006 do not touch upon contemporary culture. This is an 
unused resource which could be addressed through a proactive approach.
A significant integration instrument is the Latvian language. SIF support 
for language has been primarily in the traditional field of language courses. 
Some projects tried to develop informal, creative approaches aiming to create 
an environment for use of the language, particularly in Latgale’s schools, 
where youth were given the opportunity to use the Latvian language in practice 
through various joint activities (interest clubs, etc.). Such measures definitely 
hold the potential of being effective and should be continued. 
The Integration Programme rather unambiguously points in the direction of 
cultural dialogue. In practice, both parties to a dialogue have to first acquire a 
sense of security, otherwise there is a risk of merely self-assertion and strength-
ening one’s own territory. In most projects that were proposed and received sup-
port, the latter appears to have taken place, continuing the tradition of “parallel 
monologues.” Culture too often is interpreted only as traditional culture.
From the analysis of cultural projects, it must be concluded that the empha-
sis on the ability of society to organize by itself and offer effective, topical solu-
tions does not always work. Without a proactive approach to raise awareness 
about new approaches, potential implementers reproduce earlier used models. 
Very few projects touch upon issues related to history or identity. The possible 
reasons may be that potential applicants are not ready to address more complex 
issues or they did not view the SIF as an appropriate partner. 
In addition to planned results and benefits, projects sometimes yielded 
broader social benefits, which should be assessed positively. These benefits 
can be seen in three areas: 
1) the range of partner institution and the broadening of social networks, 
2) the creation of new initiatives (new forms of self-organization etc.), and 
3) a greater understanding about certain topics (e.g., one local government’s 
report suggests that for the first time, it gained insight into issues affect-
ing non-citizens in the community). 
41 Nils Muižnieks, ed. (2007), Nacionālo minoritāšu konvencija – diskriminācijas novēršana 
un identitātes saglabāšana Latvijā. Riga: SPPI, pg. 52.
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Summary and Conclusions
The SIF was created in 2001 to further the implementation of the Integra-
tion Programme. Thus, in assessing the contribution of the SIF to ethnic integra-
tion, the starting point is the quality of the goals and achievement mechanisms 
contained in that policy document. As the analysis here and elsewhere in this 
book attest, the Integration Programme is a rather thankless document as a 
guideline for action. Though the Integration Programme stresses important goals 
for Latvia (two-way integration and cooperation among all groups, overcoming 
mistrust, agreeing on a common understanding of history, etc.), it has serious 
drawbacks. The goals are not prioritized and certain issues related to overcom-
ing the ethnic divide are not elaborated upon beyond the introduction. The 
origins of this divide, its depth and the means for overcoming it are specific to 
Latvia and are left by the Integration Programme to the policy implementation 
phase for clarification. 
The management of the SIF chose to develop the institution as an adminis-
trator of financial mechanisms by creating the appropriate supervisory, control 
and audit systems and getting EDIS accreditation, which permitted the decen-
tralized administration of significant EU programme funding. In choosing to 
administer these funds through open and closed grants competitions, the SIF 
was successful in achieving a certain level of institutional autonomy. At the 
same time, this meant that primary model for implementing ethnic integration 
policy (as far as the SIF was concerned) became support for initiatives “from 
below” in the form of projects. Thus, the driver of policy was the “supply” 
from society. 
The SIF adhered broadly to the content of the Integration Programme and 
nominally covered all the topics therein, and since 2002 organized grants com-
petitions with funding from the state budget, as well as the European Union. 
In accordance with the results of the competitions, the best projects offered by 
applicants were supported. This mechanism was considered successful by both 
the SIF and the Integration Secretariat, whose leadership both stressed that this 
allowed the public to offer its vision of integration. 
The model of supporting projects has both plusses (the aforementioned pos-
sibility to support bottom-up initiatives) and drawbacks – it does not cover the 
whole range of topics, those producing the supply of projects have their own 
limitations linked to institutional stability and competence, and certain thematic 
areas may lack appropriate potential implementers altogether. The most contro-
versial ethnic integration topics were reflected in projects only episodically – 
e.g., issues of history are practically not addressed, nor are the role or task of 
Latvians in the integration process. This may be partially due to the image of 
the SIF as a “conservative” state institution – certain Russian-speaking NGOs 
have not opted to participate in grants competitions. 
A distinct issue is the quality of the initiatives from below. Preliminary anal-
ysis suggests that the project supported often reflected a “top-down approach.” 
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The manner in which the target audience is involved in creating the content of 
the projects should be examined far more critically. The projects supported until 
now lead one to question whether the perception of the “self-organizing society” 
is a myth or to use this concept in a more restrained manner. The model of sup-
porting initiatives “from below” could benefit from several improvements – the 
promotion of certain themes in a proactive manner and a re-evaluation of the 
potential of implementers to promote innovation. There were cases in which 
topical issues were addressed in a pro-active manner – promoting the civic 
activity of parish inhabitants, focusing employment and language training ac-
tivities in places where non-citizens and minorities live, and others. 
The options available to implementers through competitions organized by 
the SIF have been quite broad and have become more detailed over the years. 
The process of evaluating the “supply” of projects was organized in accordance 
with standard European Commission guidelines and gave a high share of points 
to quality without focusing on specific factors promoting ethnic integration, 
identification of the needs of the target groups or innovative activities.
In analysing the potential impact of projects supported by the SIF on ethnic 
integration, the theoretical basis used here was Allport’s inter-group contact 
theory. This is topical in Latvia’s situation, as strategies of separation are 
widespread in Latvian society, particularly among ethnic Latvians. In compiling 
the results of the project analysis, I conclude that approximately 20% of the 
projects supported from 2002 through 2006 included the contact which had the 
potential of leading to changes in attitudes. In another portion of the projects, 
such contact was not essential (naturalization, informing about the education 
reform), though considering these projects, in more than 50% of all cases there 
was no face-to-face contact. 
Thus, the overall conclusion about the contribution of the projects sup-
ported by the SIF to ethnic integration in 2002–2006 is the following: though 
the projects supported include a range of successful models, particularly the 
projects aimed at youth and activities promoting the participation of parents in 
the process of changing the education system, in about half of the projects the 
lack of face-to-face contact reduces the potential for a positive impact. 
The working procedures and system of the SIF operate professionally and, 
over time, a significant capacity in attracting and administering funding was 
developed. A more focused selection of projects (searching for signs of contact 
and self-organization) and elements of a proactive strategy could lead to better 
results in future work.
Given recent institutional changes and new integration challenges, it is an 
appropriate time to spark a public debate about the SIF. It appears as if the 
SIF is moving away from the issue of social integration and moving into new 
thematic areas because there are new financial opportunities. There is a need 
to define which ethnic integration issues are still topical and which institution 
will push the policy agenda forward.
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In implementing bottom-up projects, it is necessary to consider the fol-
lowing: 
The symbolic aspects of integration (history, culture, national identity) • 
will not disappear and some state institution should address them. If the 
SIF is not the optimal partner for addressing these issues, which institu-
tion is?
Projects revolving around civic participation should include and stress • 
the dimension of inter-ethnic cooperation.
Youth should continue to be a priority target group, particularly in activi-• 
ties related to civic participation and dialogue.
If the content of ethnic integration is determined by the “supply” pro-• 
posed by potential implementers, it is necessary to ensure the presence of 
inter-group contact, sufficient duration of the contact, and the initiative 
of the target group. 
Though ethnic integration still appears to many to be abstract and arti-
ficial, processes of group segregation and mistrust persist. Moreover, when 
the economy recovers, new immigrants will soon be knocking on our doors, 
forcing us to re-evaluate once again the creation of divisions and the way to 
lessen them. 

Part II 
Integration in Various Life 
Realms

Citizenship, Participation and Representation 
Ilze Brands Kehris
Introduction
Inclusion through the full, equal and effective participation of all members 
of society in social, economic, cultural and political life is a core aspect of 
integration. To reach equality of participation, the unequal status and power of 
majority and minority groups have to be programmed into the equation, and 
special attention has to be paid to the participation of minorities and migrants in 
political decision-making processes. The right to effective participation is one 
of the core rights of national minorities, as the codification of this principle into 
Article 15 of the Council of Europe Framework Convention for the Protection 
of National Minorities indicates. The rationale for treating participation as a 
key aspect of integration goes beyond minority rights and has a solid basis in 
the democratic citizenship literature.1
The arguments against an exclusive focus on electoral participation and re-
sulting majority rule are well known, and participatory democracy as the model 
has also been confirmed outside the academic literature as a general EU policy 
approach. Broad participation not only provides legitimacy to the polity and the 
decisions taken, but the inclusion of diverse views in policy deliberations also 
improves governance and outcomes. The imperatives of deliberative democ-
racy point to the importance of including such pluralism in the public debates 
preceding the election of representatives and decision-makers, but also in the 
“horizontal deliberations” within elected bodies – hence the need for mean-
ingful representation of minorities within structures that otherwise would be 
dominated by the majority. Such representation can contribute to the substantive 
representation of the interests of these diverse groups, which is the necessary 
corollary to effective participation. In a further distinction of representation the 
deliberative function has also been distinguished from the “aggregative func-
tion” – the situation when the interests of the groups represented are not only 
deliberated in the general forum of decision-making, but are taken into account 
where the decision has direct bearing on those interests. 
 1 Will Kymlicka, Wayne Norman (2000), Citizenship in Diverse Societies. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
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It is generally accepted that integration is a two-way process, whereby 
newcomers/minorities and those already settled/majority mutually adjust exist-
ing frameworks and institutions. In the political arena such a process can only 
take place through participation of minorities in the deliberative and decision-
making processes, where they can make claims that can be accommodated in 
a mutually negotiated process. The stress on minority rights to participate is an 
implicit acknowledgment that structures and procedures – indeed power – will 
favour the majority. Minority rights are thus necessary for genuine democratic 
participation. At the same time, the participation of all and a pluralism of 
perspectives is in the interest of all, since this increases the chance for better 
outcomes and represents good governance. 
The inclusion into citizenship and political participation of minority groups 
is not an option, but a necessity for the integration of society, as inclusion works 
against marginalization, fragmentation through isolation and “racialization” of 
social relations. Full and active participation in the larger society, while retain-
ing a minority identity if desired, enhances a sense of belonging to a common 
overarching citizenship identity.2 Christian Joppke argues that we are witness-
ing the decline of particularistic citizenship identities connected to nations, and 
a “lightened” citizenship based on universalist content is emerging. If this is 
the case, inclusion poses no problems as the entity is more open to diversity, 
but the potential threat to a common sense of belonging and cohesion can be 
addressed by going beyond the procedural liberal democratic citizenship to a 
thicker, value-based version of liberalism as identity, which can replace national 
and particularistic belonging to the state.3 Even for those who argue that the 
national dimension of identity remains, the uniform acceptance of the principle 
of non-discrimination also entails an acceptance of diverse personal identities 
within a common overarching identity.
If the basic object of overarching belonging is the state, then it is critical to 
analyse citizenship, including not only citizenship as a legal status signifying 
membership in a polity. All three generally accepted dimensions of citizenship 
must be analysed: political and legal status, the legal rights and duties and “the 
individual practices, dispositions and identities attributed to, or expected from 
those who hold the status.”4 Political integration includes not only access to 
political status, rights, opportunities and representation on an equal basis, but 
also the activities and participation of people themselves, with an acceptance 
of the laws, institutional framework and political values in place.5 
 2 Ibid.
 3 Christian Joppke (2008), ‘Immigration and the identity of citizenship: the paradox of 
universalism,’ Citizenship Studies, Vol. 12, No. 6, December, pp. 533–546.
 4 Rainer B Bauböck (ed.), (2006), Migration and Citizenship. Legal Status, Rights and 
Political Participation. Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, pg. 16.
 5 Ibid., pp. 11–12.
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Political integration involves several dimensions, including political 
participation, mobilization and representation. The mere existence of rights 
cannot suffice when evaluating political integration of minority and migrant 
populations. It is necessary to examine the implementation of these rights and 
participation in various dimensions, including voting, standing for election, 
taking part in the work of elected bodies, making political claims and discuss-
ing these through public debate, and involvement in civil society organizations 
and protest actions. Integration involves the provision of rights, the removal of 
obstacles and barriers to the exercise of these rights to provide real opportuni-
ties for participation, including the pro-active encouragement/activization “from 
above” and mobilization “from below” of political engagement by minority 
populations. Since “effective citizenship depends on structural opportunities for 
participation and a widespread disposition to use them,” promoting participa-
tion by minorities is logical.6 Promoting political participation thus involves 
providing not only rights and opportunities for participation, but also incentives 
for political participation.7 
Although the integration literature and policies in Europe generally target 
migrants, the question of whom integration addresses and whose participation 
should be enhanced is not as clear as it may seem, quite apart from the general 
neglect in practice and policies of majority adaptation implied in the principle 
of two-way integration. Does integration address third country nationals who 
are permanent residents only (since EU citizens arguably no longer qualify 
for “external” status)? Or should integration concepts and policies address all 
who are present beyond short visits on the territory of the state, i.e. including 
temporary residents? What about refugees and vulnerable asylum seekers? What 
about irregular migrants? Although a legal perspective focusing on the rights 
that come with a certain legal status, be it citizenship or residency, automatically 
excludes irregular migrants, these persons clearly have a presence in society 
and most also contribute by working (even if not by paying taxes). The focus 
on expelling all who do not have legal status may create the illusion that they 
are already “on the way out”, but most estimates indicate that there are stable 
or growing numbers of irregular migrants in all EU member states. If we do 
not reasonably expect voting rights to be provided to irregulars, then a case 
can credibly be made that there is room for authorities’ consultation with this 
group of vulnerable persons, since the state remains responsible for a mini-
mum level of respect for rights and provision of services (emergency health, 
education of children) of all on its territory. Nevertheless, this chapter will 
follow the generally accepted practice of focusing on minorities and (regular) 
migrants for integration purposes. In Latvia, this means not only the relatively 
 6 Alexander T. Aleinikoff and Douglas Klusmeyer (2002), Citizenship Policies for an Age 
of Migration. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pg. 42.
 7 Ibid., pg. 54.
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few third country nationals, but primarily the former Soviet citizens who are 
non-citizens, as well as for some purposes the national minorities, including 
those with naturalized citizenship status.
Exclusion from citizenship and therefore from full participation represents 
a democracy deficit. The citizenship and integration literature, largely relating 
to migration, increasingly has focused on the inclusion of the second generation 
of migrants (i.e. born on the territory of the receiving state, but of parents who 
were immigrants) as a “litmus test” for the openness of the integration regime.8 
At the same time, the denial of reasonable political rights to non-citizens (e.g. 
voting rights at the local level) goes against the goal of closing the rights gap 
between permanent residents and citizens declared by the European Union since 
the 1999 Tampere Council. In contrast to the view not infrequently heard in 
Latvia that there is a choice between facilitating access to citizenship through 
naturalization or increasing the rights of non-nationals, the premise here is that 
both aspects are necessary elements for the promotion of effective political par-
ticipation. Encouraging full membership in the polity by naturalization should 
not affect the willingness to promote other forms of political participation of 
those who cannot or choose not to naturalize. The view that providing too many 
rights to non-citizens will make them more passive in acquiring citizenship is 
not born out by empirical studies, which tend to show that political engagement 
in its various forms (civil society, local level participation) provides “training” 
opportunities and works to encourage further participation.9 
Integration indicators clearly have to go beyond the legislative framework 
to include measurements of practice. At the same time, defining indicators 
beyond rates of naturalization, proportionality of representation in elected 
bodies and the like is enormously challenging, since the quality of the inclusion 
and participation should also be measured, and this will inescapably include 
subjective elements and qualitative methodologies. The lack of comparability 
of any potential indicators, since not only their content but their very definition 
is context-dependent, does not take away from the usefulness of a framework 
of indicators to structure an assessment of the political integration of society. 
Citizenship
Considering the large number of persons in Latvia who have the specific 
status of non-citizen, it is understandable that the focus concerning access to 
citizenship has over the years been almost exclusively on this group. For the 
purposes of integration – especially in the long-term, when new immigrants 
 8 Ibid.
 9 Rinus Penninx, Karen Kraal, Marco Martiniello, Steven Vertovec (eds.) (2004), Citizenship 
in European Cities. Immigrants, Local Politics and Integration Policies. Aldershot: Ashgate; 
and Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer (2002), Citizenship Policies in an Age of Migration.
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will arrive – and also for a fuller understanding of the approach to citizenship 
overall, it is necessary to broaden the vision to include access to citizenship for 
all long-term residents in Latvia. Although access to citizenship is guaranteed 
through descent, a measurement of integration will have to include also access 
for other members of society, including the openness of the state and society 
to newcomers and the possibility for newcomers to become full members of 
society.
The Citizenship Law adopted in 1994, as amended in 1995, 1997, and 
1998, determines who can register as citizens and who can access citizenship 
through naturalization or registration or special procedures, and also defines 
the main procedures for naturalization. The Law on the Status of Those Former 
USSR Citizens Who Do Not Have the Citizenship of Latvia or That of Any 
Other State was adopted in 1995, and determines the special status of “non-
citizen” for those former Soviet citizens who were registered as living on the 
territory of Latvia on 1 July 1992, or if their last place of registered domicile 
before that date was on the territory of Latvia and their children – provided 
that they have no other citizenship (Soviet military personnel who retired after 
28 January 1992 excepted).
The status and rights of residency of persons other than citizens and non-
citizens, who have the right to permanent residency in Latvia, are determined by 
the Immigration Law, which sets the basis for access to the territory of Latvia, 
as well as to residency and permanent residency. 10
Access to residency for third country nationals requires proof of subsistence 
means and health insurance, and a work permit for employment if the residency 
is temporary. EU citizens and their family members, also European Economic 
Area and Swiss citizens, are governed by other, EU-compliant regulatory leg-
islation, but for residency beyond 90 days they also require proof of sufficient 
financial means and health insurance. Access to permanent residency requires 
a five-year period of continuous legal residency, sufficient income and health 
insurance, as well as proof of knowledge of the state language at level A2.
The status of EU permanent resident also requires this level of Latvian lan-
guage proficiency. Since the EU Council Directive 2003/109/EC on long-term 
resident third country nationals was applied also to Latvia’s non-citizens, the 
regulations adopted at the national level on procedures to acquire EU perma-
nent resident status also apply to Latvian non-citizens, just like third country 
nationals, despite the fact that the former are permanent residents of Latvia. 
The language requirement, although permitted under EU regulation as addi-
tional “integration conditions,” has made this status less interesting to Latvian 
10 The status of asylum seekers, refugees and persons with alternative status or under subsidiary 
protection is set in the Asylum Law, and the status of stateless persons is set in the Law 
on Stateless Persons, but these persons’ residence rights are still determined through the 
Immigration Law.
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non-citizens, as by passing similar language tests and a history test, they can 
become EU citizens by acquiring Latvian citizenship. 
Access to territory and residency are rights with various levels of restric-
tions for different groups. Thus, even if access to citizenship is provided based 
on a five year permanent residency period, the road to permanent residency is 
not necessarily readily accessible, especially for third country nationals. Al-
though the number of persons in Latvia who do not have permanent residency 
is not very large, over time an increasing number of such persons, who may 
face difficulties in accessing this residency status, would potentially be a nega-
tive integration indicator.
Since the basic guiding principle for the development of Latvia’s approach 
to citizenship has been legal continuity, there has been a strong stress on ius 
sanguinis in citizenship legislation. Thus, descendents of citizens of Latvia on 
17 June 1940, who have registered as such, are citizens. There is privileged 
access to citizenship based on ethnicity, as Latvians and Livs whose permanent 
place of residence is Latvia, who do not have citizenship of another state or 
have an expatriation permit from a state of previous citizenship are to be con-
sidered holders of Latvian citizenship according to the law. The predominance 
of ius sanguinis remains evident, even if the 1998 amendments entitling chil-
dren born on territory of Latvia after 21 August 1991 to citizenship of Latvia 
through registration added a certain element of ius soli. Nevertheless, birth on 
the territory of Latvia has to be accompanied by other elements – living on the 
territory of Latvia and parents who are either non-citizens or stateless.
A ius soli element is also found in the entitlement to citizenship of persons 
with permanent residence who have completed a full educational course in 
general education schools in which the language of instruction is Latvian, if the 
parents of such a person do not hold the citizenship of another state. A similar 
entitlement exists for foundlings and orphans living in Latvian orphanages or 
boarding schools. In the broadest sense, the mere possibility of naturalization 
based on a five-year period of permanent residency, including newcomers, is 
an element of ius soli. Although the mix of ius sanguinis and ius soli elements 
is more the rule than the exception in today’s Europe, the access to Latvian 
citizenship based not on descent, but on residence is in principle an indicator 
of a certain openness to inclusion, thus a positive criterion for integration. The 
link to schooling in Latvian schools is a particularly interesting element, and 
also less common, with connotations of integration.
The non-citizen, in Latvian terminology, is thus not any third country na-
tional, but a former Soviet citizen with a right to reside permanently in Latvia. 
Non-citizens have a number of rights set in Latvian laws, and their position 
is considered closer to that of citizen than to that of other foreign nationals or 
stateless persons, as shown by the consular protection of the state extended to 
non-citizens and the right to return to Latvia, and as reiterated on several occa-
sions by the Constitutional Court of Latvia. Non-citizen status generally gives 
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the holder access to the naturalization procedure and he or she can become 
a citizen upon the fulfilment of the material and procedural requirements for 
naturalization.
The Citizenship Law includes a list of exclusion criteria for access to citi-
zenship through naturalization. This list includes those with a criminal record 
in Latvia or in another country at the moment the Citizenship Law entered 
into force, those who acted against the independence of Latvia, the democratic 
parliamentary structure of the state or against the existing state power in Latvia 
with unconstitutional methods, if this is confirmed by a court decision, or those 
in the service of a foreign army or security services (or police) – prerequisites 
which can be found also in several other European countries’ laws. There is in 
addition a rather extensive list of former activities relating to the specific his-
torical circumstances in Latvia precluding the right to citizenship. These factors 
include having expressed fascist, chauvinistic, national socialist, communist or 
other totalitarian ideas or having incited to racial hatred of discord, if this has 
been established through a court decision; being an official of a foreign state 
power, administration or law enforcement institution. The largest groups exclud-
ed permanently from naturalization are probably those persons who have chosen 
to live in Latvia right after the demobilization from the USSR army and who 
did not have permanent residency in Latvia before entering the service of this 
army. Likewise, persons who have served in the KGB or the security services 
of a foreign state, if this fact has been established through the order foreseen by 
law, are not eligible for citizenship. Finally, persons who after 13 January 1991 
have acted against the Republic of Latvia by participating in various specified 
pro-Soviet organizations are also barred from naturalization.
As the lengthy list illustrates, care has been taken by the legislator to ensure 
that persons connected to the Soviet military, to Soviet security services as well 
as persons remaining within pro-Soviet civilian structures related to the Com-
munist Party, are excluded from citizenship – although their permanent resi-
dency is not called into question. Although estimates of the number of persons 
affected vary, the probable range is several tens of thousands of persons, some 
1–3 percent of the population. These persons’ right to a citizenship – a human 
right, albeit a lesser known one – is not respected in practice. Moreover, the ex-
clusion of these persons from eligibility in principle, although part of the state’s 
right to set its own citizenship requirements, is presumably based on national 
security considerations and was arguably legitimate and proportional upon the 
reestablishment of independence. Like the lustration laws preventing similar 
groups from political participation, the passage of time should ease security 
concerns, and the effectiveness of this measure as well as its proportionality 
should be questioned. Additional elements to take into consideration are the 
unequal treatment of these persons, based on their place of origin, compared 
with those Latvian citizens by descent that have served and been active in the 
same Soviet structures, but are not limited in their access to Latvian citizenship. 
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As an indicator for integration, the exclusion of groups of persons who reside 
permanently on the territory of the state from access to citizenship is undoubt-
edly a negative phenomenon.
After having resided on Latvian territory for a five year period while hold-
ing a permanent residence status, a person is eligible for naturalization as a 
citizen through the general naturalization procedures. The Citizenship Law 
prohibits dual citizenship for persons naturalizing. At the same time, the same 
article goes on to state that in case a person is considered also a citizen of a 
foreign state by laws of that state, then in the legal relation with the Latvian 
state the person shall be considered solely a Latvian citizen – thus allowing for 
the possibility that a person may in fact hold dual citizenship.
The analysis of citizenship legislation shows that although Latvia has a 
relatively liberal citizenship regime, there are other aspects which make this leg-
islation more restrictive. The permanent exclusion of certain groups, as well as 
restrictions on access to territory and residency for third country nationals, are 
examples of such factors. The requirement to pass tests and language require-
ments at a higher level than several other EU member states are also illustra-
tions, while the continued predominance of ius sanguinis elements also point 
to a possible lack of openness towards full inclusion of newcomers, although 
naturalization is provided for under specific circumstances. The lack of clarity 
on dual citizenship adds uncertainty, which will ultimately be determined by 
case law interpretation or by amendments to citizenship legislation. 
Naturalization and Registration of Citizenship
On 1 July 2009, out of 2.3 million inhabitants, 351,435 persons were non-
citizens, representing 15.6% of the population. Although this is a significant 
decrease from the early 1990s, when a third of the population were former 
Soviet citizens who were not descendents of Latvian citizens, it should be 
noted that the largest decrease has come from emigration in the first years 
after independence of persons with weak links to Latvia, and natural decline 
through death (the non-citizen part of the population includes a higher share 
of elderly persons).
Altogether, over 130,000 applications for naturalization have been made since 
1995, when the process started, and there were in December 2009 132,870 natu-
ralized citizens of Latvia (including 13,806 children who were naturalized along 
with their parents), indicating a high rate of positive decisions. Application rates 
for naturalization have gone through two peaks – one in the period following the 
liberalization of legislation at the end of the 1990s, and one around the time of 
Latvia’s accession to the EU. The highest number of applications received came 
in 2004 with over 21,000 submissions. However, the decline in naturalization 
applications since then has been dramatic, with a low point in 2008, when only 
2,600 applications were made, which has only marginally increased in 2009 to 
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3,470. With this rate of naturalization, the problem of a large share of non-citizens 
among the population will remain for some time.
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Table 2. Naturalization Applications by Gender 1996–2009
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Interestingly, there have been substantial variations in the gender balance 
in applications and naturalizations over the years. The cumulative figures since 
naturalization started in 1996  until the end of 2009 show that 63% of all natu-
ralization applicants have been women. However, if in the first decade or so, 
the ratio of women to men was relatively stable at two thirds to one third, then 
since the mid-2000s there have been more or less similar number of applicants 
from the two sexes, while in 2009, for the first time, there were more men ap-
plying for naturalization than women.
Although these changing trends require detailed investigation, there is no a 
priori indication that women face greater obstacles in accessing naturalization. 
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As could be expected, the biggest share of naturalized citizens are of 
Russian ethnicity, who have submitted 68% of all naturalization applications 
in the 14 years since naturalization started, which corresponds to their share 
among the non-citizens of Latvia (on 1 July 2009 66% of non-citizens were 
Russian).11 The next largest ethnic group to naturalize is the Belarusians, with 
over 10% of all naturalization applications (with a share among non-citizens 
of 13%), followed closely by Ukrainians (9% of all applications, 9.5% among 
the non-citizens).
There do not appear to be any great differences in access to citizenship 
according to ethnicity when the largest applicant groups are compared. The 
application and fulfilment of criteria by third country nationals is at present dif-
ficult to ascertain, in view of the fact that this group is still very small. It could 
be, in the future, that more attention needs to be paid to potential difficulties 
in fulfilling some of the criteria for certain groups. It is not inconceivable, for 
instance, that lacking the exposure to the Latvian language that most non-citizen 
applicants have had for many years, and with increasing linguistic distance be-
tween Latvian and the language of origin of the applicant, the language exams 
and expected proficiency level would be harder to attain. 
Even if the rate among those who are qualified to apply is low, the rate of 
naturalization among those who apply for naturalization is high, indicating very 
few rejections of those who go through the process. Nevertheless, in the last 
few years a trend for an increased failure rate at exams has become evident. 
Thus, for history exams the failure rate of below one percent in 2000 has over 
time increased to over ten percent, and in the last two years even to 18%. The 
failure rates for language exams were always relatively higher, starting in the 
same period at about 10%, but increasing to 20% in since 2006, and reaching an 
all-time high of 39% in 2009. These dramatic changes over the last decade, and 
in particular over the last five years, require urgent investigation and analysis.
Although an applicant who fails the exam can retry, a tightening of legisla-
tion in 2006 increased the time period needed before a second test. For language 
exams this period is now 6 months, while for the history and constitutional 
knowledge exam it is 3 months. In addition, an applicant can retake the exam a 
maximum of three times, but if all three are failed, a new naturalization applica-
tion has to be submitted and the entire procedure started anew after a delay.
The level of required language proficiency corresponds to the Common 
European Reference Framework for Languages rating B1, basic knowledge. 
This level is relatively common among those countries in the EU that do re-
quire language proficiency, although some have lower requirements (level A2 is 
11 It should be noted that approximately 60% of Russians living in Latvia are citizens of 
Latvia – more than 367,000 ethnic Russians are citizens of Latvia – while there are 232,000 
Russian non-citizens and approximately 30,000 Russian citizens with residency in Latvia 
as of 1 July 2009. 
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required by Austria, A1 by France, A2 by the Netherlands and Portugal, a mix 
of A2 and B1 for Spain and Luxembourg), while only one country – Denmark – 
has higher requirements (B2).12
Although there was concern over the low rates of naturalization following 
the brief upsurge after the 1998 referendum and one of the possible obstacles to 
naturalization was identified as fees that were high compared to average income 
and pensions, fees were gradually reduced, and provisions for the waiving of 
fees were established. Over the years, a significant share of the naturalization 
applicants has paid a lowered fee or no fee at all. In 2009, for the first time, the 
number of persons paying the full fee was fewer than half. It seems, then, that 
the cost of naturalization is not deterring persons, and there are no indications 
that any exclusion takes place directly based on socio-economic conditions. 
Following a referendum in 1998, the Citizenship Law was amended to 
make it possible for children born to either non-citizen or stateless parents after 
21 August 1991 to be recognized as citizens upon registration. These children 
are thus born as non-citizens (or stateless), and are not automatically made citi-
zens, but their parents can submit applications for their recognition as citizens 
of Latvia until the year they turn 15. After that age, the youth can themselves 
apply to be registered as a citizen, but at that point has to show proof of Latvian 
language proficiency. Since this process was started at the end of the 1990s, 
slightly over 8,000 children have been recognized as citizens. However, this is a 
long-standing contentious issue, as the number of non-citizen children in Latvia 
still remains stable, at about 13,000, since new non-citizen births outweigh the 
low number of registrations, numbering below 500 annually.
Certain categories of persons can be recognized as citizens through reg-
istration. All in all, the number of registered citizens through this procedure 
was by 31 December 2009 9,364. Of those, almost 65% were in the age group 
15–30 years of age, which would seem to indicate that the largest group is not 
those who can claim citizenship through descent or ethnicity (Latvians and 
Livs), but persons who have completed their full course of education in Latvian-
language schools. The number of such persons is below 500 per year.
There are also some persons who have become citizens of Latvia in recog-
nition of particular meritorious contributions to the state of Latvia, for which 
the procedure is adoption of a specific law by parliament for the individual in 
question. This way of acquiring Latvian citizenship does not require the re-
nunciation of any previous citizenship, and therefore de facto allows for dual 
citizenship, and also is possible even for some of the persons who are denied 
access to the ordinary naturalization procedures (former army personnel). Al-
though the list of persons who have become citizens through this procedure is 
12 Presentation by Sara Wallace Goodman based on data from European Union Democracy 
Observatory (EUDO) Citizenship Project at the 2nd plenary conference ‘Comparing 
Citizenship Policies in Europe’ in Edinburgh, 21–22 January 2010.
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quite diverse, ranging from athletes to bankers and entrepreneurs, their number 
does not exceed a few hundred, with the majority acquiring citizenship in the 
late 1990s. Although the procedure allows for openness on an individual basis 
for a broad range of persons, the risk of arbitrariness and lack of transparency 
seems particularly high.
Access to Political Participation 
Citizenship remains the key political participation criterion, as the right 
to vote and stand as a candidate for elections in national elections is reserved 
to citizens only, and in local elections to citizens of the EU. Non-citizens and 
other residents do not have the right to participate in elections, but they can 
be members of political parties and other civil society organizations, as well 
as participate in public political events and protest actions, even if they do not 
have the right to be the organizers thereof.
Participation in elections remains at the centre of political participation in 
Latvia, and the relevant laws include citizenship criteria for all types of elec-
tions. Thus the Law on Saeima Elections states that citizens of Latvia who have 
attained 18 years of age are eligible to vote, while citizens aged at least 21 are 
eligible to stand as candidates, although some categories of persons are barred 
from this right (based on past membership of USSR or Latvian SSR or foreign 
security services, membership of the Soviet communist parties and related or-
ganizations after 13 January 1991, etc.). The same applies to referenda.
The Law on European Parliament Elections extends the right to vote in line 
with EU requirements to all EU citizens, who should be aged 18 or above who 
are included in the voters’ register (based on residence) in Latvia, while EU 
citizens above age 21included in the voters’ register can stand as candidates. 
The lustration norms of the national parliament elections – i.e. the prohibition 
to participate as candidates based on security service or communist party mem-
bership – are not applied in the European Parliament elections.
The more intensely discussed question on election participation concerns 
voting rights for permanent residents at the local level. Although approximately 
half of the 27 EU member states provide some form of local election rights for 
third country nationals (active or passive), including Latvia’s Baltic neighbours 
Estonia and Lithuania, key large countries such as France, Germany, the UK, 
Poland, Italy do not. The case for providing such rights to non-citizens has been 
made in various Council of Europe, OSCE and even EU fora, but despite the 
introduction of local voting rights for EU citizens from other member states 
introduced with the Maastricht treaty, the adoption of a legal requirement to 
provide such rights is not likely to be supported at EU level through a con-
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sensus.13 The arguments for legitimacy of democracy, minority participation 
as well as good governance still stand, however, and Latvia’s authorities are 
regularly exposed to international recommendations to this effect. The issue also 
regularly recurs in public debate, due to the specific circumstances in Latvia 
with the significant number of permanent residents who have been residing in 
Latvia for decades or longer, but who have not become citizens. 
Participation eligibility in local elections is determined in the Election 
Law on City Councils and District Councils. In addition to citizens of Latvia, 
EU citizens are eligible to vote if they are included in the Residents’ register 
(all voters have to have attained 18 years of age and must be included in the 
Voters’ register in order to vote). In order to stand as candidate for the elec-
tions, a person has to have been resident in the territorial unit for at least the 
preceding 10 months, to have been either employed or self-employed in that 
territory for at least the preceding 4 months or has to own real estate. The age 
limit to stand as candidate in local elections is 18, which thus is lower than 
the age a person must have reached in order to stand as candidate in either 
national or EP elections. The lustration norms are in effect also for candidates 
in local elections. Latvian non-citizens and third country nationals do not have 
any right to participate in elections. This limitation stands out particularly in 
the case of local elections, in which, following EU requirements, EU citizens 
with only minimal links to the territorial unit in question do have rights both to 
vote and stand as candidates, while persons without EU citizenship, including 
non-citizens who have long-standing ties to Latvia, and in many cases who are 
born on the territory, do not have these rights. 
EU citizenship, specifically through the post-Maastricht local election rights 
of EU citizens, has created a challenge to the long-standing majority consensus 
on national citizenship as a criterion for formal political participation rights, in-
cluding at the municipal level. Although this is the case in all those EU member 
states which do not provide third country nationals permanent residents with 
participation rights in local elections, the issue is particularly salient in Latvia. 
This is both because the share of non-citizens among the population remains 
large, and also because this group has been resident in Latvia for a minimum 
of two decades, but a large share was born in Latvia. Even though most non-
citizens have access to citizenship through naturalization, the exclusion of such 
a large number of tax-payers from participating by voting for representatives 
at the local level, where decisions which directly affect them are made, is even 
more difficult to accept in view of newcomers from other EU member states 
having such rights. Over time, especially if the number of EU citizens increases 
and they become more visible, this contrasting situation will become untenable 
13 Jo Shaw (2007), The Transformation of Citizenship in the European Union. Electoral Rights 
and the Restructuring of Political Space. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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and should logically work in the direction of providing the right to participate 
in elections at local level for all permanent residents.
Another issue, specific to Latvia, is the question of exclusionary criteria for 
candidates in elections included in the lustration clauses. These are increasingly 
anachronistic after almost two decades of renewed independence, but effectively 
bar some high-visibility minority representatives (as well as members of the 
majority with similar backgrounds) from participation as elected politicians on 
the territory of Latvia.14
Conceptual Framing of Rights to Political 
Participation
Citizenship is closely linked to the renewal of independence, the 1922 
Constitution, and the citizenry, based on citizens from before the war and their 
descendents. The choice of this basis for independence in 1991, together with 
the dramatically changed composition of the population during the Soviet 
period, explains why citizenship was seen as such a key denominator of belong-
ing right from the beginning. However, over 700,000 former Soviet citizens 
found themselves on Latvian territory after the break-up of the Soviet Union. 
In the initial years after independence, policy approaches fluctuated between 
proposals to include all who were for independence to the little disguised hope 
that Soviet-era settlers would leave. Gradually, after significant international 
pressure, the political elite accepted the need to provide for access to inclusion 
as full citizens to those whose permanent residency was in Latvia. Until the 
end of the 1990s, however, non-citizens’ access to naturalization was limited 
through quotas (or naturalization “windows” which introduced gradual access 
based on age and date of arrival in Latvia), which were lifted after a referendum 
in 1998. The referendum also extended further the ius solis elements of citizen-
ship by recognizing that all children born in Latvia to non-citizen parents after 
1991 have the right to be registered as citizens.
Social and economic rights of non-citizens were recognized early on, 
although some discriminatory provisions were only gradually removed from 
14 This is the case for the MEP from Latvia Tatyana Zhdanok, who had in the early post-
independence period been a member of parliament in Latvia, but was after that struck 
off election candidates’ list for the Riga City Council for having been a member of the 
Communist Party after the cut-off date of 13 January 1991, a case which was unsuccessfully 
contested in the European Court of Human Rights. Nevertheless, both the Constitutional 
Court of Latvia as well as the ECtHR stressed the necessarily temporary dimension of 
such restrictions.
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legislation, and some even remain today.15 Generally speaking, however, the 
socio-economic rights of non-citizens, as well as their genuine and lasting links 
to the state, have been recognized on separate occasions by the legislator, the 
judiciary and the executive authorities, and non-citizens rights are closer to 
those of citizens than are those of resident foreigners, especially third country 
nationals.
Nevertheless, this recognition never included a vision of political rights for 
non-citizens – especially not the right to vote or stand as a candidate for elec-
tions, which is almost unanimously seen by the majority and the establishment 
as legitimately limited to nationals. The road to full political participation, it 
is argued officially, is naturalization, and this, it is claimed, is open to all on 
relatively lenient terms, compared to the rest of Europe. At the same time, the 
number of minority representatives who are citizens is significant, and since 
they belong to the same ethnic minorities as the non-citizens, many “minority 
political claims” are made and heard, including on the rights of non-citizens, 
through established political parties and elected politicians at both national 
and local level.
In the period before accession to the EU the international community played 
a significant role in pressuring and alerting the majority decision-makers to the 
general expectation of effective participation as a prerequisite for democracy. 
However, the debates led to a rather polarized response. If the need to take 
some measures to facilitate inclusion into citizenship of non-citizens was ac-
cepted by decision-makers, the lesson was learned that questions of citizenship 
are the exclusive competence of a sovereign state. The choice of focusing the 
discourse on legally based arguments led to the recognition that there are no 
legally binding international standards that can force provision of citizenship 
or the right to participation in local elections by non-citizens and that several 
of the largest countries in Europe do not provide such rights to their permanent 
residents who are not citizens. This line of argument has become the standard 
response of Latvian authorities whenever international observers comment on 
the political rights of non-citizens in Latvia. The comfort of this legal clarity 
has not created any hope that international dialogue – now that NATO and EU 
membership has been achieved – will have any impact on the will to extend 
political participation rights. 
There are signs that there may be some evolution in public opinion and that 
even if support for non-citizen voting rights at the local level has not reached 
a majority, the population at large is not so clearly opposed to such rights. In 
15 The most recently contested difference was the right to pensions for time periods worked 
on Soviet territory outside of Latvia, which was previously not included in calculation of 
pensions for non-citizens, while it was for citizens. The European Court of Human Rights 
found such a differentiated approach discriminatory, and the government in 2009 proposed 
legislation that would exclude these periods for all; another contested right is the right to 
own land in the border areas. 
108 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
2008, for instance, 47% of respondents in a representative survey of residents 
supported the provision of local election participation rights for non-citizens, 
while 39% opposed this and 14% found it difficult to answer.16 A study from 
2009 found that among citizens of Latvia, 27% were very or moderately posi-
tive to the provision of voting rights at the local level to non-citizens, with an 
additional 24% stating they were neutral in this question. 43% of the respond-
ents were very negative or moderately negative (19%) toward this proposition, 
and 8% stated it was difficult to answer. Of those that were positive, the most 
frequent reason given was simply “they live here”, but for those with a negative 
view, the most common reason was “they should naturalize” and the second 
one was that “they are not loyal towards Latvia, they don’t respect Latvia”, but 
this response category was almost equal to the one asserting that voting rights 
should on principle be reserved for citizens only.17
The conceptual framing of political participation within the context of 
citizens and non-citizens has arguably had a side-effect of creating obstacles 
to participation by third country nationals, especially in the political field. 
The framework for providing participation rights – and even more so, the 
promotion of political mobilization – is not likely to be forthcoming until the 
issues revolving around Latvian non-citizen participation – especially in local 
elections – are addressed. Thus, the image of a liberal citizenship regime will 
remain tempered by restrictions to participation of non-citizens, as well as the 
slow rates of naturalization of those who are eligible.
Legal Framework for Political Parties and Civil 
Society Organizations
The Law on Political Parties determines that only citizens of Latvia who 
have reached the age of 18 can be founders of a party, and there should be no 
fewer than 200 founders. Membership, however, is more open: citizens and 
EU citizens residing in Latvia who are at least 18 years old can be members 
of a party – and interestingly, in view of the prohibition to participate in elec-
tions – so can Latvia’s non-citizens (but not third country nationals). There is 
a requirement that at least half of members of a party have to be citizens of 
Latvia. Nevertheless, political participation through active work within parties 
is more accessible than participation in elections, even if restricted for third 
country residents of Latvia. The law on political parties does not include any 
restrictions on creating ethnic parties or regional parties.
16 AC Konsultācijas (2008), Kvantitatīvs un kvalitatīvs pētījums par sabiedrības integrācijas 
un pilsonības aktuālajiem aspekti. Riga: AC Konsultācijas. 
17 Viktors Makarovs and Aleksejs Dimitrovs (2009), ‘Latvijas nepilsoņi un balsstiesības: 
kompromisi un risinājumi,’ published on politika.lv on 14 September 2009, available at 
http://www.politika.lv/temas/sabiedribas_integracija/17591/
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According to the Law on Associations and Foundations, there are no citizen-
ship requirements for founders and members of non-governmental organizations 
and associations, but leaders of such organizations must be residents of Latvia, 
who are at least 18 years old (members can be younger). Civic participation 
through NGOs – including the right to establish such organizations – is thus 
open to all, although there is a requirement to register organizations in the 
NGO register, and their activities are regulated by law and the organization 
can be closed if violations of the law are found in a court. A specific Law on 
Religious Organizations determines the legal order for establishing these, which 
includes the requirement that at least 20 Latvian citizens aged 18 or above must 
be among the founders, but any resident of Latvia can be a member of such 
an organization.
Membership in trade unions is also not restricted to citizens, as residents of 
Latvia who work or study are entitled to freely establish trade unions, according 
to the law On Trade Unions. A trade union is officially registered if no fewer 
than 50 persons, or one fourth of the number of employees of an enterprise or 
institution, have joined it.
Freedom of assembly is guaranteed to every person in the Constitution, but 
although the Law on Meetings, Marches and Pickets also reiterates this right, 
the law specifies that the organizer, the leader, leader assistant and guardian of 
order of such an event may not be a person who is not either a citizen or non-
citizen of Latvia or a person with a permanent residency permit.
The legal framework thus establishes a system of gradually extended rights 
for political participation. Although there are citizenship criteria for participation 
in elections which exclude both third country nationals and Latvian non-citizens, 
participation in political parties is broadened to the non-citizen category (albeit 
not as founders), while participation in NGOs and trade unions as a member is 
open to all residents. Participating in protest actions can clearly not be prohibited 
on the basis of citizenship or residence, but the organization of such events is only 
allowed for permanent residents, Latvian non-citizens and citizens.
Minority Representation and Participation Through 
Elections 
Only a handful of post-1991 migrants are represented in elected bodies in 
Latvia,18 but traditional ethnic minorities are noticeably present, both at the 
national and local level. The proportionality of this representation compared 
to the share in the population depends on whether the entire population or only 
citizens are used as the base line, as among citizens 28% belong to minorities, 
18 In the most recent municipal elections (in June 2009) 2 Danish citizens, 2 Lithuanian 
citizens, 1 German citizen and 1 Swedish citizen competed successfully as resident EU 
citizens for seats on local councils.
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while approximately 40% of the population belong to minority groups. If 
the citizenship criterion is taken at face value and recognized as a legitimate 
criterion for participation in elections, then representation is much closer to 
proportional, at least at the national level.19
The present parliament, the 9th Saeima, was elected in 2006. Of the 
100 members of parliament,20 78 have identified for statistical purposes as 
ethnically Latvian, which is somewhat higher than the 72% share amongst the 
population (there are no official statistics on the ethnic origin of those eligible 
to vote). Of the rest, 15 self-identified as Russian, 1 each as Jewish, Karelian 
and German (as a traditional national minority), and 4 chose not to answer the 
question on ethnicity.
In terms of the gender dimension, 19 of the 100 MPs are women. However, 
for the two parties that are generally considered to be the minority platform 
parties, and which are assumed to attract minority voters – the more radical 
opposition party For Human Rights in United Latvia (FHRUL) (5 MPs) and the 
more moderate party coalition Concord Centre (18 MPs) – all the deputies are 
men. The question of gender mainstreaming among minority politicians thus 
seems particularly relevant, and was addressed in interviews with nine minority 
politicians in late 2008.21
Most of the interviewees had little to say on the topic, but seemed to gen-
erally think that there were equal opportunities, and at times tried to come up 
with examples of women from their parties. FHRUL does not have a woman 
in parliament, but its representatives insist that this is compensated by having 
an active woman member of the European Parliament. A FHRUL member 
also expressed the view that this is a natural process, that women are probably 
busier with household matters, but that no ‘artificial’ measures are in place to 
promote a change. On the other hand, a Concord Centre representative clearly 
stated that there are not yet equal opportunities for women, even if progress 
continues to be made. He also added that the party leadership itself has seen 
evidence of the problems with a “conservative society” in this regard, where 
19 Ilze Brande Kehre and Ilvija Pūce (2005), ‘Political Nation and Citizenship,’ in Juris 
Rozenvalds, ed., How Democratic is Latvia. Audit of Democracy. Riga: University of 
Latvia Press.
20 ‘Statistika par deputātiem,’ available at http://www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/saeima9.
GalRez.statko. Interestingly, the statistics on ethnicity no longer appear on the Saeima 
home page, as in previous parliaments, but they are available at the home page of the 
Central Election Commission.
21 Semi-structured interviews on political participation were conducted with 9 active minority 
politicians (members of parliament and members of the Riga City Council) within the 
framework of the project ‘A European Approach to Multicultural Citizenship. Legal, 
Political and Educational Challenges’ (EMILIE), materials for 9 participating partners’ 
countries available at http://emilie.eliamep.gr.
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women on the candidate lists frequently get struck out.22 He also stated that the 
party is aware of the challenge of women’s under-representation within their 
ranks and is working towards promoting gender balance through some kind of 
system of preferences. Another FHRUL member of parliament, in contrast to 
his party colleagues, clearly stated that there is no equal opportunity for women 
in Latvia, that society as a whole is conservative and looks with suspicion 
on the participation by women in political life, but that the Russian minority 
community is even more so. He also stated that there are regular struggles 
within the party on the issue, and that something like quotas would have to 
be set up, so that at least a third of the candidates on lists are women – even 
if eventually it is up to the voters to decide, and they can strike them out. The 
view that voters would try to eliminate the women on a list was expressed by 
several interviewees.
The presence of minority representatives who work actively to make claims 
for minority rights in Parliament is visible, and the various representatives 
from the two main minority associated parties FHRUL and Concord Centre 
have in their different political forms had clear agenda-setting powers, which 
are evident as engendering discussions and tabling proposals for legislation 
that aim at providing increased rights to non-citizens. Other minority-related 
proposals are also made, ranging from the regularly recurring proposal to des-
ignate Russian Orthodox Christmas and Easter as official holidays, or various 
language-related proposals. These proposals almost never have a long life, as 
they are introduced and briefly debated, but either voted down in plenary or 
sent off and “buried” in committees.
At the same time, there are various “counter-measures” – initiatives taken 
by nationalistically oriented parties, primarily Fatherland and Freedom/ Latvian 
National Independence Movement (with 5 MPs presently in parliament), to 
restrict existing minority rights, particularly in relation to use of language other 
than Latvian, as well as on issues relating to citizenship acquisition. Thus, in 
the first 5 months of 2008, there were four proposals relating to ethnic minor-
ity issues which in essence meant the reduction of rights, while there were six 
proposals to expand these rights.23 Results from a parliamentary debate moni-
toring study show that a large number of strategies are used by a small number 
of active nationalist counter-claimants to exclude and delegitimize not only the 
claims made by the minority politicians on behalf of ethnic minority groups or 
non-citizens, for instance, but the very “messenger politicians” themselves.24 
22 The Latvian voting system allows for the additions of + and – for any candidate on a list, 
which are eventually added up and can play a significant role in changing the positions 
among candidates on a list, and thus actually determine who is elected from the list, even 
if the vote goes to the list as such.
23 Marija Golubeva et al. (2008), ‘Izaicinājums pilsoniskajai līdzdalībai.’ Riga: Providus, 
pg. 12, available at http://www.providus.lv/public/27122.html.
24 Ibid., pp. 17–18.
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The minority party FHRUL for its part, uses explicit discursive “legitimizing 
strategies” for groups such as non-citizens. The result, however, is that there 
is an ongoing parallel monologue in parliamentary debates, which is almost 
ritualistically sustained by the same few representatives of these dramatically 
opposing sides. The proposals of both sides are generally voted down relatively 
early in the process, but the main problem is the lack of involvement of the 
moderate majority in the debates. The majority tactic appears to be oriented at 
killing off the proposals by silence and votes against or, even more disturbing, 
abstentions.
Riga is by far the most populous city, with 713,000 residents out of the 
2.3 million of the entire country. The concentration of resources in the capital 
means that competing for the leadership of the city has always been at the top 
of the political agenda. Given its ethnic composition, the capital is also inter-
esting for the purpose of analysing political participation: Latvians represent 
40% of the population, Russians approximately the same, while the remaining 
20% are mainly other “old” minorities (most of whom, although they belong 
to different ethnicities, are “Russian-speakers”), although a small percentage 
of new migrants and foreigners are also included. 
The Riga City Council is composed of 60 deputies, and the last elections 
were held in June 2009, on the same day as the elections to the European 
Parliament. Participation in these elections at 58.9% was above the average 
for municipal elections throughout the country, which was 53.75%. Out of 
17 parties participating with candidate lists, only four were elected this time, 
so the two largest could form a convincing majority, instead of the frequently 
unstable coalitions with several different constellations of previous Riga City 
Councils. Interestingly, the largest party by far became the Concord Centre, 
perceived as a minority-oriented party, which received over 34% of the vote, 
and a corresponding 26 seats. As a result, for the first time ever, Riga elected 
a mayor belonging to the Russian minority.
Although there is no publicly available source for city council deputies’ 
ethnic belonging after the 2009 elections, it is possible to identify deputies as 
belonging to ethnic majority or minority based not on their names, which is an 
unreliable proxy for ethnicity in Latvia,25 but on the recognition of individual 
politicians in a relatively small society, as well as their language use and pro-
ficiency. With all appropriate caveats, one can estimate that 30 deputies are 
persons belonging to minorities, while 28–30 are Latvians (with possibly two 
25 Although Russian (and some other Slavic groups) and Latvian origin family names can be 
easily identified, the high rate of intermarriage and resulting mixed ethnic backgrounds, 
which has been taking place for decades and even centuries, means that the name does 
not necessarily reflect the self-identified ethnic identity of its bearer.
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claiming Liv26 background). This is a significant increase in the representation 
of minorities in the city council, since in the previous council 40 of the deputies 
self-identified as Latvians and two as Livs.27
Lest one interpret political integration processes overly optimistically, 
it is important to note that the parties themselves have a strong tendency to 
have either exclusively majority or minority deputies. All 26 of the Concord 
Centre deputies are minority representatives, despite this party’s claim to be 
multi-ethnic and include also Latvians (they do to a limited extent on the par-
liamentary level). Two other parties, with 14 (Civic Association) and 8 (New 
Era) deputies respectively, have an all-Latvian elected candidate list. It is only 
Latvia’s First Party/Latvia’s Way which can aspire to the claim of being ethni-
cally mixed, since out of the 12 elected deputies, 4 are minority representatives. 
In general, though, the party lists indicate a rather segregated political scene. 
Nevertheless, the success rate of the Concord Centre in these elections, which 
could not credibly have been achieved on minority votes alone, indicates that 
this party was able to attract also Latvian voters. 
Perceptions of Minority Politicians on Participation
All the minority politicians interviewed stated that participation of minori-
ties is insufficient or ineffective, and some stated that there is no possibility 
to actually influence any of the decisions finally taken. As the main obstacles 
to effective participation of minorities some of the interviewees mentioned the 
large number and very existence of non-citizens. Some also stressed insuf-
ficient knowledge of the Latvian language of some active politicians, which 
limits their ability to participate in political debates in elected bodies, adding 
also insufficient knowledge of legal matters. Some stated that language profi-
ciency requirements directly limit participation by minorities. One person also 
stressed that the minorities themselves are insufficiently active, while another 
stated that there is a lot of energy and minority activism, which means that there 
is an effect, but not thanks to the political system, but rather despite it. This 
person also insisted that there had been a lot of influence on the actual situa-
tion of minorities over the years, but that this is perhaps not always noticeable. 
One interviewee expressed frustration or resignation regarding the situation of 
being in constant opposition and not being able to influence any decisions at 
all, including decisions that are primarily of concern to minorities themselves. 
One MP saw as the main obstacle the quality of Latvian politicians, whom he 
described as “closed”, suspicious and Russophobic, and the quality of minority 
26 Livs (also called Livonians) are a constitutionally recognized indigenous people in Latvia, 
who belong to the Finno-Ugric group, although in the last census of 2001 there were 
reportedly only 177 Livs left in Latvia, after long processes of assimilation.
27 See www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/cvk/pv2005.pv2005_rezult_plus.stat?nr=0100
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politicians and civil society actors, whom he criticized for not cooperating and 
coordinating sufficiently.
Several of the interviewees acknowledged that if one looks at the proportion 
of minorities who are citizens, representation is more or less proportional at 
the national level. However, one interviewee proceeded to add more complex-
ity by bringing attention to differences at the local level, pointing out that in 
Daugavpils, the second largest city in Latvia and one where Latvians are in a 
minority position with around 17% of the population, Latvians are overrepre-
sented in the local elected council. He also stressed that there is an ongoing 
process of political mobilization of Russian-speakers, although he also pointed 
out that participation in elections is generally lower among non-Latvians than 
Latvians. Another interviewee expressed the view that the representation of 
numerically small minorities in the elected bodies is good, but the Russian 
minority is underrepresented, and its role inadequately reflects its share of 
the population. One politician also pointed to the key blocking role that the 
minority MPs can have on decisions in parliament, preventing the passage of 
decisions that would be detrimental to minority interests.
Several MPs suggested that there were no positive examples of minority 
political efficacy, while one MP mentioned two minority-related claims in the 
Constitutional Court – where opposition members of parliament themselves 
submitted an application challenging quotas of state language requirements in 
private media and discrimination in the provision of subsidies to minority lan-
guage private schools. This confirmed the perception of the rather unusual role 
for the Constitutional Court, which has at times become an arena for political 
struggles that should have taken place in parliament. While the parliamentary 
majority ignored or overrode minority views, the court hearings provided a 
real platform for dialogue between the two opposing political sides. One more 
optimistic interviewee, however, expressed the view that the State Language 
Law had been a success for minority politicians, and the existence of media 
in the Russian language, in his view, is only the result of minority politicians’ 
struggle in the 1990s. Also, the minority school reform was adapted, according 
to this interviewee. An interesting view was provided by one FHRUL MP, who 
claimed that the influence on questions of finance and general social affairs 
is good, but completely absent on issues of language and citizenship or other 
issues specifically of concern to minorities. In general, minority views on posi-
tive examples were quite contradictory: the general assessment was that there 
were very few such examples, but there was also a tendency to claim credit for 
any and all positive minority-rights related decisions. The one example men-
tioned by almost all interviewees, but with different assessments of the success 
of the large-scale mobilization, was the minority education reform completed 
in 2004. This was mentioned as both a success (only thanks to the activities 
of minority politicians and protesters was the reform “softened”) and a failure 
(the reform was not stopped). One interviewee stated that this reflects what is 
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common for minority politicians – only partial successes with both a positive 
and a negative side.
Interviewees stated that there were “many” negative examples where they 
had no influence on decisions relating to matters of direct concern to them. 
Several cited the minority education reform with all the protests that did not 
stop the process. Others added also the numerous times proposals to enshrine 
Orthodox Christmas and Easter as official holidays had been blocked. The 
question of use of language other than the state language with administrative 
and local authorities was mentioned as a key issue that needs a solution at the 
legislative level, but where progress is difficult to achieve by minority repre-
sentatives. 
Voter Participation
There are no official ethnically disaggregated data on participation in 
elections, but there are some survey data on intent to participate and reported 
participation, as well as attitudes towards elections. In the most recent survey, 
conducted in January 2009,28 on citizens’ intent to participate in the munici-
pal elections or the European Parliament elections (which were both held on 
6 June), 41% claimed that they would certainly participate and 26% that they 
would most likely participate, while 8% said they would certainly not par-
ticipate and 11% stated that they most likely would not participate (with 14% 
stating “difficult to say”).29 Although this survey did not include ethnicity as 
a demographic dimension, which would allow specific analysis according to 
ethnic group participation, it did include (primary) language of the interviewee, 
divided simply into Latvian and Other (but clearly the last category would 
mostly be Russian), which can serve as a proxy for ethnicity. If the two positive 
answer categories are combined together, there is no great difference between 
these groups: 69% of Latvian-speakers foresaw that they could or most likely 
would participate, while 65% of Russian-speakers did the same. Likewise, the 
negative attitudes of 18% of Latvian-speakers are comparable to the 20% of 
similarly-minded Russian-speakers. However, the clear intent not to participate 
was more pronounced among Russian-speakers (11% vs. 6% for Latvian-
speakers), while there was also a slightly larger share from this group who had 
a clear intent to participate (43%), compared to the Latvian-speakers (41%).
There are other forms of political participation where the level of involve-
ment of majority representatives and minorities differs significantly. In the 
2008 survey among permanent residents (thus, not only citizens) on whether 
28 SKDS (2009), Vēlētāju attieksmju pētījums 2009. Riga: SKDS.
29 The actual participation rate was almost 54% in both elections, but the reported intent 
generally has been overoptimistic in all such surveys over the years, so this discrepancy 
was not exceptional.
116 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
they had signed the petition in March-April 2008 calling for amendments to 
the Constitution that would permit the voters to require the dismissal of the 
parliament through a referendum, over 42% Latvians reported having signed 
the petition, while only 17.4% non-Latvians reported the same.30 This petition 
came at a time of rising discontent with politics and politicians, and reflected 
what for Latvia was an unusual level of mobilization to protest the perceived 
cynicism and alienation of politicians from “the people”. These figures seem to 
indicate that the growing mobilization was more intense among Latvians than 
non-Latvians. Similar differences were also reported in a survey later in 2008 
with regard to a question of participation in signing petitions for a referendum – 
some 40% of Latvians said they had done so, while the corresponding number 
for Russians was 13%.31
At the same time, shortly thereafter, in January 2009, at a political rally 
in the old town of Riga of a newly formed party (but with MPs at the helm 
who were not new to politics) which tried to capitalize on anti-government 
sentiment, the audience was reportedly ethnically mixed. After the rally the 
crowds did not disperse peacefully, but groups of participants engaged in acts 
of vandalism against private and state property and other aggressive behaviour, 
which took hours for the police to contain. This level of violence at a protest 
event had not been experienced earlier in Latvia. However, the presence at these 
events of persons from different ethnic backgrounds, reported also by journal-
ists, was also a novelty in Latvia, where most protests and demonstrations have 
been largely mono-ethnic. 
A survey from August 2004 on factors that influenced participation in the 
European Parliament elections shows rather significant discrepancies between 
Latvians and other ethnic groups. Among citizens, 65% of Latvians reported 
having participated, while the reported participation rate for non-Latvians was 
lower by 10 percentage points – 55%. The same survey also indicates that the 
level of exposure to Central Election Commission information on the upcoming 
elections had been significantly higher among Latvians (72% reported having 
seen TV clips either once or repeatedly) than other ethnic groups (some 55% 
reported having seen these). The question of the linguistically divided media 
spheres needs to be taken into account here, but an incident that took place in 
connection with the 2005 municipal elections illustrates a deliberate blockage 
of the provision of information in Russian. In January that year, the nationalist 
party Fatherland and Freedom/Latvian National Independence Movement (TB/
LNNK) challenged the Central Election Committee’s right to air the information 
clips in Russian on the upcoming elections that it had produced for TV on the 
grounds that these would violate the state language law, which foresees that 
information from state institutions can only be provided in Latvian. The clips 
30 SKDS (2008), Pētījums par iedzīvotāju līdzdalību parakstu vākšanā 2008. Riga: SKDS.
31 Ibid. 
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were withdrawn a couple of days after the complaint.32 Although this factor had 
seemingly improved in the last elections, when official clips were aired also 
in Russian-language media, the continued sensitivity to language issues and 
the embrace of a controlling, punitive approach to language policy means that 
access to information on elections in minority languages clearly needs attention 
in both research analysis and practical work by the authorities.
Consultative Bodies and Civil Society Organizations
The first minority consultative council was created in the 1990s under the 
first President of Latvia after the renewal of independence, President Ulma-
nis. Although an innovative development at the time, it suffered from various 
shortcomings, never turned into an effective mechanism, and was discontin-
ued. However, a variety of consultative mechanisms have been established in 
Latvia since. Counting at both national and local level, more than 100 such 
mechanisms have at one point been established. The target audience of these is 
sometimes national minorities, sometimes non-citizens (at the local level), and 
they can be either concerned with a broad range of issues, or specific themes, 
such as those attached to line ministries (e.g. Ministry of Education). However, 
in most cases there have been questions regarding the effective functioning 
and specific tasks and competences of these councils, including the transpar-
ency of appointment procedures, the regularity of working meetings, and the 
impact on decision-making. Minority representatives with experience in these 
councils have generally expressed scepticism with regard to their functioning, 
although some have also been critical of the minorities’ capacity to participate 
effectively in such work.33 
Recently, a council for national minorities has been re-established under 
President Zatlers, but it is unclear what functions and competences such a 
council can have, considering the President’s own limited constitutional role. 
The composition of the council, with the appointment of a Lithuanian origin 
former MP of a ruling party at its head, has not lent credibility to it in the eyes 
of some of the main minority groups. Other initiatives are taking place at the 
municipal level, where the active self-organization of certain minority groups 
in Liepaja during 2009 seems to have been initiated in parallel to measures 
taken at the city council level. 
There have been no serious assessments of the functioning and shortcom-
ings of the consultative councils, although the interviews with minority politi-
cians indicate that there is a general sense of their usefulness in theory, but 
32 Latvian Centre for Human Rights (2005), Human Rights in Latvia in 2004. Riga: 
LCHR.
33 Sigita Zankovska-Odiņa (2008), ‘Nacionālo minoritāšu līdzdalība – vai un cik efektīga?’ 
Riga: LCHR.
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uselessness in practice until now. Several of the nine interviewees expressed 
their support in principle for such mechanisms. Some also stressed that there 
are ways to make such structures effective – depending on the authorities’ wish 
to engage in real dialogue – but then stating that such structures in Latvia today 
clearly do not meet this standard. However, one person replied “categorically 
no,” proceeding to explain that such mechanisms can work in countries such as 
Finland, Belgium and elsewhere, but not in Latvia, since here they are formed 
for entirely different purposes. A second MP also considered that these mecha-
nisms “never work anywhere”, explaining that he himself had participated in 
some, and that they had been useless. One politician argued that the consultative 
councils are important in themselves as a sign that there has to be a dialogue 
with the minorities. Another politician stressed that the consultative councils 
have been established “for show” only. The views were overall quite similar, 
and confirm that a thorough assessment of the existing councils needs to be 
done to identify shortcomings and possible remedies.
Finally, the rate of participation in civil society organizations is still not 
high in general in Latvia, and much of the participation concerns membership 
in religious organizations or trade unions, followed by sports and cultural or-
ganizations.34 In general, a larger number of persons is involved in organizations 
with “hobby-type” interests rather than public interest ones. Almost two-thirds 
of Latvian residents have not been involved in any kind of civil society or-
ganization, but the rate of participation is higher among ethnic Latvians (40%) 
than non-Latvians (30%). Reported membership in an NGO is higher among 
Latvians (5.3%) than among Russians (3.3%), although in this category the 
“Other” groups score a little higher than the majority (5.7%).35 Differences in 
participation rates in trade union activities also appear in survey results from 
2008. While 12.5% of Latvian respondents claimed to have participated in trade 
unions, only 8.1% of Russians stated the same.36 This is important, as trade 
union membership and participation is open to all, regardless of citizenship, so 
there are obviously some unknown obstacles at work in this case.
Another reported ethnic difference is in the rate of participation in public 
debate events, where 14% of Latvian respondents claimed to have participated, 
while the figure for Russian was only 7%. In view of the lack of participation 
rights at local elections for non-citizens, it is significant that far fewer non-
citizens (7%) compared to citizens (12%) report participating in debates. This 
seems to be indicative of the lack of engagement and inclusion of non-citizens 
even on matters of concern to them in their everyday lives. There are no 
formal obstacles to such participation, but there clearly is a need for mobiliz-
ing involvement in public life for this group of residents. In this context the 
34 SKDS (2007), Attieksme pret pilsonisko sabiedrību. Riga: SKDS.
35 SKDS (2008), Latvijas iedzīvotāju aptauja. Riga: SKDS.
36 Ibid.
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superficiality of the official position that non-citizens can and should naturalize 
and thus acquire all participation rights and become good citizens becomes even 
more obvious. While no efforts are made to mobilize this potentially marginal-
ized group – which consists of ethnic minority members – their inclusion in 
effective participation remains unlikely.
Non-Traditional Participation: Protests
Participation in various public protest events – demonstrations, marches, 
pickets and the like – has gradually developed over the years, although only 
very few large-scale events have taken place, as most involve short actions by 
crowds ranging from a handful to a few hundred protesters. An exception to 
this was the first large demonstrations since independence, which took place in 
connection to the minority education reform and the transition to an increased 
share of Latvian instruction in Russian-language schools. The largest of these 
took place on the day of Latvia’s accession to the EU, 1 May 2004. While the 
demonstration at the place of the Soviet-era Victory monument in Riga gathered 
some 20,000 participants – in a city of a little over 700,000 inhabitants – a 
grand celebration of the accession was taking place just across the river Dau-
gava in the Old Town of Riga, where representatives of Latvia’s government, 
parliament and the president were delivering speeches to the Latvian people, 
completely ignoring the alternative event, which gathered minority representa-
tives.37 Although such a stark contrast of the different participants in different 
events was probably never repeated since, the tendency that minority protestors 
were politically mobilized by “minority-related concerns” or by active minority 
politicians, while “mainstream” protests tended to gather Latvian participants, 
has been evident over the years. Against this background, the 13 January 2009 
violent protest action in Riga, mentioned above, is indeed a break with the 
trend. 
The activity around the education reform, which was implemented for 
secondary schools in September 2004, meant that public protest events were 
organized on a regular basis, albeit on a varying scale. A record kept by an MP 
and activist on education reform indicates that from April 2003 until Novem-
ber 2005 198 actions in support of education in one’s native language were 
organized by the “Shtab” (Headquarters for the defence of Russian-language 
schools), of which 110 were held outdoors. 35 of these had more than 1,000 par-
37 Latvian Centre for Human Rights (2005), Human Rights in Latvia in 2004.
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ticipants.38 The authorities and indeed society at large was only slowly getting 
used to this kind of action, however, and most of the initial reactions by both 
executive and legislative authorities were centred around finding legal ways 
to restrict the development of more public protest. In contrast to the mobiliza-
tion of Russian-speaking minority groups, ethnic majority groups had not yet 
mobilized much for this kind of public expression of opinions.39 However, as 
protest actions – small-scale and peaceful – have become a regular part of the 
urban scene, increasing numbers of Latvians also took to this form of political 
participation. As a result, the participation rate in demonstrations, which in the 
mid-2000s was reportedly very high precisely among minority representatives, 
and especially youth,40 increased also for all groups in society. This is corrobo-
rated by evidence in a 2008 survey, where some 12% of Latvians report having 
participated in public protest meetings, pickets, demonstrations, while the cor-
responding figure for Russians is 11%, and for other ethnic groups 9%.41
In terms of belief in the potential for change through protest actions, it is in-
teresting to consider the attitude of minority politicians, who were quite actively 
engaged in the protest actions in the mid-2000s. Among minority politicians 
interviewed, several persons commented that protest actions may have a role 
depending on the circumstances, but not always. One person recalled the role of 
the large-scale protest actions as “softening” the education reform, but another 
interviewee expressed the view that protest actions can be effective only if they 
mobilize large numbers of persons. One interviewee stressed the importance 
of protest actions precisely because other forms of participation are not effec-
tive, believing that such actions would become less important when minorities 
reach a more equal status in politics and use traditional methods of participation 
better. Two interviewees cautioned that protest events can at times also have a 
counterproductive effect, as they can evoke counter-mobilization, generate fear 
or dislike from other social groups, and prompt anti-minority decisions. One 
politician foresaw that protest actions will be more and more marginal, while 
other participation forms will grow in importance. Nevertheless, another long-
38 Vladimir Buzaev (n.d.), ‘Khronika aktsii v zashchitu obrazovanii na rodnom yazyke, 
provedennikh no initsiative organizatsii i lits, vkhodyashchikh v Shtab zashchity russkikh 
shkol’ [Chronicle of actions in support of education in one’s native language, held at the 
initiative of organizations and persons that participated in the Headquarters for the support 
of Russian schools], available at the FHRUL home page http://www.zapchel.lv/?lang=ru
&mode=party&submode=history&page_id=2107.
39 Kristīne Gaugere and Ivars Austers (2005), Nevalstiskās organizācijas Latvijā: sabiedrības 
zināšanas, attieksme un iesaistīšanās. Riga: Soros Foundation-Latvia, pp. 30–31.
40 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2004), Integration of Minority Youth in the Society of 
Latvia in the Context of the Education Reform. Riga: BISS, pp. 68–69. In that report, 51% 
of surveyed secondary school students from minority schools reported having participated 
in protest events, while an additional large proportion claimed they had wanted to, but had 
not due to various practical obstacles.
41  SKDS (2008), ‘Latvijas iedzīvotāju aptauja’.
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term member of parliament stated that protest actions are absolutely necessary 
“in order to put pressure on the government.” There was thus less consensus 
on the role of protest actions amongst the politicians interviewed, even among 
members of the same party.
Conclusions
Citizenship remains a core indicator of integration for Latvia, and the high 
number of non-citizens who are permanent residents is an obstacle to high 
ratings for integration of society. In order to get a fuller picture of the state of 
affairs with regard to political integration, the challenges at the starting point 
in 1991 should be recognized, and the trends of naturalization over time need 
to be closely monitored and analysed. Although citizenship continues to be 
based primarily on the continuity of the republic from before the occupation 
and thus ius sanguinis principles, elements of ius soli have opened up access 
to citizenship. 
The citizenship regime of Latvia is overall in line with other EU member 
states, although certain specific aspects, like the permanent exclusion of certain 
groups from naturalization, make it more restrictive. The low rates of naturaliza-
tion from among those eligible to naturalize is cause for concern and a negative 
indicator for integration, regardless of whether the cause lies with insufficient 
outreach by the authorities or insufficient motivation by the potential citizens, 
or both. 2009 saw increasing rates of non-citizens who chose to take on Rus-
sian citizenship while remaining resident in Latvia (see the Conclusion by Nils 
Muižnieks). Though the overall figures are still quite low, they were for the first 
time on a par with the number of non-citizens who became Latvian citizens by 
naturalization. This was most likely due to economic hardship and the hope of 
benefiting from additional Russian social security entitlements. Nevertheless, 
the lack of a clear sense of belonging to the state – in contrast to a stronger 
sense of belonging at the local level – should be a signal for policy-makers to 
intensify efforts to attract residents to citizenship. 
Political participation in elections is limited to citizens, but there are other 
forms of political participation open to all residents. The picture of political 
integration is mixed: minority representatives actively and visibly participate 
in political life and elected bodies, but there are differences in political mo-
bilization among the ethnic groups. Political parties mostly tend to be if not 
mono-ethnic, then at least oriented towards either the majority or minority 
ethnic voters, and party’s candidates for office also tend to belong to the cor-
responding ethnic group. While political interaction is high between the groups, 
integration still remains low in almost all parties.
Voters’ participation does not differ significantly among citizens of the dif-
ferent ethnic and linguistic groups, but other forms of involvement in political 
and civic activities are less uniform. Passivity and the tendency to ethnic self-
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segregation in organizations and public activities are the most significant risks 
to integration through political participation. 
Political participation among those minority representatives who are citi-
zens is more proportional than if the entire population is taken into account, 
and the parliamentary representation is numerically important, with almost a 
fifth of the MPs declaring themselves to belong to a minority, and with the two 
parties generally seen as representing minorities holding 23 seats out of 100. 
In addition, the claims made relating to minority rights and interests by these 
MPs are regularly put on the agenda and debated. However, the adoption of 
proposals gives a less rosy picture, as almost all minority-related proposals for 
legislative amendments are voted down. The minority MPs themselves, how-
ever, also stress their ability to block any proposals to restrict minority rights. 
Recent changes in the Riga City Council have provided more proportional 
representation than ever before in this important elected body, with at least 
30 out of 60 deputies belonging to minorities, as well as an elected mayor of 
Russian origin.
Finally, the large number of former Soviet citizens who are not citizens 
of Latvia and the large share of the ethnic minority population has entailed an 
almost exclusive focus on these groups when analysing integration in Latvia. 
However, the specific sensitivities around citizenship, political participation 
and language have, for the time being, entailed a closure or even blindness to 
the need to address integration more broadly for various target groups. Thus, 
the access to the territory and access to residency for third country nationals 
who are not in the category of Latvian non-citizens are important factors for 
measuring the integration potential in Latvia. 
Greatest Achievement
The greatest achievement concerning integration in the area of citizenship, 
representation and political participation is the consistently strong representation 
in elected bodies of minority platform parties and minority groups, despite the 
problem of a high share of non-citizens who cannot vote. In a key development, 
in 2009, an ethnically Russian politician representing a minority platform party 
became mayor of Riga, thus breaking the post-1991 pattern of political presence 
only as permanent opposition by minority platform parties, but excluded from 
participation as a member of a ruling coalition. This actual sharing in political 
power by minority group representatives who portray themselves as such is a 
visible symbol of political integration, and the fact that they were elected by 
an ethnically mixed group of voters is a hopeful sign that the electorate may 
be less ethnically divided than the political elite.
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Most Serious Problem
The key problem remains inadequate possibilities for political participation 
because of lack of voting rights at municipal level for non-citizens, including 
for 350,000 Latvian non-citizens, and lack of effective consultative mechanisms 
at local and national level, including specifically also for minority groups and 
non-nationals. In addition, political parties are generally not ethnically inte-
grated, which contributes to blocking development on these issues.
Most Urgent Task
The key task is to formulate pro-active policies of inclusion into politi-
cal life of all permanent residents, including by actively mobilizing political 
engagement of all members of society. This includes working towards voting 
rights for non-citizens at local level, elaborating effective and meaningful 
consultative mechanisms at national and local level, encouraging increased 
ethnic diversity within political parties and strengthening civil society engage-
ment by all members of society, including specifically by those belonging to 
minority groups.
 

Ethnic Minorities in the Latvian Labour 
Market, 1997–2009: Outcomes, Integration 
Drivers and Barriers 
Mihails Hazans
Introduction
During the first years after independence, the labour market situation was 
unfavourable for many representatives of ethnic minorities and, thus, for non-
Latvians as a group. There were three main reasons for this. First, during the 
Soviet era non-Latvians were to a much larger extent than Latvians concentrated 
in the sectors which suffered the strongest contraction in the transition process – 
manufacturing, as well as research related to the military-industrial complex. 
Second, in most cases the Latvian language skills of persons belonging to mi-
norities were not sufficient for competing in the labour market on equal terms 
with Latvians. In 1996, less than two fifths of the population with a non-Latvian 
mother tongue considered their Latvian language skills as good or fair.1 Third, 
many non-Latvians did not have Latvian citizenship, which restricted their 
labour market possibilities. In 1995, the proportion of Latvian citizens among 
the minority population only slightly exceeded one third.2 
As a result, in the late 1990s, according to labour force survey (LFS) data, 
labour force participation and employment rates among the minority popula-
tion were lower than among Latvians, while minority unemployment rates were 
significantly higher. This was the case both on average and after accounting 
for other relevant factors. For instance, if two economically active persons 
from the same region, of the same age and gender, and with the same educa-
tion level were compared, a non-Latvian individual had a significantly higher 
unemployment risk than his/her Latvian counterpart.3 Moreover, substantial dif-
ferences were found between employed Latvians and non-Latvians in terms of 
 1 B. Zepa, O. Žabko and L. Vaivode (2008), Language. March – April 2008. Riga: Baltic 
Institute of Social Sciences, Figure 5.1.
 2 Nils Muižnieks, ed., (2006), Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International 
Dimensions. Rīga: University of Latvia Press, pg. 17.
 3 Mihails Hazans (2005), ‘Unemployment and the Earnings Structure in Latvia.’ World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3504. Washington DC: World Bank, pg. 42 and 
pp. 89–90. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=659103
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distribution among occupations and industries.4 This is not an unusual situation: 
Zimmermann et al. note that “most of the existing research on ethnic minorities 
in Europe agrees on the existence of labour market disadvantages for ethnic 
minorities. Ethnic minorities typically have significantly higher unemployment 
rates, lower labour income, and they are less likely to find and keep their jobs 
than the majority population.”5 There are a number of recent studies related to 
the labour market situation of minorities in the Baltic countries.6
As Latvia has an unusually large (more than 40%) minority population 
with a substantial geographical dispersion that is mostly locally born but lives 
primarily in a different language environment, comparisons with the labour 
market situation of minorities in other countries are difficult. In Estonia, the 
Russian-speaking population is also large but less dispersed geographically and 
more separated socially than in Latvia. In Ukraine, the state language is much 
 4 Ibid., pp. 36–9.
 5 K. F. Zimmermann, M. Kahanec, A. Constant, D.J. DeVoretz, L. Gataullina and A. Zaiceva 
(2008), Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration of Ethnic Minorities, IZA 
Research Report 16, Bonn: IZA, pg. 11.
 6 See S. Aptekar, (2009) ‘Contexts of exit in the migration of Russian speakers from the 
Baltic countries to Ireland’, Ethnicities, 9, 507–526; Mihails Hazans (2007a), ‘Looking 
for the workforce: The elderly, discouraged workers, minorities and students in the Baltic 
labour markets,’ Empirica 34 (4), pp. 319–349; Mihails Hazans, (2007b), ‘Coping with 
growth and emigration: Latvian labour market before and after EU accession’, available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=971198; Mihails Hazans (2007c), ‘Latvian labour 
market before and after EU accession,’ Beyond Transition Newsletter, 18 (1), pp. 10 –11; 
Mihails Hazans (2007d), ‘Social and labour market integration of ethnic minorities 
in Latvia.’ Background study for Zimmermann et al. (2008), Bonn: IZA (unpublished 
manuscript); Mihails Hazans (2010), ‘Labour market integration of ethnic minorities in 
Latvia,’ in Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann (eds.), Ethnic minorities in European 
labour markets: Challenges and solutions. Cheltenham, UK and Northampton, MA, US: 
Edward Elgar (forthcoming); Mihails Hazans, J. Dmitrijeva and I. Trapeznikova (2007), 
‘Determinants of unemployment duration in Latvia,’ Research report to the Ministry 
of Welfare prepared for the project “Causes and duration of unemployment and social 
exclusion” of the National Programme of Labour Market Studies. Available at http://
www.lm.gov.lv/upload/darba_tirgus/darba_tirgus/petijumi/12_pet_en.pdf; Mihails Hazans, 
I. Trapeznikova, and O. Rastrigina (2008), ‘Ethnic and parental effects on schooling 
outcomes before and during the transition: evidence from the Baltic countries’, Journal of 
Population Economics, 21 (3), pp. 719–749; M. Kahanec and A. Zaiceva (2009), ‘Labour 
Market Outcomes of Immigrants and Non-Citizens in the EU: An East-West Comparison,’ 
International Journal of Manpower, 30 (1/2), pp. 97–115; K.–O. Leping and O. Toomet 
(2008), ‘Emerging ethnic wage gap: Estonia during political and economic transition,’ 
Journal of Comparative Economics 36(4), pp. 599–619; M. van der Leij, M. Rolfe and 
O. Toomet (2009), ‘On the Relationship between Unexplained Wage Gap and Social 
Network Connections for Ethnical Groups,’ paper presented at EALE 2009, available 
at http://www.eale.nl/Conference2009/Programme/PapersE/add101802_SegFnXKTo7.
pdf; B. Zepa, I. Tomsone, I. Šūpule, L. Krastiņa (2006), ‘Labour market integration of 
minority youth’ (in Latvian), Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, available at http://
www.biss.soc.lv/downloads/resources/SIF%202005–2006/Makets_jauniesi.pdf; and Zepa 
et al., (2008), Language. March – April 2008.
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closer to Russian. Therefore, the few international comparisons provided in this 
paper should be interpreted with care.
Due to the very large share of ethnic minorities in Latvia’s population, 
their labour market integration is of utmost importance from both a social and 
economic perspective. This chapter provides an account of the dynamics of the 
main integration indicators during the period between 1997 and 2009. Special 
attention is paid to developments during the period of rapid economic growth 
in 2002–2007, and the outcomes at the end of this period, as well as to the 
changes caused by the economic crisis of 2008–2009. 
This chapter examines four broad aspects of labour market integration. 
First, we compare the basic labour market outcomes (such as employment and 
earnings) of the minority and majority populations,7 applying a set of standard 
internationally comparable indicators. The single most informative measure 
of labour market inclusion of any social group is the employment rate. It, in 
turn, is determined by the labour force participation rate and the unemploy-
ment rate. Low participation signals exclusion, segregation or discouragement. 
High unemployment or low earnings among members of a group indicate the 
presence of labour market barriers (internal or external, including possible 
discrimination).
After calculating the ethnic gaps in employment and earnings, we can de-
termine to what extent these gaps can be explained by inter-ethnic differences 
in human capital, demographic and geographic characteristics. We show that 
in Latvia, the main labour market barriers faced by minorities are related to 
Latvian language skills. 
Next, we measure the degree of labour market segregation of minori-
ties by looking at inter-ethnic differences in the distribution of the employed 
population between occupations and economic activities; language skills play 
a prominent role also in this respect. Furthermore, we look at the use of the 
Latvian and Russian language by workers who are not native speakers, thus 
measuring the intensity of inter-ethnic contacts at the workplace. Finally, we 
look at the perception of state language proficiency requirements by minority 
and majority workers, as well as evidence of discrimination of some “visible” 
minorities, including Roma.
 7 Due to space limitations, other outcomes of interest, such as prevalence of self-employment, 
participation in on-the-job training among employed and in publicly provided training 
among the unemployed, duration of unemployment, etc. remain outside the scope of this 
chapter.
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Factors Facilitating Labour Market Integration of 
Minorities in 1997–2007
The most important measure of the extent to which a certain group of the 
population is integrated into the labour market is the employment rate, i.e. the 
proportion of the employed among the (working age) population. From the 
employment perspective, the decade between 1997 and 2007 was marked by 
impressive progress in the field of labour market integration of ethnic minori-
ties. In the age group 15 to 74 years, the employment gap between Latvians 
and non-Latvians, which was as big as 8.5 percentage points in 1997, stead-
ily narrowed and disappeared completely by 2007 (see Table A1). Within the 
“standard” working age (15 to 64 years) the minority employment rate in 2007 
was even one point higher than among Latvians. 
Chances to be employed depend strongly on an individual’s human capital, 
as well as on the situation in the local labour market. For instance, other things 
being equal, the probability to be employed is higher for a person with tertiary 
(university) education than for a person with secondary or primary education; 
likewise, a person living in Riga region is more likely to be employed that an 
otherwise similar person in Latgale.8 Therefore, when comparing Latvian and 
minority employment levels and trends, the composition of these two groups 
in terms of education, age, region and degree of urbanization has to be taken 
into account. 
As shown in Figure 1 (upper panel), the composition of the Latvian and 
minority population aged 15–74 in terms of educational attainment was rather 
similar both in 2002 and in 2007. In 2007, however, the minority population 
featured slightly lower proportions of both low-educated and highly-educated 
individuals than ethnic Latvians. The proportion of secondary general school 
graduates among the minority population in 2007 had gone up by 4.5 points 
compared to 2002. More substantial differences between the two ethnic groups 
in terms of educational attainment are found in the population aged 25 to 
44 years (i.e., the age group most active in the labour market) (see Figure 1, 
lower panel). During the five year period, the gap between Latvians and minori-
ties in terms of proportion of persons with higher education has increased from 
2.5 to 5.4 points. On the other hand, the proportion of low-skilled has increased 
more among minorities than among ethnic Latvians. These changes cannot be 
characterized as favourable for the employment of the minority population. 
Figure 2 (upper panel) compares the composition of the Latvian and mi-
nority population in terms of region and degree of urbanisation at the place of 
residence. In this respect, the differences between the ethnic groups are very 
substantial, but one cannot say that these differences favour one of the groups 
 8 Hazans (2007b), ‘Coping with growth and emigration: Latvian labour market before and 
after EU accession,’ Table 1.3. 
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from the employment perspective (here, we consider all kinds of employment, 
not just paid employment). More importantly, there are almost no changes 
between 2002 and 2007. Figure 2, lower panel demonstrates that during this 
period the age composition of the two ethnic groups has not changed in a way 
which would affect employment rates. 
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Figure 1. Latvian and minority population by educational attainment  
in 2002 and 2007 
Source: Calculations using LFS data.
To sum up, there is no reason to link the disappearance of the ethnic em-
ployment gap with changes in the composition of the Latvian and minority 
population in terms of educational attainment, regional dispersion, or degree 
of urbanisation (the same is true also for the period between 1997 and 2002). 
What, then, were the factors which facilitated the labour market integration of 
minorities? 
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First, as seen in Figure 3, the Latvian language skills of the minority popu-
lation have been gradually improving. Second, the proportion of non-citizens 
among minorities has fallen from 65% in 1995 to 45% in the middle of 2008.9 
Thus, the mismatch between the minority labour supply and market demand 
has become substantially smaller.
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Figure 3. Self-assessed Latvian language skills among population aged 15–74 
whose mother tongue is not Latvian (1996–2008)
Notes: Surveys conducted in June 1996, March–April 2000, November–December 2004, 
and March–April 2008, Zepa et al. (2008), Language. Figure 5.1.
Third, rapid growth of the Latvian economy in 2002–2007 combined with 
the outflow of the Latvian labour force after European Union accession in 
200410 resulted in a steadily increasing number of job vacancies, especially in 
construction, manufacturing, retail trade and private services. The combination 
of growing demand and falling supply of labour had two important consequenc-
es for the labour market. On the one hand, real wages went up, leading to an 
increase in labour force participation rates. This effect was more pronounced 
among groups which earlier featured a relatively low level of labour force par-
ticipation. Given that both the unemployment and inactivity levels among the 
minority population were initially higher than among ethnic Latvians, minorities 
were over-represented among new hires (see Tables A1–A2 for details). 
On the other hand, employers’ de facto requirements towards new work-
ers have become lower along all dimensions, including state language skills. 
This also facilitated minority employment, especially taking into account that 
 9 Data of the Latvian Population Register.
10 See Mihails Hazans, and Kaia Philips (2010), ‘The Post-Enlargement Migration Experience 
in the Baltic Labor Markets,’ in Martin Kahanec and Klaus F. Zimmermann (eds.), EU 
Labor Markets After Post-Enlargement Migration. Berlin-Heidelberg, Germany, London, 
UK and New York, US: Springer, pp. 255–304 for details.
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in the service sector good Russian language skills were considered an asset. 
Loosening hiring standards in terms of Latvian language proficiency of course 
led to a temporary worsening of the average quality of the Latvian language 
in the service sector, which led to a new round of inter-ethnic tensions both in 
public discourse and in everyday life. It is important to understand, however, 
that in the medium-term more liberal hiring standards resulted in improved 
Latvian language skills of the minority population and an increased number 
of non-Latvians actively using the Latvian language on a daily basis. Figure 3 
provides evidence that the Latvian language skills of the minority population 
were improving much more quickly between December 2004 and March 2008 
than in the previous four years. This cannot be attributed to the education 
reform, because a similar result is found also within the age groups 35–49 and 
50–74 years.11 
De facto liberalization gave a chance to work in a Latvian-language-
intensive environment to many non-Latvians who previously had no or very 
few contacts with Latvians. Thanks to an increasing number of inter-ethnic 
contacts at the workplace, both Russian-speakers and Latvian-speakers could 
improve their knowledge of the “other” language, while the dominant role of 
the Latvian language has not been threatened. Data on language use at the 
workplace (Figure 4) supports this argument. Between 2004 and 2008, among 
both native Latvian-speakers and native Russian-speakers, the proportion of 
workers who speak Latvian more than Russian showed the largest increase – 
at the expense of those who use only the native language. This suggests that 
relatively liberal access to jobs for minorities can facilitate not only their labour 
market integration but also cultural (including language) and social integration. 
Language-based labour market restrictions, by contrast, are unlikely to lead to 
successful integration of a large minority. Such restrictions create a “lock-in” 
effect: often, the necessary degree of fluency in Latvian is difficult to achieve 
just by learning in class, but in the workplace, a person with some knowledge 
of the language will almost surely reach the required level within one year or 
less; the problem is, how to get to the workplace. 
The above discussion helps to explain the polarization of public opinion 
on how strict the legal requirements for state language proficiency should be 
for employees (and how these requirements should be enforced). One part of 
society puts more value on the economic benefits from higher employment rates 
among the minority population and the social benefits from integration via the 
workplace, as well as from a growing number of active users of the Latvian 
language, while the other part perceives as a serious immediate problem and 
a strategic threat a temporary decline in the average quality of the Latvian 
language in the service sector, which is inevitable in such circumstances. 
Naturally, the former advocates a more liberal approach in language policy in 
11 Zepa et al. (2008), Language, Figure 5.2.
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the labour market, while the latter advocates stricter requirements and tougher 
enforcement. We present survey evidence on public support for both views 
below. However, it is worth noting at this point that for native Latvian speak-
ers in the latter group the perceived disadvantage and threat is more personal 
than the perceived benefit by those in the first group; hence, the second group 
is much more vocal. 
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Figure 4. Language use at the workplace, by workers’ mother tongue  
(1996–2008) 
Notes: Only employed persons included. Non-response (less than 1%) excluded.
Source: Calculation with data from Zepa et al. (2008), Language.
Finally, uneven regional development has also contributed to improving the 
labour market situation of the minority population. The increase in employment 
rates between 2002 and 2007 tended to be larger in regions where the share of 
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the minority population is higher (Figure 5, upper panel). In particular, the larg-
est (more than 10 points) increase in the employment rate is found in Latgale, 
where non-Latvians account for over 60% of the population, while in Vidzeme, 
where just one out of ten inhabitants is non-Latvian, the employment rate 
increased by less than 2 points. Likewise, in Riga and other big cities, where 
55–60% of the population are of non-Latvian ethnicity, employment growth 
was much stronger than elsewhere (Figure 5, lower panel).
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Figure 5. Share of minority population and increase in employment rates  
(2007 vs. 2002) by region and degree of urbanization
Notes: Employment rates in the Figure refer to population aged 15–74, but results do not 
change qualitatively when rates for population aged 15–64 are used. 
Source: Calculations with LFS data.
The Dynamics of Employment Rates by Ethnicity 
This section analyses the dynamics of employment rates among ethnic 
Latvians and non-Latvians in different demographic groups. Figure 6 illus-
trates the evolution of employment rates among Latvians and non-Latvians by 
gender. A steady reduction of the ethnic gap in employment was observed for 
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both genders in 1997–2007. By the end of this period, the employment rate of 
minority men exceeds that of ethnic Latvian men by almost two points. Among 
women the ethnic gap was wider during the whole period and remained posi-
tive (at 1.5 points) in 2007. This is of course related to the fact that females 
concentrate in language-intensive service sector occupations. However, among 
the working-age (15 to 64 years) population, the ethnic employment gap disap-
peared by 2007 for females as well (Table A.1). 
As Latvia entered a recession in the middle of 2008, the trend in the ethnic 
employment gap has been reversed. In the first three quarters of 2009 there was 
an almost two-point gap in favour of Latvian men and an almost five-point gap 
in favour of Latvian women (Figure 6). Moreover, in the third quarter of 2009, 
both male and female minority employment rates were by about 6 points lower 
than employment rates of ethnic Latvians. 
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Figure 6. Employment rates by ethnicity and gender, 1997–2009.  
Population aged 15–74
Source: Calculation based on LFS data (reproduced by permission from Hazans (2010), 
‘Labour market integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia.’)
By comparison, in Estonia, developments during the 2000s were broadly 
similar; among males, the widest gap (4 points) was observed in 2003, while 
among females it reached 8 points in 2006; the overall gap remained at 2 points 
in 2007–2008 for the 15–74 years old, but has been closed by 2007 among the 
working age (15–64 years) population.12 
12 See Statistics Estonia (2009), ‘Labour status of population aged 15–74 by ethnic nationality, 
sex and age,’ available at http://pub.stat.ee/pxweb.2001/I_Databas/Social_Life/09Labour_
market/08General_data_of_labour_market/02Annual_statistics/02Annual_statistics.asp.
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Figure 7. Employment rates by ethnicity and educational attainment,  
1997–2009. Population aged 18–74
Notes: Year 2009 data refer to the first three quarters. 
Source: Calculation based on LFS data
Figure 7 presents the evolution of employment rates among ethnic Latvians 
and non-Latvians by educational attainment.13 In the late 1990s, a significant 
ethnic gap in employment is found at every level of education: almost 19 points 
among tertiary educated persons, and 9 to 10 points among persons with sec-
ondary or below secondary education. Between 1997 and 2007, the employment 
level of the high- and medium-skilled population was growing in both ethnic 
groups, but growth was faster among minorities. By 2007, the ethnic gap in 
employment rates among secondary educated Latvians and non-Latvians was 
reduced to just 1.2 points, but during the crisis of 2008–2009 it increased again, 
exceeding five points in the third quarter of 2009; the three-quarter average in 
2009 was 3.4 points. Likewise, among the low-skilled, the ethnic employment 
gap was about one point in 2007 but three points in the first three quarters of 
2009, reaching eight points in 2009/Q3. For persons with tertiary education, the 
ethnic gap in employment, which was as wide as 19 points in 1997, was fluc-
tuating around 10 points during 2002–2008, but increased to almost 14 points 
in the first three quarters of 2009.
Figure 8 compares the dynamics of labour market integration of minorities 
across age groups and types of settlement (more details found in Table A.1). 
During 2002–2007, the employment gap between Latvians and minorities 
13 Teenagers aged 15 to 17 years (almost all of them with education below secondary) are 
excluded because in this age group interpreting employment is not straightforward. In 
1997, the employment rate in this category was 10% among Latvians and 4% among non-
Latvians. Between 2002 and 2007, just 3 to 5% of teenagers aged 15–17 were employed 
in both ethnic groups, while in 2009/Q1 this rate was less than 1% .
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narrowed sharply in all age groups except the elderly (65–74 years), and in 
all types of settlement except big cities outside Riga, while in the two cases 
mentioned above as exceptions there was a modest reduction.
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Figure 8. Ethnic gap in employment by age group and type of settlement  
(2002, 2007, and 2009/Q1) 
Source: Calculation based on LFS data
In 2007, the last year of the growth period, a substantial (about 4 points on 
average) ethnic employment gap is found in the prime-age group (25–54 years), 
among the elderly (65–74 years), in big cities outside Riga, and in the country-
side; the employment rate of minority youth and persons aged 55 to 64 was higher 
than that of their Latvian counterparts. Further inspection of Figure 8 identifies 
three groups of the minority population which suffered disproportionately from the 
employment shock during the first year of the economic crisis: youth, those older 
than 54, and residents of the capital city. As a result, in the first three quarters of 
2009 the ethnic employment gap was positive in all age groups and in settlements 
of all types; in Riga and other big cities (home to 70% of the minority population) 
this gap was, respectively, nine and five points wide.
The existence of labour market integration barriers is manifested by dif-
ferences in labour market outcomes which cannot be explained by differences 
in demographic and human capital characteristics of the minority and majority 
population. This approach, known as gap decomposition, was proposed by 
Blinder14 and Oaxaca15 and is widely used by labour economists when study-
ing gender or ethnic discrimination and, more generally, differences in labour 
market outcomes between demographic groups. There is a considerable body 
14 A. S. Blinder (1973), ‘Wage Discrimination: Reduced Form and Structural Estimates,’ The 
Journal of Human Resources, 8, pp. 436–455.
15 R. Oaxaca (1973), ‘Male–Female Wage Differentials in Urban Labor Markets,’ International 
Economic Review, 14, pp. 693–709.
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of recent research related to ethnicity or immigrant status.16 In the context of 
this paper, the explained ethnic employment gap is the part of the total differ-
ence in employment rates between Latvians and minorities which is due to 
differences in distribution of the two groups by human capital, demographic, 
and geographic characteristics. The remaining part (the unexplained ethnic 
employment gap) can be then attributed to differences in language skills, citi-
zenship status, other inter-ethnic differences, and possible discrimination. The 
explained and unexplained ethnic earnings (pay, wage) gaps are defined in a 
similar way, although in this case the control variables might include also some 
job characteristics.
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Figure 9. Explained and unexplained ethnic employment gap, 2002–2009 
Notes: The explained gap is the part of the total difference in employment rates which is due 
to differences in distribution of the two groups by human capital, demographic, and geo-
graphic characteristics. Control variables include: age group, education (7 categories), family 
status, region, degree of urbanisation, and quarter. The remaining part (the unexplained gap) 
can be then attributed to differences in language skills, citizenship status, other inter-ethnic 
differences, and possible discrimination. The unexplained gap is statistically significant at 
the 1% level in all years for females and in 2002, 2008, 2009 for males. Source: Calculation 
based on LFS data 
The decomposition of the ethnic employment gap into explained and un-
explained parts is presented (separately for males and females) in Figure 9 for 
16 See A. Constant, M. Kahanec and K.F. Zimmermann (2006), ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Earnings 
Divide,’ IZA Discussion Paper No. 2330; Mihails Hazans (2005), ‘Unemployment and 
the Earnings Structure in Latvia,’ World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3504. 
Washington DC: World Bank. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=659103; Hazans 
(2007b), ‘Coping with growth and emigration’; Mihails Hazans (2008), ‘Post-enlargement 
return migrants’ earnings premium: Evidence from Latvia’, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.
com/abstract=1269728; Hazans et al. (2007), ‘Determinants of unemployment duration in 
Latvia’; Hazans et al., (2008), ‘Ethnic and parental effects on schooling outcomes before 
and during the transition”; Leping and Toomet (2008), ‘Emerging ethnic wage gap’; and 
Kahanec and Zaiceva (2009), ‘Labour Market Outcomes of Immigrants and Non-Citizens 
in the EU.’
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the years 2002, 2007, 2008, and 2009. The explained gap is negative for both 
genders in 2002, as well as in 2007–2009. This means that if employment pros-
pects would depend only on gender, age, educational attainment, region and 
type of settlement, then employment rates would be somewhat higher among 
minorities than among ethnic Latvians. Hence the unexplained ethnic employ-
ment gap exceeds the observed (total) gap. In 2002, the unexplained gap was 
4.6 percentage points among females and 8.1 points among males. In five years, 
these ethnic effects have declined to 0.7 points for males and 2.4 points for 
females.17 It is fair to say that in 2007 the ethnic (including language) effect on 
employment was negligible among males and rather small among females. This 
does not exclude of course effects of substantial size within some categories 
(for instance, females with poor Latvian language skills). 
Overall the conclusion from Figure 9 is that the unexplained gap in employ-
ment rates between Latvians and non-Latvians has narrowed down substantially 
between 2002 and 2007, but significantly increased again with the beginning 
of the economic crisis, reaching four points among males and exceeding five 
points among females. 
Labour Force Participation, Job Security and 
Unemployment
Inspection of labour force participation rates (see Table A.2) reveals that 
since 2004, minority males are more active in the labour market than Latvian 
males. The female activity gap in favour of ethnic Latvians was as high as 5 
points in 2002, disappeared by 2004 and stayed near zero until 2007, but in-
creased to 2 points in 2008 (Figure 10). The largest reduction of the ethnic gap 
in participation occurred among the low skilled, as well as in the age groups 
55–64 and 25–34. Minority youth features activity rates above those of Latvi-
ans throughout the period. More detailed inspection (see Table A.3) finds that 
starting from 2007 this is the case among both students and non-students. On 
the other hand, among persons with tertiary education, as well as among those 
aged 65 to 74 and among residents of big cities (except Riga), the gap declined 
just a little between 2002 and 2007, but bounced back in 2008. 
During the initial stage of the crisis, minority workers faced a higher risk 
of losing their job. Table 1 presents annual labour market flows from employ-
ment by gender and ethnicity. For example, between 2007 and 2008, outflow 
to unemployment was 1.8 times higher among minority males than among 
their Latvian counterparts, while for females this ratio was 1.6. Higher vul-
nerability to the crisis among minority workers is to some extent due to their 
17 The explained gaps have declined as well. This happened because the increase in labour 
demand was more pronounced in groups where minorities are over-represented (see 
Figure 5, for example). 
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concentration in manufacturing and construction (see below), the hardest hit 
sectors. However, econometric analysis shows that outflow from employment 
was significantly higher among non-Latvians also after controlling for sector, 
occupation and region.
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Figure 10. Gap between ethnic Latvians and minorities in labour force 
participation by gender, 2002–2009
Source: Calculation based on LFS data.
Table 1. Labour market status of persons employed one year ago, by gender 
and ethnicity (2008 and 2009), %
Males Females
2008 2009 (Q1–Q3) 2008 2009 (Q1–Q3)
Latvians Minorities Latvians Minorities Latvians Minorities Latvians Minorities
Employed 93.7 90.3 84.2 79.6 93.1 90.5 88.6 85.1
Unemployed 3.6 6.5 10.9 14.4 2.9 4.6 5.7 9.1
Economically 
inactive 2.7 3.2 4.9 6.0 4.0 4.9 5.7 5.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Calculation based on LFS data
Over the years, unemployment rates have been consistently higher among 
minorities than among ethnic Latvians. However, minority unemployment 
rates have been falling faster up until 2005 for males and up until 2007 for 
females (Figure 11). In 2007 (at the end of the growth period), both male and 
female unemployment rates were about 1.5 times higher among minorities. 
The recession-related increase in unemployment between 2007 and 2009/Q3 
appears to be larger among Latvian males compared to their minority counter-
parts, but it was the other way around among females. Hence, the ethnic ratio 
of unemployment rates reached a historic low of 1.25 for males but was as high 
as 1.58 for females. 
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Figure 11. Unemployment rates by ethnicity and gender, 1997–2009
Source: Calculation based on LFS data (reproduced by permission from Hazans (2010), 
‘Labour market integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia.’
In Estonia, the unemployment rate among minorities in 2007–2008 was 
about two times higher than among ethnic Estonians, while in 2004–2006 this 
ratio stood at about 2.4.18 
Table 2. Registered unemployed by ethnicity and Latvian language skills before 
and during the crisis
All Males Females
Jan’08 Sep’08 Sep’09 Sep’08 Sep’09 Sep’08 Sep’09
Ethnicity
Latvian 54.2 52.5 53.9 54.1 55.0 51.4 52.8
Other 43.1 40.2 41.4 39.1 44.3 41.2
Not stated 4.4 5.9 4.4 5.9 4.4 6.0
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Latvian language skills
Completed education in 
Latvian 52.6 54.5 54.1 55.2 51.5 53.9
Highest degree certificate 6.1 6.2 4.1 4.2 7.5 8.1
Medium degree certif. 15.9 15.5 11.0 11.9 19.4 19.0
Lower degree certificate 12.0 12.4 11.5 13.9 13.0 11.3 10.1
No certificate 12.6 13.1 12.2 16.8 15.7 10.5 8.9
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Source: Elaboration on State Employment Agency data.
The proportion of minorities among the registered unemployed was about 
46% in the beginning of 2008, increased to 47.5% by the end of 2008/Q3, 
18 Statistics Estonia (2009), ‘Labour status of population aged 15–74 by ethnic nationality, 
sex and age.’
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but returned to the pre-crisis level a year later (see Table 2). Given that the 
proportion of minorities in the labour force was just 40.4% according to the 
2008 LFS, this confirms that minorities face somewhat higher unemployment 
risk than ethnic Latvians and that the initial stage of the crisis was particularly 
unfavourable for minorities.
Earnings 
According to LFS data, in 2002–2009 minority workers earned on average 
8 to 9 percent less than ethnic Latvians (Table 3). The size of this gap remained 
quite stable, although it decreased somewhat by the end of the growth period 
in 2007 and increased during the crisis years 2008–2009. The most substantial 
ethnic pay gap (21 percent on average) is found among public sector female 
workers. More detailed analysis19 shows that among males, the ethnic earnings 
gap is virtually absent in the lower part and in the middle of the distribution of 
earnings. Among private sector female workers, the gap is present only in the 
lower end of the distribution, while among public sector female workers, it is 
most pronounced in the middle. 
Table 3. Evolution of the ethnic gap in earnings, 2002–2009
Full-time workers a All workers
Males Females
Private 
sector
Public 
sector
Private 
sector
Public 
sector
2002 2007 2008
2009 
Q1–Q3 2002
2009 
Q1–Q3 2007 2007 2007 2007
Ratio of mean earnings (minority vs. Latvians, % )
91.4 92.4 90.7 90.6 91.7 92.4 98.4 90.4 92.6 79.2
Mean unexplained ethnic pay gap between Latvian and otherwise similar minority 
workers (% of mean Latvians’ earnings)
b 11.3*** 5.8*** 7.2*** 8.1*** 11.1*** 7.4*** 0.1 1.8 -1.2 8.9***
c 7.8*** 4.1*** 5.5*** 5.9*** 7.7*** 5.2** -4.7  0.2 -0.4 4.8**
Notes: 
 a Full-time status as reported by workers, but those working less than 35 hours per week 
excluded. 
 b Controls include gender, educational attainment (7 categories), being a student or pupil, age 
and its square, marital/cohabiting status, degree of urbanisation at residence (4 categories), 
type of contract, job tenure, usual weekly hours worked, ownership sector, sector of economic 
activity (12 categories), job location (5 regions and capital city), reference month. 
 c Additional controls: occupations (27 two-digit ISCO groups) and plant size (5 categories). 
Earnings functions not corrected for selectivity. ***, ** – estimates significant at 1% 
(respectively, 5%) level.
Source: Calculation based on LFS data.
19 See Hazans (2010), ‘Labour market integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia.’
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The average ethnic pay gap unexplained by human capital and demographic 
characteristics of the workers, as well as by the type of contract, job tenure, 
usual weekly hours worked, ownership sector, sector of economic activity and 
location of the enterprise, has declined from 11 points in 2002 to 6 points in 
2007 but increased to 8 points in 2009. Like the raw gap, it is most pronounced 
among public sector female workers: 9 points, 5 of which remain even within 
narrow occupation-firm size cells. The unexplained gap is virtually absent in 
the private sector and among public sector male workers. 
International comparisons suggest that the ethnic pay gap in Latvia is 
modest. Leping and Toomet20 find that in Estonia, the ratio of earnings of mi-
nority and Estonian males fluctuated around 90% in 2002–2004 but increased 
to 95% in 2005, while the unexplained ethnic pay gap fluctuated around 20% in 
2000–2004 but became two times smaller in 2005. Leping and Toomet and Leij 
et al.21 argue that barriers to the labour market and segregated social networks 
are the main factors behind the unexplained ethnic wage gap in Estonia. 
In the United States in 2000, Hispanic workers of both genders earned on 
average about 20% less than white workers, but when education level is con-
trolled for, the gap is just 7%, and when occupation is also controlled, there is 
no gap.22 However, the wage gap between Hispanics and whites has a tendency 
to increase; the median earnings of Hispanics were 74% of whites in 2006 and 
72.6% in 2007.23 
An interesting situation can be found in Ukraine, where during the late 
1990s and early 2000s Russian-speakers of both genders enjoyed quite substan-
tial earnings premia over Ukrainian speakers;24 these premia were larger and 
showed an increasing trend longer for males than for females, but have been 
declining since 2003 and 2000, respectively.
Occupational and Sectoral Segregation 
Table A.4 compares the occupational distribution of ethnic Latvian employ-
ees with the distribution of their minority counterparts in 2002 and in 2007. It 
appears that these distributions are fairly stable over time. The proportion of 
highly skilled non-manual workers has increased slightly in both ethnic groups 
(more among Latvians) at the expense of low-skilled non-manual and unskilled 
20 Leping and Toomet (2008), ‘Emerging ethnic wage gap.’
21 Leij et al. (2009), ‘On the Relationship between Unexplained Wage Gap and Social Network 
Connections.’
22 Debora Reed and Jennifer Cheng (2003), Racial and Ethnic Wage Gaps in the California 
Labour Market. San Francisco, CA: The Public Policy Institute of California; summary 
available at http://www.ppic.org/content/pubs/rb/RB_503DRRB.pdf. 
23 The Opportunity Agenda (2009), ‘Equality – State of Opportunity, 2009,’ available at 
http://opportunityagenda.org/stateofopportunity/indicators/equality/.
24 Constant et al. (2006), ‘The Russian-Ukrainian Earnings Divide.’
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manual workers. The overall degree of occupational segregation is measured by 
the dissimilarity index DI.25 In the given context, DI shows the minimal pro-
portion (in percent) of non-Latvians who would have to change occupations in 
order to make their occupational distribution identical to that of Latvians. This 
measure suggests a modest vertical segregation between ethnic groups: when 
the four “super-groups” (highly skilled non-manual, low-skilled non-manual, 
skilled manual, and elementary occupations) are considered, DI4 = 12.0 in 2007 
(almost two points up compared to 2002), while for the nine major groups of 
occupations DI9 = 13.1 (0.6 points up). This is a significantly lower level of 
segregation than in Estonia (DI4 = 15.9 and DI9 = 18.4 in 2007
26). Vertical seg-
regation in Latvia is more pronounced among women (DI4 = 13.6) than among 
men (DI4 = 10.7).
Latvians are in higher proportions in highly skilled non-manual occupations, 
while non-Latvians – in skilled manual and elementary occupations. In 2007, 
24.7 percent of Latvian employees were senior officials, managers or profes-
sionals, while among non-Latvians this proportion was 15.2 percent. It is worth 
noting, however, that the proportion of persons with a tertiary education is also 
higher among ethnic Latvian employees than among their minority counter-
parts: 27 vs. 21 percent (this gap is less than 4 points though among employees 
younger than 35 years). Hence promotion of tertiary education among ethnic 
minorities can be considered a way of improving both their living conditions 
in a long-term perspective and the productive potential of the Latvian labour 
force in general. 
The distribution of ethnic Latvian and minority employees among sectors 
of economic activity in 2002 and 2007 is also presented in Table A.4. The 
distribution of the two ethnic groups among sectors is much less similar than 
their occupational distribution: the index of dissimilarity calculated for the 
four “large” sectors (agriculture, industry and construction, market services 
and non-market services) in 2007 was 16.4 (one point below the 2002 level), 
while it was just 12.0 in the case of the four “large” groups of occupations. 
Interestingly, the opposite situation is found in Estonia, where DI4 = 9.4 for the 
four above mentioned economic sectors.
In 2007, nearly one third of Latvians and about one out of four non-Latvians 
worked in non-market services; almost 7 percent of Latvians and just half of 
this proportion among minorities were employed in agriculture (recall that only 
hired employees are considered here). On the other hand, more than a third of 
minority workers are found in industry, as opposed to one out of four Latvians. 
37 percent of Latvian employees were employed by state or local governments, 
25 See O. T. Duncan and B. Duncan (1955), ‘A Methodological Analysis of Segregation 
Indexes,’ American Sociological Review, 20, pp. 210–217.
26 Own calculation based on data from Statistics Estonia (2009), ‘Labour status of population 
aged 15–74 by ethnic nationality, sex and age.’
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NGOs, or publicly owned (by at least 50%) enterprises, while for minority 
employees this proportion was just 24 percent. Proportion of minorities among 
employees in public administration is below 20%, or less than a half of their 
share in population.
Latvian Language Skills and Labour Market 
Outcomes
Table 4 finds that both occupational and sectoral segregation of minority 
workers is to a large extent explained by Latvian language skills. According 
to self-reported classification in a survey conducted between November 2005 
and January 2006, 62 percent of employees aged 18 to 64 are native Latvian 
speakers, 20 percent have good knowledge of Latvian language, 12 percent – 
medium level knowledge, and 6 percent – poor knowledge. Among employees 
with good Latvian language skills just 6 percent would have to change occupa-
tion to make their occupational distribution identical to that of native Latvian 
speakers, while for workers with medium and poor Latvian language skills this 
proportion is, respectively, 24 and 49 percent (these figures refer to distribution 
between highly skilled non-manual, low-skilled non-manual, skilled manual, 
and elementary occupations, but the results are almost identical when 9 major 
ISCO groups are considered). A similar picture emerges as far as sectoral seg-
regation is concerned: just 9 percent of minority employees with good Latvian 
language skills would need to change the sector of employment in order to 
have both groups distributed among agriculture, industry, market services, 
and non-market services in the same proportions. For workers with medium 
and poor Latvian language skills the dissimilarity index is 15 and 22 percent, 
respectively.
Average earnings of minority workers are positively related to their Latvian 
language skills. In 2005, those with good knowledge of the Latvian language 
earned, on average, 2 percent more than native Latvian speakers, while those 
with medium and poor Latvian language skills earned, respectively, 9 and 
12 percent less than native speakers (Table 4). However, there is no unexplained 
pay gap for workers with poor Latvian language skills (plausibly, they are oc-
cupied in jobs where this factor is not considered important), while employees 
with good and medium Latvian language skills earn on average 4 and 6 percent 
less than native Latvian speakers with similar personal and job characteristics 
(Table 4). 
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Table 4. Occupational and sectoral segregation and earnings of minority 
workers by self-reported Latvian language skills level, Full-time employees 
aged 18–64, 2005
Knowledge 
of Latvian 
language
Share of 
workers
Dissimilarity index a of segregation 
from native Latvian speakers
Ratio of mean 
earnings 
to those of 
native Latvian 
speakers
Unexplained 
earnings gap 
between the given 
category and native 
Latvian speakers
By four super-
groups of 
occupations
By four main 
sectors of economic 
activities 
Native 62.5 - - - b c
Good 19.9 5.9 9.1 102.1 4.0** 3.7**
Medium 12.2 24.2 15.4 90.9 5.7*** 6.4***
Poor 5.4 49.0 22.3 88.2 1.9 0.9
Note: a The dissimilarity index DI (known also as Duncan index) is a number between 0 and 
100%, with 0 indicating equal distribution of ethnic (or other) groups among occupations 
(or sectors), and 100% indicating complete segregation. In the given context, DI shows 
the minimal proportion of workers with good, medium and poor Latvian language skills 
which would have to change occupation (or sector of economic activity) in order to make 
their distribution among occupations (sectors) identical to that of native Latvian speakers. b 
Without occupation and plant size controls. c With occupation and plant size controls. ***, 
** – estimates significant at 1% (respectively, 5%) level. Source: Calculation with survey 
data, N = 4040; see Hazans (2007b), ‘Coping with growth and emigration,’ Tables 1.11, 
1.13 and 2.7.
Based on another survey from 2006 with information on respondents’ self-
assessed language skills relative to those necessary for the given job, minority 
female workers whose job does not require language skills except for their 
mother tongue earn 8% less than their otherwise similar counterparts who 
need other languages at work (a similar result holds for ethnic Latvians of both 
genders, while among minority males this effect is absent). Moreover, minority 
females earn 19% less (other things being equal) when their Latvian language 
skills are insufficient for their job.27 
We now turn to state language proficiency as the key factor behind the 
barriers. Table 5 finds that the registered unemployed feature a much lower 
incidence of good Latvian language skills and a much higher incidence of 
poor skills than employed wage earners. Moreover, even when state language 
skills are present among the registered unemployed, they are frequently not 
certified. Almost a quarter of minority unemployed registered in 2005–2006 
did not have any legal proof of their state language skills (Table 5, column 3). 
The last three columns of Table 5 report the distribution of all (rather than just 
minority) registered unemployed by state language skills in 2005–2006 (the 
growth period), as well as before and during the crisis (September 2008 and 
September 2009). Despite some fluctuations, the distribution is quite stable; in 
particular, 12 to 13% of all unemployed lack certified state language proficiency 
27 See Hazans (2008), ‘Post-enlargement return migrants’ earnings premium,’ Section 3 and 
Table 4.
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at any level. Other research28 finds that for this group the probability of exit 
from registered unemployment to employment is substantially lower than for 
other registered unemployed; moreover, this category is also much more likely 
to leave unemployment while not having found a job. Furthermore, the likeli-
hood of completing professional training programmes at the State Employment 
Agency is positively related to certified state language skills.29
Table 5. Latvian language skills among employees and registered unemployed
Self-reported skills Certified skills
Full-time 
employees
Registered 
unemployed Registered unemployed
Minority Minority Minority All
2006/Q1 a 2006/Q1 b
2005–
2006 c
2005–
2006 c
2008 
Sep d
2009 
Sep d
Mother tongue 1.3 4.5 NA NA NA NA
Completed education 
in Latvian NA NA 12.6 54.5 52.6 54.5
Good/ High level 51.6 29.6 8.8 4.9 6.1 6.2
Medium level 32.2 37.9 31 16.1 15.9 15.5
Poor/ Low level 14.9 28.1 23.3 11.8 12.4 11.5
None NA NA 24.3 12.7 13.1 12.2
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Sources: a Calculation with data of wage earners survey for the National programme of labour 
market studies. b Calculation with data of survey of registered unemployed, see http://www.
nva.lv/docs/1_45135dc4cb20b9.91339932.pdf c Calculation with administrative data. d State 
Employment Agency.
Figure 12 compares self-reported and certified state language skills of the 
minority population aged 18–64 across five social groups: students, employed, 
unemployed (not necessarily registered), retired, and other inactive. Again, 
unemployed and inactive (except for students) have weaker Latvian language 
skills than the employed. Moreover, 50 to 60% in all groups (even more among 
the retired) do not have any certificate.
28 Hazans et al. (2007), ‘Determinants of unemployment duration in Latvia.’
29 Ibid. It is worth noting that handling the language issue in the framework of active 
labour market policies has been improving. Up until 2007, registered unemployed were 
offered Latvian language courses, but these courses did not directly lead to receiving or 
upgrading a certificate of the state language proficiency. This was corrected following a 
recommendation given by the authors. Furthermore, while the State Employment Agency 
offers professional training courses only with instruction in Latvian, since 2009 it has 
introduced training vouchers which are free from this restriction. 
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Minorities aged 18–64 by self-reported Latvian language skills
Minorities aged 18–64 by certified Latvian language skills
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Figure 12. Minority population aged 18–64 by labour market status and state 
language skills, 2007/Q3–2008/Q1.
Upper panel: Self-reported Latvian language skills
Lower panel: Certified Latvian language skills
Source: Calculation with data from Zepa et al. (2008), Language.
Finally, Figure 13 shows how labour market outcomes of the population 
are related to state language skills. The minority population with good Latvian 
language skills is not much different from native Latvian speakers (although it 
features a slightly lower proportion of students at the expense of retirees; this 
is due to the difference in the age structure, see Figure 2). The minority popula-
tion with medium or poor Latvian language skills features a higher proportion 
of working-age inactive persons; what is more, among those with poor Latvian 
language skills there is also a higher proportion of unemployed.
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Figure 13. Population aged 18–64 by self-reported state language skills and 
labour market status, 2007/Q3–2008/Q1
Source: Calculation with data from Zepa et al. (2008), Language.
State Language Proficiency Requirements
According to the State Language Law, the following categories of employed 
persons are subject to state language proficiency requirements: (i) Employees 
of state and municipal institutions, courts and agencies belonging to the judicial 
system, state and municipal enterprises, as well as companies in which the state 
or a municipality holds the largest share of the capital; (ii) Employees of private 
institutions, organizations, enterprises, as well as self-employed persons, whose 
activities relate to legitimate public interests (public safety, health, morals, 
health care, protection of consumer rights and labour rights, workplace safety 
and public administrative supervision) or who perform certain public functions. 
The requirements for specific occupations are formulated in terms of one of 
the six levels: lower and upper basic (1A, 1B); lower and upper intermediate 
(2A, 2B); lower and upper advanced (3A, 3B). Each employer is responsible 
for preparing (within 3 month after registration) a list of required state language 
proficiency levels for all jobs in the firm/organization. The requirements cannot 
be lower than those in the government regulations; employees whose jobs 
are not listed in the regulations but who work directly with customers should 
provide to the clients the necessary information on goods and services in the 
state language. 
The first version of the regulations was issued in 2000, but the list of 
occupations was extended several times in 2001–2008. In a survey held in 
2006/Q4–2007/Q1, employees were asked to compare their Latvian language 
skills, as well as language proficiency requirements imposed by employers (or 
by the law when relevant) with the level which is in fact necessary to perform 
their professional duties. Overall, 19% of the employees were not subject to 
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any state language requirements, 71% consider the requirements consistent 
with professional duties, 1% see them as insufficient, while almost 9% think 
the requirements are “substantially higher” than really necessary. Interestingly, 
such an assessment is more frequently given by Latvians (10.4%) than by non-
Latvians (6.4%); this is true also within each of the major groups of occupations 
(except for professionals, whose judgement is, on average, the same for both 
ethnic groups), as well as for employees of central government institutions and 
for private sector employees (Figure 14, upper panel).
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Figure 14. Employees who think that state language requirements imposed by 
employers for the position they occupy are substantially higher than necessary 
for performing professional duties. Upper panel: by ethnicity, occupation, and 
sector. Lower panel: by ethnicity, region, and urbanization 
Source: Calculation with data of survey of wage earners, N = 10177, Latvian University 
of Agriculture (2007), Datasets of the surveys of employees and employers conducted in 
2006–2007 for the project “Specific problems of Latvia’s and its regions’ labour market” 
commissioned by the Ministry of Welfare for the National Programme of Labour Market 
Studies.
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For non-Latvian employees, the highest proportion (12%) of those who 
thinks that language requirements for hiring were too strict is found in local 
government institutions, followed by central government institutions and NGOs, 
as well as among professionals and clerks in general (10%). At a more detailed 
level, the highest rates of perception of the state language requirements as too 
strict were found among stationary plant and related operators (20%), customer 
service clerks, general managers, and office clerks (12 to 13%), teaching pro-
fessionals (11%), life science and health associate professionals, business and 
social science professionals, personal and protective services workers, food 
processing, timber, textile, and related craft workers, models, salespersons and 
demonstrators, and sales and services elementary occupations (9 to 10%).
The perceived strictness of state language requirements varies substantially 
by region and urbanization level (Figure 14, lower panel): 18% of minority 
workers see them as too strict in predominantly Latvian Vidzeme region, while 
in Riga region this rate is less than 5%; in big cities except Riga the disapproval 
rate among minority workers is 11%, while it is just 5% elsewhere. 
These results suggest that on the eve of 2007, the state language profi-
ciency requirements were largely consistent with the real needs implied by 
professional duties, although some liberalization could be useful in regulations 
for selected occupations, as well as in application of the requirements outside 
Riga, especially in Vidzeme region. Moreover, as the results of Section 3 sug-
gest, the labour market itself provided incentives to acquire adequate Latvian 
language skills.
However, the second version of the government regulations (approved 
in July 2009), while based on the same general approach mentioned above, 
substantially extended the list of the occupations affected, especially in the 
private sector, and in some cases raised the required proficiency levels. For 
some occupations the requirements in the public sector are now higher than 
in the private sector. One of the factors which contributed to hardening of the 
regulations was the temporary worsening of the quality of the Latvian language 
in the service sector in 2006–2007, when a labour shortage forced employers 
to lower de facto requirements towards new workers. However, in a survey 
conducted in 2008,30 only 18% of native Latvian speakers supported using 
legal regulation of usage of languages or applying restrictions to those who 
do not have a command of Latvian as the way to promote a Latvian language 
environment for non-Latvians. 
Workers who do not have a certificate of the required level are given until 
Sept 2010 (basic level), March 2011 (intermediate level) or Sept 2011 (ad-
vanced level). It is already clear, however, that these deadlines are not realistic. 
Experts interviewed in October 2009 assumed that the new regulations will not 
result in mass layoffs as they probably won’t be enforced too strictly and the 
30 Zepa et al. (2008), Language.
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deadlines will be moved. However, these regulations will have a strong signal-
ling effect. In particular, they are likely to increase emigration rates and reduce 
return migration among minorities.
Is There Evidence of Ethnic Discrimination in Hiring?
Table 6 summarizes evidence on potential ethnic discrimination in hiring 
from representative large-scale surveys of employees and employers held in 
2006 in the framework of the National Programme of Labour Market Studies. 
In the employees’ survey, about 5% of Latvian respondents and 2% of minor-
ity respondents reported that in the enterprise in which they work, applicants 
of Russian or other Slavic origin would have small chances to be hired, while 
only about 1% of respondents thought that applicants of Latvian ethnicity would 
face such a problem. Representatives of visually distinct minorities face more 
barriers: in the same survey, 25% of Latvian respondents and 30% of minority 
respondents reported that Roma applicants are unlikely to be hired; 9 to 10% of 
Latvians and 6 to 7% of non-Latvians think that chances are small for Jews and 
other minorities. Results of the employers’ survey (which are of course likely 
to underestimate the incidence of discriminatory practices) are largely similar: 
for instance, 3.5% of enterprises where the working language is Latvian would 
not hire an applicant of Russian or other Slavic origin 8% would not hire a 
Jewish applicant, 27% would not hire a Roma applicant, and 7% would not hire 
other minorities. For Roma, the rejection rate is 27% also in enterprises where 
the working language is only or mainly Russian, while it is 17% in enterprises 
where Latvian is the main, but not the only working language. 
Table 6. Evidence of ethnic discrimination in hiring, 2006
Ethnicity of a 
potential job 
applicant
Employees’ survey: low chances 
to be hired by the respondent’s 
enterprise (% of all answers)
Employers’ survey: no chances to be hired by 
the respondent’s enterprise (% of all answers)
Respondent’s ethnicity Languages used in the enterprise
Latvian non-Latvian Total
Only 
Latvian
Mainly 
Latvian
Mainly 
Russian
Only 
Russian Total
Latvian 0.9 1.2 1.0 0.5 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.3
Russian and 
other Slavic 4.7 2.2 3.6 3.5 1.1 0.2 0.0 1.7
Jewish 9.9 6.3 8.3 7.9 2.9 1.5 0.4 4.0
Roma 24.6 29.9 27.0 27.2 17.0 26.6 27.5 22.2
Other minorities 9.5 6.8 8.3 6.9 3.4 2.4 4.5 4.3
N 6397 3780 10177 1815 2805 1172 245 6066
Source: own calculation with data of Latvian University of Agriculture (2007).
To sum up, although hiring discrimination against workers of Russian or 
other Slavic ethnicity seems to exist, there is no evidence that it reaches levels 
at which it would influence the employment rate among these minorities. This is 
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consistent with interview-based evidence that Russian-speaking emigrants from 
Latvia and Lithuania to Ireland, unlike their counterparts from Estonia, migrate 
to escape low wages and irregular employment, rather than because of their 
experiences as minorities.31 Nevertheless, mono-ethnic or almost mono-ethnic 
enterprises might emerge in Latvia due to extensive use of social networking 
in recruiting.32 On the other hand, the incidence of hiring discrimination against 
visual minorities is not negligible and, in the case of the Roma, it is substantial. 
The latter finding is consistent with evidence from other countries of Central 
and Eastern Europe.33
Conclusion
Despite flawed policymaking, impressive progress was achieved between 
1997 and 2008 in the field of labour market integration of Latvia’s large minor-
ity population. This was possible thanks to a period of strong economic growth 
accompanied by a massive outflow of the labour force after EU enlargement. 
Yet, the unemployment risk was higher among minorities, other things being 
equal, and the ethnic gap in employment rates remained substantial among 
the population with a higher education. As Latvia entered a recession in the 
second half of 2008, some gains in the relative position of minorities in terms 
of employment rates and earnings were lost; in the third quarter of 2009 the 
ethnic gap in employment has reached six percentage points. 
Analysis suggests that economic interests drive integration, and ethnically 
mixed companies contribute to integration via inter-ethnic communication at 
the workplace. Both occupational and sectoral segregation of minority workers 
is to a large extent explained by lack of Latvian language skills, which is thus 
the main integration barrier. However, the labour market provides incentives 
to acquire adequate Latvian (as well as Russian) language skills. Relatively 
liberal access to jobs for minorities can facilitate not only their labour market 
integration but also cultural, language and social integration. Language-based 
labour market restrictions, by contrast, create a “lock-in” effect. Furthermore, 
any shift towards a more hard-line language policy is likely to increase perma-
nent labour emigration among the minority population thus aggravating Latvia’s 
demographic problems.
31 Aptekar (2009), ‘Contexts of exit...’
32 Hazans (2010), ‘Labour market integration of ethnic minorities in Latvia.’
33 See, e.g., Zimmermann et al. (2008), Study on the Social and Labour Market Integration 
of Ethnic Minorities.
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Greatest Achievement
The greatest achievement in labour market integration was the elimination 
of the ethnic employment gap by 2007. Unfortunately, this achievement has 
not survived the crisis: the gap has bounced back reaching almost six points 
in 2009/Q3.
Most Serious Problem
The most serious problem is that minorities face a significantly higher un-
employment risk, especially among the population with a higher education.
Most Urgent Task
The most urgent task is to achieve a more adequate representation of the 
minority population in the public administration – currently it is below 20%, 
or less than a half of the minority share in the population.
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Appendix
Table A.1. Employment rates by ethnicity and demographic group, 2002–2008. 
Population aged 15–74
Latvians (%) Non-Latvians (%) Gap (% points)
2002 2004 2007 2008 2002 2004 2007 2008 2002 2004 2007 2008
Education:
Less than 
secondary 30.3 27.5 31.9 30.5 24.1 24.8 34.4 34.4 6.2 2.7 -2.5 -3.9
Upper 
secondary 65.1 65.1 69.6 70.0 58.9 62.6 68.4 67.4 6.2 2.5 1.2 2.6
Tertiary 79.5 81.6 85.1 86.7 69.2 73.1 76.5 75.1 10.3 8.5 8.6 11.6
Gender:
Men 61.3 62.2 67.1 67.4 57.1 60.3 68.9 68.2 4.2 1.9 -1.9 -0.8
Women 53.3 52.6 57.6 59.3 45.6 49.5 56.1 56.1 7.7 3.1 1.5 3.3
Age:
15–24 31.2 30.0 36.4 35.8 30.5 31.6 42.8 40.9 0.7 -1.6 -6.4 -5.1
25–34 80.0 77.5 81.5 81.4 68.0 72.8 78.1 78.8 12.1 4.7 3.4 2.6
35–44 80.4 83.9 85.6 88.2 71.8 75.8 81.8 80.8 8.5 8.1 3.8 7.4
45–54 81.1 79.4 84.7 84.9 72.5 73.9 79.8 78.4 8.6 5.5 4.9 6.5
55–64 48.1 48.8 56.5 60.8 34.1 46.8 59.1 57.8 13.9 2.0 -2.7 3.0
65–74 14.8 15.7 21.0 23.2 7.6 9.1 15.8 17.9 7.2 6.6 5.2 5.4
15–64 63.0 62.8 67.9 68.8 57.0 61.3 69.0 68.5 6.0 1.5 -1.1 0.3
Type of settlement
Capital city 61.4 63.3 67.1 68.5 55.9 59.5 66.4 64.9 5.5 3.9 0.8 3.5
Big cities a 53.0 54.8 64.4 66.5 45.7 49.3 59.9 59.2 7.3 5.5 4.5 7.2
Small cities 56.3 55.6 61.1 62.2 47.7 54.0 59.5 60.0 8.6 1.5 1.6 2.2
Rural 56.1 54.7 58.9 59.9 47.4 50.4 55.7 57.7 8.7 4.3 3.3 2.2
Totala 57.1 57.1 62.1 63.2 50.8 54.5 62.0 61.7 6.3 2.7 0.1 1.5
Notes: a Daugavpils, Jūrmala, Jelgava, Liepāja, Rēzekne, Ventspils. 
Source: Calculations with LFS data.
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Table A.2. Labour force participation rates by ethnicity and demographic 
group, 2002–2008. Population aged 15–74
Latvians (%) Non-Latvians (%) Gap (% points)
2002 2004 2007 2008 2002 2004  2007 2008 2002 2004 2007 2008
Education:
Less than 
secondary 36.3 32.7 35.6 35.3 31.5 30.6 38.3 40.4 4.8 2.1 -2.7 -5.2
Upper 
secondary 72.0 71.2 73.0 74.7 69.9 73.3 74.0 74.3 2.1 -2.1 -1.0 0.3
Tertiary 83.3 83.9 87.6 89.0 74.3 78.5 80.9 80.4 8.9 5.4 6.7 8.6
Gender:
Men 68.8 68.3 70.9 72.1 67.8 69.4 74.8 76.0 1.0 -1.1 -3.9 -3.9
Women 58.2 57.0 60.5 63.1 53.3 57.6 60.4 61.3 4.9 -0.6 0.1 1.8
Age:
15–24 38.1 35.9 40.4 41.0 40.6 40.1 49.1 47.5 -2.4 -4.2 -8.7 -6.5
25–34 87.8 84.8 85.8 87.6 79.6 84.6 84.7 86.2 8.2 0.2 1.1 1.4
35–44 88.9 89.9 89.6 93.0 84.9 85.9 87.8 90.0 4.0 4.0 1.8 3.0
45–54 88.4 85.6 88.9 88.8 81.9 85.7 85.5 86.9 6.5 -0.1 3.4 1.9
55–64 51.4 52.2 58.5 63.8 40.1 52.5 62.6 62.9 11.3 -0.4 -4.1 0.9
65–74 15.6 16.0 21.1 23.4 8.8 10.1 16.6 17.9 6.7 5.9 4.5 5.5
15–64
Type of settlement
Capital city 67.5 68.8 69.9 72.5 64.1 68.0 71.5 71.7 3.4 0.8 -1.6 0.8
Big cities a 62.3 62.2 68.5 71.1 57.5 59.3 64.4 65.1 4.8 2.8 4.2 6.0
Small cities 62.9 60.7 64.6 66.8 58.0 62.4 64.9 67.3 5.0 -1.7 -0.3 -0.6
Rural 61.1 59.2 62.2 63.8 54.0 56.8 60.7 63.4 7.0 2.4 1.4 0.4
Totala 63.2 62.3 65.4 67.4 59.9 63.0 67.0 68.1 3.3 -0.7 -1.6 -0.8
Notes: a Daugavpils, Jūrmala, Jelgava, Liepāja, Rēzekne, Ventspils.
Source: Calculations with LFS data.
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Table A.3. Population aged 15–24 by participation in education and in the 
labour force, 2002–2008
Latvians Non-Latvians
Status 2002 2005 2007 2008 2002 2005 2007 2008
Student, economically active 13.6 13.5 12.4 12.8 9.4 11.0 17.4 15.6
Student, economically inactive 52.6 54.3 51.7 51.7 48.4 54.9 40.3 43.5
Non-student, economically active 24.6 24.8 28.0 28.2 31.2 24.5 31.7 31.9
Non-student, economically inactive 9.3 7.5 8.0 7.3 11.0 9.6 10.6 9.1
Students, total 66.2 67.8 64.1 64.5 57.8 65.9 57.7 59.0
 of which:
Tertiary level students 22.6 23.1 20.3 21.5 19.0 24.3 25.1 27.1
 Upper secondary level students 31.6 32.5 30.8 30.1 27.8 33.1 26.2 24.7
 Primary level students 11.3 12.2 13.0 12.9 10.9 8.5 6.4 7.2
Completed education level
Tertiary 5.3 6.0 6.1 6.6 4.6 4.6 7.1 6.6
 Secondary professional or upper 
secondary vocational 13.6 12.0 11.2 10.4 15.6 12.3 12.5 12.2
Secondary general 28.6 26.7 27.2 27.9 27.5 32.3 35.3 37.6
Less than secondary 52.5 55.3 55.5 55.1 52.3 50.8 45.1 43.6
Number obs. 2480 2397 3930 4132 1353 1109 1612 1527
Notes: “Students” are all respondents who have defined their activity status during the four 
weeks before the survey, where studies may refer to general or vocational school, college, 
or university. Labour market status is defined with respect to the survey week.
Source: Calculation with LFS data.
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Table A.4. Occupation and sector of economic activity in the main job by 
ethnicity, 2002 and 2007. Employees aged 15–74, %
Latvians Non-Latvians
2002 2007 2002 2007
Total Total Men Women Total Total Men Women
Occupation 
Highly skilled non-manual 39.5 43.0 32.1 53.9 29.3 31.0 21.8 40.3
Low-skilled non-manual 19.9 18.0 8.0 27.9 20.6 19.6 10.4 28.9
Skilled manual 27.8 27.4 46.5 8.5 34.1 35.1 54.8 15.4
Elementary occupations 12.9 11.6 13.4 9.8 16.0 14.2 12.9 15.5
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Dissimilarity index of occupational segregation between 
Latvians and non-Latvians
by four “super-groups” of 
occupations (see above) 10.2 12.0 10.7 13.6 10.2 12.0 10.7 13.6
by nine major groups of occupations 12.5 13.1 13.0 15.2 12.5 13.1 13.0 15.2
Sector of economic activity
Agriculture, forestry and fishing 9.3 6.8 9.9 3.8 5.1 3.5 4.8 2.1
Industry and construction 24.9 26.0 39.8 12.4 33.1 35.5 46.9 24.1
Market services 29.5 35.8 31.1 40.4 38.7 42.7 38.0 47.3
Non-market services 36.3 31.3 19.2 43.4 23.2 18.3 10.2 26.5
Total 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Dissimilarity index of segregation between Latvians and 
non-Latvians by four main sectors of economic activities 
17.4 16.4 14.1 18.6 17.4 16.4 14.1 18.6
Employed in the public sector, % 42.9 36.9 26.2 47.5 34.2 24.0 19.7 28.4
N observations 5107 9723 4651 5072 3452 5546 2692 2854
Notes. a Dissimilarity index DI (known also as the Duncan index, see Duncan and Duncan, 
1955) is a number between 0 and 100%, with 0 indicating equal distribution of ethnic (or 
other) groups among occupations, and 100% indicating complete segregation. In the given 
context, DI shows the minimal proportion of non-Latvians which would have to change oc-
cupations in order to make their occupational distribution identical to that of Latvians’. 
Source: Calculation with LFS data. Reproduced by permission from Hazans (2010).
Social Policy and Integration
Feliciana Rajevska
Introduction
Social policy is related to concepts such as social inclusion and social cohe-
sion. Social cohesion is the ability of a society to ensure welfare for all of its 
members, minimizing major differences and avoiding polarization. That is the 
definition that was provided in the social cohesion strategy approved by the 
Council of Europe’s Committee of Ministers on 31 March 2004.
Social cohesion is a complex phenomenon which can be analysed from 
three perspectives:
As an ideal or goal formulated in various programmes and government • 
declarations;
As a process involving the activities of all relevant stakeholders, includ-• 
ing the allocation of resources, the establishment of institutions and the 
training of personnel;
As an acquisition, by which we mean the true effects of all of these ac-• 
tivities on the ability to minimize substantial differences in society.
In this chapter, the author will take all three of these aspects into account, 
but the primary focus will be on the end results of policy and the effects on 
people’s lives. Integration in the social sphere is a very wide field, and it cannot 
be covered in a single chapter. For that reason, the author has chosen to focus 
on such issues as combating poverty and social exclusion, the functioning of 
the social security and health care systems, national housing policy, and the 
integration of ex-prisoners. This choice is based on a stable trend of polariza-
tion in Latvian society. 
For several years now, there have been increasing worries about the avail-
ability of health care services. The proportion of inexpensive housing is negli-
gible in comparison to the situation in other EU member states, and that makes 
it more difficult for people to find a home. A certain point of reference in this 
study is the Latvia Human Development Report 2002/2003: Human Security. 
Table 1 focuses on a series of questions about areas in which respondents feel 
threatened, with answers given on a scale of 1 to 4, with “1” meaning that the 
respondent did not feel threatened at all, and “4” meaning that the person felt 
seriously endangered.
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Table 1. Perception of General Threat, September 2002
What do you fear? Avg. response
If I get sick, I won’t be able to afford treatment 3.28 (1)
If I get sick, the medical services which I receive will not be of a 
sufficient level of quality
3.27 (2)
I will get seriously ill 3.26 (3)
When I get old, my pension will be insufficient for survival 3.08 (4)
I will have no money 3.08 (4)
I will suffer an accident 3.08 (4)
I will not be able to pay rent and for utility services 3.03 (5)
Source: Māra Sīmane, ed. (2003), Latvia Human Development Report 2002/2003: Human 
Security. Riga: UNDP, pp. 30–31.
A survey commissioned by the Latvian Ombudsman’s Office and conducted 
by the SKDS public opinion research agency in November 2008 found similar 
answers – 74% to 83% of respondents said that the listed threats are impor-
tant to them. When asked about the importance of the rights of prisoners and 
those who have been released from prison, only 23% and 24% of respondents 
respectively said that they are important, while 33% and 26%, respectively, 
said that they are not.1 It is taking time for people in Latvia to understand that 
these people are a part of our society, and if they do not become integrated, no 
one can feel secure.
The functions of social policy include ensuring normal processes of regen-
eration in a society, stabilizing it, and guaranteeing social protection for those 
who need it due to various reasons. Processes of social stratification must be 
regulated so as to ensure that the gap between the richest and poorest people 
in society is moderate and does not promote any increase in tensions. There 
must be investments in people via education, health care, and the availability 
of elementary housing. Social policies must benefit all strata in society, with-
out exception. There are, however, also groups for which assistance from the 
state or a local government may become decisive at a particular stage or area 
of life.
Poverty Reduction
The first serious consideration of the issue of poverty took place with the 
adoption by the Cabinet of Ministers on 29 August 2000 of a policy docu-
ment called the “Poverty Prevention Strategy.” In this document, poverty was 
defined as a situation faced by an individual or a specific segment of society 
when, because of an insufficiency of material and social resources, they have 
limited opportunities to cover their basic needs (food, housing, clothes and, in 
certain cases, care). These people have difficulty in taking part in public life. In 
 1 See http://www.tiesibsargs.lv/lat/petijumi_un_viedokli/petijumi/?doc=444. 
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preparing for Latvia’s accession to the European Union, the Cabinet of Minis-
ters approved a memorandum on social inclusion which the Minister of Welfare 
signed on 18 December 2003, in Brussels. Since then, several programmes have 
been established to combat social exclusion and poverty – one for 2004–2006, 
another for 2006–2008, and yet another for 2008–2013. In 2003, the govern-
ment introduced a guaranteed minimal income, and in 2005 it set up a system 
of support payments for families with newborns. 
Several ministries and agencies, as well as local governments and the non-
governmental sector have been involved in these programmes. On 3 March 
2009, the Cabinet of Ministers approved new regulations on how a family or 
individual is to be declared as poor, and these stated that a family which is 
made up of a married couple, people who have joint everyday expenditures 
and who all live in the same home are seen as poor if their income per family 
member during the preceding three months has not exceeded 50% of the mini-
mum monthly wage as of the first day of the relevant year (90 lats or ~€128 
in 2009). In accordance with amendments passed by the parliament on 29 Oc-
tober 2009 to the Law on Social Service and Social Assistance, people with 
debts are eligible for social assistance support. The amendments forbid trying 
to collect debt through the social assistance granted to the person. At a special 
meeting of the Cabinet of Ministers on 15 September 2009, Welfare Minister 
Uldis Augulis said that in accordance with this definition, the number of poor 
people had increased rapidly – from 120,000 in 2008 to 144,000 in 2009, with 
the expectation that the number would grow even further to 200,000 in 2010.
Poverty levels in Latvia are measured in accordance with EUROSTAT 
methodology. The threshold for poverty risk is 60% of available median income, 
calculated on the basis of the equivalent consumer.2 In the EU 25, on average, 
16% of people are in the risk group for poverty, and this indicator is stable. 
In Latvia, however, the number of people in the group has increased – 19% in 
2005, as much as 23% in 2006, 21% in 2007, and 26% in 2008.
The breadth and depth of poverty have always been the focus of research. 
In 1998, the United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank or-
ganized a project aimed at developing policy recommendations for a national 
anti-poverty strategy in Latvia. This led to a series of publications in which 
different aspects of poverty were analysed.3 Given the ethnic structure of Latvia, 
it is important to note the conclusion of Aadne Aasland, who demonstrated that: 
 2 This calculation is based on a modified equivalency scale from the OECD – 1.0, 0.5 and 
0.3, where the first adult is compared to 1.0, each subsequent household member aged 14 
or older is 0.5, and each child under the age of 14 is 0.3.
 3 See A. Aasland (2000), Ethnicity and Poverty in Latvia. Riga, UNDP; F. Gasmane (2000), 
Who in Latvia is Poor, and Where are They? Riga: UNDP; F. Gasmane and K. de Neuburg, 
K. (2000), How to Live on Negligible Resources in Latvia. Riga: UNDP; I. Trapenciere, 
R. Rungule, M. Pranka, T. Lāce and N. Dudwich (2000), The Views of Poor People: A 
Social Evaluation of Poverty in Latvia. Riga: UNDP.
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“Ethnic belonging is not of decisive importance in characterizing and analys-
ing poverty in Latvia. When all other conditions are the same, ethnic Latvians 
have slightly better material lives than ethnic Russians and representatives of 
other ethnic groups do, but the differences are not sufficient to be of statistical 
significance.” At the same time, however, he also pointed to several areas in 
which there are substantial differences – employment and the availability of 
social aid. In the labour market, “the level of participation is fairly similar, but 
the unemployment level is higher among ethnic Russians and people of other 
ethnic groups than is the case among ethnic Latvians. (..) Although people from 
all ethnic groups in Latvia use social assistance services at the same level of 
frequency, ethnic Latvians receive the assistance which they have sought more 
often, and they tend to be better informed about the type of aid which they 
deserve”4 (see also Mihail Hazans’ chapter above). Ten years on, there are still 
fairly substantial differences between Latvians and Russians when it comes to 
how much they know about their rights and the mechanisms to protect them. 
When asked whether they had heard anything about the Ombudsman’s office, 
39.3% of Latvians, but only 20.5% of Russians and 28.6% of others said 
“yes.”
In May 2005 (i.e., one year after Latvia’s accession to the EU), a survey 
was conducted under the auspices of a joint Norwegian, Estonian and Latvian 
project, “Poverty, Social Aid and Social Inclusion (2003-2006),” to learn the 
views of local residents about the causes of poverty and gaps in income. A ma-
jority of respondents pointed to injustice in society as the main cause of poverty, 
after which they cited laziness, a lack of will and a simple lack of success.5
The Latvian Statistical Board conducts monitoring to evaluate the dynamics 
of poverty in different types of households (Figure 1). Data from 2005-2007 
show that the benefits of the so-called “years of plenty” were not received at 
all by certain groups of households. 
 4 Aasland, Ibid., pp. 47–49.
 5 F. Rajevska, ed. (2006), Sociālā atstumtība un sociālā iekļaušana: situācijas izvērtējums 
Latvijā. Riga: University of Latvia, pp. 86–87.
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Figure 1. The poverty risk index for households of various demographic kinds, 
2005–2007 (%)
Here we see that the poverty risk index is radically higher for people who 
live alone and are 65 or older – 75% of them face the risk of poverty. The steps 
taken by the government in 2008 in advance of a referendum on substantially 
increasing pensions were absolutely necessary to narrow the rapidly growing 
gap between average wages and average pensions. The generous benefit for 
families with a child up to the age of one explains the fact that comparatively 
few households with children are in the poverty risk zone.
Being poor means more than just a shortage of money or a standard of 
living that is lower than average in society. Being poor also often means lim-
ited social networks, which means less of an opportunity to receive emotional 
support. There are poor people in all EU member states, but the level of social 
disintegration is quite varied across the EU. The relationship between poverty 
and social disintegration is based on the overall standard of living in the rel-
evant country. Latvia is one of those countries in which the proportion of poor 
people is above the EU average and is continuing to increase.
The culture of public support for the poor is based not only on a country’s 
social policies and local governments, but also on families, churches, etc. In 
surveys, people have said that support from family members is among the 
most important factors in a crisis situation. In the autumn of 2008, as part of a 
project looking at human development in Latvia, people were asked whether, 
in a crisis situation, they would rely on themselves or seek help from others. 
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Those who chose the latter option were given a list of possible sources of as-
sistance that was fairly broad and was analogous to a survey that was run in 
2003 – relatives, friends, colleagues, state and local government institutions, 
non-governmental organizations, and international organizations. In 2003 the 
majority of respondents said that they would rely on their own abilities, and 
only then seek the help of relatives and friends. The fact that once Latvia joined 
the EU, there was a fairly substantial wave of emigration from Latvia showed 
that people were relying on themselves. Those who are accustomed to doing so 
are far more mobile than others. Quite a few of these people have left Latvia, 
and their proportion in society has declined. It is only logical, therefore, that in 
the 2008 survey, a majority of people said that they would seek help from their 
relatives. Relying on one’s own abilities was only in second place, followed by 
seeking help from friends.
Table 2. From whom people would seek help in 2003 and 2008  
(1 = strongly rely upon, 7 = do not rely upon)
Rely upon 2003 2008
Myself 1.88 2.21
Relatives 2.24 2.09
Friends 2.90 2.80
Colleagues 4.52 4.37
State, local government institutions 4.73 4.75
Non-governmental organizations 5.26 5.34
International organizations 6.38 6.24
Source: Latvia Human Development Report 2003, 2008 SKDS survey 
Reliance on assistance from the family is also promoted by the institutional 
mechanism of social aid, because evaluations of one’s material situation are 
based not just on oneself (as is the case in Scandinavia), but on the whole 
family. A focus on the family, of course, promises a secure source of support, 
but sometimes this hinders the development of a more diverse network of as-
sistance, and it goes hand-in-hand with distrust in others. This means limiting 
contacts outside of the family.
Social relations are considered to be a very valuable individual and social 
resource. Families, friends and organized networks provide emotional support 
and serve as a source for various gestures of attention, useful information, and 
financial assistance. This helps to satisfy an individual’s need for social inclu-
sion and a sense of belonging. Social disintegration, for its part, creates worries 
and depression, and it lowers overall welfare and quality of health. Participa-
tion in networks is an important form of social capital. In times of need, it 
can be activated, and under certain circumstances, it can be transformed into 
economic capital. Involvement shapes trust, creates a foundation for expecta-
tions, and is a cornerstone for creating the norms of public life. The welfare 
states of Scandinavia have universal social insurance systems which involve 
a pluralism of social contacts and a diversity of social networks. This makes 
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it more possible for people to receive support when they need it, and it also 
strengthens social capital. Social relationships are particularly important under 
extraordinary circumstances, and they can produce security which eases the 
negative consequences of material uncertainty.
Petra Boehnke of the Berlin Social Science Research Centre has proposed 
two alternative hypotheses on links between poverty and social integration – 
the compensation hypothesis and the accumulation hypothesis. The first says 
that if the state does not ensure adequate social support and cannot guarantee 
a survival minimum, then compensation for the social security deficit is based 
on the strategy of personal adaptation, with an increasing number of adults who 
focus on social networks. In Central and Eastern Europe, this is facilitated by 
cultural and religious traditions which speak to family solidarity and consoli-
dation, as well as by social security systems which only cover minimal needs. 
The accumulation hypothesis, for its part, considers social disintegration to be 
a companion of poverty.6 This latter thesis was first formulated by the French 
sociologist Pierre Bourdieu, who argued that participation in social networks 
requires so-called exploitation expenditures. If a principle of solidarity that 
is not based on direct mutual exchanges exists in a family, then most social 
contacts outside of the family are based on the logic of exchange and mutually 
useful support. Once poverty sets in, the individual does not have the resources 
for exchanges. Unfavourable circumstances such as poverty are often associated 
with shame and stigmatization. Former acquaintances avoid contacts with the 
person, and the person refrains from them, as well. This means a breakup of 
existing relationships, with the social contacts of poor people centred on the 
family. Social contacts outside of the family are cut off.
The massive crisis of 2009 has forced many people to make do, but it has 
also reemphasized the responsibility of the state for socially weaker groups in 
society. The illusion of welfare which existed during the so-called “years of 
plenty” (2005–2008) involved easy availability of loans and a boom in lending. 
This strengthened the spirit of individualism. Interesting evidence of this is seen 
in differences in answers given by survey respondents in May 2005 and October 
2008 as to whether the existing income gap in society was acceptable and who 
is to blame for poverty – individuals or society. In 2008, there were consider-
ably fewer people than in 2005 who believe that the income gap in society must 
be much smaller, which meant more people who argued that poverty is largely 
the result of an individual’s lack of will. The interpretation here might be that 
broader opportunities emerged once Latvia joined the European Union. That 
also strengthened the idea that success and higher income are largely depend-
ent on the individual’s ambition, dedication, and readiness to improve himself, 
work relentlessly, and undertake responsibility and risk. Let us add that even 
 6 P. Boehnke (2008), ‘Are the Poor Socially Integrated? The Link Between Poverty and Social 
Support in Different Welfare Regimes,’ Journal of European Social Policy, Vol. 18(2).
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back then many respondents felt that society was responsible for the fact that 
there are poor people in Latvia. The survey in the autumn of 2008 coincided 
with the nationalization of Parex Bank and the onset of the crisis in Latvia. 
Crises create great harm, but they also have certain advantages – they promote 
social consolidation in the interests of survival, encouraging people to identify 
and seek out common interests. The New Deal of US President Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt, after all, was the product of the Great Depression, and it led to a 
far greater involvement by the state in the process of income redistribution. 
In the UK, for its part, the country’s universal welfare system emerged from 
the frugality and dangers of World War II which the people of Britain all ex-
perienced together. We can assume that, by the summer of 2009, there would 
again be a change in views as to whether society or individuals are to blame 
for poverty – there would be fewer people who would be prepared to blame 
the individual for circumstances that are beyond one’s control.
Integration of Pensioners
Pensioners, and particularly those who live alone, have traditionally been 
seen as a social risk group. Latvia’s national strategy for social protection and 
inclusion 2008–2010 includes the goal of improving the availability of resources 
and services to pensioners who are subject to the risk of poverty, and particu-
larly those who live alone.7 Pensioners in Latvia were given some extra money 
for work they did up until 31 December 1995. The additional contribution was 
negligible at first – just 19 santims (~€0.27). Later it was raised to 30 santims 
(€0.42), but only for those whose old age pension was no higher than LVL 105 
(~€150) in 2006, LVL 135 (~€193) in 2007, and LVL 225 (~€321) in 2008. As 
of 1 June 2008, those who wanted to receive the additional payment had to have 
worked for at least 30 years (or 25 years in the case of those who retired early 
because they worked under harmful or particularly difficult circumstances). 
The average additional sum in June 2008 was LVL 13.88 (~€20). Because of 
the upcoming referendum in 2008, the sum was raised to 70 santims (~€1) per 
year and given to all pensioners irrespective of the size of their basic pension. 
Accordingly, the additional sum, on average, amounted to LVL 24.40 (~€35) 
in 2009. That has been a real boon for pensioners who were not affected by 
pension cuts during the period of crisis. All pensioners faced a 10% cut as 
of 1 July 2009, which meant a decline in the average pension in Latvia from 
LVL 173 (~€247) in June to LVL 145 (~€207) in July. The percentage of those 
who receive small pensions (up to LVL 135 or ~€193) rose by 10%. These 
changes were anulled by a Constitutional Court decision.
Latvia does not have the kinds of widow pensions which exist in many 
EU member states, but since the beginning of 2007, the surviving spouse of 
 7 Report on the National Strategy for Social Protection and Inclusion 2008–2010.
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a deceased pensioner receives a one-time support payment at the death of his 
or her spouse equal to two times the individual’s pension. This subsidy also 
applies to those widows and widowers who were themselves pensioners at the 
time when the spouse died. In 2007, Parliament increased the untaxed minimum 
of pensions from LVL 110 (~€157) to LVL 165 (~€236). In 2008, it extended 
to 31 December 2011, the ability of people to retire early (at the age of 60, or 
two years earlier than normal), provided that they had worked for at least 30 
years. Such people receive 80% of a full pension. During the crisis, however, 
this was cut to 50% of the basic sum as of 1 July 2009, the aim being to dis-
courage early retirement and to save money in the social budget.
Despite this drastic cut in the pension for those who retire early, the number 
of such people nevertheless increased by 2,000 between June and July 2008. 
The number of working pensioners, however, shrank from 60,800 in June to just 
35,000 in July, thus partly compensating for increasing unemployment among 
people in Latvia who are of working age.
Insured people who have retired at the specified age or later cannot have 
an old age pension that is lower than the national social insurance allowance – 
a sum that has not been changed since 2005 despite significant inflation and 
wage increases. Depending on how long the person has worked, a coefficient 
of 1.1, 1.3, 1.5 and 1.7 is applied to the pension, but the basic sum of LVL 45 
(~€64) remains negligible. This means that the government is saving money 
at the expense of those people who are least secure in financial terms while, 
at the same time, paying certain civil servants wages that exceed the sum by 
100 times or more.
Differences between citizens and non-citizens in Latvia do not relate only 
to political rights. They also affect the social status of individuals. The 1995 
law on pensions says that years spent working outside of Latvia prior to 1991 
are to be counted only for citizens when it comes to calculating their pension. 
Non-citizens, in turn, get a pension only for the years that they spent working 
in Latvia, unless there is an agreement with the other country. This discrimi-
natory norm applies to more than 15,000 non-citizens in Latvia. One of them, 
Natālija Andrejeva, filed a claim with the European Court of Human Rights on 
this matter. After graduating from the Rīga Polytechnic Institute, she worked 
for a chemicals factory in the Latvian town of Olaine from 1973 until 1990, 
but received her wages by mail from Kyiv and Moscow, because as an envi-
ronmental protection specialist, she was subordinate to bosses in those cities. 
When Andrejeva retired, those years were not counted in the calculation of her 
pension. Latvia’s courts ruled that her pension had been calculated correctly. 
She filed her suit with the ECHR in 2000, and the court agreed to hear the case 
in 2006. In 2007, the case was submitted to the Grand Chamber of the ECT, 
and after a court hearing in 2008, it ruled in February 2009 that Latvia’s system 
was discriminatory against pensioners who are not citizens of Latvia. The court 
ordered the government to pay Andrejeva €6,500 in compensation. Latvia and 
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Russia ratified an agreement on partnership in the area of social security in 
October 2008, meanwhile, and it states that Latvia does recognise the years that 
people once worked in Russia and vice versa.8 Because of the ECHR ruling, 
Parliament is reviewing the law on pensions. It has been suggested that in order 
to ensure the principle of equality in this process, citizens, too, should not have 
pensions which are based on years worked outside of Latvia until 1991.
During a global economic crisis, the sustainability of every country’s social 
security system and the trust of individuals in that system have been tested. A 
survey conducted in late 2008 found that people do not have much trust in the 
social security system when a risk occurs.
Table 3. Reliance on the social security system in case of a risk
Unweighted 
number
% of 
total
I believe that I will receive more or less sufficient funding to 
ensure my standard of living 50 5
I’ll make do 171 17.2
It won’t satisfy my needs 552 54.8
I don’t know 227 23.1
Total 1,000 100
Source: SKDS survey, November 2008
As we can see in Table 3, most people are concerned about the Latvian 
social security system and uncertain about what will happen to them if a risk 
situation arises. Only 5% of people say that they would maintain their stand-
ard of living via social assistance if they were to lose their primary source of 
income. More than one-half (54.8%), in turn, say that the social security system 
is inadequate for their needs. It is hard to understand why fully 23.1% of people 
could not answer the question, but it does suggest that people simply don’t 
have much information about the system. This causes greater concerns among 
people, and it does nothing to suggest that policies in this area are based on a 
sense of responsibility. All in all, people think that politicians and bureaucrats 
do not ensure observation of the public interest (an average rating of 3.64), and 
43.7% of survey respondents think that politicians and bureaucrats ensure this 
interest poorly or not at all.
Access to Health Care as a Factor Integrating Society
A European Commission White Paper states that health is the central need 
in people’s lives, and that at the level of the European Union and the world, 
EU member states must support people’s health with effective policies and 
 8 A. Dimitrovs (2009), ‘Tiesības uz izsvītrotajiem gadiem,’ in www.politika.lv, 24 February 
2009.
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programmes.9 The Lisbon Treaty of 2007 also emphasizes the responsibilities 
of member states when it comes to developing health care systems.10 Latvia 
has a memorandum on social inclusion (2003) which defines the main tasks 
aimed at improving health care – informing socially excluded people about 
their rights, state-guaranteed health care services and ways of receiving these; 
strengthening the system of primary health care by reducing the number of 
patients registered with each general practitioner and increasing the number 
of such practitioners; improving the level of information among patients and 
their co-operation with general practitioners, particularly in economically less 
developed regions; supplementing the list of medications and medical products 
compensated by the state with new diagnoses and the relevant products in ac-
cordance with available financing, thus increasing the number of people with 
serious disorders who are guaranteed regular access to necessary medication; 
developing the system of emergency care services; establishing a unified infor-
mation and communications system; and improving the provision of emergency 
care to people in Latvia’s rural areas.11
Latvia’s public health strategy care states that the country’s health care 
system is based on the principle of social solidarity. All of the residents of 
the Republic of Latvia have the right to receive health care services that are 
covered by mandatory health insurance, and they must pay taxes proportional 
to their income. Section 111 of the Latvian Constitution states that “the state 
protects people’s health and guarantees a minimum amount of medical assist-
ance to everyone.”
During the reform phase, one goal in terms of health care policies was an 
increase in the availability of relevant services. Statistics show, however, that 
accessibility has actually diminished. A 2003 study found that one-third of re-
spondents (33.4%) had to do without health care services for various reasons. 
Among them, 10.6% did not have access to more than one service. Reasons 
include a lack of money or health insurance (23.1%), a lack of time (9.4%), long 
queues (3.7%), and an excessive distance to the necessary health care institu-
tions (3.4%).12 As is the case in other areas, there are significant differences 
among Latvia’s regions when it comes to the accessibility of health care serv-
ices. Inaccessibility in Riga is lowest (23.5%), because Latvia’s largest health 
care institutions are concentrated in the capital city. In Kurzeme, inaccessibility 
is higher than the national average – 36.4% in 2003. In southern Latgale, the 
 9 Commission of the European Communities White Paper Together for Health: A Strategic 
Approach for the EU, 2008–2013, Available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph_overview/
Documents/strategy_wp_en.pdf.
10 Ibid.
11 See the Joint memorandum on Social Inclusion of Latvia, available at http://www.likumi.
lv/doc.php?id=90818.
12 V. Boroņenko (2003), Veselības aprūpes pakalpojumu pieejamība Rīgā. Riga, 
pp. 43–45.
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percentage was 35%.13 Data from 2005 do not show any improvements. All in 
all, 35% of Latvia’s residents said in 2005 that they lacked money to visit a 
doctor. The plurality (50%) of these respondents was 60 years old or older.14
In formal terms, health care services are available to everyone in Latvia. 
Before a patient can receive government financed services, however, he or she 
must pay a patient fee. There are a few risk groups which are exempted from 
this fee so as to expand the availability of services – children up to the age of 
18, poor people, the politically repressed, people who suffered health problems 
as a result of the Chernobyl nuclear disaster, people with mental disorders, 
and those who are under the care of social care centres and local government 
senior citizens’ homes. People also do not have to pay the fee for emergency 
medical services if their life has been threatened. When it comes to more 
complicated medical procedures at the secondary and tertiary level of health 
care, the state pays for them only if the patient has been sent to a specialist by 
a general practitioner. The provision of free medications in Latvia is based on 
universal principles of justice. Medications are provided for people with specific 
diagnoses and irrespective of their social status. The per capita financing for 
compensated medications in 2007 was EUR 38.15
Latvia has one of the smallest health care budgets in the EU, both in terms 
of a percentage of GDP and in terms of absolute numbers. These figures show 
clearly that since the restoration of independence, the health of Latvia’s resi-
dents has never been a priority for the government. It has always been left up to 
local residents and their general practitioners. It is no surprise that even during 
the “years of plenty,” per capita state financing in Latvia was just 70% of the 
financing provided in Lithuania, 54% of the spending in Estonia, and 30% of 
expenditures in the Czech Republic.
Table 4. Health care financing from the Latvian national budget, % of GDP
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
% of GDP 3.46 3.58 3.46 3.08 3.03 3.10 3.20 3.23 3.43 3.63 3.51 3.50
Source: Ministry of Health. See http://www.vm.gov.lv/index.php?id=246&top=129.
Table 5. The per capita health care budget in 2006 (in euros)
Latvia Lithuania Poland Estonia Czech Rep. Finland
Euros 194.8 279.2 289.2 362.2 645.4 1,845.9
Source: EUROSTAT. 
13 Ibid., pp. 46–48.
14 Aija Zobena, ed. (2005), Latvia: Human Development Report, 2004/2005: Human Capability 
in the Regions. Riga: University of Latvia Press, available at http://www.szf.lu.lv/files/
petnieciba/publikacijas/Demokratijas_atskaite_9.pdf.
15 Ministry of Welfare (2008), Report on Latvia’s national strategy for social protection and 
social inclusion, 2008–2001. Riga, pp. 57–59.
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The mortality rate in Latvia is among the highest in all EU member states. 
Of particular concern is the fact that the number of deaths among people of 
working age has increased dramatically. In 2000, there were 218 deaths per 
1,000 residents, but by 2006 that number increased to 223.16 Latvia’s infant 
mortality rate has declined from 11 per 1,000 in 2001 to 7.6 in 2006, but this 
is an unstable trend. In 2007, the infant mortality rate increased to the highest 
level among all countries in the Baltic Sea region – 8.7 per 1,000.17 The im-
proved economic situation was clearly reflected in the fact that the number of 
suicides declined from 30.8 per 100,000 residents in 2000 to 17.8 in 2007.18 The 
long-lasting economic crisis, however, has substantially increased this indicator, 
particularly among men. The average life expectancy in Latvia rose from 70.4 
years in 2002 to 70.9 years in 2006,19 but it remains the lowest in the Baltic 
Sea region. There is also still a considerable gap between the life expectancy 
of men and that of women – 10.9 years in favour of women.20
Table 6. Deaths per 1,000 residents in the Baltic States
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
EU 27 9.98 9.89 9.97 10.12 9.65 9.84 9.61 9.67 9.69
Estonia 13.44 13.57 13.51 13.41 13.11 12.86 12.89 12.98 12.76
Latvia 13.57 14.01 13.90 13.95 13.85 14.25 14.47 14.52 13.95
Lithuania 11.21 11.61 11.84 11.87 12.03 12.83 13.20 13.52 13.15
Source: EUROSTAT.
The birth rate in Latvia remains comparatively low, although it has been 
increasing – 8.53 births per 1,000 residents in 2000, 9.03 in 2003, 9.73 in 2006, 
10.23 in 2007, and 10.77 in 2008.21
The incidence of HIV/AIDS in Latvia has quadrupled from 958 cases in 
2000 to 3,981 in 2007.22 In absolute numbers, the number of HIV/AIDS deaths 
has increased dramatically, too, from 24 deaths in 2000 to 273 in 2007.23 This 
is true despite the fact that the death rate exceeds the EU average only by 0.1 
deaths per 100,000 residents (1.3 in Latvia, 1.2 in the EU 27 in 2006). Here, 
however, we again see a tendency of an increase – 1.8 in Latvia in 2007.24
More evidence of the negative situation with public health in Latvia is pro-
vided by the number of people who are receiving treatment for alcoholism – a 
16 See http://www.who.int/shosis/data/Search.jsp. 
17 Eurostat. See http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu. 
18 Ibid.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid.
21 Ibid.
22 Central Statistical Board of Latvia. See http://data/csb.gov/lv/Dialog/Saveshow.asp.
23 Ibid.
24 Eurostat, op. cit.
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rise from 986 in 2000 to 1,308 in 2007 per 100,000 residents.25 In absolute 
numbers, that is 30,084 people, or 1.3% of all of Latvia’s residents.
Registered drug addictions in Latvia rose from 94 per 100,000 people in 
2000 to 126 in 2006 in Latvia.26 The number of smokers in Latvia (people aged 
16 and up) has declined a bit in percentage terms – from 33% of the population 
in 2000 to 30.4% in 2006.27 Over the last several years, the percentage of young 
people (aged 13 to 15) who smoke has increased in Latvia – from 34.2% in 
2002 to 37.6% in 2007. This is a higher percentage than is the case in Estonia, 
Lithuania, Poland and Slovakia.28
Table 7. Tobacco smokers (aged 16 and over), % of residents29
2000 2002 2004 2006
Estonia 29.4 28.9 28 29.9
Latvia 33 33.2 30.1 30.4
Lithuania 32 28.25 27 24.5
EU 29.27 28.38 27.49 26.96
The number of hospital beds in Latvia declined slightly from 773.4 per 
100,000 residents in 2002 to 755.4 in 2007, but the number remained far greater 
than the EU average (from 628.6 to 590.4 beds per 100,000 residents).30 The 
number of practicing physicians in Latvia has not changed substantially in 
recent years – from 286.3 per 100,000 residents in 2000 to 286.1 in 2007.31
Table 8. The number of practicing physicians per 100,000 residents in the 
Baltic states
2000 2002 2004 2005 2006 2007
Estonia 309.7 314.7 321.7 320.2 328.9 --
Latvia 286.3 274.7 284.7 291.9 291.5 286.1
Lithuania 364.0 364.2 355.6 363.2 364.8 --
The development of primary health care is based on general practitioners 
and a teamwork model involving the physician and a nurse or assistant.32 Pri-
mary health care consists of primary health care practitioners, most of whom 
are general practitioners. They are independent physicians, self-employed phy-
sicians, or representatives of the private sector.33 The difference between “self-
25 Central Statistical Board of Latvia, op. cit.
26 Ibid.
27 European Health for All Database (HFA–DB), WHO/Europe. See http://data.euro.who.
int/hfadb. 
28 See http://www.who.int/whosis/data/Search.jsp. 
29 Ibid.
30 Eurostat, op. cit.
31 Ibid.
32 E. Tragakes, O. Avdeeva, M. Schäfer, eds. (2008), Health Systems in Transition, Latvia: 
Health System Review. European Observatory on Health Systems and Policies, pg. 171.
33 Ibid.
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employed” and “private” relates to the individual’s tax status. A self-employed 
practitioner pays the individual income tax on the basis of his or her earnings, 
and the facilities and equipment are paid for or rented by the practitioner. Pri-
vate general practitioners, for their part, have share companies that are taxed 
as such. Physicians who offer primary health care services must, irrespective 
of the type of institution where they do their work, conclude a contract with 
the State Agency on Mandatory Health Insurance.34
General practitioners provide primary health care for children, adults and 
the elderly (when there are acute or chronic problems). This includes outpatient 
surgery, rehabilitation, care during pregnancy, prenatal care and emergency 
aid. They prescribe medicines, conduct diagnostic tests, and promote disease 
prevention and health improvement efforts.35 The role of primary health care 
nurses and assistants includes:
Ensuring primary health care for eight hours a day, five days a week;• 
Assisting general practitioners in treatment and preventive efforts related • 
to all groups of patients;
Ensuring first aid;• 
Ensuring simple diagnostic tests (taking of blood samples, for in-• 
stance);
Ensuring health promotion activities.• 36
24/7 services are not guaranteed by general practitioners. In emergency 
situations, patients can receive assistance from emergency medical personnel 
or at the emergency room of a hospital.37
Social and health care are poorly integrated in Latvia, as are primary, sec-
ondary and tertiary health care. There is a shortage of doctors and nurses at the 
level of primary health care. This relates to a lack of personnel in health care 
which is the result of demographic circumstances. Reforms have been gradual 
and experimental in many cases. There have been a number of changes which 
have gradually led us to the current system.38
Closing down inpatient services at 13 small hospitals in 2009 and increasing 
the patient fee in large hospitals from 5 to 12 lats per 24-hour period means 
that people are increasingly treating themselves at home, thus becoming chronic 
patients whose treatment would cost a lot more than would otherwise be the 
case. The local government representatives and hospital directors met with 
representatives of the Health Ministry and the State Agency for Mandatory 
Health Insurance twice in 2009 to argue that the new rules were not in line with 
public needs and interests. Pressure from the public in 2009 was significant, and 
34 Ibid., pg. 172.
35 Ibid., pg. 176.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid, pg. 229.
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medical institutions ran the risk of losing patients and being reduced to offering 
only emergency care if the procedure for funding was not changed. Cabinet reg-
ulations governing the organization and funding for health care were amended 
six times in 2009. As of 2010 the fee for a day in a hospital was reduced from 
LVL 12 to LVL 9.50 and access to health care for low income residents was 
expanded. As of 30 January 2010 residents whose income per family member 
over the previous three months did not exceed LVL 130 were exempted from 
patient’s co-payments. At the same time, residents whose incomes did not 
exceed LVL 150 per month had only to pay 50% of the co-payment, with a 
single payment for a surgical procedure not exceeding LVL 15.
The equal availability of services is related to so-called horizontal equality. 
In the area of health care, this is interpreted as equal access in relation to equal 
needs. The level of accessibility of any service depends on several factors, 
including availability of services when they are needed (as opposed to having 
to wait in long queues which delay the availability of the service), the ranking 
of services that are defined by law, easier access for people with special needs, 
geographic barriers, patient fees which affect the availability of health care 
services for people with low levels of income, and the overall situation with 
poverty, which affected the ability to pay patient fees.39
The equal availability of services is one of the key issues for Latvia’s health 
care system. The good news is that access to health care services is universal, 
and the services which, by law, are financed by the government are fairly all-
encompassing. The complications which have occurred in Latvia in terms of 
the accessibility of health care services have had to do with the scanty budget 
which is available for health care overall.
Geographic distances also reduce access to health care services. For rural 
residents in particular, a simple doctor’s visit is costly, because specialists are 
mostly centred in larger cities such as district centres or the capital city. A 
substantial share of health care financing in Latvia is based on out-of-pocket 
expenses.
Long-term treatment can create the threat of poverty for a patient, and so 
the state has set a ceiling on patient fees after which no more fees have to be 
paid. The total fee for each period of inpatient care cannot exceed a total of 
LVL 250 (~€356), and the total fee paid for outpatient and inpatient services 
during the course of one year may not exceed LVL 400 (~€569).40 Elderly 
people are helped very much by the fact that the system of compensation for 
medications and medical equipment offers compensation equal to 100%, 90%, 
75% and 50% of the total cost for people with certain diagnoses. In 2005, the 
government began to pay compensation for medications in accordance with 
39 Cabinet of Ministers Regulations of 19 December 2006 No. 1046 on the Procedure for 
Organizing and Funding Health Care.
40 Ibid.
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the principle of the reference price, which means that the state will pay for 
the cheapest among medications with the same effects. The compensation per-
centage rate allows the government to pay compensation to a larger number of 
patients, but the fact is that Latvia offers less in the way of compensation for 
medications than do the other two Baltic States.41
Latvia’s health care system is focused on making sure that a segment of the 
resources that are devoted to inpatient care is diverted to primary health care 
in the system of general practitioners, transforming small rural hospitals into 
daytime inpatient facilities or long-term care centres.42
Improvements in people’s health are perhaps one of the most complicated 
issues, because health depends on so many factors – the provision of health care 
services, income levels, lifestyles and the surrounding environment.43
There is much evidence in Latvia to show that people with lower levels of 
income also have lower levels of health care service use because of financial 
barriers. The fact is, however, that it is specifically people with lower income 
who need more health care than others. That is particularly true among pension-
ers who have comparatively low income and need health care services far more 
often than others. The same applies to unemployed people, as well as children 
from families with low levels of income.
The Integrative Potential of Housing Policy 
Housing policy is very important to everyone because it addresses a basic 
human need. Housing policies in different countries are based on various 
models with different forms of property ownership – social, public, private 
and co-operative. In nearly all West European countries, social housing is an 
inalienable part of overall policy.
The main actors in housing policy are the state, local governments, and the 
market. The goal of housing policy is to create conditions in which everyone 
can choose an appropriate home. The Czech author Martin Lux has written 
that public housing policies are linked to the assumption that state and local 
government must ensure the redistribution of housing expenditures in a way 
which guarantees that people from various groups in society have homes. The 
state must understand its social responsibility, redistributing spending so that a 
social fund for housing can be created and the state can intervene in the housing 
market via laws and regulations, the priority being a liberalization of the hous-
ing market.44 Lux adds that the role of local governments has been increasing 
41 Ministry of Welfare, Report on Latvia’s National Strategy…, op. cit., pg. 41. See http://
www.lm.gov.lv/text/549. 
42 Tragakes, E., Avdeeva, O. and M. Schäfer. Health Systems…, op. cit., pg. 234.
43 Ibid., pg. 238.
44 Lux Martin (2003), Housing Policy: An End or a New Beginning? Budapest: Open Society 
Institute, pg. 11. 
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consistently in the European Union member states when it comes to housing 
policies. Decentralization in this area has become particularly popular, and 
there has been both absolute and relative decentralization. In the former case, 
the whole process is turned over to local governments, which strengthens their 
influence in this area (local governments approve regulations, set rental ceil-
ings and engage in regional planning). In the latter case, the local government 
has a limiting role vis-à-vis free market relations in the housing sector.45 In 
EU member states, the duty for local governments is to protect people in those 
groups in society who cannot afford a home in the free market.
In East European countries, the availability of social housing for the poor 
remains low because of a lack of financial resources and of shortcomings in 
the law. The area of operations for local governments is limited, and there are 
few opportunities to pursue housing policies in an active way.
Housing policy in post-independence Latvia was launched in 1991, when 
laws were adopted on denationalization of real estate – a process which contin-
ued for the subsequent decade and more. The law on rents was adopted in 1993 
and amended eight times afterward. It regulates rental conditions irrespective 
of who owns the real estate, legal relations between renters and owners, their 
duties and demands, and procedures for concluding, amending and ending 
rental agreements.46 The law defines the types of flats that are considered to be 
appropriate for people to live in. This refers to lighting and the availability of 
heat so that the home can be suitable for long-term accommodations and vari-
ous household objects. Such housing must also correspond to construction and 
hygienic requirements that have been defined by the Cabinet of Ministers.47
Table 9. Apartment privatization in Latvia’s regions, major towns and districts, 
end of year. The percentage of privatized flats among all flats open for 
privatization
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
3 10 21 48 63 72 76 79 81 83 85
Source: Central Statistical Board
Article 36.2 of the housing law includes norms which do not allow owners 
of flats to evict families with children, pensioners, and disabled people from 
their homes because of debts related to rent and utility payments unless differ-
ent housing is provided for them.
Until 2007, the main agency in terms of social housing policy was the 
Ministry for Regional Development and Local Government, but since the be-
ginning of that year, the system has been turned over to the Ministry of Eco-
nomics, which is charged with social housing policy and its implementation. 
45 Ibid., pp. 23–26.
46 See ‘Likums par dzīvojamo telpu īri,’ available at http://www.likumi.lv/doc/php?id-
56863.
47 Ibid.
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Local governments design and implement social housing policies in their own 
territories.
Table 10. Constructed flats in Latvia
Total % of previous year Paid for by residents % paid for by residents
1990 13,325 – 1,200 9%
1991 7,210 54.1% 856 11.8%
1992 4,876 67.6% 890 18.2%
1993 3,753 76.9% 928 24.7%
1994 3,369 89.8% 798 23.7%
1995 1,176 52.7% 1,068 60.1%
1996 1,483 83.5% 1,331 89.7%
1997 1,480 99.8% 1,332 90.0%
1998 1,351 91.3% 1,251 92.6%
1999 1,063 78.7% 1,048 98.6%
2000 899 84.6% 836 93%
2001 800 88.9% 784 98%
2002 794 99.2% 726 91.4%
2003 830 104.5% 828 99.8%
2004 2,821 340% 1,137 40.3%
2005 3,807 134.9% 1,371 36%
2006 5,865 154% 1,762 30%
2007 9,319 158.9% 2,032 21.8%
2008 8,084 86.7% 1,988 24.6%
Source: Central Statistical Board, author’s calculations
In 2008, there was intensive work on a draft policy document on social 
housing, but the government never adopted it. It is important, however, to 
identify three principles relative to housing policy, as mentioned in the draft 
project – the principles of participation, assistance and integration. The partici-
pation principle states that each person tries to provide his or her own home, 
chooses a place of residence in accordance with available income, and tries to 
increase that level of income and, thus, level of welfare. The assistance prin-
ciple applies if someone cannot afford a home and is poor. The local govern-
ment helps by renting a social home until the crisis situation has been resolved. 
The draft document argued that this is a situation which can be resolved quite 
quickly, because rental agreements can be signed only for six months before 
being concluded anew. If a local government cannot help people by renting 
out social homes, then the state offers subsidies for this process. The integra-
tion principle, for its part, means that the development of social homes does 
not create segregation between larger and smaller populated areas. Housing is 
seen in a complex way, with thought given to where there are jobs, a social 
infrastructure and other services.
Article 35 of the law on social services and social assistance states that 
housing support, guaranteed minimal income support and other forms of support 
178 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
are paid by local governments from their basic budget.48 The scope of the 
subsidy and the way that it is paid out are determined in regulations which are 
compulsory for local governments. The law on the way in which assistance for 
housing purposes is arranged defines various ways in which local governments 
can help. They can rent out properties which they own, they can rent out social 
homes, they can provide people with temporary homes, they can help people 
to exchange one rented flat for another, they can offer subsidies for rental and 
related costs, they can offer a one-time subsidy for renovations of housing, they 
can pay for the renovation of housing, or they can help people to purchase or 
build a home.49
The law on local government assistance in housing issues describes those 
persons and situations in which immediate help is needed. The law also defines 
those people who receive assistance first and foremost. Existing law says that 
assistance must be given only to those people who face a completely hopeless 
situation. The aid is not available to most people – families with children, 
pensioners, young families, etc. These are people whose income is above the 
survival minimum, but is not enough to save up money, improve housing condi-
tions or to purchase or rent housing on the basis of market prices.50
Latvia’s memorandum on social inclusion states that low levels of income 
and the comparatively high cost of rent and utility services are the main prob-
lems related to housing.51 These problems have not changed at all over the 
last five years. There are new problems as well – the inability of some people 
to repay mortgage loans which they have taken out. The situation is made all 
the more difficult by the fact that since the restoration of Latvia’s independ-
ence, the state and its local governments did not participate or only minimally 
participated in the construction of new residential buildings. Until 2002, the 
share of homes and apartments built on the basis of local government financ-
ing remained very negligible, and between 1996 and 2003, local governments 
built hardly any homes at all. A positive boom in housing construction began 
in 2004, when the percentage of homes built at the expense of their potential 
residents declined from 99% in 2003 to 57% in 2004 and 42% in 2008. We 
have to note, however, that the proportion of small and cheap flats in all of 
this was quite small. Most of the construction was focused on the emerging 
middle class in Latvia.
48 See ‘Sociālo pakalpojumu un sociālās palīdzības likums,’ available at http://www.likumi.
lv/doc/php?id=68488. 
49 See ‘Par palīdzību dzīvokļa jautājuma risināšanā,’ available at http://www.likumi.lv/doc.
php?id=56812. 
50 F. Rajevska and A. Vanags (2005), ‘Ekonomiskās un sociālās tiesības.’ In Juris Rozenvalds, 
ed., Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija? Demokrātijas audits. Riga: University of Latvia, pg. 69.
51 See ‘Latvijas kopējais sociālās iekļaušanas memorands,’ available at http://www.likumi.
lv/doc.php?id=90818. 
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One reason for the low percentage of state and local government-owned 
flats is the denationalization of real estate and the privatization of what were 
once state and local-government owned buildings. This fundamentally changes 
the structure of Latvia’s housing system.
Table 11. New residential buildings (1000 m2 of floor space)
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008
Total 200.5 191.1 188.5 187.6 194.2 452.3 552.2 812.6 1,188.4 1,153.2
Paid for by 
residents 199.6 181.0 187.1 177.0 193.9 257.0 324.7 388.9 474.1 479.0
% paid for 
by residents 99.6 94.7 99.3 94.4 99.8 56.8 58.8 47.9 39.9 41.5
Source: Central Statistical Board
The proportion of the housing market controlled by the private sector 
increased from 76% in late 2000 to 87% at the end of 2007.52 That helps to 
explain why there were 16,767 requests for local government flats during 
the first half of 2005, while local governments only had 1,726 flats that were 
available.53 In other words, demand for local government flats exceeded supply 
by a factor of nearly ten.
An EU report on housing statistics in 2005 stated that Latvia was in one of 
the lowest places in terms of housing construction, the issue being the number 
of constructed homes per 1,000 residents. According to 2005 data, Latvia built 
2.8 homes per 1,000 residents.54 At the top of the list among EU member states 
were Ireland (19), Spain (12.6), Cyprus (8.6), France (6) and Finland (5.8).55
The number of social homes in Latvia has increased in recent years. On the 
one hand, this shows that people have been focusing on the problem, but on the 
other hand it also shows that there is a certain share of the population which 
cannot survive on the basis of its own level of income. The number of social 
homes increased from 56 in 2001 to 74 in 2003. We must also remember the 
large number of people who are in the queue for better housing conditions – 
10,449 in 2003.
There have been various proposed solutions. The law on local government 
assistance in housing issues was amended early in 2005, and in addition to ex-
isting rights, the amended law also stated that local government housing must 
be given first and foremost to renters from denationalized buildings. Local 
governments were given the right to help such people to purchase or build new 
homes, covering their mortgage expenditures fully or in part. The state can 
52 See http://www.csb.lv/csp/events/csp/events/?mode=arh&period=06.2008&cc_
cat=472&id=5667. 
53 Ministry of Economics statistics about local government help in housing issues. See http://
www.em.gov.lv/em/2nd/?cat=15897.
54 Ibid., pg. 11.
55 Ibid.
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help this risk group by issuing guarantees for the purchase or rental of a home 
(Article 27.1 of the law). These amendments allow local government councils 
to approve binding rules in this process and to offer one-time housing support 
for those renters in denationalized buildings who have been evicted from their 
flat (Article 26.1 of the law). The national government helps by providing 50% 
of the financing which local governments have available for the subsidy.
New Cabinet of Ministers regulations on the way in which local govern-
ments are provided with targeted subsidies related to housing issues were 
adopted on 5 April 2005. The regulations say that a subsidy is available for 
30% of the value of denationalized housing that is purchased from its owner, 
but no more than LVL 5,000 per individual case. Sadly, the norm was actually 
effective only between 2006 and 2008, after which the country’s economic 
crisis brought it to an end.
At the conclusion of this section of the paper, it is worth adding that mi-
norities and immigrants in Latvia have not traditionally lived in any compact 
territories. They have not been segregated, and ghettoes have not emerged. This, 
however, is a matter which requires further research.
The Integration of Prisoners56
There are thousands of incarcerated people in Latvia, but the numbers have 
declined in recent years – from 8,815 at the beginning of 2000 to 6,873 at the 
beginning of 2009. However, the number of people convicted of crimes each 
year has been around 5,000.57 In comparison to other European countries, the 
proportion of incarcerated persons remains high.58 The proportion of recidivists 
in the system – i.e., people who have been incarcerated more than once – re-
mains at a level of more than 50%, with a tendency to increase.59 
56 This part of the chapter was authored by Dace Demme, a 2008 graduate from the master’s 
degree programme on governance and communications at the Vidzeme University of 
Applied Science.
57 The annual report of Latvia’s Prisons Board in 2008.
58 See http://www.kcl.ac.uk. 
59 Annual reports from the Prisons Board in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008. 
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Figure 4. The proportion of recidivists in the system of incarceration
Structural and Regulatory Aspects of the Integration 
of Prisoners
In order to integrate ex-prisoners into society, it is necessary to work with 
them while in prison to so that they do not commit new crimes after serving 
their sentence.60 This resocialization includes education, social rehabilitation 
and employment.
After the restoration of independence, Latvia had 15 prisons, but since the 
end of 2008, there have been 12 – four were merged, and one was shut down. 
After Latvia’s accession to the European Union in 2004, the government began 
to think about ways of improving prisons and ensuring that prisoners had access 
to different activities.
The European Prison Rules have been binding on Latvia since 11 Janu-
ary 2006. The document states that employees of prisons must be more than 
just guards, but must also facilitate the reintegration of prisoners into society 
once they have completed their sentences, offering them care and assistance 
programmes. Prison administrators should promote the activities of those insti-
tutions which offer care and reintegration services to prisoners, both in places 
of incarceration and elsewhere.
60 Cabinet of Ministers Regulations No. 7, 9 January 2009, ‘On a conceptual document on 
the re-socialisation of incarcerated persons,’ Latvijas Vēstnesis, No. 6(3992), 13 January 
2009.
Feliciana Rajevska. Social Policy and Integration 183
There is reason to doubt whether personnel at Latvia’s prisons can satisfy 
these rules. People need a university degree in education to work at educational 
institutions, including kindergartens, but, according to Interior Ministry regu-
lations, all that is needed for those who work in the prison system alongside 
prisoners every day is a high school education and Latvian language skills. 
Makuševs has argued that “the effort to train and educate specialists with di-
plomas from kindergarten and high school proved to be unsuccessful. People 
went down the path of criminality, but we naively hope that a prison guard 
without any special training will be superior and be able to deal with someone 
who is a criminal or recidivist in terms of educating, retraining and socially 
adjusting that person.”61
Early in 2009, the Cabinet of Ministers finally approved a framework docu-
ment on the resocialization of prison convicts which the Justice Ministry had 
taken a long time to develop. This marked a significant step toward the reinte-
gration of ex-convicts. The document calls for evaluating the risks and needs of 
convicts, planning and implementing measures related to their resocialization. 
This should help prevent money from being invested in projects which have 
no positive effect on a convict’s criminality.62 It has to be added, however, that 
under austerity, there is not enough money for the resocialization of convicts.63 
This means that there will not be sufficient state funding for the implementation 
of the aforementioned policy document.
Employment for Prisoners
Most prisoners who have been convicted spend two or more years in prison. 
If they do not have any work to do, they forget their working skills and lose 
their sense of purpose. The aim of providing employment for prisoners is reso-
cialization to allow them to live a law-abiding life after they are set free. The 
ability to earn some income is a secondary motivation for prisoners to become 
involved in employment in prison.64 The number of convicts with work has 
increased in recent years.65
61 A. Makuševs, ‘Roku dzelžu vietā – profesionālisms un autoritāte,’ Diena, 11 April 
2008. 
62 M. Luste, ‘Notiesāto personu resocializācija – solis pareizajā virzienā,’ Latvijas Vēstnesis, 
29 January 2009, available at http://www.lv.lv/?menu=doc&id=187017. 
63 ‘Bezdarbs sāk valdīt arī aiz cietumu mūriem,’ Diena, 9 January 2009.
64 H. Purviņa, ‘Notiesāto personu darbs: panaceja vai utopija?’ Jurista Vārds, 12 May 
2008.
65 Annual reports from the Prisons Board in 2003, 2004, 2005, 2006, 2007 and 2008.
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Figure 5. Share of convicts capable of working who are employed in prison
The proportion of prisoners involved in employment was highest between 
2003 and 2007, perhaps because during this period many people from Latvia 
moved to Western Europe in search of work. As a result, employers in Latvia 
lacked personnel and turned to the use of prisoners as a solution to this prob-
lem.
The policy document on the employment of incarcerated people was pre-
sented to a meeting of ministerial state secretaries by the Justice Ministry on 
29 November 2007. It was the first document of its type, saying that convicts 
earning a wage are a special category of employed people governed by special 
legislation. Wage issues, according to the document, had to be addressed on the 
basis of the same principles which exist for the population at large.66
While visiting Latvia in 2006, British expert Ursula Smart said that the 
main issue in Europe in the 21st century was not finding just any old job for 
prisoners. Instead, she said, the focus must be on the professional skills of 
prisoners so as to enhance their ability to find a job after they are released from 
prison. Such work can be a source of income, but it is safe to say that most 
prisons operate at a loss when it comes to output capacity.67
The employment of a prisoner cannot be directly compared to the employ-
ment of someone who is not incarcerated. We all work to improve our capacities 
and to expand our experience so that we can ensure career growth and higher 
wages. In the case of prisoners, employment programmes have specific pur-
poses – allowing prisoners to spend their time in a useful way, helping them to 
66 See http://www.mk.gov/lv/doc/2005/TMkonc_081107.doc. 
67 Recommendations from a seminar, ‘Employment Models in Prisons,’ by the Latvian Human 
Rights Centre, Riga, 20 April 2006.
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maintain their working skills, and only then doing what is possible to develop 
their skills and experience so that they can find work after being released. 
Wages are a comparatively minor issue in this case, because wages paid to 
prisoners tend to be fairly negligible, and besides, prisoners are not allowed to 
have cash in places of incarceration, so they cannot spend what they earn.
Employment for prisoners is not possible without employers, but employers 
who want to employ incarcerated people must organize work at the prison, and 
they must count on the specifics of the labour force there. This implies certain 
inconveniences and risks.
Latvia’s law on the corporate income tax was approved in February 1995 
and took effect on April 1 of that same year. Article 19.1 of the law says that 
companies which employ prisoners do not have to pay the corporate income 
tax, which was the first step taken by the government to encourage employers 
to give work to prisoners. One year later, in July 1996, the law was amended 
to provide for only a 20% tax reduction for companies employing prisoners.68 
This reduced support for this process. In October 2005, the law was amended 
again to exclude the tax discount altogether.69
The National Probation Service
Latvia’s National Probation Service (NPS) was established by the Justice 
Ministry in 2003, before Latvia’s accession to the European Union. This was 
an enormous step toward the reintegration of prisoners into society. The job 
for the agency is to implement national policies related to the criminal punish-
ment of forced labour, as well as socializing sentences related to compulsory 
community work. The agency also supervises those who are on probation 
and helps them to adjust their behaviour.70 Between 2003 and 2007, the NPS 
expanded from six territorial units to 28, with another 10 affiliates in various 
parts of the country.
The functions of the NPS have also expanded. There are eight tasks for the 
agency, and the ones which have to do with the integration of prisoners and ex-
prisoners the most are the design of probation programmes, the implementation 
of licensed programmes involving prisoners and former prisoners, supervision 
of people who have received suspended sentences or have received early release 
from prison, and provision of post-penitentiary assistance to people who are 
preparing for release or have already been released.71
68 See Latvijas Vēstnesis, No. 108(593), 21 June 1996.
69 See Latvijas Vēstnesis, No. 179(3337), 9 November 2005.
70 The Law on the National Probation Service, 18 December 2003, amended 
26 October 2006.
71 Ibid.
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There are some 10,000 people in Latvia at this time who are involved in the 
integration of current and former prisoners.72 This includes the family members 
of convicts, as well as prison personnel. The number might be much lower if 
changes were made to the punitive system. Currently, law enforcement insti-
tutions seek prison terms for defendants more often than is really necessary. 
Living and social conditions in prisons are fairly terrible – 20 to 50 prisoners 
in a single cell, and negligible opportunities for education, rehabilitation and 
employment. This means that a young petty thief who spends two years in 
prison will probably become a robber, and not an obedient citizen of the state. 
It is also true that fewer prisoners would mean a lesser need for resources for 
their reintegration into society.
Conclusions
Politicians in Latvia do not have much of an understanding of the fact that 
a well-developed social policy is a fairly important component in economic 
growth, because social and economic policies are interrelated and interdepend-
ent. The dominant assumption in government is that economic growth and a 
larger numbers of jobs are in and of themselves enough to guarantee social 
inclusion.
In policy documents, social integration goals are formulated and the in-
stitutional framework for social integration policies has basically been estab-
lished, but the political process has not ensured an adequate reaction to public 
needs, and it does not deal with the increasing polarisation which is evident 
in society.
There are some positive trends: poverty in families with children has dimin-
ished to a certain extent. The fact that in summer 2009, the government did not 
reduce the untaxed minimum for dependent children and has been fairly cau-
tious in dealing with child care subsidies indicates that those who are in power 
believe that there would be massive public protests if generous family support 
policies were trimmed in any crude way. However, it does appear that a number 
of cuts will be made in the 2010 budget. Ever since Latvia’s accession to the 
European Union, there has been positive movement toward a higher untaxed 
minimum in Latvia – from LVL 21 in 2004 to fully LVL 90 in the first half of 
2009. The main beneficiaries of this were people with low wages. They were 
the biggest losers, however, when the untaxed minimum was slashed dramati-
cally on 1 July 2009 – from LVL 90 to just LVL 35, with each person having 
to contribute an additional LVL 12.65 a month to the national budget.
The biggest mistake in pension policies was a freeze on the social security 
allowance payment at a level of LVL 45 during a period of major inflation 
and wage increases (2006–2008). This seriously worsened the situation of 
72 The annual report of the National Probation Service, 2008, pg. 14.
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pensioners against the background of employed people, and it initiated the 
2008 national referendum on raising pensions. In the pre-referendum situation, 
increased pensions were devalued by the 2009 crisis, and pensioners turned out 
to be the largest group in society from which the government took away 10% 
of earned income, which was returned to them in April 2010 by Constitutional 
Court decision.
In terms of housing policy, the state pursued a policy of non-intervention 
for a long time, relying on the invisible hand of the free market, as well as 
on local government housing subsidies. A positive trend emerged along with 
accession to the EU, but efforts that have been made are not in line with the 
scale of the problem. The country lacks cheap housing, and the proportion of 
social homes is the lowest in the EU.
Decisions in the area of health care policy were postponed again and again. 
The sector has largely been privatized, and during a situation in which the pur-
chasing power of local residents is low, that will mean a massive worsening in 
the health situation of many people, as well as chaos in the system itself.
The burden on social aid services has increased to a disproportionate degree. 
There have been improvements in the system in terms of personnel numbers 
and personnel training, but the abilities of local governments to help people are 
uneven, and many local governments spend most of the available money during 
the first half of the year. The national government’s decision to cover some of 
the necessary funding is a partial solution, but a solution nonetheless.
The government’s decision in 2008 to limit unemployment benefits to four 
to six months, depending on the amount of time that the unemployed person 
had worked before becoming jobless, was a mistake. The result was that many 
people of working age have found themselves without any income at all. On 1 
July 2009, Parliament declared that all unemployed people would receive unem-
ployment support for nine months. There has been a system since September 1 
in which the government pays monthly stipends of LVL 100 to people who do 
public works. Investments in human capital, however, remain very low.
Latvia’s penitentiary system is doing poorly with the resocialization of 
convicts, and the proportion of recidivists remains very high indeed.
Greatest Achievements
Latvia has entered the European Union’s overall social inclusion policy 
context, which requires conducting measurements of exclusion and poverty, 
as well as taking steps to address these challenges. The social security system 
has seen improvements in staffing and staff training. The government’s com-
mitment to cover half of the funding to ensure the guaranteed minimal income 
is a partial solution for local governments with low revenues. Creation of the 
State Probation Service in 2003 under the auspices of the Ministry of Justice 
was an important step on the road to the integration of ex-prisoners.
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Most Serious Problems
The state lacks cheap housing and there is very little social housing. There 
is a lack of understanding among policy-makers that a developed social policy 
is an important element of economic growth and that social and economic 
policy are interdependent. The size of the state social security benefit has not 
increased since 2005 despite high inflation and wage increases and, at LVL 45, 
is inadequate and social inequality is growing. The commercialization of health 
care and the closure of hospitals have decreased accessibility, but Latvia devotes 
one of the lowest shares of GDP towards health care in the EU. The rate of 
incarceration remains high, the rate of recidivism is greater than 50% and grow-
ing, and the prison system has not proved successful at resocializing inmates. 
Most Urgent Tasks
Among the most important tasks are the regular revision and increase in 
the guaranteed minimum income to a level permitting survival, integration of 
social care and health care, and the creation of cheap housing. As a result of 
a February 2009 European Court of Human Rights ruling, Latvia must amend 
pension legislation to equalize the rights of citizens and non-citizens to pensions 
for time worked until 1991 outside of Latvian territory. A more intense use of 
alternatives to custodial sanctions should be introduced. 
Education for Social Integration
Brigita Zepa
Introduction
In the context of social integration, the education system can be examined 
from two different perspectives: on the one hand, to what extent does the 
education system include or exclude individuals acquiring education; on the 
other hand, how successful is the education system in inculcating in people the 
knowledge and skills they need for professional and social life, thereby ensuring 
the integration of the individual in society. These two issues are closely linked, 
insofar as an individual’s exclusion from the acquisition of education today is a 
primary cause increasing the risk of social exclusion later in life, denying him 
or her access to public goods of various kinds. 
This chapter investigates two broad issues. The first is linked with strate-
gies within the education system for promoting the development among young 
people of the knowledge and skills necessary in a democratic society. In the 
context of social integration, this is recognition of diversity in society, tolerance 
of others, critical thinking which allows perception of the complexity of social 
reality and the ability to act in it effectively. The second issue is how the edu-
cation system ensures the inclusive function towards those being taught, what 
is the education system’s strategy with regard to such “educational mistakes” 
as low academic attainment and early school leavers. 
This chapter will investigate how the education system implements the 
following tasks of integrating through education: 
1) ensuring equal rights to education, promoting inclusive education, reduc-
ing the risk of social exclusion; 
2) promoting skills for active democratic participation and social respon-
sibility, furthering recognition of diversity among the younger genera-
tion; 
3) nurturing competence for intercultural contact and cooperation.
In the early 1970s the task of the education system was focused on academ-
ic results while remaining agnostic with regard to social aspects. Contemporary 
European policy sets the education system another important goal as well – 
reducing social inequality and promoting the inclusion and integration into 
society of various social groups. In the context of this research, this suggests 
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the necessity of discovering which educational practices increase social exclu-
sion and which practices further social inclusion.1
The Debate on Creating a Unified Education System 
Since the late 1990s when social integration policy was initiated in Latvia, 
its task was defined as creating a single community society on the basis of 
acquisition of the Latvian language. A logical continuation of this policy was 
bilingual education policy drafted in the late 1990s, which set as one of its 
goals the creation of a unified education system. Currently, this theme cannot 
be found in education policy documents. At the same time, it is well understood 
that a school system divided along linguistic lines promotes the reproduction 
of sociolinguistic communities, which inevitably leads to the construction of 
one’s own positive identity and its juxtaposition with the negative identity of 
the “other” and serves to maintain a certain level of tension between these 
communities. 
The following education policy steps can be considered as strategies that 
may help create a unified education system: 
1) introduction of bilingual education in minority schools; 
2) dual stream schools. 
The creation of a unified education system is also furthered by the strategy 
of the parents of children belonging to national minorities to send their children 
to Latvian schools. 
Among the many education researchers in Latvia, only Maria Golubeva has 
turned her attention to the issue of creating a unified education system. In her 
research Integrating Diversity in the General Education System, she used Amir 
and Sharan’s analytical model, which suggests overcoming school segregation 
by evaluating a number of structural variables (the legal basis, the stances of 
society, the cultural context) and implementation (school attitudes, links with 
goals set by politicians).2 Golubeva indicates that researching the existing edu-
cation system in such a way, one can determine which aspects hold more risks 
and in which circumstances concrete programmes for promoting the creation 
of a unified education system are necessary, etc. 
In their research Minority Children in Latvian Language Schools, Ina 
Druviete and Marija Gavriļina provide answers to the question “What hinders 
 1 European Committee for Social Cohesion (CDCS) (2004), Revised Strategy for Social 
Cohesion. Strasbourg: Council of Europe. 
 2 Marija Golubeva (2008), Dažādības integrācija valsts vispārējās izglītības sistēmā. Riga: 
Providus, pg. 31, available at http://www.providus.lv/public/26462.html. 
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the integration of Latvian and Russian schools?3 They demonstrate a series of 
problems one encounters in ethnically and linguistically diverse classes: 
1) misunderstandings based on different mentalities; 
2) the lack of methodological training; 
3) the lack of special textbooks and other teaching materials; 
4) difficulties in communicating with parents.4 
By the same token, Maria Golubeva reviewed this research and detected an 
effort to highlight differences in the mentality of Latvian and minority children 
as an even greater problem than the lack of well-trained teachers.5 Golubeva 
begins a debate with Druviete and Gavriļina about their stance “that a minor-
ity pupil in a Latvian language school will only partially acquire the so-called 
ethnic element in education or will not acquire it at all.”6 Golubeva suggests 
that an insistent demand that the obligation of each pupil is to “be aware of 
and feel belonging to an ethnic group” is in contradiction to one of the goals 
formulated by James Banks for citizen’s education in a multicultural society: 
education should not only provide pupils with the opportunity to freely assert 
their cultural (or racial, ethnic) identity, but also must ensure pupils the freedom 
to operate outside the boundaries of their ethnic and cultural groups.7 Golubeva 
also points out that Druviete’s and Gavriļina’s approach is characterized by the 
postulates of “deficiency theories”, in other words, the situation of minority 
children in Latvian language schools is examined with reference to the chil-
dren’s inability to fit into these schools, while underplaying deficiencies in the 
education system itself as the root of the problem.
In this debate, one can see that Golubeva is guided by the values of educa-
tion in a multicultural society (freedom of choice in cultural, ethnic belonging), 
while Druviete and Gavriļina are guided by the ethnic nationalism that is rooted 
in Latvian politics. The positions represented by these authors illustrate in sharp 
relief the dominant positions on the issue of the education system’s division 
according to the language principle and the silence of policy documents there-
on, suggesting that at least in the short term, there will be neither any policy 
innovation nor an open debate in society which might mark a change in the 
prevailing discourse on this issue. At the same time, it is useful to examine the 
practices which to a certain extent pave the way for the creation of a unified 
system of education. 
In the opinion of Golubeva, it is necessary to adopt policy guidelines or 
a strategy that would lead to the integration of diversity in Latvia’s school 
 3 Ina Druviete and Marija Gavriļina (2003), Minoritātes bērni latviešu mācībvalodas skolās. 
Riga: Puse, pp. 31–37. 
 4 Golubeva, Dažādības integrācija valsts vispārējās izglītības sistēmā, pg. 37.
 5 Ibid.
 6 Ibid.
 7 James Banks (1997), Educating Citizens in a Multicultural Society. 
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system. At the base of such a strategy there must be a certain consensus among 
the persons involved in the school system (parents, teachers, pupils, the school 
administration, the local education authority, government and policy-makers), 
and it must be adopted after wide consultations with all stakeholders.8 
The international research project Divided Education, Divided Citizens,9 in 
which Maria Golubeva participated from the Latvian side, found that a school 
system divided along linguistic lines influences the creation of a different politi-
cal culture among the respective group of youth, but also that a certain part of 
youth and teachers support a separated system. The research found that minority 
youth are less convinced of their political efficacy than the majority. With regard 
to the division of schools, the research found that 39% of Russian-speakers and 
23% of Latvian pupils and 29% of Russian-speakers and 14% of Latvian teach-
ers agreed with the statement that “the existence of separate schools is a very 
good thing.” The share of pupils who claimed that they would not want to learn 
in one class with those belonging to the “other” group was 42% of Latvians and 
56% of Russian-speakers. These figures show clearly that a divided education 
system reproduces dissociation from the other sociolinguistic group as well as 
negatively impacts motivation for political participation. 
Bilingual Education as an Integrating Strategy
One of the goals of introducing bilingual education was to promote the in-
tegration of minority youth into the labour market and enhance their prospects 
for studying in Latvia’s institutions of higher education where the language 
of study at state-funded institutions since 1992 has been Latvian. A signifi-
cant amount of research has been conducted in Latvia on the introduction of 
bilingual education, but thus far no research has been done on the impact of 
bilingual education on school results which would permit the evaluation of this 
policy in terms of attaining the goals set for it. 
The lack of research, as well as the publicly available Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science data do not permit an evaluation of how learning subjects 
bilingually has affected school results. In this context, it is interesting to review 
the analysis conducted by the representatives of the Russian cultural, education 
and science association “Arkon” Alexandra Malashonok and Nikita Khalyavin 
of the marks in centralized examinations in all of Riga’s state and municipal 
secondary schools.10 The authors compare marks in centralized examinations 
 8 Golubeva, Dažādības integrācija valsts vispārējās izglītības sistēmā, pg. 44.
 9 Marija Golubeva, Stephen Powell, Elmina Kazimzade, Anca Nedelcu (2009), Divided 
Education, Divided Citizens? A comparative study of the effects of separate schooling on 
civil enculturation, available at http://www2.providus.lv/public/27199.html.
10 Aleksandra Malashonok, Nikita Khalyavin (n.d.), ‘Podrobnee ob issledovanii rezultatov 
reforrny obrazovaniya v russkikh shkolakh,’ Assotsiatsiya Russkoy kul’tury, obrazovaniya 
i nauki “Arkon”, available at http://www.svoi.lv/userfiles/File/memorandum-svoi.doc.
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by Riga school pupils for the period 2004 to 2007 depending on the language 
of instruction. For the analysis, they did not choose subjects in which less than 
20% of the pupils took the examinations. Malashonok and Khalyavin compare 
Russian and Latvian pupils’ average marks in mathematics, English and history. 
The results obtained suggest that Russian pupils do more poorly in English, but 
that there was no observable worsening of results in the time period covered 
which could serve as a baseline for comparison with results obtained in subjects 
in which instruction takes place bilingually. 
In comparison with 2005, results in mathematics examinations in 2006 and 
2007 worsened by several percentile points. With regard to history examina-
tions, one sees that the results are very inconsistent among both Latvian and 
Russian pupils. However, a common characteristic is that the average mark 
for Russian pupils was 3/10 of a point lower (in 2007 7/10 of a point lower) 
in comparison with Latvians. These results suggest that in examinations where 
language knowledge is more important, for example, in history, Russian pupils’ 
school results are lower compared to those of Latvians.
At the same time, the 2007 annual report of the Ministry of Education and 
Science mentions that “2006–2007 school year results are similar in educa-
tional institutions that are implementing education programmes in the Latvian 
language and those implementing minority education programmes.” These two 
materials suggest that without a detailed evaluation of the influence of bilingual 
education on school results, it is not possible to draw conclusions about the 
inclusive impact of the education reform with regard to minority youth.
Table 1. Riga state and municipal secondary school student average marks in 
centralized examinations by language of instruction
Subject Year Russian Latvian Difference %
Mathematics 2004 2.88 3.00 -0.12 -4%
Mathematics 2005 2.68 2.82 -0.14 -5%
Mathematics 2006 2.73 2.97 -0.24 -8.1%
Mathematics 2007 2.71 2.99 -0.28 -9.4%
English 2005 2.73 3.26 -0.53 -16.3%
English 2006 2.74 3.22 -0.48 -14.9%
English 2007 2.86 3.38 -0.52 -15.4%
History 2005 2.62 2.91 -0.29 -10.0%
History 2006 3.01 3.37 -0.36 -10.7%
History 2007 2.66 3.36 -0.70 -20.8%
A certain comparison of academic results can also be obtained from the 
International Student Evaluation Programme (SSNP 2006) research. The 
authors of the 2006 research acknowledge that there are practically no differ-
ences between the average attainment of pupils studying in Russian language 
schools (schools implementing minority education programmes) and those in 
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Latvian language schools (491 vs. 494 points).11 If in 2000 and 2003 pupils in 
Latvian language schools had slightly better average results, in 2006 there was 
no longer any difference and attainment levels had equalized. In comparison 
with 2003 results, those in 2006 decreased for pupils studying in Latvian lan-
guage schools or dual stream schools. The results of pupils in Russian language 
schools (schools implementing minority education programmes) did not change 
compared to the previous research cycle in 2003.12 Children from both Latvian 
and Russian schools in the countryside had significantly lower educational at-
tainment compared to children in the cities, particularly in Riga.
In their article on educational attainment of minorities in the Baltic states, 
Hazans, Trapeznikova and Rastrigina investigate the issue of the inclusiveness 
towards minorities of the system of higher education.13 The authors stress that 
among Latvians in the age group 21–45 there are 7–8% more persons than among 
the same age group among minorities. However, in the article in question, there 
was no possibility of ascertaining the reasons for differences in educational attain-
ment. Taking into consideration that a gradual transition to instruction in Latvian 
has taken place in state funded institutions of higher education since 1992, the 
assumption that some Russian-speaking youth have gone to Russia to receive a 
higher education in their native language is well-founded. This, in turn, suggests 
the conclusion that the transition to study in Latvian has weakened the reproduc-
tion of highly educated human resources in Latvia. 
Table 2. The number of pupils studying in general education day schools
Pupils in general education day 
schools with Latvian as the primary 
language of instruction 
Pupils in general education day schools 
with Russian as the primary language 
of instruction 
2005/2006 186,409 68,078
2004/2005 193,665 73,711
2003/2004 198,295 79,302
2002/2003 204,348 83,201
2001/2002 208,454 89,718
2000/2001 208,185 95,850
1999/2000 205,885 101,506
1998/1999 198,353 105,806
Source: the home page of the Ministry of Education and Science
Ministry of Education and Science data on the changing enrolment in Latvian 
and Russian language schools shows a relative decrease in the number of pupils 
11 A. Geske, A. Grīnfelds, A. Kangro, R. Kiseļova (2006), Kompetence dabaszinātnēs, 
matemātikā un lasīšanā – ieguldījums nākotnei. Latvija OECD valstu Starptautiskajā 
skolēnu novērtēšanas programmā 2006, pg. 127. 
12 Ibid., pg. 129. 
13 Mihails Hazans, I. Trapeznikova, O. Rastrigina (2008), ‘Ethnic and parental effects on 
schooling outcomes before and during the transition: evidence from the Baltic countries,’ 
Journal of Population Economics, 21(3) 2008, pp. 719–749.
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studying in Russian. From the 1998–1999 school year to the 2005–2006 school 
year the number of pupils in Latvian day schools has decreased by 11,944 pupils, 
while the decrease in Russian schools for that period was 37,728. 
The impact of the education reform on the political attitudes of schoolchil-
dren was studied in a research project entitled Integration of Minority Youth 
in the Society of Latvia in the Context of the Education Reform which found a 
strengthening of the trend among Latvian and Russian-speaking communities 
towards separation and mutual isolation as a result of the education reform. 
The impact of the education reform on Latvian language use is documented in 
the study Language, which was conducted every year from 1996 through 2008. 
Annual studies on state language acquisition and use among Russian-speakers 
permit observation of behavioural and attitudinal changes over a period of more 
than 10 years. Research results suggest that the number of young people with 
good Latvian language proficiency has increased from about 40% in 1996 to 
73% in 2008. At the same time in 2004, during the most active phase of imple-
menting the education reform, attitudes towards Latvian language use became 
more negative: in 2003 38% of Russian-speakers were positively disposed 
towards speaking in Latvian, while the figure had dropped to 27% in 2004. 
Dual Stream Schools as a Sociolinguistically Inclusive 
Strategy
As demonstrated by Ministry of Education and Science data, over the last 
ten years the number of dual stream schools has diminished significantly. In 
the 1998–1999 school year there were 145 such schools, but by 2007–2008 
there were only 88, which accounted for only 9.2% of all general education 
day schools. About 40% of such schools are located in Latgale. 
Table 3. Changes in the number of dual stream schools 1998–2008
Total Latvian Russian Dual Latvian-Russian Polish Ukrainian Belarusian English
2007/2008 958 722 141 88 5 1 1 0
2006/2007 974 727 148 92 4 1 1 1
2005/2006 983 727 152 97 4 1 1 1
2004/2005 993 724 155 108 4 1 1 x
2003/2004 1009 729 159 115 4 1 1 x
2002/2003 1017 720 166 124 5 1 1 x
2001/2002 1029 725 175 122 5 1 1 x
2000/2001 1037 724 178 128 5 1 1 x
1999/2000* 1057 727 189 133 5 1 * 2 x
1998/1999 1074 728 195 145 5 1 - x
* incl. one Lithuanian school
Source: the home page of the Ministry of Education and Science at http://izm.izm.gov.lv/
upload_file/Izglitiba/Vispareja_izglitiba/Statistika/2007/skolu_sk_07.xls.
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Dual stream schools were created in Latvia during the Soviet years in the 
1960s. In these schools, children from Latvia’s two dominant linguistic groups – 
Latvian and Russian – attended in separate classes or “streams”. The term “dual 
stream” continues to be used today, even though the current emphasis is on the 
distinction between schools according to the educational programme they are 
implementing. Thus, this term could be replaced with another, given the fact 
that the education process has become more open and social integration policy 
has been directed towards making cooperation between children of different 
language groups more intensive.14 
At the very end of the 1980s and the beginning of the 1990s, many “dual 
stream” schools, especially in Riga, were liquidated. Then, in the mid- and late-
1990s the number of “dual stream” schools increased, as many were created 
on the basis of Russian schools. In 2003, researchers at the Baltic Institute of 
Social Sciences (BISS) concluded that there are basically two different types 
of “dual stream” schools. 
In the first group are those to which was added a Latvian “stream” – chil-
dren whose native language was Latvian began to learn at the school in separate 
classes. In this case, the school became a dual stream school in relation to the 
concrete local government’s strategy to optimize schools taking into account 
the demographic situation and the ability of the local government to ensure ef-
fective use of the finances allocated for education. It is the local government’s 
area of authority to open or close a general education institution, as the state 
budget covers only expenses related to paying teacher’s salaries.
The second group is comprised of schools with children whose native 
language is Russian, but which have licensed educational programmes in the 
Latvian language alongside minority education programmes. Schoolchildren 
who are learning according to Latvian programmes create so-called Latvian 
classes or “streams.” Such a model in creating a “dual stream” school can be 
characterized as initiative “from below” based on the requests of parents who 
want their children to learn in Latvian starting from grade one. 
The research conducted by the BISS in 2003 points to a number of social 
gains for various target groups (schoolchildren, teachers, local governments) 
provided by “dual stream” schools. Textual analysis of focus groups with 
schoolchildren, teachers and local government representatives permits the fol-
lowing conclusions. First, “dual stream” schools increase the freedom of choice 
of minority schoolchildren in the field of general education. The co-existence 
of two linguistic groups opens up opportunities for inter-ethnic communica-
14 In this chapter, the term ‘dual stream’ school is used for all general education day 
secondary schools implementing general education programmes in either the Latvian 
language of minority education programmes. If necessary, the type of dual stream school 
is specified. 
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tion, develops understanding among both Latvian and minority children about 
cultural diversity, and creates a store of experience in intercultural contact. 
Second, multicultural teacher teams develop in “dual stream” schools, 
furthering cooperation between Latvian and Russian schools in implementing 
bilingual education. The social and pedagogical environment at “dual stream” 
schools promotes interethnic dialogue not only among children, but among 
teachers as well. Third, in Latvia local governments are institutionally charged 
with opening, closing and unifying schools. For smaller local governments in 
particular, “dual stream” schools are a way to resolve the effective distribution 
of financial resources allocated for education, taking into account the demo-
graphic situation when there are not enough children to fill a school and the 
desire to acquire an education in Latvian in an environment with both a Latvian 
and a Russian cultural environment.
Notwithstanding the social gains derived from such schools, their academic 
attainment is on average lower than that in other schools. As demonstrated by 
the SSNP 2006 research results, the academic results of children from “dual 
stream” schools in Riga and other big cities are significantly lower than those 
in other urban schools. The results of children from rural “dual stream” schools 
are similar to those in rural Latvian schools.15 No analysis has been conducted 
as to the reasons for the different levels of attainment in urban schools. At the 
same time, it should be acknowledged that the results of the BISS research 
testify to the inclusive social impact of “dual stream” schools, which is inter-
esting, given the fact that the decisive consideration in creating such schools 
was economic. 
Inclusive Strategies in Educational Institutions 
Implementing an inclusive schools policy also means preparing children 
who are characterized by a socially inclusive orientation and tolerance towards 
representatives of various social groups. Although there is some concern in 
Latvia, as elsewhere, about intolerance in contacts among teachers or students, 
there is very little research about the issue of tolerance in schools. For example, 
research entitled Drop Outs from Primary School: Solutions to the Problem 
points to the necessity of creating an inclusive environment. Experts discovered 
instances in which a teacher had exhibited a very intolerant attitude towards a 
child or his family: “you are from such a family and you can’t do anything”. 
As a result, the children “have enormous fear of the teachers, since they have 
had a very negative experience in their previous school – “are you stupid, are 
you an idiot, that you can’t keep up with the others” he feels absolutely dark. 
15 A. Geske, A. Grīnfelds, A. Kangro, R. Kiseļova, Kompetence dabaszinātnēs, matemātikā 
un lasīšanā – ieguldījums nākotnei, pg. 128.
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They are marked by it, and they proceed with the conviction “I am dumb, I am 
an idiot” (a social pedagogue). 
At the same time, the research by Austers, Golubeva and Strode entitled A 
Barometer of Teacher Tolerance shows that there is a definite incompatibility 
between teachers’ stances about the necessity of cultivating tolerance in children 
and the practices used to implement this goal.16 On the other hand, teachers 
often understand tolerance in a very restricted manner, relating it only towards 
a few social groups. Basically, teachers link the necessity of tolerance with the 
arrival into Latvia of people of different cultural backgrounds, which could 
happen “some time in the future”. Teachers do not see manifestations of toler-
ance in everyday situations, including in relations with poorer classmates or 
physically or mentally challenged children. The research suggests that teachers 
base their discussions on tolerance with children on their own experience, do 
not utilize the insights that could be gained from courses, training materials or 
policy documents, such as the National Programme for the Promotion of Toler-
ance. This limited understanding often prevents teachers from preparing young 
people for life situations that will differ from their own. At the same time, the 
teachers admit that they would not know what to do if children from different 
cultural backgrounds came into their classrooms. The research also shows that 
teachers rely more on authority and less on cooperation and mutual respect 
with schoolchildren. In nurturing such values in young people, teachers repro-
duce the values typical of authoritarian communication, reducing children’s 
self-confidence and their possibilities for addressing personal and social issues 
through democratic communication. 
In a dissertation entitled A Comparative Analysis of Teachers’ Pedagogical 
Activity in Latvian and Minority Primary School Classes,17 Liesma Ose con-
cludes that “in schools with Latvian language instruction with many children 
with different native languages, the pedagogical activity of the teacher often 
lacks tolerance towards the children’s varied sociocultural experiences and its 
manifestations in the learning process. When two sociocultural experiences 
meet, the teacher tries to dominate, since she does not trust the child’s socio-
cultural experience. Thus, the future dimension in pedagogical activity – out-
growing today’s culture and creating internal democracy within classrooms – is 
missing. One way to ensure that teachers were aware of the need to create an 
inclusive environment in the school is by envisaging intercultural and inclusive 
education modules in teachers’ training.18 
16 Ivars Austers, Maria Golubeva, Ieva Strode (2007), Skolotāju tolerances barometrs. Riga: 
Providus.
17 Liesma Ose (2007), Skolotāju pedagoģiskās darbības salīdzinoša analīze latviešu un 
mazākumtautību sākumskolu klasēs,” Unpublished dissertation, Riga. 
18 Maria Golubeva, Dažādības integrācija valsts vispārējās izglītības sistēmā, pg. 26, available 
at http://www.providus.lv/public/26462.html.
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Dialogue Between Parents and the School
Among Latvian school directors polled in a comparative study (SSNP, 
2006), 54% feel almost no interest or desire from parents that the school 
guarantee high educational quality. This is a relatively high indicator among 
the countries included in the study. The authors conclude that in many other 
countries parents show their interest about educational institutions more ac-
tively and are more demanding. These data permit the conclusion that parents’ 
passivity in relation to educational quality does not provide any incentive for 
schools to improve quality.19
Kārlis Boldiševics and Maija Upmane in their article “Insights and Pros-
pects for Dialogue between Parents and the School”20 stress the necessity of 
involving social partners in the development of the education system and the 
improvement of quality and conclude that in contemporary society, parents’ 
participation in education policy is necessary. However, currently at the level 
of the school, local and national government, participation rates are every low. 
The authors explain this with reference to the centralized nature of the education 
system, which creates a great distance between parents and education policy. 
Legislation is to blame as well, as it envisages parental initiative and partici-
pation only in economic matters.21 While the public lacks participation skills, 
schools have insufficiently developed skills in dealing with people of various 
opinions, sometimes do not perceive parents as social partners, and perceive 
negatively any attempts to influence school life. The authors stress that parents 
are dissatisfied with their experience of participation to date in the school and 
outside of it, suggesting that issues affecting the education process and educa-
tion quality are virtually impossible to affect. Parents perceive other parents, 
children, and sometimes teachers as their main cooperation partners, but rarely 
mention NGOs, representatives of state or local governmental institutions or 
parliamentary deputies. Parents who live outside of Riga mentioned the local 
government as a cooperation partner.22
Parents indicate that parents’ councils basically help the school administra-
tion in resolving economic and organizational issues, for example, by deciding 
about the use of resources donated by parents, addressing issues linked with 
feeding the children or security. But the council’s influence on other essential 
issues (e.g., evaluating the quality of education, preparing proposals for im-
proving the teaching process) is very limited and depends on the make-up of 
the school council and its leadership. 
19 Geske, Grīnfelds, Kangro, Kiseļova, Kompetence dabaszinātnēs, matemātikā un lasīšanā – 
ieguldījums nākotnei, pp. 130–131. 
20 Kārlis Boldiševics and Maija Upmane (2007), ‘Vecāku un skolas dialoga atziņas un 
perspektīvas,’ in Izglītība zināšanu sabiedrības attīstībai Latvijā. Riga: SAK, pp. 108–121.
21 Ibid., pg. 111.
22 Ibid., pg. 112. 
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Research conducted by the BISS in 2002 entitled Analysis of the Imple-
mentation of Bilingual Education showed that parents were not involved in 
preparing a significant education reform. Parents were informed about bilingual 
education reform only when it began to be implemented in schools, but even at 
that level, discussions did not take place. Admittedly, certain school directors 
did indicate that they were ready to take parents’ opinions into consideration 
in organizing the learning process: “If parents request it, we are ready to adopt 
a different model which would further the knowledge of the children” (school 
director in Zemgale).23
Diversity in Latvian Textbooks
The content of textbooks can be seen as one element which shapes the 
schoolchild’s conception of the outside world. Krupņikova’s research on “Di-
versity in Latvian Textbooks” shows that the portrayal of social life in Latvian 
and Russian language textbooks is rather different. The author concludes that 
the textbooks analysed have almost no representations of Latvian minorities 
except for Russians, and that the contribution of minorities in Latvian culture 
and history is largely ignored.24 Russians are mainly portrayed in textbooks 
in the Russian language, which make almost no mention of Latvians or other 
Latvian minorities. The author concludes that textbooks in both Latvian and 
Russian are ethnocentric with regard to other groups and their social and cul-
tural contribution. They are more open to “Western culture”, though each has 
its own “most popular country”. The textbooks do not reflect any interaction 
between Latvians and Russians. Moreover, in translating Latvian language 
books into Russian, Latvian proper names are changed into typical Russian 
names, but Latvian books have no characters with Russian names. Latvian 
language books create a monocultural information space without minorities, but 
Russian characters in Russian language books are divorced from the Latvian 
social scene. Minorities are mainly mentioned in those sections which deal with 
specifically minority themes (ethnic composition of the population, citizenship, 
the naturalization process), but not in other sections. Minority representatives 
are not used as illustrations of loyalty towards the country, demonstrations of 
civic participation, and other positive examples. These roles are reserved for 
ethnic Latvians. Little attention is given to the other Baltic countries Estonia 
and Lithuania, their culture and traditions, ignoring the close historical, political 
and economic ties in the Baltic Sea region. 
23 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2002), Bilingvālās izglītības ieviešanas analīze. Riga: 
BISS, pg. 73.
24 Marina Krupņikova (2004), Daudzveidība Latvijas mācību grāmatās. Riga: Latvian 
Human Rights Centre, pp. 80–81, avalable at http://www.politika.lv/temas/izglitiba_un_
nodarbinatiba/6125/. 
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The Advantages and Possibilities of the Critical 
Thinking Approach – a Strategy to Motivate 
Schoolchildren
Research conducted by the BISS entitled Utilization of the Critical Think-
ing Approach in the Education System in Latvia 2008 shows that the critical 
thinking approach is one of the most successful alternative ways of organizing 
the teaching process in the contemporary school. It has a positive impact on 
the schoolchild’s motivation to learn, it develops skills of analysis, structuring 
information, comparing various opinions and arguments, working in a group, 
cooperating in solving problems and more. After using the critical thinking ap-
proach, teachers have observed positive changes in the models of interaction 
between teachers and students in the classroom and outside it, with more open, 
less hierarchical relations. The teacher is a confederate, an ally, a helper, not 
the “vessel of absolute truth”. 
Another benefit is a diversification of models of interaction. As teachers 
have observed, the classical models (teacher – student, student – teacher – 
student) are supplemented with other models (student – student; teacher – 
student – student – teacher). Teachers mentioned various situations, when, for 
example, a student helped a classmate understand new material or when the 
teacher acquainted the students with a certain strategy for solving a problem 
and the students worked out additional strategies.
As suggested by the results of a survey of schoolchildren conducted for the 
research, they too support such an approach in the learning process. Students 
like the fact that various forms of cooperation and interaction are used. For 
example, 73% like to participate in discussions with classmates, 67% like to 
study materials given by the teacher with other classmates and 56% mentioned 
that they like to discuss problems for which there is no one best solution. 
These are all typical working methods of the critical thinking approach, but at 
the same time, schoolchildren are divided over whether they like the forms of 
interaction where they have to use the skills that should be the results of the 
critical thinking approach. 
In the assessment of teachers, the critical thinking approach permits improv-
ing the interaction skills of all schoolchildren regardless of their psychological 
peculiarities. The experience of teachers suggests that the ability to become in-
volved in a discussion and express one’s opinion not only creates and develops 
the child’s self-confidence, but also nurtures tolerance towards diversity and dif-
ferent attitudes, which is a very important ability in contemporary society. The 
observations of teachers suggest that using the critical thinking approach can 
contribute to creating and solidifying a sense of community in the classroom, 
giving students the opportunity to get to know one another and cooperate with 
classmates with whom they would have no contact outside the classroom. 
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Inclusive Strategies in Schools: Examples of Best 
Practice in Europe
Based on an investigation of schools in four countries, the project “Youth 
and ethnically diverse schools” provides examples of best practice in various 
conflict resolution strategies in multicultural school environments in schools 
and in promoting inclusive policy.25 The goal of these strategies is to help 
schoolchildren better resolve conflict situations, to promote skills of expressing, 
discussing and harmonizing their interests. 
Mediator training foresees teaching students to become mediators in dis-
cussions between students or between students and teachers. Participants in 
the training learn effective conflict resolution methods, as well as learn about 
issues of cultural difference. 
Class contracts involve coming to an agreement about good and unaccept-
able forms of behaviour with the goals of preventing racism and conflicts due 
to cultural differences. Students themselves try to create regulations to help 
prevent such problems and to improve the atmosphere in the classroom. In 
such discussions, students talk about exclusion, violence, racism and conflicts 
due to cultural differences. 
Clear, known and participatory regulations are formulated within the school 
about what is and is not acceptable in the school and what to do if the regula-
tions are violated. Violence, and ethnic violence in particular, are one of the 
main issues in such regulations.
A capability raising strategy has the goal of strengthening the self-respect 
of students, raising their confidence in their abilities. To implement this, it is 
first of all necessary to perceive the child as an individual. This strategy is 
based on the creation of an individual learning plan in accordance with the 
child’s language knowledge, as well as socialization activities with the goal of 
strengthening the child’s self-confidence.
Strategies for fostering a sense of belonging have the goal of promoting the 
student’s sense of belonging at two different levels. At the individual level, the 
strategy is linked to the individual life experience of each student. At the social 
level, the essence of the strategy is to create belonging to a group based on 
common goals, not ethnic belonging (in various working groups or in the class 
group at school). The goal of this strategy is to raise awareness that a person’s 
life is very diverse and that a person’s identity (religious, national, cultural, 
political or gender) creates belonging to very diverse groups. This strategy is 
implemented primarily in extracurricular activities.
Separate training for girls and boys groups involves discussions about 
issues of personal and social importance: the prevention of violence, various 
25 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2006), Jaunieši un etniski neviendabīgas skolas. 
Pasākumi pret etnisku vardarbību skolēnu vidū. Rokasgrāmata praktiķiem. Riga: BISS.
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forms of dependence, substance abuse, conflict resolution strategies, as well as 
personal life, future plans related to professional and work choice, friendship, 
love and sexuality. The goal of this training is not to create a static “male” or 
“female” identity, but to ponder and evaluate conceptions linked with certain 
roles and expectations, as issues about gender and cultural difference are closely 
related. Cultural norms determine gender roles, and children have to learn how 
to unite diverse perspectives about gender held by their parents, friends, at 
school and in the surrounding society. 
Multicultural education in general education elementary teaching pro-
grammes involves discussions about various issues linked with multicultural-
ism. 
Abstract training about cultural diversity has the advantage that all students 
are spoken to in a similar way, the children evaluate a problem from the same 
position – as observers. In evaluating a situation and creating conflict resolution 
strategies, one does not pay particular attention to the origin of each individual 
schoolchild.
School cooperation in teaching cultural diversity has at its base the creation 
of a network of school cooperation with the goal of exchanging methodological 
materials and practical experience. 
“School Failure”
Although Latvian education policy has chosen inclusive education and one 
of the basic postulates of education development policy is “access,” meaning 
all members of society should have equal opportunities to get an education,26 
researchers have pointed out that many young people in Latvia do not acquire 
even an elementary education and that Latvia has one of the lowest shares of 
young people with a secondary school education in the EU. In order to char-
acterize the effectiveness of an education system’s inclusive of exclusive prac-
tices, both the academic literature and policy documents use the term “school 
failure.” Research on school failure permits assessing the education system’s 
influence on the integration of youth in society, including integration’s social 
and ethnic aspects. In OECD documents, the analysis of school failure takes 
place in three directions: 
1) low academic results, 
2) early abandonment of school, and 
3) preparedness for the labour market.27
Research conducted in Latvia and elsewhere suggests that the issue of 
school failure is usually addressed in two ways: how the education system 
26 Izglītības attīstības pamatnostādnes 2007.–2013. gadam, pg. 23. 
27 OECD (1998), Overcoming Failure at School. Paris: OECD.
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engenders school failure and what is the role of educational practices in pro-
moting social inclusion. Academic results are characterized by the educational 
attainment level of the population and school academic results in comparison 
with those in other countries. Early abandonment of school is characterized by 
institutional and individual reasons for school abandonment and strategies that 
promote social inclusion. Poor preparedness for the labour market is analysed 
with reference to professional education as an inclusive strategy in the labour 
market. 
The education system is comprised of education levels (primary, second-
ary, higher) and programmes (special, professional), as well as agents (school-
children, families, teachers, administrators, policy-makers, communities and 
NGOs). The goal here is to explore the structures and social agents (activities), 
which reduce school failure and overcome social exclusion, to discover strate-
gies that promote inclusive education, social cohesion and the creation of a 
knowledge society.
The Level of Educational Attainment in Society 
Data from research conducted by the BISS in 2006 on life-long educa-
tion suggest a trend towards a reduction in educational attainment among 
youth – these are youth who have acquired an education since the restoration 
of independence.28 Research shows that a portion of the age group 15 to 24 
does not continue education although their educational level is rather low. For 
example, among those who have not received a primary education, 10% of 
the respondents did not continue studies; among those who acquired only a 
primary education, 15% do not continue studies (see Diagram 1). Most people 
in the 25–34 age group have usually acquired a primary and secondary educa-
tion. Among respondents aged 25–34, 1% have not finished primary school, 
but 14% have only acquired a primary education. Every fifth person in this age 
group (20%) does not have a secondary education. At the same time, in the age 
groups 35 to 44 and 45 to 64, there are fewer poorly educated people: those 
with only a primary education are 6% in the 35 to 44 age group and 7% in the 
45 to 54 age group. Insofar as only about 10% of those aged 25 to 34 with only 
a primary education continue to study, it can be predicted that the education 
level of most in this group will remain unchanged.
Though poorly educated youth enter the job market early, their low educa-
tion level lowers their competitiveness. The life-long education research data 
suggest that 22% of respondents in the 25 to 34 age group without a secondary 
education are unemployed (the average unemployment rate in this age group 
28 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2006), Mūžizglītības pieejamība un iespējas izglītoties 
Latvijā. Riga: BISS.
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overall was 9%), while 30% without a secondary education are employed com-
pared to 60% employed in the age group overall 
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The educational attainment level of 35 to 54 year-old inhabitants is the 
highest compared to other groups. This age group has the smallest share which 
has received only a primary education (6% of respondents in the 35 to 44 age 
group and 7% in the 45 to 54 age group), but the share of respondents with 
an unfinished primary education does not reach 1%. This can be explained 
with reference to the abolition of obligatory secondary education (in 1992), 
as young people who acquired an education when secondary education was 
no longer mandatory and primary school could be finished without a diploma 
are now aged 29–30 or younger. However, in examining research conducted in 
this field, one acquires a wider view of the circumstances contributing to the 
growth in under-education. 
It is characteristic that in the age groups 35–44 and 45–54 there are more 
people with a secondary professional education than in the 25–34 age group. 
This suggests that obligatory secondary education spurred people to acquire a 
higher professional education level, compared to young people in recent decades 
who have entered the labour market having attained only a primary education. 
Research in Latvia on under-education draws attention to the circumstances 
contributing to the problem, such as missed lessons, poor results, repeat years 
206 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
and drop out rates,29 but also on the limited ability of these youth to enter the 
labour market.30 
Latvian School Academic Results in Comparative 
Research
Since 1998 Latvia has participated three times in the Programme for 
International Student Assessment SSNP (PISA), which permits international 
comparisons of the effectiveness of Latvian schools.31 4719 fifteen year old 
schoolchildren from 177 education institutions (basic schools, secondary 
schools, gymnasia, professional schools, technical schools, art schools and 
others) and the heads of these institutions in Latvia participated in the basic 
research of the 2006 PISA study.32 The authors of the research suggest that 
Latvia’s results are satisfactory, as they almost reach the average indicators 
among 30 OECD countries. In Latvia 17.4% of schoolchildren have not attained 
the 2nd level, which is the basic level in the SSNP at which children demon-
strate competence in natural science that permits them to become active in life 
situations related to natural sciences and technology and to fully participate in 
social life and the labour market in the future. The average indicator among 
30 OECD countries was 19.2%. However, the attainment levels in Latvia’s 
neighbouring countries suggest that there is much room for improvement. In 
Lithuania the figure is 20.3%, in Russia – 22.2%, but in Estonia – only 7.7%.33 
The 2006 research reveals very different levels of achievement in different 
types of schools.
The best attainment is among schoolchildren in Riga’s schools, but the 
lowest is among schoolchildren in the countryside (the difference is 23 points). 
The results in other big city (Daugavpils, Jelgava, Jūrmala, Liepāja, Rēzekne, 
and Ventspils) schools are similar to those in smaller cities and differ from 
those in Riga by 11 points.34 Schoolchildren in classes 7–9 attending gymnasia 
have average attainment levels 54 points higher than those of children in basic 
school and 36 points higher than those in high schools. 
29 Indra Dedze, Maiga Krūzmētra, Ingrīda Mikiško (2004), Savlaicīgu pamatizglītības apguvi 
traucējošo faktoru kopums. Available at http://www.politika.lv/index.php?f=409; see also 
Brigita Zepa, ed., (2007), Skolēnu atbiršana pamatskolās. Problēmas risinājumi. Riga: 
BISS. 
30 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2006), Mazizglītoto mazākumtautību jauniešu integrācija darba tirgū. 
Riga: BISS. 
31 A. Geske, A. Grīnfelds, A. Kangro, R. Kiseļova (2006), Kompetence dabaszinātnēs, 
matemātikā un lasīšanā – ieguldījums nākotnei. 
32 Ibid., pg. 125. 
33 Ibid., pg. 126. 
34 Ibid., pg. 127.
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These differences in attainment are considerable. In comparison with the 
results of 2003, the achievement distribution in natural science according to 
school type is virtually unchanged.35 At the same time, schoolchildren from 
primary schools in big cities have very low achievement levels, which evokes 
concern about the inequality of opportunity in education – as early as the 
primary school level elite schools and low level schools are created where 
children have limited opportunities for further education.36 There are significant 
differences between the attainment levels of rural and urban schools in reading 
skills: rural schools still lag behind the achievement levels of schools in Riga 
and other big cities. No longer can one see the previous evening out trend.37 The 
average difference in reading competence between boys and girls is quite large 
in Latvia – 50 points. There are big differences in other countries as well, but 
considering our schoolchildren’s overall attainment (below the OECD average), 
the low reading competence of boys evokes great concern. Almost a tenth of all 
boys are in the group with the lowest attainment under level one. Their further 
success in secondary education is at risk.38 It is significant that schoolchildren 
at the end of primary school in Latvia have skills in natural sciences, math-
ematics and reading which are almost at the average level of the world’s most 
advanced countries.39 At the same time Latvia has few primary school children 
with good or excellent attainment in mathematics or natural sciences, which 
can hinder the attainment of the goals enshrined in various state development 
documents in the realm of science, technology and other spheres. There is more 
a tendency to work intensively with weaker schoolchildren, which of course, 
is also important.40 The SSNP shows that Latvia’s 15 year old schoolchildren’s 
attainment is not very dependent on the family’s welfare and the availability of 
educational and cultural resources at home in comparison with average levels 
in other countries in the OECD and outside it. The authors of the research think 
that the Latvian education system can compensate the influence of these nega-
tive factors to a certain degree. 41 
The results of research conducted by the BISS in 2007 entitled The Influ-
ence of the Cost of Education on School Drop Out Rates in Primary Schools do 
not coincide with those of the OECD SNNP research results for 2006, which 
concluded that “the economic and social status of the schoolchildren’s family 
does not have a substantial impact on his attainment in study, which means 
that schools also fulfil social functions by evening out differences between 
needy and more well-to-do children.” The difference in conclusions can be 
35 Ibid. 
36 Ibid., pg. 130. 
37 Ibid., pg. 129.
38 Ibid.
39 Ibid., pg. 131.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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explained with reference to at least two circumstances: first, the international 
student assessment does not include drop-outs or those who miss classes often 
and are on the verge of dropping out; second, student fees can affect academic 
success indirectly, depending on the extent to which the local government can 
support parents in covering school expenses. The BISS research shows that the 
inability of low-income parents to cover education costs (textbooks, notebooks, 
stationary, clothes, and other goods and services necessary for school) has a 
negative influence on the child’s academic results and increases the risk of drop-
ping out in primary schools. In the current situation, local government social 
assistance has a vital role in integrating the children of low-income families 
into the education system. However, it should be noted that the ability of local 
governments to cover school expenses is dependent on their financial means. 
This situation exacerbates social inequality, as those living and working in 
poorer local governments have relatively lower incomes than those living in 
richer local governments. 
Early School Leavers
In accordance with Eurostat data, the share of youth aged 18 to 24 who 
had acquired a primary education and did not continue their studies in 2006 
was 19%, which is the highest rate of the three Baltic States (Lithuania 10.3%, 
Estonia 13.2%).42 At the same time, it should be stressed that in 2004 the Eu-
ropean Council set the goal of reducing the share of youth who receive only 
a primary education to 10% by 2010, as well as reducing the share that leave 
primary school without finishing it.43 
Imprecise registration makes it difficult to ascertain the share of youth who 
leave school early and do not acquire a primary education. Jānis Eglītis draws 
the conclusion that about 10% of youth in Latvia do not acquire a primary 
education.44 Research conducted by the BISS in 2007 entitled Dropouts from 
Primary School: Solutions to the Problem concludes that there is no clarity 
about the scale of the school dropout problem, as there is a lack of statistics 
about those who leave school and the registration of school-age children is 
imprecise. The authors refer to statements by experts who mention cases from 
their own experience when they have encountered children who remained un-
registered: “Currently, illiterate teenagers are appearing. There are children who 
42 Eurostat (2007), Early school leavers. Available at http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/portal/
page?_pageid=1996,39140985&_dad=portal&_schema=PORTAL&screen=detailref&lang
uage=en&product=STRIND_SOCOHE&root=STRIND_SOCOHE/socohe/sc051.
43 Commission of the European Communities (2004), Progress Towards the Common Objectives 
in Education and Training: Indicators and Benchmarks, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
education/policies/2010/doc/progress_towards_common_objectives_en.pdf. 
44 Jānis Eglītis (2007), ‘Izglītība zināšanu ekonomikai,’ in Izglītība zināšanu sabiedrības 
attīstībai Latvijā. Riga: SAK, pp. 142–163.
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are seventeen years old, who have no family doctor, no education, they are not 
registered as living anywhere, they migrate throughout the country.”45 
The importance of the problem of school dropouts is confirmed by much 
research that shows that a low education at the beginning of a professional 
career increases the risk of unemployment, poverty and the risk of anti-social 
behaviour.46 At the same time, it should be acknowledged that there is often 
great demand in the labour market for workers, which creates the impression 
of the irrelevance of education (this was evident in Latvia after accession to 
the EU, which opened the door to labour out-migration and increased demand 
for labour within Latvia).
Several studies have been conducted in Latvia about dropouts. Usually, this 
research uses an institutional approach, which explains the impact of various 
institutions – the school, the family, society – on the behaviour of the child. In 
the aforementioned study by the BISS, an institutional approach is combined 
with an individual perspective, which also examines the individual school-
child and his resources, involvement in school life, and academic results. The 
research analyses the interaction of factors from both perspectives and reveals 
a wide array of circumstances contributing to dropouts.
The research suggests that many circumstances have changed, and this 
requires the appropriate action: if the planned economy and the totalitarian 
regime envisioned strict control over the population, including over school 
attendance, the new circumstances provide greater freedom of choice, but also 
require greater responsibility from the individual. This responsibility pertains to 
both the schoolchild and his or her parent, including registering one’s residence, 
taking responsibility for the education of one’s child. As a social pedagogue 
noted, “I want to mention the good old Soviet times, which many would con-
demn. Back then, in my opinion, there were fewer children who did not go to 
school. Concretely, in my class there were children who did not learn well, 
but they were transferred on to the next class, and they came to school. Now 
it’s more like this – if the child does poorly at school, if he thinks he does not 
understand, he doesn’t come to school.”47 One expert notes that the problem 
of school dropouts has gradually become more topical since the restoration of 
independence and this is due not only to changing social values, but also to 
the fact that insufficient attention is paid to problem children, resulting in in-
sufficient supervision of various processes taking place in the system. Experts 
draw attention to the fact that the current education system is not oriented 
towards lessening failure, bad school attendance or early school leavers: “the 
45 Ibid., pg. 23. 
46 For example, E. Eemer et al. (2000), Characteristics of Early School Leavers: Results 
of the Research Strand of the 8- to 15-Year Old Early School Leavers Initiative. Dublin: 
Educational Research Centre of St. Patrick’s College, pp. 4–7. 
47 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2007), Skolēnu atbiršana pamatskolās. Problēmas risinājumi. Riga: 
BISS, pg. 54. 
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number has grown in the past 15 years, as in the early 1990s the old system 
was destroyed and a new one had not yet been created, social values changed 
a lot. To a large extent the education system was oriented (..) towards talented 
children, disregarding children with social or family problems. During these 
years the system became unmanageable and to a certain degree slipped out of 
control with regard to school attendance, the evaluation of academic results, 
and such matters” (municipal social worker). 48
One can see in the remarks of experts that both education workers and local 
government officials recognize and understand the downward spiral effect which 
cumulatively leads the schoolchild to leave school early. However, according 
to one expert, “Currently, schools are not doing anything. They say that they 
are integrating these children, but in reality, schools want to get rid of them, 
because as soon as the school has bad academic results, the director gets criti-
cized or people say ‘see what a bad school.’ In words, we are for an inclusive 
school, one that integrates everyone, but in reality, it is to the contrary – we 
exclude people. Yes, we might integrate a child in a wheelchair who calmly and 
quietly sits in class, but not a teenager from a group at risk who has problems, 
who is loud, and who does not learn. Schools try very hard to be free of such 
things” (school psychologist).49 Experts indicate that the activities of schools 
are in contradiction to the idea of an inclusive school, as the school is evalu-
ated according to schoolchildren’s academic results, and thus, does not have an 
interest in integrating young people with learning or behavioural difficulties, 
as that will be reflected first of all in their bad grades: “Schools do not address 
this problem. They simply do not pay any attention to it. They know that there 
are such children, that they are somehow getting by. If he comes to school, and 
sits there, even if he does nothing, that’s fine” (school director).50
A similar stance can be discerned with regard to remedial classes in a school 
which specialized in the intensive acquisition of the German language: “we do 
not have a remedial class and that is school policy. We have intensive German 
language acquisition and the school’s stance is that children who have problems 
with languages cannot learn a second foreign language. Thus, one cannot speak 
of any remedial action” (social pedagogue).51 
The reasoning and statements of experts reveal the social construction of 
interaction involving students and how their relations with parents and teachers 
create a chain of negative experiences leading to a lack of success, negative 
attitudes towards interaction with teachers, resulting in negative attitudes to-
wards schools and high dropout rates. Labelling and extremely liberal demands 
towards children in primary schools create a situation in which children leaving 
48 Ibid., pg. 55. 
49 Ibid., pg. 79.
50 Ibid. 
51 Ibid., pg. 62. 
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primary school and entering classes with more complex subjects are unprepared 
for the next academic level. As an NGO representative put it, “The child is 
simply transferred on from primary school – ‘go ahead wherever I put you, 
there will be problems with you wherever.’ He simply gets pushed ahead. He 
enters the 5th grade a smoker, drinker and truant. But the problem begins as 
early as the first grades. He hasn’t been to school in a long time. It all seemed 
normal then, because what could one expect – the family was disadvantaged, 
you just have to let him move ahead, let him go.” 52
The Basic guidelines for education development 2007–2013 declare that 
“in the knowledge society a person’s knowledge and skills have a decisive 
importance in attaining a high level of welfare.”53 At the same time, statistical 
analysis and research suggests that the share of young people in Latvia who 
have acquired a secondary education is one of the lowest in the EU. In an arti-
cle entitled “The Paradox of the School: A High Value Attributed to Education 
and a Low Motivation to Learn,” Vera Boroņenko points to the contradiction 
between how the public and people involved in the education process evaluate 
the value of education and the low motivation to learn.54
At the same time, research conducted by the BISS reveals the falling value 
of education among families in a certain segment of society. In the future vision 
for their children constructed by poorly educated parents, there are very low 
educational ceilings. A social worker noted that “Parents say: ‘our son will 
work, because the family needs financial support. I myself have finished the 
eighth grade, do I earn a poor wage? In construction it’s 500 lats a month?”55 A 
low level of education is reproduced, poorly educated parents cannot imagine 
the opportunities a higher education would provide their children, they don’t 
understand their children’s problems. Another social worker notes: “Often the 
parents’ self-esteem is low – if we don’t have an education, our child will not 
be able to get one either.” Thus, the results of a survey of schoolchildren are 
no surprise: 38% do not know about their father’s education and 24% do not 
know about their mother’s education. 
Repeat Learning in the Same Grade
One of the strategies used by schools to improve the academic results of 
children encountering difficulties is requiring them to repeat the same grade. 
The home page of the Ministry of Education and Science contains data about 
the number of children repeating grades in general education day schools, which 
52 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2007), Skolēnu atbiršana pamatskolās, pg. 30.
53 Izglītības attīstības pamatnostādnes 2007.–2013. gadam. http://izm.izm.gov.lv/normativie-
akti/politikas-planosana/1016.html
54 Vera Boroņenko (2007), ‘Skolas paradokss: augsta izglītības vērtība un zema motivācija 
mācīties,’ in Izglītība zināšanu sabiedrības attīstībai Latvijā. Riga: SAK, pg. 77.
55 Brigita Zepa, ed., (2007), Skolēnu atbiršana pamatskolās, pg. 58. 
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has shown an upward trend in recent years. A novel trend is that this obtains 
not only for boys, but for girls as well. The number of those repeating grades 
has increased significantly since the 2003/2004 school year: it has doubled for 
girls and increased by a factor of 2.7 for boys. The 2003/2004 school year is 
the year that those who began school in the 1999/2000 school year are in fifth 
grade. The Ministry website does not have data broken down by language of 
instruction, thereby precluding verification of the hypothesis that links the 
problem of repeating grades to teaching subjects bilingually. 
The Ministry’s 2007 annual report mentions that the number of those repeat-
ing grades from the first through the ninth grade decreased in the 2005/2006 
school year compared to the previous year, but increased again by 1.68% in the 
2006/2007 school year. These figures suggest a trend towards increasing repeat 
grades compared to the end of the 1990s. Comparing those repeating grades 
by class, it can be seen that those repeating grades has decreased from the first 
through the third grades, but has increased significantly from the fifth through 
the ninth grades, especially in the 2003/2004 school year. The number of those 
repeating grades increases in classes with more teaching hours, with more dif-
ferentiated subjects, and where the subject matter becomes more complicated – 
in a word, in those subjects that Russian schoolchildren learn bilingually. 
Possibly, the improvement in results among first graders was promoted by the 
requirement that five and six-year-old children be prepared beforehand.56 
In analysing the positive and negative aspects of repeating grades, the au-
thors of the research Drop Outs from Primary Schools: Solutions to the Problem 
point to the divergent evaluations of experts of the legislative norm which states 
that a child with more than three failing marks cannot be transferred to the next 
grade level. Some experts believe that repeating the same grade changes nothing 
in the child’s achievement unless additional assistance is given to the child. At 
the same time, other experts suggest that the large number of those repeating 
grades is the consequence of the legislative change, as schoolchildren had ac-
cepted as normal the fact that they could not study and not get good grades, but 
still progress to the next grade and finish school. In the future, in accordance 
with the new demands, the number of those repeating a grade should decrease. 
As a social pedagogue noted, “I would guess that a few years will pass and 
those who are in school now already know that that will not work in the future 
and they will not get ahead.” 57
 Experts believe that repeating a grade is not an acceptable practice in 
primary school, where learning difficulties are probably the outcome of a 
previously unnoticed and neglected lack of understanding of the teaching pro-
gramme which cannot be remedied by repeating a grade. As a social pedagogue 
noted, “The gap is not created in the sixth grade. (..) the gaps in the seventh 
56 Ibid., pg. 30. 
57 Ibid., pg. 66.
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and eighth grade are of such an order that he simply cannot keep up. (..) For 
example, he can’t read! I make him try to solve a problem, but he stumbles 
along. He concentrates on reading, not the meaning of the text. When did the 
problem begin? Not in the seventh grade. And what good will it do if I leave 
him in the seventh class.”58 
Making children repeat grades in the older classes generally creates ad-
ditional problems – the schoolchild’s behaviour worsens and conflicts begin 
with teachers. According to experts, that is basically an artificially created in-
terruption in the child’s rhythm of life. Because of this interruption, he is not 
only forced to learn in a class with younger children, but he also has to watch 
how his peers have rushed ahead of him. Perhaps some are motivated by this, 
but a majority loses interest in learning. According to a social pedagogue, “It 
often happens that it is precisely in the second year that the child’s behaviour 
worsens, he feels superior to his classmates. If the teacher has not found a way 
to reach this child, he often disturbs the teacher and there are conflicts. (..) In 
a larger class one child was supposed to be in the ninth grade, but now he is in 
the sixth grade, he is 16 years old. Teachers have a difficult time establishing 
contact with him, he tries to provoke them in all manner of ways, he ruins the 
lesson, he feels superior to everyone.”59 According to the experts, repeating a 
grade has a positive impact on the child’s academic results if the attitude of 
those around him is supportive and communication is positive. However, in 
practice, this strategy is more often ineffective. 
Table 4. The number and share of second and third time repeat students in 
general education day schools by sex at the end of the school year
2nd and 3rd Time Repeat Students 2nd and 3rd Time Repeat Students (%)
Total Girls Boys Total Girls Boys
2004/2005 8348 2377 5971 2.79 1.59 3.98
2003/2004 10246 2807 7439 3.28 1.81 4.74
2001/2002 3932 1228 2704 1.17 0.73 1.61
2000/2001 4239 1266 2973 1.24 0.74 1.74
1999/2000 4444 1325 3119 1.28 0.76 1.81
1998/1999 4398 1306 3092 1.27 0.75 1.80
1997/1998 4870 1381 3489 1.41 0.80 2.04
Source: Home Page of the Ministry of Education and Science.
58 Ibid.
59 Ibid., pg. 67. 
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Table 5. The number of second and third time repeat students in general 
education day schools from Grade one through Grade 12 at the end of the 
school year
1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 6th 7th 8th 9th 10th 11th 12th
2004/2005 934 401 381 527 643 930 1346 1665 1261 132 101 27
2003/2004 1100 407 460 605 799 1126 1592 1953 1875 172 105 52
2002/2003 1107 437 426 533 593 906 1146 1266 303 99 68 36
2001/2002 1096 433 351 361 326 373 334 327 228 52 40 11
2000/2001 1252 457 372 373 315 361 394 345 243 55 38 34
1999/2000 1421 456 432 418 319 377 346 334 265 33 29 14
1998/1999 1642 507 471 413 303 295 294 244 161 34 22 12
1997/1998 1683 586 504 527 371 326 342 280 176 35 22 18
Remedial Classes as an Inclusive Strategy
Experts suggest that an effective means for improving a schoolchild’s aca-
demic results is learning in a pedagogical remedial class. In a remedial class, 
the number of children is twice as small and it is possible to work with each 
student individually, exercising greater social control. At the same time, ac-
cording to other respondents, the child himself often does not want to continue 
learning in a remedial class because of the negative associations. As an NGO 
representative put it, “The class has very few children, the teachers can pay 
more attention. (..) The teacher works with them, there is no letting up, there 
is greater supervision. If he misses school one day, the teacher calls home and 
asks why he’s not at school, not like in a regular class, when you believe that 
the child is ill.”60 
However, remedial classes do not always fulfil their tasks of “filling in the 
knowledge gaps” and providing an opportunity to return to a “normal class”. 
Experts have observed cases where the child does not want to return and the 
remedial class does not promote inclusion, but segregation. As a school director 
noted, “These children end up in these classes very late, and when they enter 
this programme, the children are more or less equivalent, they are from the 
same group. This creates an isolated environment and it is rather difficult to 
put them smoothly back into the general mass in the school.”61
60 Ibid., pg. 69. 
61 Ibid., pg. 70. 
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Evening Schools as an Inclusive Strategy
Table 6. General Education Evening Schools 
Total Latvian Russian Latvian/Russian
Total in the Country 34 18 0 16
2006/2007 34 16 0 18
2005/2006 34 14 0 20
2004/2005 33 13 0 20
2003/2004 35 12 0 23
2002/2003 35 11 0 24
2001/2002 37 10 0 27
2000/2001 37 10 1 26
1999/2000 38 10 1 27
As suggested by the data of the Ministry of Education and Science, the 
number of evening schools is decreasing. Changes in various types of evening 
schools vary: the number of dual stream Latvian-Russian schools decreased 
from 27 in the 1999/2000 school year to 16 schools by 2006/2007, while the 
number of Latvian schools has grown. It should be stressed that five Latvian 
districts (Dobeles, Kuldīgas, Ventspils, Rēzeknes, Daugavpils) have no evening 
schools whatsoever. On the one hand, it should be acknowledged that the per-
formance of evening schools is rather low, as about a fourth of those attending 
finish without a diploma, suggesting failing grades in a number of subjects. 
Moreover, this is an increasing trend: if 15% of the students finished without a 
diploma in 1997/1998, by 2005/2006 the figure had increased to 26%. On the 
other hand, the necessity of evening schools as an opportunity to continue edu-
cation for those who for various reasons left school early cannot be denied. 
Table 7. The number of students who finished Grade 9 in general education 
evening schools with Latvian as the language of instruction 
Total With a report card
Equivalency 
examination
Without a 
diploma
% without a 
diploma of the total 
2005/2006 863 634 0 229 26
2004/2005 790 579 1 210 26
2002/2003 679 504 4 171 25
2001/2002 636 473 8 155 24
2000/2001 845 621 2 222 26
1999/2000 905 696 2 207 23
1998/1999 966 804 1 161 17
1997/1998 1053 889 5 159 15
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Table 8. The number of students who finished Grade 9 of general education 
evening schools with Russian as the language of instruction 
Total With a Report Card
Equivalency 
examination
Without a 
Diploma
% without a diploma 
out of the total
2005/2006 199 152 0 47 24
2004/2005 222 150 0 72 32
2003/2004 189 120 0 69 36
2002/2003 243 173 6 64 26
2001/2002 282 216 0 66 23
2000/2001 301 223 2 76 25
1999/2000 446 296 9 141 32
1998/1999 532 455 1 76 14
1997/1998 584 483 4 97 17
Inclusive Strategies for the Most Motivated Students
 In presenting the results of centralized examinations in secondary education 
programmes, the annual report of the Ministry of Education and Science points 
out that examination results in state gymnasia are significantly better than the 
average, while high schools and local government gymnasia results are slightly 
better than the average. Technical schools, colleges and evening schools have 
similar centralized examination results, but they are all lower than average. 
The weakest results are among those in professional education institutions, as 
only 40% of teaching time is devoted to general education subjects compared 
to that in general education programmes. Thus, it is evident that the education 
system in Latvia reproduces differing academic achievement levels in various 
education institutions, which limits the educational mobility opportunities of 
certain categories of children. Choices made in primary school or low academic 
results clearly limit one’s further educational path.
The 2007 annual report of the Ministry of Education and Science mentions 
that “on the whole, state gymnasium academic achievement levels are higher 
than in other schools. This attests to the existence of an appropriate learning 
environment to support talented children.” Latvia has created a network of edu-
cation institutions that is capable of integrating the most able young people and 
providing them a successful further educational path. Currently, Latvia has 16 
state gymnasia. The state’s supplementary funding for these state gymnasia is 
of only symbolic importance: “In accordance with the order No. 820 of 12 Sep-
tember 2007 of the Ministry of Education and Science “On supplementary state 
budget funding for state gymnasia in 2007,” 15 state gymnasia were allocated a 
total of 30,000 lats (2000 lats each)”.62 This suggests that school management, 
62 For the 2007 annual report of the Ministry of Education and Science, see http://izm.izm.
gov.lv/upload_file/Parskats.pdf.
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the educational qualifications of teachers, the criteria for choosing students, 
and the past work and traditions of the school have resulted in a high quality 
of education that the education system has legitimized by calling the relevant 
schools “state gymnasia”. At the same time, the contribution of the ministry 
here should be judged as minimal. 
Professional Education as an Inclusive Strategy in the 
Labour Market
 The integration into the labour market of undereducated youth is hampered 
by the weakly organized system of professional education. In the 2005/2006 
school year, Latvia had 96 professional schools with about 43,000 students. 
More than half the schools are located in Riga, 80 of them are under the juris-
diction of the Ministry of Education and Science, and 9 are private. The goal 
of the Law on Professional Education of 1999 is to ensure the implementation 
of the state’s professional education policy and the activities, management and 
development of the system of professional education.63 Regardless of the fact 
that the goal of the law is to “ensure the comparability of Latvian professional 
education and professional qualifications with that acquired abroad, creating 
opportunities for people to continue their education abroad and compete in 
the international labour market,”64 experts are rather critical about the quality 
of professional education in Latvia and point to its incompatibility with the 
requirements of the market. 
In assessing the effectiveness of professional education, Krieviņš and 
Lesiņš stress that one third of those who finish professional education do not 
work in their chosen profession, while more than half need additional training. 
The reasons mentioned for this are, first of all, the ageing technical base of 
the schools, the incompatibility of the teacher’s qualification with the needs of 
the labour market, as well as the incompatibility of the subjects taught and the 
content thereof to current requirements.65 From the perspective of social and 
labour market integration, it should be noted that, while professional education 
is a certain part of the education structure, only a small portion of graduates 
succeed in continuing on to higher education. This is particularly true of trade 
school graduates, of whom 76% do not continue their education. This education 
is not very successful in integrating youth into the labour market, nor does it 
pave the way for a higher education. These schools often carry a certain stigma 
in society, the number of those learning there is decreasing, as parents try to 
send their children to general secondary schools, as there is a prevailing view 
63 For the Law on Professional Education, see http://www.likumi.lv/doc.php?id=20244.
64 Ibid.
65 J. J. Brunner (2003), Latvia. Higher Education: Changing Conditions, Problems, Challenges 
and Policy Options. World Bank, pg. 19. 
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that trade schools have a low level of teaching, which limits the opportunities 
of youth to continue in higher education and prevents them from finding well-
paid work. The prevailing view is that the schools are poorly equipped, the 
teachers have a low level of qualification, and there is a lack of cooperation 
with business. Those finishing these schools usually acquire the skills needed 
on the job. 
Table 9. Number of students attending professional education institutions
2007/2008 37667
2006/2007 40439
2005/2006 42727
2004/2005 44651
2003/2004 46789
2002/2003 46533
2001/2002 47627
Often professional education is viewed not as a purposeful professional 
choice, but as a solution to the problem of dropping out of school early. In the 
research Drop Outs from Primary School, the experts surveyed saw one solution 
to the problem of dropouts in an orientation towards professional education. At 
the same time, the experts also point to several significant obstacles hindering 
the integration of children from risk groups and dropouts into the education 
system through the means of professional education. First of all, usually one 
can begin to attend a trade school, as with evening school, if one has finished 
the 8th grade. Thus, if a child has left school earlier, acquiring a trade through 
the education system is not possible. As a social pedagogue put it, “I have 
information that there are districts where evening schools and trade schools 
begin only after the eighth grade. If a child has left the scene after 6th grade, 
then there is practically no possibility to get him back in. I think this system 
should be reformed, so the child can acquire a trade after the seventh grade and 
finish his primary education.”66
Secondly, according to the experts, acquisition of a trade school education 
is hindered by the incomplete nature of the network of professional schools. 
Not all districts have such institutions and if they do, they are located in the 
district capitals, and transportation is not affordable for many youth. As a social 
pedagogue noted, “In the countryside providing a sufficient choice is definitely 
a problem. If cities more or less have trade schools, I don’t know how big an 
opportunity there is for parents to send their children after the 7th grade. But I 
think this problem can be resolved.”67 The professional orientations of youth 
and the suitability of the network of professional schools to the needs of the 
66 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2007), Skolēnu atbiršana pamatskolās. Problēmas risinājumi, 
pp. 101–102. 
67 Ibid., pg. 102. 
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labour market are problems stressed by experts. As a local government offi-
cial stated, “the professional orientation has to be very strong. (..) How many 
professional schools do we have? Where will they go after the 9th grade, to 
Ireland or to work as salesclerks? (..) This is a complex question – professional 
orientation, the development of the network of professional schools and what 
kind of specialists will be needed.” 68 
Conclusion
The analysis of the education strategy in the context of social integration 
in this chapter leads to a series of conclusions: 
The divided school system reproduces isolation between the two major • 
sociolinguistic groups and negatively affects the motivation to participate 
politically among minority youth. In public discourse, the dominant dis-
course is that of ethnic isolation, which determines the existence of the 
divided school system. It is only in the academic world where one finds 
a civic discourse aimed at creating values for a unified school system. 
At the same time, various strategies are being implemented that pave 
the way to a certain extent for the creation of a unified school system 
in the future. 
The implementation of bilingual education has promoted the improve-• 
ment of Latvian language skills among minority youth, which promotes 
their integration into the labour market. At the same time, the education 
reform furthered the separation of communities along sociolinguistic 
lines. 
A good example of youth integration is dual stream schools; interestingly, • 
they were created primarily as a result of economic considerations.
The level of understanding and the behavioural patterns inculcated in • 
schools are not suitable to the rapid changes taking place in society 
and for life in a multicultural society. Teachers often understand issues 
related to tolerance in a very narrow manner, their pedagogical activ-
ity often lacks tolerance towards the varied sociocultural experience of 
students and its manifestations in the learning process. At the same time, 
textbooks do not reflect the diversity of society, are ethnocentric with 
regard to minorities and their cultural contribution. 
At the same time, new approaches to teaching, for instance, the introduc-• 
tion of critical thinking, open up big opportunities for strengthening the 
learning motivation of schoolchildren, as well as promoting tolerance 
towards various manifestations of social and ethnic diversity. Examples 
of good practice in promoting tolerance among schoolchildren elsewhere 
68 Ibid., pg. 88.
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in Europe suggest that there is a large unused potential that can be used 
to promote more inclusive education policy in Latvia.
While recognizing the necessity of cooperation between various actors • 
and institutions in education, parents usually consider other parents and 
children to be the primary cooperation partners, but do not see NGOs or 
state institutions as partners. 
The large number of children who leave school early without acquir-• 
ing a primary education testifies to serious deficiencies in the field of 
inclusive, accessible education policy. Another bad sign is the fact that 
Latvia has the lowest share of those with a secondary education in the 
Baltic states. What is more, Latvia has old-fashioned, unattractive pro-
fessional training institutions that are unsuited to meeting the needs of 
the labour market. 
A portion of the inclusive strategies currently being implemented in • 
Latvian schools, for example, making students repeat grades or attend 
remedial classes or change schools, do not attain the desired results. The 
inclusive impact of evening schools is decreasing: the decrease in the 
number of evening schools has negatively influenced access to education 
in various regions of Latvia. At the same time, the fact that the number 
of Russian-language evening schools is decreasing faster has a negative 
impact on minority access to education. 
Greatest Achievement
The greatest achievement in the context of the education reform lies in the 
fact that the results of centralized examinations in the exact sciences do not 
differ in schools and classes where instruction is in Latvian or bilingually. This 
is the most serious counterargument to critics and opponents of the reform, as 
it demonstrates the effectiveness of bilingual education in the acquisition of 
subject matter in the exact sciences.
Most Serious Problem 
The most serious problem in addressing issues of education in the context 
of social integration remain barriers to creating a unified system of education 
based on a unified curriculum, textbooks and language of instruction. Barriers 
are created by prejudices among the public and researchers about the necessity 
of creating such a system. Militant nationalist forces, in turn, are advocating a 
complete transition to instruction in Latvian in all schools funded by the state 
budget without offering a strategy for implementing such a transition.
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Most Urgent Task
The most important task in the field of education in the context of social 
integration is the creation of unified system of education through a concrete 
strategy and steps to implement this goal. A very important task is garnering 
wide public support and understanding about the necessity of such a system of 
education. One step in this direction would be introduction of a unified Latvian 
language examination, a task being addressed by the Ministry of Education 
and Science. 

The Media and Integration
Ilze Šulmane
Interaction Between the Media, Politics and 
Economics
To analyse the role of the media in social integration, it is important to un-
derstand which factors have an effect on the media. Journalism as a profession 
faces various external and internal influences. This interaction can be viewed at 
the macro-level, focusing on how journalism interacts with politics and econom-
ics. We can point to the external agents of influence – the state, media owners, 
advertisers, sources of information, and the audience. However, we must also 
speak to internal agents of influence – directors of media organizations, as well 
as rank-and-file journalists. 
The relationship between the media and government is marked by con-
tradictory trends everywhere. There has been a closer relationship between 
journalists and the political elite, because they share a common socio-political 
environment. The commercialization of the media has promoted conservatism 
and defence of the elite in many media organizations, but in others it has en-
couraged greater media hostility toward the government. When the media feel 
pressure from the power elite, journalists shift from simple reporting, interpreta-
tion and commentary to unmasking, criticizing and defending, thus becoming 
independent political actors.1
Media systems are based on local socio-political and cultural circum-
stances. The development of media systems, the structure of the media, and 
the specific content of publications (agendas, represented images, stereotypes, 
myths, separation between “ours” and “theirs”) – all are influenced by existing 
political culture, by the ethnic division of political parties, the historical and 
contemporary socio-political situation which prevails, relevant legal regulations, 
as well as close links to economic groupings in terms of the distribution of the 
advertising market.
The fact that a country does not financially regulate or support the press can 
have a positive effect in terms of freedom of expression. However, there can be 
 1 This trend was noted by the media researcher McNair. See B. McNair (2006), Cultural 
Chaos: Journalism, News and Power in a Globalised World. London and New York: 
Routledge, pg. 57.
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undesirable consequences – no nationally declared values such as an Integration 
Programme can oblige the private media to observe the programme’s positions 
or to demonstrate concern for any group in society if this is not of financial 
advantage. This can mean the disappearance of media outlets which are meant 
for smaller groups in society. The content of a publication or programme can 
become trivialized in an attempt to find as broad an audience as possible.
Competition in a small media market often forces the media to use cheaper 
content from big countries, because original broadcasts are expensive. This 
can cause concerns about the preservation of a national or ethnic culture and 
increase the influence and domination of the information space of another 
country. Recent changes in relations between the government and the opposi-
tion in Latvia have led media outlets to position themselves not just in relation 
to politicians and media outlets of other languages, but also to newspapers 
published in the same language – to mark out their political sympathies or 
antipathies more clearly. On the one hand, this may lead to an intensification 
of hateful, combative discourse (and create problems for those in power, as 
they receive a double portion of criticism from both oppositions). On the other 
hand, this situation can complicate the primitive identification which is based 
on ethnic elements, forcing the media and their consumers to focus more on 
substance and less on the political or ethnic status of those who are defending 
a certain point of view. 
The economic crisis, too, can have a dual effect. It can bring society closer 
together by discussing issues related to survival, as well as social and economic 
matters, thus forgetting, at least for a period of time, various historical and 
ideological disagreements. There can also be a search for scapegoats, however, 
and this role is most often assigned to an “alien.” 
Then there is the presence of a very large, powerful, active and interested 
neighbour – Russia. It and its information space ensure the maintenance and 
exacerbation of confronting viewpoints when this is of political advantage. In 
the public arena, this encourages ethnic Russians to see Russia as their true 
homeland, and it helps to convince them that they face great oppression in 
Latvia.
All of this ensures pluralism in terms of viewpoints and attitudes in the 
media, but it may also promote entropic processes in which criticism is based 
not on analysis and constructive solutions, but instead on sarcasm based on 
the positions of another country, and which questions values that are important 
for the existence of the state and the unity of society. This, in turn, leads the 
Latvian news media to put up greater fences against the “aliens.” These outlets 
do not engage in any public discussion of the problems which these “aliens” 
face, and they suggest that Latvians themselves should feel threatened. Thus, 
social, political, historical and cultural circumstances join together with external 
influences on the Latvian media system in objectively promoting the production 
of disintegrating discourses in the media space.
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Media Accessibility: The Aspect of Language
The systemic transformations which occurred in the wake of the restora-
tion of independence not only opened the path toward democratization, but 
also established two subsystems – the Latvian language media and the Russian 
language media. In Soviet times, the media tended to propagandize the same 
ideas in two languages. Now there is different content in the media system – 
information in two languages which sometimes interacts, but usually stays 
apart. In quantitative terms, both subsystems are self-sufficient. While initially 
unstable, the Russian language press has become stronger, and audiences in 
both languages have access to several daily and weekly national newspapers, 
TV programmes, advertising publications, a diversity of weekly and monthly 
magazines, etc. The Russian language press in Latvia is not a typical example 
of a minority press – one which speaks only to the needs of a specific culture 
and exists alongside the national press used by a majority of the population and 
addressed to the whole community of citizens. 
There have been a few failed attempts to bring the two information arenas 
closer together by offering translated versions of press publications – the 
newspapers Diena and Rigas Balss both used to offer a Russian language edi-
tion. There have also been unsuccessful attempts to produce local newspapers 
in both languages simultaneously. The only exception to these failures is a 
newspaper which delivers the same information in both languages – it is the 
free newspaper 5 min.
The fact that the Russian language press has become more stable and that 
it can also be read by representatives of other ethnic minorities has not served 
the interests of other ethnic groups in terms of developing their own media.2 
This is advantageous to the Russian language press, because it expands the audi-
ence, but it also reduces the use of other minority languages, thus diminishing 
the presence of cultural diversity in the public arena in various languages. The 
same applies to the book publishing industry.
There have also been efforts to produce television and radio programmes 
in the Latgalian dialect or for the Livs. There are various cultural organiza-
tions for ethnic minorities, but their activities are not reflected too extensively 
in the mass media, and links to their Internet homepages are not particularly 
visible. In interviews, representatives of these organizations say that they have 
not noticed any television broadcasts or press publications that are focused on 
minority ethnic groups, the only exception being radio.3
Latvians and Russians have an equal availability of media that present in-
formation in their native languages, but the opportunities for Russian-speakers 
 2 There are newspapers for Latvia’s Lithuanians and Poles, along with a newspaper for the 
local Armenian community which is offered in Armenian, Latvian and Russian. Copies 
of these newspapers are available at the Latvian National Library.
 3 Brigita Zepa, ed. (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas. Riga: BSZI, pg. 210.
226 How Integrated is Latvian Society? An Audit
must nonetheless be seen as more diverse, because they have access to vast 
media resources from Russia – the electronic media, the Internet, the press, as 
well as books and movies. The existence of a media system with two languages 
exacerbates market competition both among advertisers and between the two 
languages in the media. Rules concerning the proportion of language use in 
the electronic media have served to extend the reach of the Russian language 
while simultaneously narrowing people’s opportunity to obtain information and 
entertainment on several TV channels in the Latvian language.4
A report from an EU working group on multilingualism emphasizes the 
importance of television broadcasts which allow people to develop an inter-
est in other cultures, thus strengthening their motivation to learn a language.5 
Particular attention in the document is devoted to the importance of subtitles, 
which can be an effective means for learning a language, suggesting that 
channels which dub their series or have a behind-the-scenes translator must be 
encouraged to offer subtitles as an option.6
In 2003, the EU issued guidelines on the use of minority languages in the 
electronic media, calling on member states to develop policies aimed at the 
use of those languages. This means that support for public broadcasting must 
involve concern for the linguistic needs of ethnic minorities.7 In Latvia, such 
rights might rest not only with Russians, but also Belarusians, Ukrainians, 
Poles, Lithuanians and Latgalians.8
The democratic demand for diversity, the elimination of regulatory norms, 
and the more widespread use of the Russian language may attract this linguistic 
group to the Latvian media. However, it can also create tensions and insecurity 
among members of the other part of society who see it as a threat against a 
diverse supply and the availability of media that are presented in Latvian. The 
development of two equal sub-systems does not promote the learning of the 
Latvian language or its more widespread use; instead it creates a gap between 
the two linguistic groups, each of them having its own media space.
 4 Here we can mention protests against TV broadcasts which viewers expressed in the 
entertainment section of the newspaper Diena in 2008.
 5 The group’s final report can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/
doct/multishort_lv.pdf.
 6 Ibid.
 7 The report ‘Thematic Comment N3: The Protection of Minorities in the European Union,’ 
can be found at http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/cfr_cdf/doc/thematic_comments_2005_
en.pdf. 
 8 See State Language Commission (2007). Latviešu valoda 15 neatkarības gados. Riga: 
Zinātne, pg. 125.
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Media Accessibility: Regions and Special Needs
In terms of media accessibility, there are still substantial differences be-
tween the countryside and the capital city. Comparative data about accessibility 
in Riga and in Latvia’s regions suggest the situation has improved, but it is 
still important to increase the availability of the Internet. Also of importance 
is ensuring TV and radio coverage in Latvia’s more peripheral areas so that 
people in those regions do not feel isolated. Unfortunately, the economic crisis 
has spurred talk of a reduction in the number of cultural broadcasts of impor-
tance to rural residents. TV7 is to shut down its analogue broadcasts, and Radio 
Klasika is to narrow the territory in which it can be received.
Problems with Internet access in the countryside create a knowledge gap 
and unequal opportunities in the labour market. Poor people who do not have 
an Internet connection or multifunctional mobile telephones have fewer oppor-
tunities than do people in big cities and those who are wealthier. An increase 
in the price of press delivery, the fact that the Diena Subscription Centre has 
narrowed its local services, and that there is a lack of competition against the 
services that are provided by the Latvian Postal Service – all make it harder to 
ensure regular and timely deliveries of the press to more peripheral areas.
People with special needs in Latvia have said that it is hard for them to 
receive information that would reduce barriers against their integration into so-
ciety. In a study on the situation of hearing-impaired people in Latvia, Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 2007, respondents in Latvia in particular 
said that they had problems in obtaining information and communicating with 
“the world of the hearing.”9 In a 2004 discussion at the Latvian Association of 
the Hearing-Impaired, participants said that the fundamental rights of hearing-
impaired people to take part in the country’s political life were constantly vio-
lated. There was never a political discussion on Latvian Television which was 
translated into sign language, interpreters were unavailable at election precincts, 
and the speeches delivered by Latvia’s top officials at the New Year were not 
translated into sign language. Only 3% of the programming on Latvian Televi-
sion was made available to the hearing-impaired.10 
There have been some discussions in the media about subtitling foreign 
films, as opposed to dubbing them. People with hearing problems would prefer 
subtitles to dubbing. The idea was listed by the National Radio and Television 
Council (NRTC) in its strategy for 2009–2011, although the main stated motiva-
tion for the idea was that it would help people to learn foreign languages, not 
that the hearing-impaired would become more integrated into society.
In 2009, the NRTC included in the national remit an extension in the 
Latvian Television evening news programme (26 minutes) which ensures sign 
language interpretation. The programme provides a review of daily events and 
 9 See http://www.lns.lv/public/userimages/Beyond%20Silence_datu%20baze.pdf.
10 See http://www.lns.lv/public/?id=33&ln=lv&news_id=140.
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includes information from Latvia’s regions. Because of the economic crisis and 
financial problems, it is not possible to predict what will be preserved. 
People with hearing problems have also complained about a divergence 
between text and image on television. The subtitles and images are autonomous, 
and the subtitles which appear on news programmes on channels such as LTV, 
LNT and PBK are just a brief and moving line of facts which do not reflect 
the essence of the news.
Organizations for people with special needs publish their own special-
ized publications. For people with hearing disorders, there is the newspaper 
Walking Together,11 which is published twice a month and is archived on the 
Internet. The Latvian Association of the Blind has published its own magazine, 
Encouragement. The needs of people with vision impairment are met more by 
specialized libraries than by the mass media – the Latvian Central Library and 
its branches in Balvi, Daugavpils, Cēsis, Rēzekne, Liepāja and Ventspils. Along 
with books in Braille, the needs of the visually impaired are satisfied with audio 
books that are available in Latvian and in Russian.
There have been a few positive trends in the area of mass culture. There is 
special equipment which allows hearing-impaired people to perceive the content 
of theatrical performances. The Latvian National Opera was first in this regard, 
but since November 2007, the Daile Theatre has also offered subtitling.12 The 
universal practice among Latvia’s cinemas is to subtitle films.
Trust and the Role of the Media in Establishing 
Common Values
Trust in the mass media in Latvia has declined since 2000, but in com-
parison to the very low level of trust in other institutions, it can still be seen 
as comparatively high. A survey conducted in November 2008 by the SKDS13 
company confirmed that the media are seen as an important source of infor-
mation for the vast majority of respondents (94%). Researchers compared the 
answers given by Latvians and Russians and by citizens and non-citizens, find-
ing that the answer that the mass media are an important source of information 
was given quite equally among the various groups, but in terms of the types 
of mass media, there were differences – Latvians and Russians were equally 
likely to cite television as a source of information, but radio, newspapers and 
magazines were seen as slightly less important sources among Russians than 
among Latvians. 
11 See http://www.lns.lv/public?id=108&ln=lv.
12 http://www.leta.lv/archive_item.php?id=153CF77C-996C-4C5B-A613-
28A75AF5F8AA.
13 SKDS (2008), Survey commissioned by ASPRI for the Human Development Report. Riga, 
unpublished.
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It is important here to determine how trustworthy these various sources of 
information are in the eyes of people in different groups in society. There are 
substantial differences. 88% of Latvians, 58% of Russians, 80.5% of citizens, 
and 54.6% of non-citizens trust Latvian Television, for instance, while 5% of 
Latvians, 18% of Russians, 9% of citizens and 17% of non-citizens do not. The 
differences are less distinct when it comes to commercial channels, except for 
the First Baltic Channel (PBK) – it is trusted by 27.6% of Latvians and 62% 
of Russians, 39% of citizens and 58% of non-citizens. When it comes to Rus-
sian television channels that are visible in Latvia, they are trusted by 33% of 
Latvians, 73% of Russians, 45% of citizens and 77% of non-citizens. Public 
radio is trusted by 73% of Latvians, 49.5% of Russians, 67% of citizens and 
42% of non-citizens. Trust in commercial radio stations is fairly even across 
the board.
The press is traditionally seen as a disintegrating factor, because newspapers 
tend to be focused on small and differentiated target audiences. People trust 
“their own” press publications and distrust others. The Latvian language press 
is trusted by 80% of Latvians, 41% of Russians, 71% of citizens, and only 26% 
of non-citizens. The Russian language press, by contrast, is trusted by 27% of 
Latvians, 72% of Russians, 41% of citizens, and 74% of non-citizens. Trust 
in Internet news portals is fairly even, once again, although non-citizens are 
comparatively less likely than citizens to trust such sources of information.
Approximately one third of the respondents in the aforementioned groups 
say that they know about the interests defended by specific newspapers in 
Latvia, and more than one-half of respondents in both ethnic groups know that 
information in the media tends to be one-sided because of economic interests 
and that information in the media may be biased because of political sympathies 
or antipathies.
An interesting issue is how this knowledge affects media use. Respondents 
were asked: “If a media outlet defends a position with which you do not agree, 
do you stop reading/listening to/watching it?” The answers were divided fairly 
equally – 38% of all respondents said yes, 34% said neither yes or no, and 28% 
said no. Russian respondents and non-citizens are more likely than Latvians and 
citizens to use only those media outlets which affirm their beliefs, but differ-
ences here are not major (35% of Latvians, 40% of Russians, 37% of citizens, 
and 42% of non-citizens).
Trust in specific newspapers was also analysed in a study conducted in 
2006. The survey showed that Latvians read and trust newspapers in the Latvian 
language considerably more than others, while Russians and members of other 
ethnic groups mostly read and trust newspapers that are published in Russian. 
The level of trust in the newspaper Diena is a bit higher among Russians than 
is the case with Neatkarīgā and Latvijas Avīze, and the percentage of Russian 
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respondents who read that newspaper is smaller than is the case among others.14 
Latvians have greater distrust in Russian language newspapers than Russians 
do in Latvian newspapers – only 3–5% of Latvians trust them. Russians are 
most likely to trust the newspaper Vesti Segodnya, then Chas, and only then 
Telegraf.
These data suggest that the level of trust in the media is linked to the lan-
guage in which the media work. This is most true in the case of the press, but 
it is also seen in attitudes vis-à-vis the other media. Trust is a fairly subjective 
judgment, and it is not always based on usage experience. Instead it has to do 
with the image of an “alien” media outlet. 
The Electronic Media
In the 1990s, the conceptual approach of Latvian Television and the NRTC 
and the absence of Russian language broadcasts encouraged viewers to turn 
to Russian television programmes on cable TV. The number of cable clients 
increased very rapidly after the Russian channel ORT was no longer broad-
cast on a terrestrial basis in Latvia – from 28% in 1998 to 47% in 2003. The 
proportion of Russian speakers watching the channel reached 20% during this 
period of time.
Latvian broadcasting organizations compete with Russian television over 
the local Russian-speaking audience. The proportion of viewers of the Latvian 
Television evening news programme “Panorama” increased a bit between 2000 
and 2003 – from 7% to 10%. The broadcast “What’s Happening in Latvia?” was 
watched by 11% of non-Latvians. The proportion of the non-Latvian audience 
for Radio Latvia 1 was between 7% and 10%. Commercial channels attracted 
a greater share of the Russian audience – both LNT and TV3 were watched by 
11% of non-Latvians.15
The public electronic media have not tried to become involved in discus-
sions of issues which create conflicts in society. The Integration Programme 
instructs the media to disseminate information mostly about “ethnic culture.” 
It does not mention the fact that broadcasts in Russian could serve as an instru-
ment for consolidation in society – something that is of key importance, given 
Latvia’s ethnic makeup. Integration in media policy has been dominated by a 
unidirectional communications model, although public broadcasting organiza-
tions today should support programmes which make it possible to express alter-
native minority identities, to learn about less familiar cultures, or to demonstrate 
positive examples of interaction. During the first years of independence there 
14 Zepa (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pp. 88–89.
15 Sergejs Kruks and Ilze Šulmane (2005), ‘Plašsaziņas līdzekļi demokrātiskā sabiedrībā.’ 
In Juris Rozenvalds (ed.), Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija? Demokrātijas audits. Rīga: LU, 
pp. 137–151.
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were a few Latvian language learning programmes and a soap opera in which 
characters spoke both languages and had relationships amongst themselves, but, 
this approach has nearly been forgotten.
A 2008 study (SKDS (2008), survey commissioned by ASPRI for the HDR) 
involved questions about the three most widely watched television channels, 
the three most often read press publications, the three most listened to radio 
stations, and the three most often visited Internet sites. The study confirmed the 
thesis that Latvia’s non-citizens are living in an entirely different information 
space, and there were great differences in media use in comparison to citizens. 
95% of respondents said that they watch TV. Citizens cited LNT, TV3 and 
LTV1 as the most often watched channels, while non-citizens were more likely 
to plump for TV5, TV3+, ORT and PBK.
A similar situation exists with radio. There are stations which are popular 
among citizens (LR2, SWH, Skonto), while the most popular stations among 
non-citizens are Russkoye Radio (18%), SWH+ and MixFM. The Radio 
Latvia 4 programme “Dome Square” seeks to attract non-citizens, and that is 
something that should not be forgotten during the economic crisis, when many 
programmes are simply being eliminated from the schedule.
Integration processes can also be affected by the extent to which non-
Latvians use local and foreign media outlets which are presented in Russian. 
An SKDS study found that PBK was the most popular channel and was watched 
by 60% of families in which Russian is spoken at home.16 This channel mostly 
rebroadcasts programming from the leading channel in Russia, but there are 
also local productions – morning news, as well as an evening news programme 
called “Latvia’s Time” («Латвийское время»). There is also the programme 
“From the Other Side” («С другой стороны»). At the same time, the second 
most popular channel is local – LNT (35.4%). Evident changes have occurred 
at that channel to attract the audience. It has presented an increasing number 
of soap operas from Russia, including “Liquidation.” These broadcasts are 
subtitled in Latvian, and there is no dubbed voice to eliminate the original 
language. Commercial television stations broadcast the “New Wave” music 
competition, which is controversial in Latvia. In order to attract non-Latvians, 
Russian subtitles are also placed on the original Latvian series “Hope Street.” 
In the media (the Internet site of Diena, and in reader responses sent to the 
newspaper’s television supplement), there have been discussions in which this 
practice has been denounced.17 Recently debate has shifted toward the issue of 
accepting or rejecting the huge amount of Russian language television output on 
16 Ainārs Lerhis, Andis Kudors, and Ivars Indāns (2007), Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības 
etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā. Rīga: APPC, pg 55.
17 J. Blūms, (2009), ‘Kāpēc Latvijas televīzijās prevalē lēti Krievijas seriāli?’ 8 February 
2009. See http://www.diena.lv/lat/tautas_balss/lasitaji_raksta/kapec-latvijas-televizijas-
prevale-leti-krievijas-seriali.
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the part of native Latvian speakers. There have been concerns about the quality 
of the products and the values which the various series offer.
Behind LNT in terms of popularity is RTR-Planeta (35%), which does not 
broadcast any programming from Latvia.18 Other popular channels include 
NTV Mir (30.5% of respondents from families in which Russian is spoken 
watch it), TV 3 (25.6%), LTV1 and LTV 7 (19% and 21%). Among Latvians, 
the most frequently watched channel is LNT (78%), followed by LTV 1 (70%) 
and TV3 (61.5%).19
A study in 2006 found that Russians prefer Russian television channels, 
while Latvians prefer Latvian television channels, and although there are non-
Latvians who watch Latvian channels, that does not mean that they watch 
programmes that are presented in Latvian. An important discovery was that 
young Latvians also watch Russian television channels, but there is a greater 
percentage of young Russians who watch such channels than is the case in 
other age groups.20 Families in which Latvian is spoken also watch Russian 
television channels, but they prefer Latvian ones instead – first of all LNT, and 
then LTV. It was also found that Latvians watch a news programme on LTV7 
that is presented in Russian.
Among Russian news programmes, the unquestioned leader is “Latvia’s 
Time” on the First Baltic Channel. Comparative content analysis of news pro-
grammes has shown that there are different approaches to political organiza-
tions, experts, subjects and positive or negative news on the various channels. 
Russian language channels spend more time on interpreting disputed aspects of 
history than is the case with Latvian language channels. On TV5, too, journal-
ists present Soviet-era military poetry on May 9, send out congratulations to 
war veterans, etc.21
The longest-running news programme in Russian is the one on LTV7. It and 
the news programme on TV5 have similar ratings. The LTV7 news programme 
has often been changed in terms of duration and format, but there has been little 
research about its content or its influence, particularly in terms of integration.
Journalists at public broadcasting organizations are not accustomed to any 
evaluation of the quality of their work, and their reaction tends to be fairly 
harsh. The NRTC is perceived as a body which represents politicians and po-
litical parties and is not a self-regulating institution. In the background of this 
18 Lerhis et al. (2007), Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā, 
pg. 54.
19 Ibid. It has to be noted, however, that these data are very malleable. TV3 and LNT are 
fierce competitors.
20 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pp. 87–88.
21 For more on this see Kruks, S., Juzefovičs, J., Kikuste, E. and G. Kikusts (2007), ‘Ziņas 
Latvijas televīzijās. LTV1, LTV7, TV3, LNT, TV5 un PBK ziņu raidījumu satura analīze. 
2007. gada 16.–27. aprīlis.’ Riga.
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has been disagreement between the management of Latvian Television and the 
NRTC on the one hand and the news team on the other. 
Analysis of news programmes has found mistakes and shortcomings, such 
as the use of just some sources and an imbalance in viewpoints.22 An NRTC-
commissioned study showed a lack of analytical stories in news content, as well 
as a specific political direction in the news.23 It is specifically on public televi-
sion that quality, balance, a focus on different groups in society and greater 
thought about broadcasts that could serve as an integrative factor should be an 
issue. Public broadcasting organizations must have concrete programming in 
terms of content and language which speaks to all of the minorities in Latvia, 
because only then will there be a chance to think about a subscription fee col-
lected from all Latvian households. 
There has also been analysis of popular news broadcasts in Russia, look-
ing at how Latvia is presented in the Russian media and specifically in news 
programmes.24 Researchers found negative representation of Latvia, as well as 
a defence of Russian ideology and “national identity” in representing the so-
called “compatriots” in Latvia. When the Russian media do report on Latvia, 
the subjects usually focus on controversial issues which allow the media to 
present Latvia in an unattractive light – the events of March 16, court cases 
against Latvia’s “liberators”, the lack of sufficiently ceremonial presentation of 
May 9 events in the Latvian media, etc. All of this allows the Russian media 
to talk about the “rebirth of fascism” in Latvia.25
Media discourse in Russia suggests that Latvia has a homogeneous and 
uniform Russian community, one with identical socio-political problems, one 
which faces discrimination, one which is humiliated by Latvian government 
officials, and one which requires Russia’s support and assistance. Individual 
circumstances are generalized, and the media claim that there are various 
threats to which the Russian community of Latvia is subject. The boundaries 
of the community are clearly marked in ethnic terms, and links to Russia are 
presented as an important element on the agenda – one that justifies Russian 
media interest in events in Latvia.26
Students of foreign influence in Latvia have expressed concerns that this 
space is being flooded with anti-democratic and nationalist content from Russia. 
22 For more on this, see Ilze Šulmane and Sergejs Kruks (2007), ‘Plašsaziņas līdzekļi 
demokrātiskā sabiedrībā’. In Juris Rozenvalds, ed., Cik demokrātiska ir Latvija. Demokrātijas 
monitorings 2005–2007. Rīga: Zinātne, pp. 74–75.
23 See Kruks S., Juzefovičs J., Kikuste E. and G. Kikusts (2007). Ziņas…, op. cit., pg. 2.
24 Nils Muižnieks (ed.) (2008), Manufacturing Enemy Images? Russian Media Portrayal of 
Latvia. Riga: University of Latvia Press. See also Lerhis et al. (2007), Ārvalstu ietekme 
uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā.
25 Solvita Denisa (2008), ‘The Story with History.’ In Muižnieks (ed.), Manufacturing Enemy 
Images? pp. 79–107.
26 Dmitrijs Petrenko (2008), ‘How Does the Russian Community Live in Latvia?’ In Muižnieks 
(ed.), Manufacturing Enemy Images? pp. 45–77.
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It has also been argued that “media content from Russia rules the information 
space for Russians in Latvia” and that Russia’s government is making use 
of manifestations of Russian nationalism at home to produce the assumption 
that it can also hope to manipulate with the emotions of Russian speakers in 
Latvia, as well.27 These authors have noted that Russia’s support policy for 
compatriots abroad has become more intense, and they believe that this will 
have an increasingly strong effect on ethnic integration in society – an effect 
which will hinder integration.28
Media output from Russia is both accessible and popular. Unfortunately, 
there is a lack of research in Latvia to measure the true influence, to identify 
the media effects, or to seek out correlations among media choice, usage in-
tensity and the level of information, values and attitudes toward the country. 
There have been surveys focusing on what people from both language groups, 
as well as citizens and non-citizens, think about Russia, loyalty, patriotism and 
language,29 but these indirectly confirm the split in society.
There are no national policies in the area of the electronic media that might 
have an effect on the representation of integration processes on electronic chan-
nels, except for the indirect effect of awarding or refusing frequencies. Nearly 
the only way to ensure national regulations of representation and to affect 
integration processes with the help of the media is to issue regulations which 
apply to public broadcasting. LTV1 broadcasts exclusively in Latvian. LTV7 is 
a channel with sports and cultural shows, but it also broadcasts in Russian. It 
was only at the beginning of this century, when the channel was still known as 
LTV2, that it was positioned as a channel meant for the integration of minori-
ties. It presented shows intended for Russians or for people from both linguistic 
groups.30 Over the last two years the channel has shifted toward sports and 
entertainment. A more recent plan for three public television channels insists 
that “LTV7 will be focused on sports, active lifestyles and entertainment.”31
The word “integration” does not appear anywhere in the 2009 conceptual 
document on the development of public television.32 The document speaks to 
minority audiences only in terms of the radio: “The goal of Radio Latvia 4 is to 
strengthen its positions as a leader among Russian and minority audiences in all 
of Latvia, and particularly its regions, by producing high-quality informational, 
27 Lerhis et al. (2007), Ārvalstu ietekme uz sabiedrības etniskās integrācijas procesu Latvijā, 
pp. 56–57.
28 Ibid., pg. 68.
29 E.g., comparative data from SKDS that were presented at the conference “Russia’s 
Informational Influence in the Post-Soviet Space”, “Views About Patriotism,” Riga, 22 May 
2009.
30 The National Concept on the Development of Latvia’s Electronic Public Media, 2006–2008, 
pg. 8.
31 The National Concept on the Development of Latvia’s Electronic Public Media, 2009–2011, 
NRTC. See http://www.nrtp.lv/lv/padome/normativie-akti/nacionala-koncepcija.
32 Ibid.
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analytical and cultural programming. The proportion of national news will be 
increased in news reports and informational broadcasts, developing cooperation 
with the regional press, radio and television.”33 Because of the economic crisis, 
there may be substantial changes in programming. Among those projects that 
could be on the chopping block are ones which are focused on integration such 
as “Dome Square” on Radio Latvia 4.
Overall, broadcasting on minorities in the electronic public media has 
shrunk. There are several Russian language programmes such as “Сегодня”, 
“Рыбалка”, and “Криминальная информация”, but there is no more morn-
ing news show in Russian, and evening news programmes are presented only 
on weekdays. The once important broadcast “Страна.лв”, which focused on 
information and entertainment, is also gone. Analysis of ratings shows that 
the narrowing or elimination of such broadcasts led people to switch to other 
channels.
An increase in the proportion of programmes on LTV that are meant for 
non-Latvians and a broader offer in Russian might attract greater numbers of 
Russian-speakers to Latvian programming. However, from the perspective of 
competition among languages, it narrows the use of the Latvian language and 
reduces resources for original programming and films in Latvia. The logic of 
the advertising market may also focus on support for channels and programmes 
that are meant not for specific target audiences or endangered groups in soci-
ety, but instead for as large a segment of the audience as possible. That is why 
Latvia’s commercial channels offer so many programmes, films and broadcasts 
in Russian and from Russia. Their quality is not always the best because of 
commercial considerations, and here we are not even looking at the facts, values 
and lifestyles which they represent.
The Press
In the late 1990s, the number of non-Latvian readers of the Latvian daily 
press had a tendency to increase. In the early 2000s, the share of the non-Latvian 
audience was proportionally higher than had been the case in the 1990s, but 
then came confrontations over education reforms, and the trend was reversed.
More Latvians read Russian publications than non-Latvians read Latvian 
ones. There is greater interest in thematic and specialized publications – the 
business dailies and women’s magazines. The differences are even greater in 
terms of citizens and non-citizens who read the daily newspapers – Diena has 
a slightly larger share of non-citizen readers, while their numbers for other 
newspapers are negligible. Among Russian language dailies, Vesti Segodnya 
has always had the largest share of non-citizen readers, while Telegraf has been 
read more by citizens. Up until 2003, the proportion of non-citizens for all three 
33 Ibid.
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Russian language dailies was on the rise. Magazines have been affected less 
by political confrontations, and the share of citizens who read such magazines 
has remained largely unchanged.34
According to a study on integration, 87% of citizens and 85% of non-
citizens read at least one press publication, and magazines had the largest 
share of readers. Among newspapers, the largest proportion of citizens (27%) 
reads Diena and local newspapers, while among non-citizens, the most popular 
newspapers at that time were Chas (21%), Vesti Segodnya (19%), and local 
newspapers (16%). This suggests that the local press, which is less politicized, 
might be a factor in the integration of non-citizens, helping them to develop 
stronger identification with a specific territory.
Over the last four years, Latvian and especially Russian language dailies 
have seen subscription and circulation numbers drop. Over the course of those 
years, Chas lost half of its subscribers – from 14,313 in January 2006 to 6,464 
in January 2009.35 The leader in terms of subscription numbers at the begin-
ning of 2009 was Vesti Segodnya, which is published by the Fenster publishing 
house and had 12,920 subscribers on January 1 of that year. That was half as 
many readers as the leading Latvian dailies – Latvijas Avīze and Diena. The 
smallest readership is that of Telegraf, although the numbers have increased 
since a change in ownership at the newspaper.36
Several Chas journalists were candidates in the 9th Saeima election in 
2006. Among them was the newspaper’s editor. Also on a candidate list was 
the publisher of Vesti Segodnya. This had a very clear effect on the content of 
the newspapers, which printed much information about the relevant party pro-
grammes and sought to polish up the image of the candidates. The newspapers 
focused on issues raised by “Russian parties” and the electorate toward which 
those messages were addressed. Still, the intensive publicity for the journalists 
who were candidates did not ensure their election.37
A successful example of an integrative source of information is the afore-
mentioned free newspaper 5 min. It has been very popular among both Latvians 
and Russian-speakers, and from the perspective of integration, that is of funda-
mental importance in that both communities receive the same information. A 
similar role is performed by the official newspaper Latvijas Vēstnesis, which 
ensures that members of both communities have access to laws and decisions.
34 This is starting to worry some Latvians, as seen in reader comments attached to a blog by 
Dmitrijs Mironovs on the Internet portal of the newspaper Diena. See http://www.diena.
lv/lat/tautas_balss/blog/dmitrijs-mironovs/tv-un-latvija?comments=3#comments. 
35 See Kruks and Šulmane (2005), ‘Plašsaziņas līdzekļi demokrātiskā sabiedrībā,’ 
pp. 137–151.
36 For newspaper subscription data, see http://www.leta.lv/search/?phase=abon%C4%93%C
5%A1%2A&id-25E119D9-8980-4199-BE13-BE9003A20B19. 
37 Ibid.
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Latvijas Avīze and Vesti Segodnya feed off one another, making reference to 
each other’s content and criticizing it. Press reviews, no matter how combative 
they might be, often offer the only chance for a reader to find out what has 
been said in the media environment of the other language. Only Radio Latvia 
offers press reviews which discuss the most important elements of the agenda 
of daily newspapers in both languages.
Writing about the Russian language press in Latvia, Zagorovska and 
Šudņevs have argued that “it has become an important phenomenon in public 
opinion, and it increasingly influences political processes in the country.” They 
add that “this is the only way in which Latvia’s Russian-speakers can express 
their views to the government and their attitudes about what is happening in 
this country.”38 One might agree with this judgment if it was applied only to 
non-citizens. The role of the Russian language press is contradictory. Some 
have claimed that “the Russian language press is not politically engaged, and it 
has no interests related to the pursuit of power,” but then there is also the idea 
that leftist politicians are the ones who defend the interests of Russian read-
ers. Authors proudly note that the newspaper Chas is in a global association 
of Russian press publications, which means that it does not isolate itself and 
instead moves into a new arena.39 The president of the Petits publishing house, 
Aleksejs Šeiņins has also written that he is proud of the local Russian press as 
a unique and self-sufficient phenomenon – one that is an independent business 
which competes in the advertising market.40
The Internet
In 2005 it was found that the audience of Internet portals is far more diverse 
than that of the press. The share of non-citizens who use Latvian language 
portals is similar to the proportion who read Latvian newspapers (5–9%), and 
regarding the linguistic divide, one finds that these Latvian media outlets – 
Delfi.lv, Apollo.lv and Tvnet.lv – have larger shares of the non-Latvian audi-
ence. A study conducted in 2003 about the audience of Internet portals over 
the course of seven days, for instance, found that the non-Latvian audience for 
the three aforementioned portals was 23%, 19% and 17%, respectively. 30% of 
the readers of the Russian version of Delfi, in turn, are Latvians. The Internet 
version of the newspaper Diena attracts about as large a share of non-Latvians 
as the newspaper itself does, although in absolute terms, the number of the 
readers of the newspaper is far smaller.
38 On the other hand, a journalist from the PBK television channel and his party did win 
election to Parliament, which apparently shows that for Russian-speakers, the most important 
source of information is television.
39 K. Zagorovska, P. Šudņevs (2006), ‘Krievu preses fenomens Latvijā,’ in Inta Brikše (ed.), 
Informācijas vide Latvijā: 21. gs. sākums. Rīga: Zinātne, pp. 167–169.
40 Ibid., pp. 174–175.
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Citizens cited the Internet as a source of information twice as often as 
others did. Delfi.lv is visited by approximately one-third of citizens and 16% 
of non-citizens. The portal is visited by speakers of both languages, and the 
Latvian version attracts a larger audience. Articles which have led to the harsh-
est debates and concern topics that are worrisome to people in both linguistic 
groups receive comments both in Latvian and in Russian on both versions of 
the portal. The same comments are often posted on the Latvian and the Russian 
site, and this is one of the few areas of the public media in which “they” and 
“we” come together to avoid unilateral monologues. 
The public policy centre Providus has established a database related to 
public policy on the Politika.lv portal. The database is in Latvian and English, 
and it contains sections on media criticism and social integration. Articles in 
the database focus on integration, media practices related to diversity, research 
results, evaluation thereof, and reader comments. The portal also presents 
interviews with foreign experts and politicians on integration policies and mi-
norities.41 There are also studies as to how migration affects ethnic relations in 
Latvia, the integration of immigrants in Latvia and Poland, and integration of 
new members of society.42 The portal presents the idea that Latvia needs new 
myths which do not promote the consolidation of the electorate of a single 
political party or a merger on the basis of ethnic principles, but instead ones 
which can bring the people of Latvia together.43 The portal also includes blogs 
in which authors discuss integration, the interpretation of history and memo-
rial dates.
The portal Dialogi.lv presents articles in both languages. It offers a 
“Tolerance Library” related to integration issues. There is also a Good Will 
Memorandum that was signed on November 10, 2008, and was published on 
Tolerance Day on November 13. The discussion here has to do with aspects 
of multiculturalism, the integration of disabled people and the unemployed, as 
well as the rights of homosexuals.44 Dialogi.lv is valuable in that it offers the 
same information in both languages, and that may promote discussions in both 
languages, as well. These two portals, along with other Internet resources, play 
a role in the identification, discussion and analysis of integration problems and 
processes.
41 Aleksejs Šeiņins (2003), ‘Krievu prese – Latvijas fenomens,’ in Ābrams Kleckins (ed.), 
Dienas kārtība Latvijai 2004. Rīga: Baltijas forums, pp. 343–346.
42 An example is an interview with Paresh Solanki, presented under the title ‘Minorities 
Need Good Marketing.’ See http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=16787.
43 See ‘Migrācijas ietekme uz etniskajām attiecībām Latvijā’, http://www.politika.lv/index.
php?id=16689. See also ‘Mācāmies uzņemt. Imigrantu integrācija Latvijā un Polijā’, http://
www.politika.lv/index.php?id=16691. See also ‘Jauno sabiedrības locekļu integrācija’, 
http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id=15697. 
44 See http://www.dialogi.lv/article_new.php?id=2787.
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Portals that are visited by the masses, as opposed to specialists, play a 
positive role in that they present different views, ideologies and values, allow 
representatives of various ethnic groups to intermingle, offer a place for dis-
putes and dialogues, and make it possible to use both languages, as in real life. 
On the other hand, comments are left anonymously, and irresponsible people 
leave comments which offend. In this sense, these portals offer a platform for 
polarization of viewpoints, and this can promote both intolerance and disinte-
gration.
The Effect of Journalistic Culture on Media Texts
A quantitative and qualitative study of journalists45 conducted in 1998 
shows that journalists, particularly those who work for daily newspapers, have 
diverse opinions as to their role. People working for Latvian newspapers say 
that they are active and want to influence processes. They are more likely to 
emphasize their role as objective analysts of events and organizers of public 
debates. Russian journalists see themselves as fighters for a “Russian renais-
sance,” as representatives of the Russian community and of non-citizens, and 
as participants in and organizers of political and protest campaigns. Journalists 
at Russian language newspapers openly admit that they provide support to the 
largest so-called Slavic parties in advance of elections.
The description of direct competitors and, particularly, of daily newspapers 
published in the other language, is contradictory and diverse. One can identify 
various attitudes among journalists vis-à-vis professional values such as neu-
trality, the separation of fact from opinion, etc. Sometimes observers claim that 
there are different traditions and practices in Latvian and Russian journalism. 
There are radical differences in the attitudes of journalists vis-à-vis the ethical 
issue of conflicts of interest. Specifically, this has to do with journalists who are 
simultaneously candidates for public office or active politicians. The practice 
has mostly been denounced in interviews conducted by Latvian journalists.46
There have been positive trends, including in the training of journalists, 
an increasing number of whom are bilingual and can use sources of informa-
tion from both linguistic environments and work for media in both languages. 
Accented Latvian can also be heard more often on the radio. A popular LTV 
45 The results of a survey conducted in late 1998 by Ilze Šulmane. See Ilze Šulmane (2000), 
‘Latvijas žurnālisti gadsimta beigās: Socioloģiskas aptaujas rezultāti,’ in Daudzveidība II 
(Diversity II). Riga: University of Latvia Department of Communications Studies. See 
also Ainārs Dimants (2004), Pašcenzūra pret paškontroli Latvijas presē: mediju pētījuma 
atklājumi. Valmiera: Vidzeme University College.
46 Ilze Šulmane (2007), ‘Kurš uzraudzīs sargsuni: nacionālo dienas laikrakstu žurnālistu 
attieksme pret profesionālo ētiku Saeimas vēlēšanu kontekstā.’ In Skaidrīte Lasmane (ed.), 
Politiskā komunikācija, ētika un kultūra Latvijas Republikas 9. Saeimas vēlēšanās. Riga: 
LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, pp. 207–222.
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soap opera, “The Price of Senselessness” features characters that communicate 
in both languages, engage in inter-ethnic marriage, represent reality, and both 
break and, sometimes, reproduce stereotypes.47 Language skills alone, however, 
do not indicate any commonality or similarity in views or values.
The Role of Media Content in Integration and 
Disintegration
The media situation in Latvia features external diversity and pluralism. 
There are many different press publications, television and radio channels, and 
the Internet, all of which ensure the appearance in the public arena of opposing 
ideas, viewpoints and ideologies. However, most people have neither the time 
nor the resources to make use of several or many sources of information so as 
to learn what other thoughts exist in the public arena. Typical in the Latvian 
media at this time are polarization and a lack of internal diversity. It is not too 
often that a television channel or programme, a newspaper or magazine, or even 
a single article offers a balanced and equal description of various views.
Content analysis of the media has long since shown that the agenda is 
different for the media outlets of the two languages. This is a trend that has 
remained quite stable over the course of time.48 The main issues may be the 
same, but their framing can be very different. The widely discussed “umbrella 
revolution” of 2007, for instance, was presented in Russian language news-
papers largely as an “ethnic Latvian” protest or a provocation directed by the 
US embassy. In Latvian language newspapers, by contrast, the protests were 
presented as a rebirth of the nation.49
Differences in the presentation and interpretation of various events can be 
seen in relation to domestic politics. The Latvian and Russian press have very 
different interpretations of Latvia’s declaration of independence, its citizenship 
law, the national language law, education reforms,50 attitudes vis-à-vis the EU 
and NATO, the National Development Plan, etc. There are also different views 
on economic matters such as possible energy sources, banks, the construction 
of the Latvian National Library, etc. 
47 Because of the financial crisis in Latvia and a lack of support on the part of LTV management, 
the soap opera was renamed and moved to a private television channel.
48 Brigita Zepa et al. (2005). Etnopolitiskā spriedze Latvijā: konflikta risinājuma meklējumi. 
Rīga: BISS, pp. 57–70.
49 For more on this, see Solvita Denisa, ‘Nerussky bunt,’ available at http://www.politika.
lv/index.php?id=14804.
50 For more on this, see Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas.
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Analysis of Latvia’s two most recent parliamentary elections51 shows that 
the views and messages of politicians and the media are separate in the two 
linguistic arenas. This relates to the choice of a media outlet for political ad-
vertising and also the editorial content of the various media, focused mostly 
on ethnic or linguistic aspects of their target audiences. In the 2009 European 
Parliament and local government elections, for the first time, a “non-Slavic” 
party campaigned very actively in the Russian language media and published in-
formation about itself in both languages.52 Here the attempt has been to address 
the Russian-speaking electorate, with intensive use of outdoor advertising.
A comparison of media and political messages shows that the frameworks 
of various political forces in election campaigns are openly presented in the 
Russian national press, which positions itself as a participant, allows political 
actors to present their messages without any critique at all, and identifies itself 
with the Russian-speaking community. The Latvian language press, by contrast, 
is less likely to take part in party politics, preserving a certain distance as an 
observer.53
There are also substantial differences in opinions in the Latvian and the 
Russian media on foreign policy issues such as attitudes toward the United 
States, the war in Iraq, Kosovo, etc. When the Russian-Georgian war erupted, 
a battle of interpretations started in the Latvian media. Journalists had diametri-
cally opposite views of the conflict, and depending on the language in which 
the relevant publication was published, journalists actively tried to identify 
“comrades” and “enemies” in the Georgian conflict.54
There are also differences related to whether Latvia should be focused 
toward the East or the West, what its relationship with Russia should be like, 
and who exactly Stalin was and Vladimir Putin is. The presentation of issues 
related to history, collective memory, collective myths and dates of com-
memoration has, for a long time, been used by the media of both languages 
as an effective means for evoking an emotional response and splitting society. 
51 For the 2002 election, see Sergejs Kruks and Ilze Šulmane (2002), Pilsoniskās sabiedrības 
attīstība un sabiedrības integrācija: 8. Saeimas priekšvēlēšanu kampaņas preses un politiķu 
diskurss. Rīga: SIA JUMI, pp. 3–103; for the 2006 election campaign, see Inta Brikše and 
Vita Zelče (eds.) (2007), Latvijas Republikas 9. Saeimas vēlēšanu kampaņa: priekšvēlēšanu 
publiskā telpa. Rīga: Zinātne.
52 The reference is to the First Party of Latvia/Latvia’s Way (LPP/LC), whose leader, Ainārs 
Šlesers, invested heavily in his ultimately unsuccessful campaign to become the mayor of 
the Latvian capital city of Rīga. His party placed advertising in both Latvian and Russian 
language publications and on television channels watched by both Latvians and non-
Latvians.
53 Inta Brikše (2007), ‘Preses rāmējumi 9. Saeimas priekšvēlēšanu komunikācijā’. In Brikše 
and Zelče (eds.), Latvijas Republikas 9. Saeimas vēlēšanu kampaņa: priekšvēlēšanu publiskā 
telpa, pp. 15–106.
54 Z. Gorbušina ‘Interpretāciju karš’, available at http://www.politika.lv/index.php?id-
=16725.
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Of importance in the public arena has been the discourse of liberation and oc-
cupation. Views about what happened in Latvia in 1940 are completely polar-
ized, although there have been some periods in which they have drawn closer 
together. Politicians use these differing experiences, collective memories, and 
views about history to engage in public political bargaining – the status of the 
Russian language as an official minority language, the ability of children to 
pursue their education in Russian, and the awarding of citizenship are all offered 
in “trade” for a recognition of the fact of the occupation.55
Then there are dates of commemoration such as March 16, when the World 
War II-era Latvian Legion is commemorated, May 9, when the end of World 
War II is remembered, and March 25, when, in 1949, there were mass deporta-
tions of Latvia’s residents to Siberia. Confrontational discourse on these dates 
appears year after year, with particularly intense debates during campaign 
season. One example is a member of Parliament for PCTVL (For Human Rights 
in a United Latvia) who is also a working journalist and absolutely rejects the 
historical nature of Latvia’s statehood.56 A study of how various events have 
been presented in the media over a longer period of time suggests that the exac-
erbation of different views in the media has to do not only with domestic politi-
cal circumstances, but also with the results of influence by external factors.57
When it comes to culture, there are differences in the two types of media. 
Russian language newspapers in Latvia print columns and inserts with content 
that has been created in Russia or that is republished from Russian newspapers. 
That is advantageous from a business perspective, and it may be that the target 
audience is interested in such content, but this strengthens and maintains two 
completely different information worlds in Latvia. Publications from Russia as 
such are not particularly popular, and few people in Latvia subscribe to them. 
Local and national events in Latvia, meanwhile, are insufficiently reported 
and analysed in the Russian language press, even though non-Latvians attend 
performances at the New Riga Theatre and at the Latvian National Opera. A 
similar situation exists in Latvia’s regions. Survey data show that the Russian 
language media have little or nothing to say about important aspects of culture 
in Latvia. The Latvian press, for its part, sometimes ignores important cultural 
events if the performers in question come from Russia.58
Because the media focus on popular culture and sometimes provide prod-
ucts that are cheaper (e.g., rebroadcasting of cultural programmes from Russia 
55 For more on what Harmony Centre chairman Nils Ušakovs has said on the Internet, see 
Vita Zelče (2007), ‘Vēsture un 9. Saeimas vēlēšanas.’ In Brikše and Zelče (2007), Latvijas 
Republikas 9. Saeimas vēlēšanu kampaņa: priekšvēlēšanu publiskā telpa, pg. 208.
56 Ibid.
57 An example of this is that at the international level, Russia insists that the date when the 
Latvian Legion is commemorated represents a “rebirth of fascism” in Latvia.
58 See Aivars Tabuns (ed.) (2006), Kultūras. Jaunieši. Mediji. Riga: University of Latvia, 
pp. 28–31 and 49–53.
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or the United States), the public media should offer programmes which present 
local achievements in culture and the arts, not just among Latvians, but among 
Russians and others as well. They should not merely present Russian (usually 
classical Russian) culture.
Content analysis has shown that in the traditional media and the press, 
statements which foment ethnic hatred and biases are uncommon, but they 
are very common in comments left by readers of Internet portals. Stereotypes 
most often relate to political evaluations and identification.59 Intolerant or stere-
otypical statements about Latvians or Russians usually appear in the context 
of specific political forces or groups with specific views.60 As such statements 
accumulate, hatred toward an entire nation can be established, even though 
the public criticisms may well apply to Latvian politicians, for instance, not 
the Latvian nation and people. There have also been new stereotypes in both 
media worlds. One example includes the idea that newly naturalized citizens 
are a unified community.61
The mass press tends to report on extremes, and that is why there is a dis-
proportionate presentation of the views of radicals on both sides. The Latvian 
press, for instance, rarely reports on Russians who speak several languages, 
are satisfied with life, are not waiting for Russia to protect them, and do not 
support Russian policies. Similarly there are few articles which demonstrate an 
understanding of the subjective feelings of a Russian born in Latvia who has 
to prove his/her knowledge about history or language. The Russian language 
press, for its part, has never reported on the fate of a member of the Latvian 
Legion, or any understanding of the limited ability of Latvians to speak their 
native language in Latvia’s capital city.
On the Internet, there are often hostile descriptions such as “damn Rus-
sians,” “Nazis,” “rebirth of fascism,” “Moscow’s hand,” “fifth column” and 
“nationalist radicals.” Many commentators criticize those who produce this 
intolerant discourse and demand that they be isolated from the portals in ques-
tion, but the overall flow of anonymous comments demonstrates a fairly high 
level of intolerance toward those who have different opinions.
The demonstration on January 13, 2009, and the riot in Old Riga which 
followed were not represented in media discourse as an ethnic conflict, perhaps 
specifically because the event represented a departure from Latvia’s accustomed 
59 Ilze Šulmane and Sergejs Kruks (2002), ‘Ethnic and Political Stereotypes in the Latvian and 
Russian Press in Latvia’, Humanities and Social Sciences, Latvia, No. 1(34), pp. 71–90.
60 Ilze Šulmane and Sergejs Kruks (2006). Neiecietības izpausmes un iecietības veicināšana 
Latvijā: Laikrakstu publikāciju un politiskā diskursa analīze (Diena, Neatkarīgā, Latvijas 
Avīze, Vakara Ziņas, Telegraf, Čas, Vesti Segodniya). Riga, pp. 4–128.
61 For more, see Dmitrijs Petrenko (2007), ‘Pilsonības naratīvs 9. Saeimas priekšvēlēšanu 
kampaņā’. In Brikše and Zelče (eds.) Latvijas Republikas 9. Saeimas vēlēšanu kampaņa: 
priekšvēlēšanu publiskā telpa, pp. 167–180.
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culture of peaceful demonstrations.62 Media polarization was seen in advance of 
the May 9 events in 2009, particularly in the context of approaching elections. 
Polarization is by no means linked exclusively to the language of the relevant 
media outlet. An example here is attitudes toward sexual minorities. Reporting 
on Latvia’s gay pride events, which are known as “Friendship Days,” tends to 
be similar in media outlets in both languages, and it often differs only in terms 
of whether traditionally conservative or liberal values are being defended.
The Latvian media give voice to people with very different views. This 
is a good thing from the perspective of individual rights and freedoms, and it 
promotes the development and representation of a diversity of individual identi-
ties. At the same time, however, this can also hinder the emergence of a civil 
society that is unified and based on common fundamental values.
Regulation and Self-Regulation
Legal regulations concerning the media in Latvia are usually in line with 
European Union requirements. In a study on the subject of limitations to 
freedom of speech on inciting hatred,63 Kučs argues that courts in Latvia are 
increasingly taking into account the principles developed by the European Court 
of Human Rights. Examples include the separation of opinion from news report-
ing. However, ensuring this may be quite difficult, because not all of Latvia’s 
press publications observe these principles. The failure to separate among 
genres and the habit of journalists of expressing subjective and emotional judg-
ments makes it hard for experts to analyse this process of separation in cases 
when it must be decided whether a statement in the media has been libellous.
There are still legal regulations which excessively limit freedom of speech 
by failing to take into account whether a disputed statement has been factual 
or an opinion. Courts evaluate statements grammatically, without taking into 
account the context of the article or series of articles. It is quite easy in Latvia 
to sue a journalist even if he has simply quoted the views of a government of-
ficial, as opposed to making the offensive statement himself. Journalists from 
regional newspapers have reported that this is the case.64
Prior to 2003, the Latvian Security Police launched only a few criminal 
investigations of racial intolerance or speech which foments discrimination, 
Kučs reports, adding that such cases were a fairly new phenomenon in court 
practice. He also emphasizes how important it is to inform the public, also 
62 The events of January 13 were described differently in the media – “revolution of eggs” (Vesti 
Segodnya), “revolution of empty bottles” (Chas), “revolution of penguins” (Neatkarīgā), 
“liquored-up revolution” (Diena) and “paving stone revolution” (Telegraf).
63 Artūrs Kučs (2004), Vārda brīvības robežas: goda un cieņas aizskaršana, naida kurināšana. 
Riga: Nordik, pg. 7.
64 Kruks and Šulmane (2005), ‘Plašsaziņas līdzekļi demokrātiskā sabiedrībā’.
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speaking to the role and responsibility of the media in promoting tolerance and 
in disseminating negative stereotypes.
Latvia has no press council or ombudsman to oversee the process and inter-
vene in those cases when the media publish information which offends a race, 
nationality, minority or religious group, thus hindering public debate about the 
validity of a complaint. Such a debate would make it possible to review cases of 
negative practices and to publish analysis and judgments about disputed issues, 
thus educating the public at large, as well as the community of journalists. The 
Latvian Association of Journalists has been insufficiently active in the area of 
self-regulation and internal critique. Only the Latvian Association of Publish-
ers has organized training and seminars for editors to discuss the two separate 
information spaces and the different culture of journalists, as well as the role of 
diversity and pluralism in the media. However, there have been cases in which 
advertising which may contain racially offensive discourse has been cancelled. 
Such incidents are reviewed by the industry’s self-regulatory institutions, and 
discussions about them also appear in the press.
In a 2008 survey, the SKDS company posed this question: “Should offen-
sive or inappropriate comments on the Internet be erased (censored)?” More 
than 60% of respondents said yes, 11% said no, and answers among Russians 
and Latvians were quite similar (5% more Latvians than Russians agreed with 
the statement). Non-citizens were slightly more likely than citizens to agree that 
offensive comments should be erased (69% versus 64%). Another question was 
this: “As long as a journalist observes the law, should he be free to do whatever 
he wants?” 42% of Latvians and 35% of Russians answered in the positive.
Many media outlets in Latvia have signed up to a declaration on tolerance 
on the Internet, which calls for the erasing of any statements which foment 
hatred. However, hostile discourse in that environment has not been reduced. 
Commentators often complain that statements which foment hatred or offend 
an individual are not being erased sufficiently or quickly enough, while others 
have accused the management of the various portals of limiting freedom of 
speech. As the proportion of user-created content in the media increases, the 
issue of the level of responsibility of the author or publisher of the relevant 
text has come to the fore. 
An Evaluation of the Role of the Media
The aforementioned BISS study contains important insights about what 
media consumers, politicians and representatives of public organizations think 
about the role of the media in the integration process. Participants in focus 
group discussions said that because of the two separate media arenas in Latvia, 
there are different interpretations of reality, and these are different than the 
reality which respondents encounter on an everyday basis:
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 There’s no conflict at the everyday level, but if you open up a newspaper, 
it’s there, if you close the newspaper it’s gone. If you switch on the TV, 
it’s there, but if you switch it off, it’s gone.65
Similar views in this regard were expressed by Russian and Latvian focus 
group participants. The conclusion was that different media outlets present dif-
ferent kinds of propaganda, and so one media outlet or channel is not enough to 
understand what is happening. The researchers found that most respondents had 
negative opinions about the role of the mass media in the area of integration.
Representatives of non-governmental organizations said that the media 
promote a polarization of views, use integration issues to sell their product, 
mostly publish negative information, serve the interests of political parties, and 
promote ethnic mobilization. Respondents also said that representatives of the 
radical organizations are most likely to be satisfied with the current situation 
in the media arena.66
Both ordinary individuals and politicians said in interviews that the media 
do have a role to play in the area of integration. Many spoke of the influence 
of foreign television channels, cable TV and the Russian media.67 Representa-
tives of political parties emphasized the role of the media in shaping of public 
opinion and defining the agenda. They argued that the press writes about politi-
cally sensitive issues in a very diverse way, while the Russian language daily 
press mostly reports on events in Russia, thus strengthening the identification 
of readers with Russia, not Latvia. Several respondents said that the Russian 
language press is closely linked to politics in Moscow.68
Representatives of some parties complained that certain newspapers and 
public TV do not give them a platform.69 Asked which newspapers are most 
intolerant, they pointed to Latvijas Avīze among Latvian and Chas and Vesti 
Segodnya among Russian language newspapers. The arguments, however, were 
based on who was talking. Some respondents, for instance, said that Latvijas 
Avīze is the only one which upholds the self-confidence of ethnic Latvians and 
defends their rights.
Politicians also pointed to the fact that the media are private enterprises, 
that they are interested in their business, that they express the views of editors 
and owners, not the public at large, and that “no one pays anything” for the 
presentation of integration issues, so they are not presented at all.70 Asked what 
to do in order to ensure that the media promote social integration, respondents 
suggested the establishment of a new media outlet with the support of the 
65 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 88.
66 Ibid., pp. 208–210.
67 Ibid., pg. 226.
68 Ibid., pp. 239–242.
69 Ibid., pp. 241–242.
70 Ibid., pg. 241.
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state or non-governmental organizations, while others proposed that govern-
ment financing be provided for special articles in newspapers or broadcasts on 
TV. Still others called for the establishment of a media regulator to ensure the 
independence of positions taken.71 
A study focused on culture, young people and the media72 found that even 
if the issue is an ideologically neutral sphere such as culture, there are still very 
different representations. It is hard to receive the same information if one only 
consumes the media in one language. Young people and experts criticized the 
media, insisting that the cultural spaces are very different, and that the media 
business maintains this split because integration is not a business project. Ex-
perts also said that communications between Latvians and non-Latvians could 
be facilitated with bilingual publications and broadcast programmes.73
A fundamental element in the process of language learning is an understand-
ing of culture. Positive attitudes toward less familiar cultures can be facilitated 
through study, comparing types of rituals (weddings, funerals) and forms of ad-
dress.74 This might be one of the most important jobs for television – explaining 
and describing this so as to establish a socially open and unified society which 
accepts the coexistence of different cultures.
A report from an EU working group on multilingualism noted that the rapid 
rebirth of regional languages shows that people are happy to learn new lan-
guages if the motivation is clear. The authors point to Finland, where the media 
encourage people to learn languages. Methods include “educational leisure,” for 
instance, which is very different from standard educational techniques.75
In Latvia, choices or changes related to language, particularly in the public 
arena and in the media, are not just a matter of communications. For the most 
part, they relate to manifestations of power and expressions of identity. Sensitive 
issues related to language use appear regularly in the media of both languages, 
with concerns expressed about a decline in the quality of both languages, about 
the demonstrative refusal to speak one or the other language in contacts with 
clients, and about imprecision in the translation of people’s surnames.76
71 Ibid., pg. 243.
72 Tabuns (ed.), Kultūras. Jaunieši. Mediji.
73 Ibid., pg. 103–106.
74 Baker C. (2002) Foundations of Bilingualism and Bilingual Education (Latvian translation). 
Riga: Nordik, pg. 237. 
75 See http://ec.europa.eu/education/languages/archive/doc/multishort_lv.pdf. 
76 This latter issue is often discussed in the Russian press, ignoring the fact that both languages 
are similar in this regard, and proper nouns from other languages are pronounced in a 
different way. This is a linguistic issue which should be addressed by both communities 
together.
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Participation
Public participation is most often manifested through protests, but it is 
less common to be involved in other ways – voting in elections, working for 
NGOs, meeting with members of Parliament, or approaching the mass media. 
In one survey, only 90 of 1,200 respondents said that they had contacted the 
media in this regard, and even fewer had ever met with civil servants, MPs or 
government ministers.77
A survey conducted in November 2008 to find out how respondents partici-
pate in the preparation of media content and what reciprocal links there are in 
this process found that more than half of respondents (55%) had never called 
a newspaper, written a letter, or left comments on the Internet. Russians (59%) 
and non-citizens (74%) were more likely to give that answer than Latvians and 
citizens. In comparing various forms of participation, differences are even more 
distinct in an area such as the posting of photographs or videos on the Internet – 
only 27% of citizens and 14% of non-citizens reported having done so.
If we look at these data from the regional perspective, we find no direct 
relationship to the availability of the media (the Internet). Activities such as 
blogging, chatting, posting of videos on portals, and telephone votes are not 
the provenance of people in Riga and its metropolitan area alone – respondents 
from regions where Internet coverage is weaker also do the same. People in 
Riga, however, are dominant when it comes to writing letters to the editor and 
ringing newspapers and other media outlets.
Journalists from the Russian language press say that they are more con-
cerned about ordinary people and that they are closer to the people. The re-
ciprocal link of letters to the editor, however, is not too common in this media 
segment. The number of letters and reports on phone calls from the audience 
has declined both among the Latvian and the Russian language media. Instead 
there is often republication of comments left on the relevant newspaper’s In-
ternet site, and because such comments are usually anonymous, they tend to 
be more confrontational.
Overall, public influence on media content is not too substantial. Local 
residents do have the right to receive a written response from the media to 
criticisms that have been levelled. They do not, however, have any influence on 
the content of public radio and television programming. Viewers and consumer 
77 AC Konsultācijas (2008), Kvantitatīvs un kvalitatīvs pētījums par sabiedrības integrācijas 
un pilsonības aktuālajiem aspektiem. Riga: Īpašu uzdevumu ministra sabiedrības integrācijas 
lietās sekretariāts. 
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organizations do not participate in decision-making, as opposed to the case in 
certain West European countries.78
The process of filing complaints with media organizations is largely an in-
dividual process, because there are no active organizations which seek to influ-
ence media content. Because there are few activities on the part of the audience, 
the media do not involve viewers in an evaluation of programming – something 
that would help to learn the views of different groups in society while allowing 
such groups to become more visible in media content.
Conclusions and Recommendations
In methodological terms, it is difficult to differentiate between the role 
and responsibility of the media in promoting processes of integration and dis-
integration and those of other actors such as political parties, NGOs and the 
educational system. Latvia’s media structure ensures good access to speakers 
of Latvian and Russian, but the voices of smaller ethnic groups are hardly ever 
heard. In terms of ideology and content, there are two separate information 
spaces which offer different political agendas and actors, different collective 
memories, different views about the future, and different values, as well. 
The commercialization of the media, political parallelism and the exist-
ence of two different information spaces maintain external diversity and the 
representation of different voices, but internal diversity within a single media 
outlet has not been systematically ensured. Without unified ethical norms and 
a common journalistic culture with effective self-regulation mechanisms, and 
with harsher competition among media outlets even in the same language, the 
autonomy of journalists and professional values such as high-quality, analytical 
and balanced journalism cannot be fully manifested, and that probably has a 
disintegrating effect on society.
The agenda of the media, and particularly the press, is dominated by politi-
cal news, and there is little attention to the everyday practices and dialogues 
of people in society. Co-existence is positively assessed by researchers who 
study ethnic tensions, but this is a matter which is represented in the media in 
a fairly fragmentary way.
Competition among so-called rightist parties makes them and the media 
outlets which support them compete amongst themselves, while the so-called 
Slavic parties and the media which support them serve to consolidate the Russian-
78 For instance, there is an audience council in Austria. Representatives of viewer organizations 
serve on the councils of broadcasting organizations in Luxembourg, Portugal and the 
Netherlands. The situation in other countries in Eastern and Central Europe is worse. See 
Holznagel B. and Jungleisch C. (2007), ‘The Protection of Viewer Rights in Europe.’ In 
Baldi P. and Hasebrink U. (eds.), Broadcasters and Citizens in Europe. Trends in Media 
Accountability and Viewer Participation. Bristol: Intellect, pp. 53–74.
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speaking audience. The “normalization” which emerged in advance of educational 
reforms has given way to a greater proportion of polarized messages.
The effects of politics in Russia can also be seen in the media arena. As 
political and economic confrontations increase, the media start to produce 
harsher representations of March 16 and May 9, and the discourse about a 
“rebirth of fascism” (which has no confirmation in public opinion surveys) 
becomes more active. This, along with mistakes made by Latvian politicians, 
does not promote integration. 
The economic crisis may mean that national issues and historical confronta-
tions might become less important on the agenda, but crisis traditionally leads 
people to seek out scapegoats, and since a general election is approaching, 
members of the political elite are staking out their positions. This brings up 
subjects that split up voters and audiences to an even greater degree.
There has been no public debate about how to reduce the effects and role 
of the Russian information space and its propaganda in processes of integration 
and disintegration, and Latvian media outlets have not identified policy options. 
There has also been no serious research into media effects from Russia. Other 
important areas of research – the effects of the media on the public agenda, 
information, and changes in attitudes and opinions on specific issues – have 
not been sufficiently developed. The possibly disintegrating role of the media 
is rooted less in the activities of the media themselves, and more in the rep-
resentation of the existing situation and the consequences of factors which lie 
outside of the media themselves.
What should be done to ensure that the media help to integrate society?
1) There must be courses at schools which teach young people to use the 
media. This might reduce negative effects, because teachers can talk about how 
stereotypes emerge, how important the choice of information sources is, and 
how specific problems are framed.
2) There is a need for publications or at least sections of Internet portals 
which engage in a critique of the media. There should also be a professional 
publication for media employees to ensure a reciprocal link, along with media 
critique. This would enhance the responsibility of the media, and the community 
of journalists could discuss questionable practice and ethical dilemmas which 
help to disintegrate the audience.
3) Programmes and public media broadcasts which promote civil society 
and social integration must be planned, financed and produced, ensuring that the 
needs of specific groups in society are met and that these groups have access 
to the media.
4) Media policy must define steps to be taken toward a greater sense of 
security and belief that a group’s interests are being taken into account. This 
applies both to the majority and to minorities.
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5) An attractive language teaching programme is needed on TV, along with 
programmes for young people in which speakers of both languages interact 
(competitions on knowledge and skills, games, etc.). 
6) There should also be broadcasts which have basic information about 
Latvia, its geography, culture, history and distinguished individuals (both Latvi-
ans and non-Latvians). These would be meant for recent immigrants and for 
people who are poorly integrated into the Latvian environment – non-citizens 
and older people.
7) The status of public broadcasting organizations should be clarified and 
their dependency on state financing should be reduced, to help ensure the sur-
vival of public broadcasting in Latvia.
8) The public media should set aside broadcasting time on specific days 
and at specific times for public discussions, messages from local residents and 
NGOs, and programmes in minority languages (with subtitles on television).
9) The public and other media must promote themselves in the media outlets 
of the other language so that people learn about what is on offer, and audiences 
become larger. This would bring together the fairly limited information and 
cultural spaces in Latvia.
10) The scientific potential and resources of the Latvian media and interdis-
ciplinary sectors must be coordinated so as to engage in complex research into 
the issue of whether and how specific types of media consumption and other 
factors affect the views of people toward Latvia, different groups in society, 
and their identity, history and citizenship.
Only if policy-makers are truly interested in integration – something that 
is of key importance in dealing with the economic crisis, political alienation, 
greater emigration, and a reduction in civic patriotism – will there be more 
intensive and targeted thinking about how to attract large segments of the 
audience to a specific information space, as well as about the quality and ef-
fectiveness of this process.
Greatest Achievement
Despite the historical, political and economic circumstances with a disinte-
grative impact, the Latvian media space is characterized by external pluralism 
and the media structure guarantees good access and media content for the two 
largest linguistic communities – Latvians and Russian-speakers – which is a 
significant achievement.
Most Serious Problem
The most serious problems are the existence of two parallel media spaces 
which differ in terms of ideology, values, content, collective memory, political 
agenda, and future vision. As a result of media commercialization, political 
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parallelism and the influence of Russia’s media, there is no diversity of opinions 
within media outlets and the parallel media spaces do not promote the integra-
tion of various audiences and social groups. 
Most Urgent Task
The most important tasks are conducting research on media effects, as well 
as elaborating media policy to determine the minimum level of funding and 
content which would permit public broadcasters to ensure programming for 
the integration of all social groups and to define conditions for Latvia’s main 
private commercial broadcasters aimed at promoting high quality, culturally 
diverse programming that guarantees language acquisition. 
Identity, Ethnic Relations, Language and 
Culture1
Aivars Tabuns
Introduction
In the late 1990s, there were extensive debates in Latvia about language, 
culture and identity. Even the need for the restoration of independence was often 
justified with reference to the idea that such issues can only be addressed prop-
erly in an independent country. One of the first politically significant decisions 
by the Supreme Council of the Latvian SSR was the adoption of a language 
law in 1989. A later version of the law emphasized the following: 
 The purpose of this law is to ensure: 1) the maintenance, protection and 
development of the Latvian language; 2) the maintenance of the cultural 
and historical heritage of the Latvian nation; 3) the right to freely use 
the Latvian language in any sphere of life within the whole territory of 
Latvia; 4) the integration of members of ethnic minorities into the soci-
ety of Latvia while observing their rights to speak their native language 
or other languages; 5) the increased influence of the Latvian language in 
the cultural environment of Latvia, to promote the more rapid integration 
of society.2
Discussions about the status of the Russian language are continuing to this 
very day. Riga Mayor Nils Ušakovs, for instance, believes that if the Russian 
language were granted the status of an official language, that would make it 
possible to use the language in contacts between local residents and local gov-
ernment institutions, to submit documents to the authorities in Russian, and to 
use the Russian language more extensively in the country’s educational system.3
Debates about Latvia’s history, ethnic relations, ethnic threats, and the 
country’s geopolitical orientation have a similarly long history. Debates 
about policies related to ethnic and national identity have not been radically 
 1 The author would like to thank Brigita Zepa, Ieva Strode, Vija Kļave, Sigita Sniķere, and 
the Latvian Ministry of Defence for their support in preparing this paper.
 2 The State Language Law, in effect as of 1 September 2000. See http://www.likumi.lv/doc.
php?id=14740.
 3 Nils Ušakovs, “Press Conference.” See http://www.lenta.ru/conf/ushakov (in Russian).
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confrontational in recent years, but these issues still serve as one of the most 
important factors in the “ethnicization” of political parties, and this is the one 
aspect of integration which deserves the greatest focus.
Latvia’s Integration Programme (2001) states in its introduction that “each 
resident of Latvia has the right to shape and maintain his or her own national 
identity.”4 Further, it states: 
 The integration of society, in many senses, depends on the opportunities 
for development not only for Latvians, but also for the country’s minori-
ties. This refers to the right to preserve one’s ethnic identity, but also 
to the inevitable need to accept the Latvian language as the only state 
language and to learn and use it (..) Opposition to integration is based 
on the fear of losing one’s own ethnic identity. In truth, however, this 
means that the individual does not understand the essence of integra-
tion – the integration of society speaks not to the loss of ethnic identity, 
but rather to its nurturing and expansion (..) Non-Latvians must believe 
that they can preserve their ethnic identity and be full-fledged members 
of this country.5 
The same section of the document contains the claim that one factor which 
brings the people of Latvia together in the process of integration is “the desire 
to preserve and develop their ethnic and cultural identity.”6 In the section of 
the programme that is devoted to culture, there is an emphasis on the need to 
“ensure the preservation and development of cultural values, to promote dia-
logue among cultures, and to guarantee the individual’s right to freely express, 
defend and develop his or her ethnic, cultural and religious identity.”7
The Integration Programme often uses the concept of ethnic identity, and 
only in one sentence does it use the concept of national identity. This is true 
despite the fact that in the context of theories about integration policies, the 
statement that “each (author’s emphasis) resident of Latvia has the right to pre-
serve and maintain his or her national identity” is conceptually contradictory 
with the goal of integration that is stated in the programme: “To establish (..) 
a society that is based on common basic values.”8
Researchers from the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences have also pointed 
to the lack of conceptual clarity in the Integration Programme: 
 Without stating so specifically, the integration programme includes 
efforts to develop integration policy in two directions. (..) On the one 
hand, there is the idea of strengthening the nation state. On the other 
 4 Ministry of Justice (2001), ‘National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia.’ 
Riga: Ministry of Justice, pg. 8.
 5 Ibid., pg. 9.
 6 Ibid., pg. 11.
 7 Ibid., pg. 68.
 8 Ibid., pg. 71.
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hand, the integration programme insists that the people of Latvia are 
joined together by the desire to preserve and to develop their ethnic and 
cultural identity (..) Integration of the ideas of a nation state and multi-
culturalism in a single programme is a job that is not only complex, but 
may also prove to be contradictory.9
There are several things which it make it difficult to analyse collective 
identities and to come to conclusions as to how successful or unsuccessful 
this process has been in Latvia: 1) collective identities are multidimensional 
phenomena which can be measured using different indicators which each de-
scribe different processes and different trends; 2) various studies focused on 
the measurement of collective identities use different methods, questions and 
scales, which makes it difficult to compare the data and to evaluate trends; 3) 
a great deal of research data is not available for secondary analysis, because 
authors have used different data grouping principles in their research reports; 
4) measurements of collective identities are essentially based on indicators 
which only indirectly describe the studied phenomenon or any aspect thereof; 
5) individuals find it hard to recognize and formulate their belonging and the 
level of its intensity.10
The Weatherhead Initiative in International Affairs at Harvard University 
has classified eight dimensions in the measurement of identities:11
1) Recognition – the degree to which a group accepts a particular social 
identity; and the degree to which a state recognizes a social identity;
2) Exclusivity – the degree to which a given social identity excludes the 
holding of another social identity;
3) Primordiality – some identities are interpreted as being chosen and 
others as essential and unchangeable;
4) Entativity12 – measures the degree to which groups are perceived (mostly 
by outsiders) as being “real”, as cohering as a natural group, rather than 
an arbitrary one;
5) Status – the way in which identity is seen as positive, neutral or nega-
tive; something to be taken pride in or something to be ashamed of. 
 9 Brigita Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas. Riga: Baltic Institute of 
Social Sciences, pg. 7. 
10 A. Von Busekist (2004), ‘Uses and Misuses of the Concept of Identity,’ Security Dialogue, 
Vol. 35, No. 1, March, pg. 82.
11 R. Abdelal, Y. M. Herrera, A. I. Johnston and T. Martin (2001), ‘Treating Identity as a 
Variable: Measuring the Content, Intensity, and Contestation of Identity,’ available at http://
www.wcfia.harvard/edu/default/files/Johnston_Treating.pdf, pp. 11–12. 
12 The term “entativity” refers to the extent to which a group is perceived as being a coherent 
unit, one in which the members of the group are bonded together in some fashion. See 
B. Lickel, D. L. Hamilton and S. J. Sherman (2001), ‘Elements of a Lay Theory of Groups: 
Types of Groups, Relational Styles and the Perception of Group Entativity,’ Personality 
and Social Psychology Review, No. 5, pg. 131.
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Again, this can be measured from the perspective of in-group and out-
group members, and the state as well;
6) In-Group Favouritism/Out-Group Hostility – focuses primarily on this 
issue, the degree to which “groupness” leads to in-group favouritism 
and out-group hostility;
7) Claims – the claims that membership in an identity group makes on an 
individual and the right to hold opinions different from the group on 
matters of fundamental interest to the group, or what claims are made 
in terms of sacrifice of one’s economic or other interests;
8) Goals/Purposes – the primary goals/purposes of the group. (For instance, 
does an ethnic identity imply a belief in sovereignty or other less de-
manding forms of recognition?)
Any evaluation of integration processes is also seriously hindered by the 
multidimensional nature of the whole concept of integration – it can be inter-
preted in various ways. Conclusions in research are substantially affected not 
just by the indicators and methodologies selected, but also by the fact that the 
collected data offer vast opportunities for interpretation. Accordingly, there 
will be separate analysis of different aspects of collective identities and how 
these are formed.
An Evaluation of Integration Policy and Interethnic 
Relations
Ever since the late 1980s, researchers in Latvia and elsewhere in the world 
have been concerned about the prospects for ethnic relations in the country. It 
should be remembered that the proportion of minority residents in Latvia was 
higher than in Lithuania and Estonia. Toward the end of the Soviet period, there 
were more non-Latvians than Latvians in five of Latvia’s largest cities (just 
36% of the residents of Riga were Latvians). Most foreign experts, including 
those who wrote about “ethnic conflict,” had to acknowledge, however, that 
most people in Latvia are seldom involved in conflicts on an everyday basis, 
and ethnic differences have little effect on changes in the structure of popula-
tion and employment (see Mihails Hazans’ chapter above). Internal migration 
is not dictated by ethnic factors, there is no ethnic segregation in terms of 
neighbourhoods, and ethnic under-representation has been seen primarily in the 
civil service, where most employees are Latvians.13 Research on the proportion 
of minorities in the labour market does not point to widespread discrimination 
13 See Artis Pabriks (2002), Etniskās proporcijas, nodarbinātība un diskriminācija Latvijā. 
Riga: Providus. 
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or ethnic segregation. Indeed, most companies are multi-ethnic in nature.14 
When it comes to the lack of ethnic parity in the national civil service, the main 
explanations have been the weak participation of minorities in the restoration of 
the state, the ongoing lack of Latvian language skills among minorities, a lack 
of citizenship, scepticism about the work of government institutions, and low 
wages in the state sector (see also the chapter by Ilze Brands Kehris above).15
It is also true that major political protests in recent years have not been 
ethnically based. Latvians and non-Latvians have taken part in these. The 
comparatively low number of everyday conflicts that are based on ethnicity, 
however, is seen as a necessary, but insufficient prerequisite for social integra-
tion. In a survey conducted in March 2006,16 only 9% of respondents agreed 
with the statement that “all in all, society can be considered to be consolidated 
and integrated,” while 65% disagreed with the statement. A comparatively high 
percentage of respondents (27%) were undecided on the matter. Data from the 
study entitled Integration Practice and Perspectives illustrate how difficult 
it is to evaluate processes of integration. The taxonomy of the acculturation 
strategies used by the researchers is based on two dimensions – identification 
with an ethnic group (ethnic identity), and subjective identification with a state 
(civic identity). If respondents accept both identities, then there is reason to 
talk about integration, but if they reject both identities, then one can speak of 
marginalization. If one of the identities dominates over the other, then there 
is reason to think about assimilation and strategies of separation.17 One of the 
possible strategies to be identified in the research was fusion, which leads to 
the emergence of an entirely new identity.
80% of Latvians, 83% of Russians and 81% of people of other nationalities 
expressed support for the strategy of integration in this study.18 Latvians and 
Russians had different views of the strategy of separation in which individuals 
attach a great deal of importance to the preservation of their culture, but avoid 
contacts with members of other ethnic groups and feel no sense of belonging 
to Latvia. 9% of Latvians and 27% of Russians supported this strategy. The 
researchers found that young people were more likely to support the strategy 
of separation than were older respondents.19
14 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, Latvian Academy of Sciences, Institute of Economics 
(2004), Society Integration and Business: The Ethnic Dimension. Riga: BISS, LAS IE, pg. 81, 
available at http://www.bszi.lv/downloads/resources/ekonIntegr/Ekon_integr_EN.pdf.
15 Pabriks, Etniskās proporcijas, nodarbinātība un diskriminācija Latvijā.
16 SKDS (2006), ‘Sabiedrības integrācijas aktuālākie aspekti,’ Riga: SKDS, pg. 36.
17 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 36.
18 Respondents were asked to read five stories which were based on five different types of 
acculturation strategies – assimilation, integration, separation, marginalisation, and fusion. 
Then they were asked to rate each story on a five-point scale, with 1 meaning no support 
at all, and 5 meaning full support. Ibid., pg. 19.
19 Ibid., pg. 20.
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Non-Latvian respondents were far less likely to identify themselves with the 
integration strategy (65% said that they “largely” or “completely” corresponded 
to that type of person).20 20% of respondents identified with the strategy of 
separation, 9% with the strategy of marginalisation, and 30% with the strategy 
of fusion. Respondents were asked to evaluate each strategy separately, and the 
data show that most non-Latvian respondents identified themselves with several 
models, sometimes ones which excluded one another entirely.
When we look at how many non-Latvians chose one of the proposed 
strategies, we can conclude that there is no single strategy for acculturation in 
Latvia. Instead, all five strategies of acculturation are represented to a more or 
less similar degree. It is also true that the answers given by Latvian and Rus-
sian respondents differed quite substantially.21 Latvians, on average, believed 
that 25.5% of non-Latvians would choose the strategy of integration, while 
non-Latvians felt that there would be more people who would do that (38% of 
Russians and 34% of members of other ethnic groups, on average). The spread 
of the strategy of separation, by contrast, was quite similar (36% among Latvi-
ans, 33% among Russians).
We may ask which of these indicators best characterizes the integration 
process – the fact that more than 80% of non-Latvians support this model, that 
65% of non-Latvians identify themselves with it, or that there is a considerably 
lower public assessment of the spread of this model of behaviour (25–38%). If 
we analyse answers given by those people who support the integration model, 
we find that approximately one-quarter say that for the most part, they do not 
particularly feel any sense of belonging to Latvia’s society. Nearly one-third 
says that their Latvian language skills are quite poor (the choices included the 
statements “I speak no Latvian or very little Latvian” and “I speak a bit, and I 
can converse only about simple issues”). Asked about the language which they 
speak in contacts with friends and acquaintances, nearly one-half of respondents 
chose the response “Nearly always in Russian.” Even when it comes to govern-
ment institutions, some 20% of people in this group mostly speak Russian, at 
least as far as they themselves have reported. Nearly 20% only watch television 
channels from Russia (more than 60% said “mostly Russian TV”). Some not 
only have not become Latvian citizens themselves, but they also don’t want 
their children to become Latvian citizens. In the group of respondents who 
identified themselves with the strategy of separation or marginalization, all of 
these indicators of social integration were even less favourable.
At the same time, researchers found that approximately one-half of respond-
ents in Latvia say that everyday relations with people of other nationalities are 
“good”. Approximately one-fourth said that they are very good, and one-fifth 
said that they are “satisfactory.” Only 5% of respondents said that relations are 
20 Ibid., pg. 34.
21 Ibid., pg. 35.
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bad or very bad.22 Similar data have been found in other studies. One that was 
conducted by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences23 asked respondents to rate 
their relations with others on a ten-point scale, with 1 referring to hostile rela-
tions, and 10 referring to excellent ones. Ethnic Latvians rated their relations 
with non-Latvians at a level of 7.8, while non-Latvians rated their relations 
with ethnic Latvians at a level of 8.4. In other words, people believe that they 
are friendly with others.
People were also asked to answer this question: “What keeps you from 
feeling patriotic and proud about Latvia?” Ethnic relations were not mentioned 
often as a reason (6% of Latvians and 10% of Russians). For the purpose of 
comparison, we can note that the system of governance was rated far more 
critically (37% and 33%).
If we compare these data to data from the late 1990s, then we see that 
there has been a substantial increase in the number of respondents who say 
that interethnic relations are good (two-thirds say that they are “satisfactory”, 
while one-fifth said that they are “good”).24 Back then there were quite a few re-
spondents who felt that there was a threat of interethnic conflict. Approximately 
one-third of Russian-speaking respondents denied that this was so, but more 
than one-fifth of respondents in that group said that there could “definitely” or 
“possibly” be such conflicts.25
The study Ethnic Tolerance and the Integration of Latvia’s Society used five 
indexes to describe ethnic identities and evaluations thereof (ethnic separation, 
positive social identities, dogmatism, contacts, social distance).26 The index 
of ethnic separation shows that Latvians are more likely than non-Latvians to 
be ethnically cautious to the point of separating themselves from other ethnic 
groups. Latvians are also less likely to have a positive social identity in terms 
of wanting to emphasize and maintain that identity. Most respondents in Latvia 
claim to enjoy contacts with people from other ethnic groups (81% of Latvians, 
87% of non-Latvians).27 The dogmatism index shows that many Latvians and 
non-Latvians (around 25% in each case) tend to see the world in black-and-
white terms; these are people who believe in a single truth.28 Ethnic stereotypes 
22 AC Konsultācijas (2008), ‘Kvantitatīvais un kvalitatīvais pētījums par sabiedrības integrācijas 
un pilsonības aktuāliem aspektiem,’ pg. 28.
23 Brigita Zepa (ed.) (2004), Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija. Riga: 
BISS, pg. 76. 
24 Baltijas datu nams (1998), ‘Ceļā uz pilsonisku sabiedrību,’ Riga: Baltijas datu nams, 
pg. 129.
25 Centre for the Study of Public Policy (1997), New Baltic Barometer III, Studies in Public 
Policy, No. 284, Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, pg. 34.
26 Zepa (ed.) (2004), Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija, pg. 48.
27 Ibid., pg. 61.
28 Ibid., pg. 78.
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are more common among Latvian respondents, but both they and non-Latvians 
believe that one group wants to force others to accept its views.29 
The fact that ethnic stereotypes are more common among Latvians was 
seen in a study that was conducted in the early 1990s – The Formation of New 
Political Systems and the Question of Democratic Stability: The Case of Latvia 
(1993).30 Researchers believe, however, that the ethnic distance between the 
two communities is not great, which is seen in data about mixed marriages, 
experience with interethnic conflicts, as well as in ethnic stereotypes.31 The fact 
that interethnic relations have not deteriorated during this period is best seen 
in dynamics related to the number of mixed marriages (unlike the evaluations 
or self-evaluations presented by respondents in sociological surveys, this is an 
indicator that cannot be falsified). At the beginning of the 1990s, approximately 
18% of Latvian men were marrying non-Latvian women, and a slightly higher 
percentage of Latvian women were marrying non-Latvian men. In 2008, the 
proportion of such marriages was 19.8% among Latvian men, and 20% among 
Latvian women.32 Survey data show that Latvians are less likely to accept close 
relationships with Russians than the other way around,33 but at the same time, 
two-thirds of Latvian respondents (66%) say that they would accept the mar-
riage of their son or daughter to a Russian.34
These data show, all in all, that the support of non-Latvians for integration 
strategies is higher in the public arena than is the preparedness of respondents 
to identify themselves with such practices, let alone pursuing them in real life. 
The identification criteria of non-Latvians have not become stabilized. Ethnic 
relations have improved a bit over the last decade, but the process is hindered 
by the fact that many people distance themselves from members of other ethnic 
groups and are prejudiced against them. Moreover, this is more often true 
among Latvians than among others.
Ethnic Identity and Linguistic Integration
The Latvian and Russian languages are of decisive importance in the proc-
ess of establishing collective identities, as this is the main criterion in marking 
out the boundaries between ethnic and linguistic groups. Competition between 
languages increases the sense of endangerment in the two groups. That is ex-
actly why there are harsh discussions about the use of the two languages, with 
29 Ibid., pg. 72.
30 G. Ozolzīle, T. Tisenkopfs, A. Tabuns, J. Broks and J. Ozolins (1993), The Formation of 
New Political Systems and the Question of Democratic Stability: the Case of Latvia. Riga: 
Baltic Studies Centre.
31 Ibid., pg. 28.
32 Data from the Central Statistical Board, http://www.csb.gov.lv.
33 Zepa (ed.) (2004), Etniskā tolerance un Latvijas sabiedrības integrācija.
34 Ibid., pg. 66.
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a more active ethnic discourse in the media. This refers to issues such as the 
State Language Law and reforms in the minority education system.35 Latvians 
have extensive expectations vis-à-vis non-Latvians in the country – they must 
accept the Latvian language and culture, and they must dissociate themselves 
from the Russian cultural heritage. At the same time, however, “the strategy of 
assimilation seems exaggerated and unbelievable for respondents in the Latvian 
context, because the Russian community in Latvia is very large, and to a great 
degree it is self-sufficient.36 Because the spread of ethnic fears has an effect on 
the understanding of group identities,37 politicians use linguistic fears to polar-
ize society and increase distrust and suspicions.38
Ilga Apine and Vladislavs Volkovs have argued that 
 Many Russians in Latvia link their identity to the preservation of the 
social functions of the Russian language in civil society. The strength-
ening of the collective identity of Russian residents of Latvia cannot 
be described unambiguously. Of importance in the collective linguistic 
identity of the Russian minority is a shift in the value orientations of 
Russians from the Soviet (imperial) identity to the identity of a national 
minority. The collective identity of Russians who do not have close 
links to the civic identity which exists in Latvia can also be stimulated 
by negative trends such as self-sufficiency and self-segregation. For a 
certain part of the Russian minority, the collective linguistic identity 
has become the only foundation and resource for social self-organiza-
tion.39
Sociologists use different indicators in the attempt to identify the impor-
tance of ethnic identity. In the early 1990s, people were asked this question: 
“How much do you have in common with Russians?” 48% of non-Latvian re-
spondents gave the answer “a great deal,” 29% gave the response “some,” and 
only 5% and 2% respectively answered “not much” or “nothing at all.” Asked 
the same question with reference to Latvians, 13% and 3% of non-Latvians 
chose “not much” or “nothing at all,” 24% said “a great deal,” and 40% gave 
the answer “some.” Of key importance is the fact that a fairly substantial pro-
portion of respondents (16% in the former case and 19% in the latter) had no 
answer to the question.40
35 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 29.
36 Ibid., pp. 47–48.
37 Leo Dribins (ed.) (2007), Mazākumtautības Latvijā. Vēsture un tagadne. Riga: LU FSI, 
pg. 134.
38 Zepa et al. (2005), Etnopolitiskā spriedze Latvijā: Konfliktu risinājumu meklējumi, 
pg. 6.
39 Ilga Apine and Vladislavs Volkovs (2007), Latvijas krievu identitāte: vēsturisks un 
socioloģisks apcerējums. Riga: LU FSI, pp. 215–216.
40 Centre for the Study of Public Policy (1994), Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey 
Study, Studies in Public Policy, No. 222. Glasgow: University of Strathclyde, pg. 55.
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The ethnic identity of respondents is also characterized by answers given 
to this question: “How important in your life is the fact that you are a Latvian/
Russian/member of another ethnic group?” The Baltic Institute of Social Sci-
ences found that Latvians are more likely than non-Latvians to say that this fact 
is important or very important (74% of Latvians and 51% of Russians gave that 
response in a study in 2006).41 In 2004, the same answers were given by 53% 
of Latvians and 32% of Russians.42
In 2008 respondents were asked this question: “Are you concerned about 
the possibility that you might lose your ethnic identity?” 71% of respondents 
said no, 22% said yes, and 7% said that they did not know.43 In the 2006 study 
Integration Practice and Perspectives Latvian respondents were far more likely 
that Russian respondents to be concerned about threats against the Latvian 
language and culture (53% of Latvians and 78% of Russians said that there 
are hardly any threats or that it is more likely that there are no threats than 
that there are threats.44 This indicates a fairly high level of a sense of ethnic 
endangerment in both groups, but the people in each group have different views 
as to their own endangerment and that of the other group.
The Integration Programme states more than once that the cornerstone of 
integration is people’s readiness to accept the Latvian language as the state 
language. It also emphasizes the need to strengthen the situation of the Latvian 
language.45 Because linguistic identity is the most important component in 
the ethnic self-understanding of the Russian minority,46 the linguistic aspects 
of the Integration Programme are perceived by many Russians as potentially 
being discriminatory, this despite the fact that “the Russian language is almost 
completely dominant among Russian families and in informal communications. 
There are Russian language media and educational institutions.”47
Between 1996 and 2008, 13 surveys of Latvia’s residents have been taken 
to observe the results of the country’s language policies, changes in language 
skills, the extent to which Latvian is spoken, as well as attitudes toward that 
language. The results have shown the consequences of language policy. The 
level of language skills and speaking habits have changed rather slowly over 
the course of time, although the Latvian language skills of non-Latvians 
have improved considerably. The segment of the population which speaks no 
Latvian at all diminished from 22% in 1996 to just 7% in 2008, and the use 
of the language in various areas of life is on the rise, particularly in the public 
41 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas.
42 Etnopolitiskā spriedze, pg. 30.
43 AC Konsultācijas (2008), ‘Kvantitatīvais un kvalitatīvais pētījums,’ pg. 29.
44 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pp. 76–77.
45 Ministry of Justice (2001), ‘National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia,’ 
pp. 7 and 63.
46 Apine and Volkovs (2007), Latvijas krievu identitāte, pg. 215.
47 Ibid.
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arena. Speaking the Latvian language is promoted by the formal language 
environment, as well as the language law, which particularly applies to public 
situations. The decline in the self-sufficiency of minority languages can be 
seen as significant proof of the consolidation of the majority language’s status. 
Respondents increasingly feel that it is necessary to have a command of both 
the Russian and the Latvian language.48
Data from the study called Integration Practice and Perspectives however, 
show that Russian respondents mostly speak Russian on the street, at shops and 
at work (more than two-thirds of respondents said that they mostly or exclu-
sively speak Russian in such situations or that they speak Russian more than 
they speak Latvian). In government institutions, too, Russian respondents are 
more likely to speak Russian. Approximately one-quarter of Russian respond-
ents “mostly or only watch Russian television channels,” more than half watch 
Russian channels more often than Latvian ones, and fewer than one-fifth watch 
Latvian channels more than Russian ones. 
The linguistic situation for other minority groups in Latvia is consider-
ably worse, because it is harder for children to get an education in their native 
language (there were 1,432 students in non-Russian minority schools in the 
2007/2008 school year, and the language of teaching at most of those schools 
was Latvian and/or Russian anyway).49 There are also fewer mass media 
resources for other minority languages, and the same is true with respect to 
cultural products such as books, recordings of music, films and theatrical per-
formances. Most Russian respondents agreed with the statement that “Russians 
must understand that the Latvian language is the state language in Latvia, and 
so if one wants to live in Latvia, one must learn the language” (the statement 
was supported by 94% of all residents and 86% of Russians, with 50% saying 
that they completely agree with it; 11% of Russians and 5% of people of other 
nationalities disagreed with the statement.50 Despite this fact, researchers found 
in 2005 that “communications between a Latvian and someone of another na-
tionality are usually based on Russian, because the level of Latvian language 
skills among Russians and representatives of other ethnic groups tends to be far 
lower than the level of Russian language skills among Latvians.”51 Asked about 
their Latvian language skills, 9% of Russian respondents said that they speak no 
Latvian or hardly any Latvian, while 26% said that they are only able to discuss 
simple issues in Latvian.52 At the same time, some of the Russian respondents 
48 Baltic Institute of Social Sciences (2008), Language. Riga: BISS, pp. 5–7.
49 Classes are taught in Polish at five schools, in Ukrainian at one school, and in Belarusian 
at one school. There is one Estonian and one Lithuanian school at which some subjects 
are taught in the minority language. Two schools teach the Romani language as a separate 
subject. http://www.am.gov.lv/lv/latvia/integracija/mazakumtautibu-izglitiba/?print=on.
50 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 79.
51 Etnopolitiskā spriedze, pg. 30.
52 Unpublished data from Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas.
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who said that they have a complete command of the Latvian language neverthe-
less admitted that on the street, in shops and at government institutions, they 
mostly speak Russian (around 10% of Russian respondents said so).53
Generally speaking, the conclusion here is that the integration-based prin-
ciple of allowing ethnic groups to maintain and develop their ethnic identities 
and to speak their native language is not being violated. At the same time, the 
Integration Programme states that “the integration of society in many ways 
depends on the ability of Latvia’s minorities to develop, which refers not only 
to the right to preserve their ethnic identity, but also to the need to accept the 
Latvian language as the only state language, to learn the language, and to speak 
it in public situations.” The latter part of this statement remains a problem. In 
2008 approximately one-third of respondents considered the language barrier 
as something which divides society (only social and material stratification were 
mentioned more often in this regard).54
National Identity
The protection and maintenance of ethnic identities can be a necessary 
prerequisite for political stability and a reduction in the level of ethnic fears. 
That alone, however, is not enough to ensure no confrontations in a civil 
society in which ethnic corporativism doesn’t dominate over the long-term 
interests of the public at large. Societies in which ethnic groups have different 
ideas about the fundamental principles of national identity are often subject 
to political crisis. They find it hard to find solutions to economic and political 
crises, because the initial ideas of ethnic groups about politics, the state and 
its relationship with the citizenry have not been harmonized on the basis of 
fundamental principles.
In a study that was called Shifting Identities: Mobilization of Ethnic Groups 
and the Effects of Changes in the Ethnic Structure of Society on Social Inte-
gration, researchers found that the consolidation and mobilization of ethnic 
groups such as Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Poles, Lithuanians and Jews 
in pursuit of their ethnicity and of a strengthening in their ethnic identity are 
often not balanced out with the emergence of a civic identity and support for 
processes of integration.55
National identity can be analysed in many different ways, but researchers 
often study the “proximity” of respondents to the state (including geopolitical 
identity), national pride, and support for the basic political positions of the 
53 Ibid.
54 AC Konsultācijas (2008), ‘Kvantitatīvais un kvalitatīvais pētījums,’ pg. 30.
55 Elmārs Vēbers (2004), Mainīgās identitātes: etnisko grupu mobilizēšanas un sabiedrības 
etniskas struktūras izmaiņu ietekme uz sabiedrības integrāciju. Riga: University of Latvia. 
See http://www.politika.lv/print.php?id-3995.
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state.56 In many studies conducted in Latvia, respondents have been asked 
how closely they feel they are related to their country, city, region or Europe.57 
The word “closeness” in English is synonymous to “proximity”, which comes 
from the Latin and refers to that which is closest and most tightly bound.58 In 
this chapter, a high level of territorial proximity refers to a specific environ-
ment which respondents consider to be important and comfortable.59 Several 
studies in Latvia have shown that indicators related to national proximity have 
remained more or less stable, with a slight decline in some cases. The differ-
ence between evaluations given by Latvians and by Russians has not changed 
to any statistical degree between 1995 and 2008.
Table 1. Proximity to the state  
(Average arithmetic indicator: 1 = “very close links”, 0 = “no links at all”)
Proximity to the state 2008** 2003* 1995*
Latvians 0.75 0.76 0.80
Russians 0.68 0.61 0.73
Arithmetic difference 0.08 0.15 0.07
Sources: * International Social Survey Programme data; ** SKDS (2008).
The International Social Survey Programme (ISSP) survey posed two 
questions to Russian respondents: “How close do you feel to Latvia?”, and 
“How important for being truly Latvian is it to respect the political institutions 
and laws?” The data show that there are correlations among these variables. 
16% of Russians who think that they are closely linked to Latvia also feel that 
this does not mean that they have to respect the government and the country’s 
laws. Younger Russian respondents (29 and under) were less likely than older 
respondents to say that the government and the law must be respected.60
There was also an analysis of the correlation between these two questions: 
“How close do you feel to Latvia?” and “Would I rather be a citizen of Latvia 
56 R. Sinnott (2005), ‘An Evaluation of the Measurement of National, Sub-National and 
Supranational Identity in Major Cross-National Surveys,’ Geary Discussion Paper Series, 
February 2005, pg. 34. See http://www.ucd.ie/geary/publications/2005/GearyWp200502.
pdf. See also A. Rawi, Y. M. Herrera, A. I. Johnston and R. Mcdermott (2005), “Identity 
as a Variable,” available at www.wcfia.harvard.edu/misc/initiative/identity/publications/
ID050722.pdf.
57 In a study conducted by the International Social Survey Programme, the concept of “feel 
close to…” must be interpreted as “emotionally attached to” or “identifying with.”
58 The concept of proximity is used by social psychologists and anthropologists in terms of 
concepts such as “social proximity” and “cultural proximity.” The first to make widespread 
use of the term was Edward T. Hall (2006), The Hidden Dimension. Garden City, N.Y.: 
Doubleday. 
59 Territorial proximity is usually evaluated on a scale, with 1 referring to “very close links” 
and 0 referring to “no links at all.”
60 Aivars Tabuns, (2007), ‘Nacionālā identitāte un integrācija.’ In Aivars Tabuns, ed., Drošība 
un tiesiskums Latvijā. Riga: University of Latvia Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, 
pg. 116.
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than of any other country in the world?” The data show correlation between 
these two variables, but 29% of Russians who feel closely linked to Latvia 
would prefer to be another country’s citizens. At the same time, Latvian citizen-
ship is attractive for 11% of Russians who do not feel close to Latvia.61
The geopolitical identities of non-Latvians are characterised quite well by 
data from other studies, including We, Celebrations, The State: A Sociologi-
cal Study of How National Holidays are Celebrated. In it, researchers found 
that 20% of non-Latvians respondents feel linked or closely linked to Europe, 
31% to Russia, and 78% to Latvia.62 In another study, the question was a bit 
different: “How close do you personally feel to Russia?”, with 44% of Russian 
respondents saying “close” or “very close”, while 39% don’t feel very close, 
and 16% don’t feel close to Russia at all.63
It is of key importance here that non-Latvian schoolchildren are more likely 
than respondents from other age groups to indicate closer links to Europe and 
Russia (39% and 45% respectively), with weaker links to Latvia (52%).64 In 
another study, The Emergence of Identity and the Participation of Young People, 
students from the 9th and 11th grade and from the second year of professional 
trade schools were surveyed (n = 3,046). 64% of the Russian respondents in 
that study said that they felt linked or closely linked to Russia, while only 31% 
said the same about Latvia.65
When asked about their sense of belonging in different social groups, young 
people again revealed their sense of identity. 63% of Russian respondents felt 
very close or closer to a certain extent to Russians in Latvia, while only 14% 
felt close to Latvia’s Latvians. Similar responses came from Latvians – the 
sense of belonging with Latvians was declared by 61%, while only 21% said 
the same about Latvia’s Russian residents. Most non-Latvian young people 
(54%) said that they belong in the Russian community of Latvia, as opposed 
to belonging among Latvia’s Latvians (28%).66
The ISSP study showed that Russian respondents who were asked about 
Latvia’s national achievements in 2003 thought less about them then than was 
the case in 1995. In 2003, Russians had a more positive view only of Latvia’s 
achievements in sports. The attitude of these respondents did not change in rela-
tion to Latvia’s economic achievements or the country’s social security system. 
There is less pride now in the armed forces, democracy, scientific achievements, 
accomplishments in the arts and literature, the country’s political influence in 
61 Ibid.
62 Brigita Zepa (ed.) (2008), Mēs. Svētki. Valsts. Valsts svētku svinēšanas socioloģiska izpēte. 
Riga: Baltic Institute of Social Sciences, pg. 73.
63 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 73.
64 Ibid., pg. 99.
65 Ritma Rungule (ed.) (2005), Jauniešu identitātes veidošanās un līdzdalība. Pētījuma 
pārskats. Riga: LU FSI, pg. 70.
66 Ibid., pg. 72.
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the world, and the idea of a just and equal attitude toward all social groups 
in society. Russian respondents have particularly lost a sense of pride about 
Latvia’s history.67
Similar data were received in a 2008 study. Russian respondents were most 
often proud of Latvia’s environment and the country’s achievements in sports. 
The greatest difference between Russian and Latvian respondents in this regard 
relates to the country’s cultural heritage and folk songs (67% of Latvians and 
39% of Russian respondents felt proud about these), to achievements in art and 
culture (44% and 26%), and accomplishments in science and technology (35% 
and 18). 11% of Russian and 3% of Latvian respondents say that they are not 
proud about anything.
In 2008, 77% of Latvians and 50% of Russians fully or mostly agreed with 
the statement “I am a patriot of Latvia.” 36% of Russians disagreed, and 14% 
did not answer. When asked “Which is the country with respect to which you 
feel patriotic?”, 29% of Russian respondents cited Russia, 19% said that they 
don’t feel patriotic about any country, and 6% did not answer. It is necessary to 
emphasize here that the two answers are not mutually exclusive – in an SKDS 
study, 61% of those who feel that they are patriots of Russia do not feel that 
they are patriots of Latvia, but 39% do. Among those Russian respondents who 
do not feel that they are patriots of Russia, a greater percentage believe that 
they are patriots of Latvia (61%).
In comparison to an ISSP study in 1995, Russian respondents in a 2003 
study run by SKDS were less likely to agree with the statement that “there are 
things in Latvia today which make me feel ashamed about Latvia.” The think-
ing of Russian respondents is also seen in attitudes toward the statement that 
“I would rather be a citizen of Latvia than of any other country in the world.” 
In 2003, only 25% of Russian non-citizens preferred Latvian citizenship to that 
of any other country, while in 2008, the answer came from 39% of respondents 
who were not Latvian citizens (36% would choose another country’s citizenship, 
while 25% did not answer. On the other hand, only 33% of Russian citizens 
in 2003 thought that it was better to have Latvian citizenship than to have any 
other, but in 2008, fewer thought so – 20% disagreed, and 31% did not answer 
(SKDS). These changes indicate an increasing level of nationalism in the views 
which Russians have about Latvia.
These data show that the people of Latvia have a great many fragmented 
and often contradictory identities. A low level of proximity to the state, disre-
spect for Latvia’s government and laws, and no desire to obtain Latvian citi-
zenship – all of these phenomena are linked. Many citizens feel no ties with 
Latvia and would prefer to be some other country’s citizen. These are people 
whose thinking and lifestyle are not oriented toward a territorial community 
or its needs and values.
67 Tabuns (2007), ‘Nacionālā identitāte un integrācija,’ pg. 110.
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Weakly expressed proximity to the state does not encourage the emergence 
of a national identity. A deficit in roots, a sense of instability, a sense of insecu-
rity, and contradictory identities – all of these provoke disloyalty and damage 
social contacts among people. The situation in Latvia is considerably more 
complicated than is the case in other countries, although ISSP data show that 
analogous problems are also faced by Israel and Russia.
Table 2. Proximity to the state
How close do you feel to the state?
Cohort of respondents Very close Close Not too close Not close at all
Jews in Israel (1,061) 80% 14% 4% 2%
Latvians in Latvia (592) 36% 49.5% 12.5% 2%
Russians in Russia (2,266) 26% 41% 23% 10%
Russians in Latvia (305) 13% 55% 27% 5%
Average among 35 countries 
(43,285) 48% 40% 9% 2%
Source: ISSP, 2003.
A 2008 SKDS study posed the question a bit differently – “To what extent 
to you feel a sense of belonging in Latvia?”, with 1 = “not at all” and 5 = “very 
much.” 64% of Russian respondents chose 5 or 4. Many studies show that 
substantial numbers of non-citizens have no plans to seek citizenship in Latvia 
(51% of them said so in the study Integration Practice and Perspectives, with 
15% saying that they also don’t want their children to become citizens of 
Latvia). 
Another question was this: “If Latvia’s independence were threatened, 
would you be prepared to defend it?” 68% of Latvians, 38% of Russians, and 
52% of people from other ethnic groups said “yes.” 8% of Latvians, 23% of 
Russians, and 18% of people from other ethnic groups said “no.” The remain-
ing couldn’t say.68 In another SKDS survey, respondents were asked whether 
they would take up arms in defence of Latvia during an armed conflict. Among 
men aged 45 and younger, 69% of Latvians and 33% of Russians said that they 
probably or certainly would, while 39% of Russians said that they probably or 
certainly would not (28% did not answer the question). Russian respondents 
who were citizens were more likely than those who were non-citizens to say 
that they would defend Latvia, but in the latter group, too, 35% did not answer, 
and 23% said that they would not do so.
In December 2005, the DATA Serviss research firm conducted a survey in 
which it found that 33% of non-Latvian and 70% of Latvian respondents thought 
positively about Latvia’s accession to NATO.69 Similar results were found in 
another study – The Emergence of the Civil Society in Latvia’s Largest Cities 
68 AC Konsultācijas (2008), Kvantitatīvais un kvalitatīvais pētījums, pg. 40.
69 Ibid.
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and the Most Ethnically Heterogeneous Regions of Latvia.70 700 respondents, 
half of them citizens and half of them non-citizens, were surveyed in Latvia’s 
larger cities and ethnically heterogeneous regions. Nearly twice as many Rus-
sian respondents said that they trust the Commonwealth of Independent States 
(CIS) than those who said that they trust NATO (41% and 22% respectively).
I have argued that
 All in all, it can generally be said that many non-Latvians still identify 
themselves with Russia, and so they are not satisfied with the govern-
ment’s pro-Western policies. Latvians, for their part, think that such 
non-Latvians are disloyal toward the state. Differences in the geopoliti-
cal values of the two groups do not help in facilitating political integra-
tion in Latvia. The fact is, however, that non-Latvians have relatively 
few opportunities to change Latvia’s foreign policy, and so the political 
differences of opinion between the two groups are primarily of a latent 
nature.71
One element in national identity is a unified perception of political history. 
Latvia’s Integration Programme states that 
 It is important to establish an objective understanding of the past in order 
to reach agreement about Latvia’s future. Of particular importance is the 
history of Latvia’s period of independence, along with the causes which 
led the independent republic to be occupied and violently incorporated 
into the USSR in 1940. The people of Latvia did not voluntarily choose 
the Soviet system or lives in a totalitarian system. Of fundamental im-
portance is a unified position vis-à-vis the unlawfulness of the Soviet 
regime – deportations and all manner of other repressions against the 
Latvian people, nationalization of private property, forced collectiviza-
tion and industrialization, and demographic policies. Denunciation of 
this must be based on an in-depth and objective understanding of histori-
cal events if different ethnic communities – and younger generations in 
particular – are not to find that historical understandings are an obstacle 
against integration processes.72
Historical memories are seen as a factor which splits society by nearly one-
third of respondents (less often mentioned phenomena included the mass media, 
foreign propaganda, and the interpretation of citizenship issues, while phenom-
ena that were mentioned more often included social and material stratification, 
70 Ibid.
71 Aivars Tabuns (2006), ‘Attitudes Toward the State and Latvian Foreign Policy.’ In Nils 
Muižnieks, ed., Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions. Riga: 
University of Latvia Press, pg. 32.
72 Ministry of Justice (2001), ‘National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia,’ 
pg. 9.
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as well as the language barrier).73 Data from several other surveys indicate the 
same. A study of history teachers and high school students, for instance, found 
that most students at schools where classes are taught in Russian do not believe 
that Latvia was reoccupied in 1945.74
Students from Latvian and Russian language schools have different views 
about the Soviet period (1994–1990). This period of history was rated positively 
or mostly positively by 63% of respondents from schools where classes are 
taught in Russian (only 6% rated it mostly or totally negatively). At schools 
where classes are taught in Latvian, the responses were quite the opposite – 9% 
and 62% respectively.75 Asked whether knowledge about Latvian history is a 
factor in the shaping of civic identity, 35% of Russian students and 56% of 
Latvian students replied in the affirmative.76
The We, Celebrations, The State: A Sociological Study of How National 
Holidays are Celebrated study found that 66% of Latvians and 46% of non-
Latvians take part in celebrations of Latvia’s Independence Day, November 18. 
65% of Latvians said that the holiday is very important or mostly important 
to them, while the same was said by only 35% of non-Latvian respondents.77 
91% of those who said that the holiday is important did things to celebrate it, 
which was also true among 18% of those who find the holiday to be “completely 
unimportant.” Latvians celebrate the holiday at home and at public events, while 
non-Latvians mostly celebrate it at public events alone.78
The authors of the same study also found that the Latvian language press 
publishes much more information about the national holiday. In Russian lan-
guage newspapers, there are usually just brief snippets of information about 
events that have already happened. The authors of the study report that 
“planned events are described in a highly alienated way, as if the discussion 
were about some other country. Nothing is said about the participation of local 
residents in the celebrations. (..) Russian language newspapers have far more 
information about negative phenomena related to the holiday.” The authors also 
found that Internet portals which are presented in the Latvian and the Russian 
language mostly rely on information from the LETA news agency, but Russian 
language portals are far more laconic about the events, or they do not reflect 
them at all.79
73 AC Konsultācijas (2008), ‘Kvantitatīvais un kvalitatīvais pētījums,’ pg. 30.
74 Leo Dribins (2008), ‘Latvijas vēstures faktors sabiedrības integrācijas procesā.’ In Ilga 
Apine et al. Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai: cēloņi un pārvarēšanas iespējas. Riga: 
LU FSI, pp. 12–13.
75 Viktors Makarovs and Ilze Boldāne (2008), ‘20. gadsimta vēstures pretrunīgo jautājumu 
pasniegšana Latvijas skolās un muzejos.’ Riga: SFL, pp. 12–13.
76 Ibid., pg. 76.
77 Zepa (ed.) (2008), Mēs. Svētki. Valsts, pg. 72.
78 Ibid., pg. 88.
79 Ibid., pg. 17.
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Leo Dribins has argued that in Latvia, “the influence of totalitarian ideology 
has not been overcome when it comes to the elements of people’s memories.”80 
At the same time, however, 60% of Russian and 48% of Latvian respondents 
fully or partly agree with the statement that “it would be better if there was less 
talk in Latvia about historical issues with respect to which unified views do not 
exist in society” (Unpublished data from SKDS). This brings up a question: 
Why are discussions about history so important to people, and what makes 
that so? Participants in discussions most often are motivated not only by the 
desire to establish positive ideas about their ethnic group and its contribution to 
Latvia’s economic and social development, but also by the readiness to empha-
size the losses which have been caused to the group by various political regimes 
and to claim that the group has exclusive political rights. Some respondents 
dispute the legitimacy of the country’s independence and deny that there can 
be ethnic coexistence in Latvia without any conflicts at all. Also of great im-
portance is the fact that many Latvians take an uncritical approach to various 
aspects of history, while the understanding of history among non-Latvians is 
substantially affected by the mass media in Russia. These try to present Latvi-
ans as people who support fascist ideology and have a fascist understanding 
of history (it is important that Russian propaganda still replaces the concept 
of National Socialism with the concept of fascism when discussing Latvia). 
Because the ideas of many non-Latvians in Latvia are based on the influence 
of the Russian media, it is no surprise that these people ignore the importance 
of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact while, at the same time, approving of Soviet 
aggression against Latvia as a means for self-defence.
If there can be questions about the precision of data from sociological 
surveys, then there can be no question about the validity of the results of the 
2009 European Parliament Election. In Latvia’s voting system, people cast 
ballots for a certain party, but they can either place a plus mark next to an 
individual candidate’s name or cross out that name to signify favour or disfa-
vour – these are taken into account when determining which candidates from 
a list have been elected. In the EP election, former Soviet Latvian Communist 
Party leader Alfrēds Rubiks from the Concord Centre party got 66,603 pluses 
and was stricken from the ballot by 8,848 voters. Also on the list was Latvian 
MP Boriss Cilevičs, who received far fewer pluses – 36,358. Euro-MP Tatjana 
Ždanoka from For Human Rights in a United Latvia (FHRUL) got 55,759 
pluses and was stricken 1,049 times.81 231,330 citizens of Latvia voted either 
for Concord Centre or for FHRUL, and only 4% or so struck the names of 
Rubiks and Ždanoka from the ballots. The fact that more than 124,000 voters 
gave pluses to two people who actively fought against the restoration of Latvia’s 
80 Dribins (2008), ‘Latvijas vēstures faktors sabiedrības integrācijas procesā,’ pg. 61.
81 Central Statistical Bureau data. See http://www.cvk.lv/cgi-bin/wdbcgiw/base/eiro9.
Veles9_REZultati.pers_statist?sec=7. 
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independence and gave far fewer pluses to other candidates who did not do 
so – that is an indicator that cannot be falsified, and it should be important both 
to researchers and to the Latvian electorate. 
It can be concluded from all of this that processes of shaping a national 
identity must be viewed critically. The people of Latvia have different views 
about the past,82 as well as the present. Different ethnic groups also have dif-
ferent ideas about the country in which they wish to live. The bottom line is 
that there are substantial differences between the geopolitical identities of the 
various ethnic groups.
Culture
The introduction to the section of Integration Programme devoted to cul-
ture states that it is necessary to increase the state’s care for the preservation, 
study and development of the cultural heritage of Latvians and the country’s 
minority nationalities, to create conditions for integration in the area of cul-
ture, to promote the understanding of the people of Latvia about the cultural 
values of the Latvian nation and the ethnic groups which reside in the country, 
to encourage respect and tolerance toward the cultures of other nations, and 
to encourage all of the people of Latvia to be involved in cultural life.83 Even 
though the programme admits that “the common cultural space has aspects of 
functioning that are typical of it alone, and information about the system, its 
structures and changes therein can be obtained by cultural and sociological 
research,” there have been few studies of this particular aspect of integration, 
and so conclusions must be based on fragmentary data (young people have 
been studied more often, which makes it possible to understand conditions for 
changes in social values).
The main areas of cultural policy have included a more precise identifica-
tion and expansion of cultural rights, improved financing for culture, improve-
ments in the accessibility of culture, increased information about cultural life, 
and expanded cultural dialogue. I believe that the most appropriate allegory in 
describing culture is Janus, the Roman god of doorways and time – a symbol 
of every beginning and every end. Janus is usually portrayed with two faces 
pointing in opposite directions. The suggestion is that he is simultaneously 
looking at the future and the past, while his 365 fingers encircle our present. It 
is important, too, that one of the faces is always that of a youth, while the other 
is that of an old man. Culture, too, is distinctly dual in nature: it is both open 
82 Aivars Tabuns, ‘Comments on David Laitin’s Book.’ In Changing, Overlapping and 
Interacting Identities: Acta Universitatis Latviensis, Vol. 680, “Political Science,” 
pp. 179–181.
83 Ministry of Justice (2001), ‘National Programme on the Integration of Society in Latvia,’ 
pg. 68.
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to the future and locked up in the past in a way that limits freedom. Culture 
can maintain that which is sacred, or it can deny it.84
The idea that Russian culture is under threat is often linked to the idea that 
the everyday use of the Russian language may diminish. Even sociologists 
often fail to distinguish these phenomena. In the study Integration Practice 
and Perspectives, respondents were asked whether the existence of the Russian 
language and culture in Latvia was under threat. 11% of Russian respondents 
said that it is in grave danger, 34% said that it is more threatened than not, 
34% said that it is less threatened, and 17% said that it is not threatened at 
all.85 At the same time, results from surveys and focus group discussions show 
that many Russians perceive Latvians to be a “less important” ethnic group, 
one which does not even have its own culture.86 Faced with the statement that 
“Russian culture is superior to Latvian culture, and so Russians do not have to 
learn the Latvian language,” 16% of respondents whose native language is not 
Latvian agreed fully or in part.87
The same study also offered two other statements which helped to show the 
readiness of Latvians and Russians to accept the other culture. One related to 
the readiness of Latvians to accept multiculturalism: “Latvians must understand 
and accept the fact that there are different ethnic groups in Latvian society, 
including Russians, Belarusians, Ukrainians, Roma, Lithuanians, and others.” 
Most residents of Latvia agree (85% of Latvians and even more non-Latvians 
agree with the statement, while 11% of Latvians do not).88
Culture and traditions as a factor of closeness to Latvia are more important 
among young Latvians than among young Russians (the idea that they are a 
factor of closeness was supported by 31% of Russian and 72% of Latvian young 
people).89 When asked what makes them feel patriotic and proud about Latvia, 
29% of Latvian and 14% of Russian respondents said that it is culture (Unpub-
lished data from SKDS). Young Russians are less likely than young Latvians to 
say that the study and acceptance of Latvian culture is a factor in the shaping 
of civil identity (31% and 73% respectively).90 The majority of young Latvians 
(48%) believe that people who do not accept local traditions and habits cannot 
fully belong to Latvia, while 44% of young Russians disagree.91
84 Aivars Tabuns (2004), ‘Culture and Integration of Society.’ In Cultural Dilemmas During 
Transition: East Central Europe Versus Taiwan. Conference papers. Munster: National 
Science Council of Taiwan and LIT Verlag, pp. 268–269.
85 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pg. 76.
86 Ibid., pg. 78.
87 Ibid., pg. 79.
88 Ibid.
89 Rungule (ed.) (2005), Jauniešu identitātes veidošanās un līdzdalība, pg. 75.
90 Ibid., pg. 76.
91 Ibid.
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The sense of ethnic belonging has a substantial effect on the cultural activi-
ties of just some young people. Far fewer Russian schoolchildren than Latvian 
schoolchildren (5% vs. 16%) sing in a choir or are involved in various extra-
curricular clubs (11% vs. 17%). 54% of Latvian, 52% of Russian, and 49% of 
other non-Latvian young people take part in clubs, cultural groups, etc.92 The 
fact is that quantitative indicators about the cultural activities and consump-
tion of culture in the two largest ethnic groups do not indicate the existence 
of a gap in the terms of the culture of the two. This is seen, for instance, in 
a study on the cultural activities and national integration of young people.93
The Russian language and Latvian language mass media tend mostly to 
reflect the artistic activities of their own ethnolinguistic group. The Russian 
language mass media often present information about the events of other ethnic 
minorities while seldom discussing the cultural activities of young Latvians. 
The Latvian language mass media, for their part, very seldom pay any atten-
tion at all to Ukrainian, Belarusian and other minority cultural activities.94 In 
a study of the two types of newspapers and Internet portals over the course of 
two months in 2005, it was found that nearly 100 cultural events in Liepāja, 
Daugavpils, Jūrmala and Valmiera (all are regional centres) were mentioned, 
but there were only two about which there was information in both the Latvian 
and the Russian language media (a concert staged by a Romani group from 
Lithuania and a reality show produced at the Karosta facilities in Liepāja).95
Even when it comes to the visual arts, there are substantial differences in 
the way in which they are presented in Latvian and Russian news media – this 
despite the fact that there are no linguistic barriers against the perception against 
such artworks.96 The study focused on Russian and Latvian university students 
to analyse their cultural consumption, values, communications and activities, 
finding that students are mostly unified in their interest about Western culture 
(mostly pop culture). Both Latvian and non-Latvian students watch foreign 
films and download foreign music. Young people in both groups praise Western 
musicians, authors and artists, as well as certain Latvian musicians. Latvian 
students are more likely than non-Latvian students to make use of Latvian 
cultural products – they read the works of Latvian authors, listen to the music 
of Latvian musicians and watch films that have been produced in Latvia more 
often than non-Latvians do. At the same time, however, young people in the 
two groups have a fairly different communicative environment, and the same 
is true when it comes to their competence about and interest in cultural life in 
Latvia. Many non-Latvians do not feel competent in evaluating the profession-
92 Ibid., pg. 59.
93 Aivars Tabuns (ed.) (2006), Kultūras. Jaunieši. Mediji. Riga: University of Latvia, Faculty 
of Social Sciences.
94 Ibid.
95 Ibid., pg. 33.
96 Ibid., pp. 38–43.
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alism of Latvian cultural workers, and if they assess it, they are more critical 
than Latvian students are.97
It must be stressed, however, that apart from ethnic music, cultural groups 
are usually not homogeneous in ethnic terms. Some 35% of Russian students 
take part in cultural activities in which the proportion of Latvian participants is 
equal to or exceeds the share of Russian participants. Cultural activities repre-
sent an environment in which young people learn about members of other ethnic 
groups – something that helps them to get rid of mistaken stereotypes.98
At the same time, however, young Russians are considerably less likely to 
take part in the Latvian Song and Dance Festival, to attend concerts and other 
cultural events, or to watch such events on TV.99 Young Russians quite often 
think that the Song Festival is important to foreigners (28% say that it is im-
portant or very important), but they are far less likely to say that it is important 
for non-Latvians (18% say that it is important or very important for Russians, 
and 15% say the same about other nationalities in Latvia). The conclusion here 
is that the integration of society in Latvia is affected more substantially by the 
global cultural arena than by cultural processes which occur in Latvia.
Ethnic Studies
Latvia’s Integration Programme claims that 
 The interest of people in their own ethnic identity will always be a sensi-
tive component in the multi-national Latvian society. Civic integration 
in a democratic nation state relates to ethnic identities. Social integra-
tion can be endangered by ethnic disharmony and conflicts. From the 
perspective of ethnic policy, such tensions and conflicts can be caused 
by two types of causes. First of all, they can be caused by an increased 
sense that Latvian identity is endangered, and secondly, they can be 
caused by members of national minorities who feel that their own ethnic 
identity is under threat. The goal for ethnic policy research is to identify 
and forecast the causes of ethnic disharmony in a timely way so that 
recommendations can be developed on how to prevent them.100
The studies cited in this chapter and many others show that research has 
been the most successful specifically in this sub-section of the Integration 
97 Ibid., pp. 57–70.
98 Ibid., pg. 107.
99 Rungule (ed.) (2005), Jauniešu identitātes veidošanās un līdzdalība, pg. 60.
100 Integration Programme, op. cit., pg. 92.
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Programme,101 although cultural processes and their effects on integration have 
been studied to a lesser degree.
Summary
The authors of a recent study on opposition to social integration believe 
that contradictions among the ethnic groups in Latvia have recently been mani-
fested in several forms – at the symbolic level, in politics, as a result of the 
divided information space, negative interethnic stereotypes, and the increased 
activities of radically nationalist organisations. The authors argue that “the press 
disseminates ideas and views which are in confrontation with the very essence 
of integration.”102 Studies show that many people believe that a greater con-
tribution to social integration is made by people outside of politics – athletes, 
musicians and artists.103
The authors of a study conducted by the Baltic Institute of Social Sciences 
agree: 
 Generally speaking, there are radically different discourses and very 
different collective identities in Latvian language and Russian language 
newspapers, which are read by Russian and Latvian speakers. The sepa-
rate media spaces cause a gap between the two ethnolinguistic groups, 
which makes it more difficult to engage in mutual discussions, exchange 
viewpoints, and shape unified identities. This gap is closely linked to 
the polarization of political identities, because parties, too, represent the 
interests of one group or the other, and the ethnic identities of parties 
dominate over ideological differences related to economic, social and 
other issues. In terms of discourse, people who think differently are 
marginalized in both the Latvian and the Russian language press. These 
people are presented as individuals who do not represent the majority 
view, and the papers do what they can to discredit them as being selfish, 
criminal or radically nationalist.104
Deniss Hanovs and Irina Vinnika have proposed the hypothesis that “trans-
formations in the collective memory of Latvia’s Russian speaking community 
may overcome trends of self-isolation, weaken the idea that the community has 
been alienated, and increase participation in the civil society.”105 The results of 
101 For more on this, see the homepage of the Providus public policy research centre (http://
www2.providus.lv/public/petijumi.html), as well as the homepage of the Latvian Centre for 
Human Rights (http://www.humanrights.org/lv/html/lv/jomas/datu_baze/29355.html). 
102 Dribins (ed.), Pretestība sabiedrības integrācijai, pp. 6 and 26.
103 Ibid., pg. 28.
104 Zepa (ed.) (2006), Integrācijas prakse un perspektīvas, pp. 29–30.
105 Denis Hanovs and Irina Vinnika (2005), ‘Krievvalodīgie Latvijā: diasporas kultūras 
atmiņas saturs un veidošanas tehnoloģijas.’ Proceedings of an international conference, 
Riga: University of Latvia, 2005, pg. 188.
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sociological surveys confirm that there are several issues with respect to which 
Latvians and Russians have fairly different collective memories. It is also true 
that their judgments about historical facts differ significantly.
It was hoped at one time that increased welfare and a more inclusive 
citizenship policy would facilitate consolidation among ethnic communities, 
but integration processes are developing very slowly. There is evidence of the 
mutual isolation of the Russian and the Latvian segments of civil society.106 
The geopolitical self-identification with Latvia is not too extensive among non-
Latvians, but interethnic relationships at the personal level have improved to a 
certain extent. Another positive fact is that “by any standard, racist extremism 
in Latvia has been quite weak” – there are few such organizations in Latvia, 
and support for them amidst the electorate is weak.107 Even though Latvians and 
Russians have different views as to the country’s ethnic policies, moreover, “the 
conflict is not likely to turn violent or create an ethnopolitical crisis.”108
If we take into account the eight potential dimensions for measuring iden-
tity that have been identified by Rawi, Herrera, Johnston and Martin,109 then 
we can conclude that the level of acceptance of other ethnic identities is high 
in all ethnic groups, and government institutions ensure the preservation and 
development of ethnic identity. At the same time, the people of Latvia do not 
agree as to how and whether many different identities can co-exist.110 Most 
people in Latvia think that identities are “chosen,” but they also perceive other 
ethnic groups as being “real.” Each ethnic group says that its identity is one 
about which pride, not shame can be felt. Ethnic hostilities are not common, but 
neither is ethnic favour. Ethnic groups do not issue strict requirements to their 
members – more typical is voluntary ethnic self-isolation (particularly among 
Latvians), as well as symbolic ethnic confrontation. The goals and intentions 
of ethnic groups are disharmonious, but resources brought to bear in addressing 
this fact are not violent.
Latvia’s Integration Programme sought to promote understanding and coop-
eration among individuals and different groups in Latvia, saying that “the goal 
of integration is to establish a democratic and consolidated civil society which 
is based on common fundamental values.”111 Research data do not indicate, 
106 Ivars Ijabs (2006), ‘Russians and Civil Society.’ In Muižnieks N. (ed.), Latvian-Russian 
Relations, pg. 83.
107 Nils Muižnieks (2005), ‘Latvia.’ In Cas Muddle (ed.), Racist Extremism in Central and 
Eastern Europe. London: Routledge, pg. 102.
108 Brigita Zepa and Inese Šūpule (2006), ‘Ethnopolitical Tension in Latvia: Factors Facilitating 
and Impeding Accord.’ In Muižnieks N. (ed.), Latvian-Russian Relations, pg. 83.
109 See Rawi, A., Herrera, Y. M., Johnston, A. I. and T. Martin. “Treating identity…”, op. cit., 
pp. 11–12.
110 Aivars Tabuns (1998), ‘Mūsu mainīgās un daudzveidīgās identitātes,’Diena, 17 January 
1998.
111 Ministry of Justice (2001), ‘National Programme on the Integration of Society in 
Latvia,’ pg. 4.
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however, that the Integration Programme and its instruments have facilitated 
the achievement of these goals very much – integration processes have largely 
been based on the activities of non-political agents, this despite the fact that the 
process has been hindered by the mass media. It is the everyday experience of 
individuals that has served as the foundation for the emergence of ethnic trust 
and integration that is based upon it. 
Greatest Achievement 
The greatest achievement in this area is that all ethnic groups have been 
ensured the opportunity to preserve and develop their identities. Most inhabit-
ants of Latvia are not concerned about losing their ethnic identity. The group 
that does not know the Latvian language at all is slowly decreasing.
Most Serious Problem
Efforts to create a civic/political nation have not been successful – ethnic 
groups still very have divergent notions of the kind of country they would like 
to live in and their geopolitical identities and perceptions of history are starkly 
different, which is furthered by the ethnically segregated party system. 
Most Urgent Task
The most important task in the near future is to promote debate and public 
understanding about ethnic tolerance and respect, a feeling of togetherness and 
the risks of ethnic strategies of self-isolation. To weaken ethnic stereotypes 
and promote a “we” feeling, it is necessary to support the non-segregated and 
non-political activities of cultural, sport, educational, environmental and other 
organizations, as well as intercultural contact and communication. 
Conclusion
Nils Muižnieks
This volume has sought to provide answers to the question posed in the title 
“How integrated is Latvian society?” This question, in turn, contains within 
it several related questions. What do we understand by the term “integrated”? 
How should one measure integration? What are the various factors affecting the 
extent and nature of social integration in Latvia, including the historical legacy, 
government policy, the economic situation, Latvia’s international position, and 
others? What is the overall picture and what are recent trends? 
In seeking to answer these questions, this volume began by delving into the 
intellectual history of the idea of social integration. Most European discourse 
on social integration deals with either immigrant integration or Roma integra-
tion, whereas the Latvian context also requires an approach that captures the 
specific character of ethnopolitical and linguistic disunity bequeathed by Soviet 
rule and, sometimes, exacerbated by Latvian policy. After reviewing social 
theory, human rights approaches and new European policy frameworks, Nils 
Muižnieks identifies the consensus understanding of social integration as being 
a process of unifying society by promoting participation, non-discrimination and 
intercultural contact. He suggests that these three mechanisms are interdepend-
ent and that each has a corollary: participation needs to be supplemented by 
representation, non-discrimination by the pursuit of equality in outcomes, and 
intercultural contact by intercultural competence. While such an approach can 
be extended to encompass “new” migrants and Roma, in the Latvian case, the 
core cleavages generally revolve around differences between ethnic Latvians 
and “old” Russian-speaking Soviet-era migrants and their descendants.
A sound conceptual approach to social integration must be supplemented by 
a nuanced understanding of the Latvian historical and cultural context, which 
is provided by Juris Rozenvalds. Rozenvalds points to a number of legacies – 
from the Soviet era, the period of the “Awakening” in the late 1980s, and the 
early post-independence period in the 1990s – and identifies several lingering 
“habits of mind” which have hindered integration policy development. These 
include the widespread belief in the uniqueness of the Latvian situation and 
an ingrained minority consciousness among Latvians. While the “Awakening” 
period featured inter-ethnic cooperation on the road to independence, Rozen-
valds also highlights the subsequent damage caused by mistakes in citizenship, 
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language and education policy. These mistakes often derived from a lack of 
Latvian elite interest in minority issues, mistrust of minorities and an unwilling-
ness and inability to engage in sustained dialogue. When integration policy was 
adopted, it was a messy compromise formed largely as the result of international 
pressure in a context of crisis. 
Ilona Kunda examines the role of the Society Integration Foundation and 
the impact of the projects it has supported in addressing ethnopolitical and 
linguistic cleavages in society. She notes that the Foundation, which has been 
one of the primary funders of integration-related projects since its creation 
in 2001, is widely recognized as an efficient, transparent and well-governed 
agency. The weaknesses of the Integration Programme as a guide for action 
combined with the desire to develop the Foundation into a serious, but neutral 
money-administering machine prevented it from becoming a pro-active player 
in integration policy development. Inspired by a somewhat misplaced faith in 
the self-organizing capacity of society and its ability to generate integration 
policy solutions “from below,” the Foundation has often supported “monologue” 
projects lacking sustained face-to-face contact between persons belonging to 
different cultural groups. This was not only a politically safe path to tread in 
the political minefield of integration policy, it also reflected the preferences of 
many inhabitants of Latvia, who sought support for maintaining and reproduc-
ing familiar strategies of separation.
Subsequent chapters assess the nature and extent of integration in a wide 
array of life realms: 1) citizenship, participation and representation; 2) the 
labour market; 3) the social sphere of welfare, health, housing and the inte-
gration of ex-prisoners; 4) education; 5) media; and 6) culture, language and 
identity. The chapter authors were provided with suggested indicators reflect-
ing participation and representation, intercultural contact and competence, 
non-discrimination and equality (see the appendix). Moreover, chapter authors 
were asked to identify the greatest achievements, most serious problems and 
most important tasks in their respective policy realms. These can be found at 
the end of each chapter.
In assessing the role of citizenship, participation, and representation in 
integration, Ilze Brands Kehris notes that, with non-citizens still representing 
15% of the population 20 years after independence, it is difficult to claim huge 
progress in political integration. Naturalization rates recently hit an all-time low, 
while failure rates in the naturalization examinations hit record highs. This does 
not reflect any changes in legislation or in the administration of the law, but 
rather the low levels of motivation, scarce resources and limited social capital 
of applicants. Laws excluding certain groups (ex-Soviet military and KGB per-
sonnel) from naturalization and limiting others from standing for office appear 
increasingly anachronistic as immediate post-independence security concerns 
have faded. Minorities are slightly under-represented at the national political 
level and in some local governments, but well-represented in others, e.g., in 
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Riga. With some partial exceptions, political parties remain largely oriented 
towards one ethnolinguistic group and most minority activists and politicians 
perceive their participation as being ineffective in both legislative politics and 
through advisory bodies.
During the economic boom years from 2002 through 2007, the labour 
market was quite successful in promoting the integration of ethnic and linguis-
tic minorities and ethnic disparities in employment and unemployment rates 
largely disappeared. Mihails Hazans demonstrates that the labour shortage led 
to the de facto easing of Latvian language requirements during the boom years, 
which led to many minority workers learning Latvian on the job. Moreover, 
this led to increased inter-ethnic contact in the workplace and a decrease in 
the already modest levels of sectoral and occupational segregation. Latvia has 
only a small ethnic pay and earnings gap, though the gap is more pronounced 
among female public sector workers. The existing survey evidence on labour 
market discrimination suggests that Roma are the group most at risk of dif-
ferential treatment. Unfortunately, the onset of economic crisis in 2008 was 
accompanied by a reversal of previous positive trends in the labour market 
integration of ethnic minorities.
In assessing social policy and integration, Feliciana Rajevska finds that the 
share of the population at risk of poverty is large and growing, but that there 
is no intimate link between ethnicity and poverty. However, she does find that 
ethnic Latvians are better informed about their social rights. In a February 
2009 ruling, the European Court of Human Rights found that Latvia’s pension 
policy has discriminated against some non-citizens (who are almost all members 
of ethnic minorities), in that time worked outside of the territory of Latvia is 
counted in calculating pensions for citizens, but not for non-citizens.1 The pri-
vatization of health care, combined with economic crisis, means that many will 
be unable to afford care and the health situation will deteriorate significantly. 
There is a serious dearth of cheap and social housing. Rates of incarceration 
and recidivism are very high, though the creation of the State Probation Service 
was a step forward.
The link between the education system and integration, as analysed by 
Brigita Zepa, is a complex one. Some progress has been made in overcom-
ing the Soviet legacy of two parallel educational sub-systems operating in the 
Latvian and Russian languages through bilingual education reform, dual-stream 
schools and other strategies. However, a significant share of Latvian and minor-
ity pupils and teachers support separate education, teachers are often unprepared 
to cope with diverse classes and many textbooks are ethnocentric. Participation 
 1  The practice affects 16,850 non-citizen pensioners. See the ruling of the European Court 
of Human Rights in the case Andrejeva vs. Latvia, pg. 16, available at http://cmiskp.echr.
coe.int/tkp197/view.asp?item=1&portal=hbkm&action=html&highlight=55707/00&sessi
onid=28048028&skin=hudoc-en.
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by parents in education policy decision-making is low. According to interna-
tional comparative studies, Latvia’s overall education achievement levels are 
satisfactory, though overall figures mask great diversity within the system and 
significant urban-rural differences. A serious problem is the low quality of 
professional education and the mismatch with the needs of the labour market, 
which hinders subsequent integration into the labour market.  
While separation is sometimes still the norm in education, the same holds 
true in the media world, which is characterized by external diversity (many 
media outlets) and internal uniformity (a lack of diversity in viewpoints within 
media outlets) and limited interaction. The chapter by Ilze Šulmane finds that 
Latvia has two stable, self-sufficient media sub-systems based on the Latvian 
and Russian languages using different sources and featuring divergent content 
and stances towards important aspects of socio-political life, such as history 
and international affairs. While there are examples of audience overlap (the 
newspaper 5min, the internet portal dialogi.lv), the rule is coexistence in parallel 
worlds. With the partial exception of Latvian Radio, the Latvian authorities have 
not exploited the opportunities inherent in public broadcasting to systematically 
inform, involve and entertain minorities in their native languages. While local 
Russian-speakers have wide access to local Russian language media outlets, 
they also use the vast array of media originating in Russia. Smaller non-Russian 
minorities, in turn, have considerably less access to media in their own lan-
guage. Other groups with limited media access include persons living in rural 
or border areas without internet access or public broadcasting coverage, as well 
as the hearing and sight impaired. 
Aivars Tabuns finds a very contradictory situation in the realm of identities, 
ethnic relations, language and culture. On the positive side of the ledger, more 
than three-quarters of both Latvians and minorities believe that ethnic relations 
are satisfactory or good and that ethnic conflict has become less likely over 
time. Latvia has relatively high and stable rates of ethnic intermarriage, while 
studies find that ethnic distance is not very great. Latvian language knowledge 
among Russian-speakers has improved significantly since independence. These 
positive characteristics, however, are accompanied by more negative ones: 
persistent threat perceptions among both Latvians and minorities about their 
identities, continued use of Russian as the “language of interethnic communica-
tion,” a very weak sense of attachment to Latvia by Russian-speakers and deep 
differences in geopolitical identities. 
Thus, the overall picture and recent trends are very contradictory, with 
elements of separation, marginalization and integration within each of the life 
realms. Latvia has become more integrated in some realms (Latvian language 
knowledge, progress towards a unified education system), but the economic 
crisis has set back progress in other realms (the labour market, social policy). 
Patterns of separation and exclusion in the media and in public and political life 
are stable and deep-rooted. In analysing the situation in different life realms, 
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the authors generally employed the triadic framework of analysis stressing non-
discrimination, intercultural contact, and participation. Some chapter authors 
were able to find the suggested data for most of the suggested indicators (e.g., 
Mihails Hazans on the labour market and Ilze Šulmane on the media). How-
ever, other authors (e.g., Feliciana Rajevska on social policy and integration) 
were clearly asked to accomplish an unrealistic task, given the frequent lack of 
disaggregated data and space constraints. Several chapter authors present only 
limited data on perceptions of policy, participation opportunities or inequali-
ties in their respective realms and the existence and effectiveness of advocacy 
groups. Often, such data are simply not available. 
With the liquidation of a separate ministry responsible for integration in 
2009, a small department (6 persons) within the Ministry of Justice and the 
Society Integration Foundation are all that remain in integration policy-making 
in 2010 outside specialized units within sectoral ministries. As has been the case 
since the beginning of policy dialogue on integration in the late 1990s, political 
disagreements continue to hamper the adoption of a (new) policy document to 
guide decision-making and frame public debate. While waiting for the policy 
elite to come to a new consensus, the Society Integration Foundation could 
make internal changes to ensure that projects it supports more often contain an 
element of inter-ethnic contact and cooperation. Another institution – the Om-
budsman’s Office – has not been a player in integration policy, though its role 
as Latvia’s equality body gives it the potential to assume a more active stance 
by commissioning research on discrimination, reviewing complaints, conducting 
public awareness raising campaigns, and providing policy advice.2
There are risks inherent in the current integration policy drift.3 The Latvian 
state and its representatives have largely withdrawn from the integration policy 
field - no agreement has been reached on a new policy document after several 
years of debate, institutions responsible for integration are being done away 
with one after another (the latest casualty of budget cuts has been the Natu-
ralization Board), government money is no longer being allocated to NGOs in 
general and minority NGOs in particular, and an increasing number of Latvian 
politicians refuse to speak Russian in public. At the same time, the Russian 
Federation has become much more active in seeking to win the hearts and minds 
of Russian-speakers in general and non-citizens in particular. The Russian gov-
ernment has adopted several policy documents in the realm of “compatriots” 
 2  See the Ombudsman’s home page at www.tiesibsargs.lv. On the role of equality bodies in 
Europe more generally, see Rikki Hotlmaat (2006), Catalysts for Change? Equality bodies 
according to Direcitve 2000/43/EC – existence, independence and effectiveness. Brussels: 
European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs and Equal Opportunities. 
 3  For an elaboration of various future scenarios, including “disintegration,” see Nils Muižnieks 
(2008), ‘Ethnic Relations in Latvia in 2020: Three Scenarios.’ In Žaneta Ozoliņa and Inga 
Ulnicāne-Ozoliņa (eds.), Latvija 2020: Nākotnes izaicinājumi sabiedrībai un valstij. Riga: 
LU Akadēmiskais apgāds, pp. 155–172. 
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policy, created new institutions to implement them, and allocated increasing 
amounts of funding to diaspora NGOs and Russian diaspora media, including in 
Latvia.4 As a result, in 2009, for the first time since the early 1990s, the Russian 
ambassador to Latvia was able to report that the number of Latvian non-citizens 
to apply for Russian citizenship (about 4000) exceeded that applying for Latvian 
citizenship.5 Latvia needs to “restart” its integration policy. 
A “restarted” integration policy would need to take several circumstances 
into account.  For one, effective, targeted policy measures require data disag-
gregated by ethnicity, native language, citizenship, gender, age, and region.6 The 
planned 2011 census will provide a good opportunity not only for data collec-
tion, but also for public debate about the use of simplistic categories that do not 
always reflect many people’s identities. Furthermore, new policy documents and 
policy initiatives need to envision a Latvia that is not only losing many people 
to outmigration, but that is also attracting labour migrants, asylum-seekers and 
refugees. As argued in other research, Latvia needs to craft social integration 
policy with a view to immigrant and refugee integration as well.7 Otherwise, 
new European integration problems will compound old integration challenges 
bequeathed by Soviet rule. Latvian society is not very integrated now, but the 
lack of policy and future migration in this policy vacuum could undermine 
progress already made.
 
 4  For a historical overview of Russian policy towards the diaspora in Latvia, see Nils 
Muižnieks (2006), ‘Russian Foreign Policy Towards ‘Compatriots’ in Latvia.’ In Nils 
Muižnieks (ed.), Latvian-Russian Relations: Domestic and International Dimensions. 
Riga: University of Latvia Press, pp. 119–130; for  recent developments see Gatis Pelnēns 
(ed.) (2009), The ‘Humanitarian Dimension’ of Russian Foreign Policy Toward Georgia, 
Moldova, Ukraine, and the Baltic States. Riga: SIA Apgāds “Mantojums”, pp. 137–190.
 5  See the interview with Russian ambassador to Latvia Aleksandr Veshnakov in Baltic 
News Service, 7 January 2010, ‘Vešnakovs: krīzes smagums Latvijā ir pat lielāks nekā 
Krievijā.’
 6  On the importance of such data and obstacles to collecting it, see Patrick Simon (2007), 
‘Ethnic’ statistics and data protection in the Council of Europe countries. Strasbourg: 
Council of Europe, ECRI, and European Commission, DG Employment, Social Affairs 
and Equal Opportunities (2006), European handbook on equality data. Brussels: European 
Commission. 
 7  See Dace Akule (ed.) (2008), Learning to welcome: the integration of immigrants in Latvia 
and Poland. Riga: Providus; Nils Muižnieks (ed.) (2009), Immigrant Integration in Latvia. 
ASPRI Working Paper No. 1, September 2009, Riga: ASPRI, available at http://www.szf.
lu.lv/eng/petnieciba/sppi-instituts/petijumipublikacijas/working-paper/; and Brigita Zepa 
and Inese Šūpule (eds.) (2009), Imigranti Latvijā: Iekļaušanās iespējas un nosacījumi. 
Riga: BSZI. 
Draft Integration Indicators
Ilona Kunda and Nils Muižnieks
Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Citizenship, 
representation, 
defence of 
interests
1. The phenomenon as 
a whole: where is there 
inequality?
What is the proportion of 
citizens and non-citizens? 
(trends, reasons)
To what extent are minorities 
and women represented in the 
structures of power? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon
To what extent is there 
dissatisfaction with one’s 
citizenship status?
How many naturalization 
applicants pass the 
examination on the first try?
Are there disparities between 
citizens and non-citizens, 
ethnicities and genders in 
trust in government? 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks 
Who wants to naturalize 
but cannot? Are there social 
groups without any NGOs? 
1. The phenomenon as a whole: 
is there contact? 
To what extent are mechanisms 
of participation (parties, NGOs) 
multiethnic or mono-ethnic?
How intensively do mono-ethnic 
parties and NGOs engage in 
contact with others? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon 
How great is ethnic distance? 
In which realms is there 
cooperation and the lack thereof? 
What are the consequences? 
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks 
How serious a problem is 
extremism – individuals and 
groups that are non-democratic 
and deny equality? 
1. The phenomenon as 
a whole: what are the 
most important forms 
of participation? 
To what extent are 
individuals involved 
in NGOs? Political 
parties? How actively 
do citizens participate 
in elections?
Have other modes of 
participation become 
more important?
2. Quality of the 
phenomenon 
To what extent are 
people satisfied 
with their ability to 
influence decisions?
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks 
What are the major 
barriers to participation 
and advocacy? Which 
groups are in the 
most disadvantaged 
position? 
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Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Economic 
participation 
(employment)
1. The Phenomenon as a 
whole
What is the share of those 
employed? 
What is the level of 
unemployment? 
Are there significant 
differences on the basis of 
region, ethnicity, gender, age? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon 
How many working people 
are below the poverty line? 
To what extent are people 
with disabilities employed? 
To what extent are youth 
employed?
What is the average 
difference in wages between 
women and men? 
Do people think that all have 
equal opportunities in the 
labour market? 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks
Who are the long-term 
unemployed?
1. The Phenomenon as a whole
To what extent is there ethnic 
segmentation in the labour 
market by profession or sector? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon 
With whom do people not want 
to work? Whom do they not want 
to hire? 
How many people could not 
work in a job requiring Latvian 
language skills? 
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks
What is the level of employment 
among Roma and immigrants? 
1. The Phenomenon as 
a whole
To what extent 
do trade unions 
and professional 
associations include 
those employed? 
2. Quality of the 
phenomenon 
To what extent 
do inhabitants 
trust trade unions 
and professional 
associations? 
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks 
Are there sectors/
professions in which 
there is no organized 
advocacy or interest 
representation?
Poverty Gini coefficient
How many people are below 
the poverty threshold (by 
region, gender, age, ethnicity, 
etc.)
To what extent are the poor 
concentrated in a district or 
region? 
To what extent are 
poor people organized 
to defend their 
interests?
To what extent does 
the public support such 
activities?
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Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Social 
security 
(housing, 
health, social 
protection)
1. The Phenomenon as 
a whole: where is there 
inequality?
Is there equal access to social 
protection? 
Is there equal access to 
housing and health care? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon
To what extent is accessibility 
guaranteed to the disabled?
To what extent are 
risk groups provided 
with alternatives to 
institutionalized care?
To what extent are the 
specific health care needs of 
old people, youth, and women 
met? 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks 
Are persons of a certain 
ethnic group or gender 
overrepresented in risk 
groups? 
1. The Phenomenon as a whole: 
is there contact?
To what extent are certain groups 
(people with a certain illness, 
risk children, old people, etc.) 
segregated from society?
To what extent is there ethnic 
segregation in the housing 
market?
2. Quality of the phenomenon
Which are the groups people do 
not want to have as neighbours?
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks
To what extent are social risks 
passed on from generation to 
generation?
Are certain ethnic groups over-
represented among offenders/
prisoners?
1. The Phenomenon as 
a whole 
Is there advocacy 
or interest group 
representation in these 
spheres?
2. Quality of the 
phenomenon 
How does the public 
perceive activists in 
these realms? 
Do the advocates feel 
they are effective?
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks 
Which groups do 
not have any interest 
representation?
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Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Education 1. The Phenomenon as a 
whole: is there inequality?
To what extent is education 
equally accessible to all? 
How many young people fall 
out of the education system? 
What is the percentage of 
youth with a low level of 
basic skills? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon
To what extent are students 
satisfied with the quality 
of education? With the 
regulation of language use in 
the education system? With 
their career opportunities 
after school?
 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks
Who are those who leave 
school early? What is the 
background (by region, native 
language, etc.) of youth with 
low levels of basic skills?
1. The Phenomenon as a whole: 
is there contact?
What is the ethnic and social 
make-up of students at various 
levels of education?
What is the share of dual stream 
institutions?
2. Quality of the phenomenon 
Do Latvian and minority schools 
have any contact? 
To what extent do schools teach 
civic education and intercultural 
competence? 
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks
How serious a problem in 
schools is violence based on 
ethnicity, language or other 
grounds?
1. The Phenomenon 
as a whole: is there 
participation?
To what extent do 
parents participate in 
decision-making?
To what extent is 
internal democracy 
(self-government, etc.)
developed in schools?
2. Quality of the 
phenomenon
To what extent are 
parents and youth 
satisfied with their 
ability to influence 
decisions?
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks
Are there groups about 
whom decisions are 
taken without any 
consultation?
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Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Media and 
Information
1. The Phenomenon as a 
whole
To what extent is there equal 
access to ICT and the media 
(the press, radio, TV, the 
Internet, telephone service)?
2. Quality of the phenomenon
To what extent do public 
radio and television reflect 
the diversity of society? 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks
To what extent are 
stereotypes prevalent in 
the media? Against which 
groups? 
How frequent is incitement to 
hatred?
1. The Phenomenon as a whole
To what extent do the media 
audiences of Latvian and other 
language outlets overlap?
To what extent are there 
discussions in the media between 
different language groups?
To what extent have journalists 
working in different language 
media united in professional 
associations? 
2. Quality of the phenomenon
To what extent do people 
believe that the media promote 
understanding between people? 
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks
How many people live outside 
of Latvia’s information 
environment?
1.The Phenomenon as 
a whole
To what extent do the 
media promote civic 
participation? 
2. Quality of the 
phenomenon
To what extent do 
people trust the media? 
To what extent do 
people believe that the 
media are a serious 
social force? 
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks
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Equal rights in the relevant 
area of life (non-discrimination, 
recognition)
Contact between various social 
groups
Participation, 
involvement, shared 
responsibility, influence 
on public affairs
Culture, 
Language, 
Identity
1. The Phenomenon as a 
whole
To what extent is there equal 
access to culture: what is 
the average cost of a book, a 
theatre ticket, museum entry 
in relation to the minimum 
wage? How often do cultural 
events take place nearby in 
various regions, in the city/
countryside?
To what extent are there equal 
opportunities to preserve and 
develop all the cultures in 
the country (through specific 
cultural events, museums, 
publications, etc.) at the local, 
regional and national levels? 
To what extent does cultural 
policy satisfy the cultural 
needs of all inhabitants?
2. The quality of the 
phenomenon
What is the share of people 
who believe that government 
policy does not pose a threat 
to their identity? What is the 
share of people who believe 
that other groups do not pose 
a threat to their identity? To 
what extent are minorities 
satisfied with language 
policy? 
3. Most vulnerable groups 
and risks
How many people cannot 
speak in the state language?
 Which groups feel 
stigmatized because of their 
identity?
1. The Phenomenon as a whole
What is the share of mixed 
marriages?
To what extent do issues of 
history divide Latvian society? 
What is the share of public 
intercultural events? What 
is the rate of participation in 
intercultural events?
How accessible are places/centres 
were intercultural dialogue can 
take place on a regular basis? 
How regularly do public 
discussions take place on 
language, culture and identity?
2. The quality of the phenomenon
What is the share of inhabitants 
who believe that minority culture 
is part of Latvia’s cultural 
heritage? That it should be 
funded from the state budget? 
What is the share of people who 
feel a sense of belonging to more 
than one culture? 
What is the share of persons 
belonging to a minority who feel 
a sense of belonging to Latvia? 
(by age group)
What is the share of people who 
can freely use two or more local 
languages? How many people do 
not know Latvian and Russian? 
3. Most vulnerable groups and 
risks
What is the share of inhabitants 
who believe that there are 
insurmountable differences in 
values in society?
1. The Phenomenon as 
a whole
What is the share 
of inhabitants who 
participate in amateur 
cultural events?
Are there social 
initiatives to defend or 
develop languages or 
cultures? 
2. The quality of the 
phenomenon
To what extent are 
inhabitants satisfied 
with their ability to 
influence cultural 
(language, history) 
policy? 
3. Most vulnerable 
groups and risks
Are persons belonging 
to certain cultures or 
identities excluded 
from activities in the 
public sphere?
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